Mattie P. Biddix, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 29, 2002
01994837 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 29, 2002)

01994837

01-29-2002

Mattie P. Biddix, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Mattie P. Biddix v. United States Postal Service

01994837

January 29, 2002

.

Mattie P. Biddix,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01994837

Agency No. 1C-431-0009-98

Hearing No. 220-98-5270X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final

decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant was discriminated

against on the basis of disability (arthritis in neck and back and carpal

tunnel syndrome of the left wrist) when she was denied end tour overtime

because she was on light duty on the following dates: October 2-6, 9-13,

16-20, 23-27, 30-31, 1997; November 1-3, 6-10, 13-14, 22-24, 28-29,

1997; and December 5-7, 12, 1997.

BACKGROUND

The record reflects that complainant worked as a part time flexible

(PTF) mail processor in pay location 114 in the 030 manual unit on light

duty at the agency's Columbus, Ohio Processing & Distribution Center.

Effective November 22, 1997, she became a full time flexible mail

processor in pay location 111.

In July 1997, complainant presented the agency with documentation from

her physician requesting light duty due to numbness in her hand and arm.

Complainant's restrictions included bending and repetitive grabbing

motions with her left hand. The record reflects that the agency placed

complainant on light duty at that time.

Complainant averred that, on August 7, 1997, her supervisor (the

Supervisor) advised her that she was not allowed to work overtime because

she was on light duty. Complainant noted that other light duty employees

in her unit were allowed to work overtime. The record reveals that, on

or about August 7, 1997, the agency made the decision with respect to the

030 unit to utilize PTFs only after exhausting the overtime desired list.

The Supervisor admitted that he informed complainant that she was not

allowed to work overtime. The Supervisor explained that, in order to

reduce his overtime usage, he told the manual unit supervisors that the

light duty PTF mail processors (the light duty PTFs) in pay location

114 could not work overtime. He scheduled a five day work week for the

light duty PTFs because they were unable to work the overtime needed in

the automation unit, and his goal was to reduce the usage of overtime

hours.<1> The Supervisor averred that, to his knowledge, none of the

other PTFs from pay location 114 were working overtime in the 030 unit.

The Supervisor maintained that, after complainant became a full time

flexible mail processor, the outgoing unit would not utilize her because

she was on the pay location 111 overtime desired list.

The Distribution Operations Manager (the Manager) averred that the agency

did not allow complainant to work end tour overtime from October 2,

1997 through November 12, 1997 because complainant could not work on

the machine in the automation unit. The Manager further stated that

she told her managers to control the use of overtime in their units

and advised them that the light duty PTFs in pay location 114 should be

assigned overtime after the overtime desired list full time employees.

Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on January 20,

1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced

above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a

copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ assumed arguendo, that complainant established a prima facie case

of disability discrimination, and concluded that the agency articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The AJ found

that complainant was denied end tour overtime based on business reasons

regarding the control and usage of overtime hours, specifically, she

was not on the overtime desired list and her restrictions prevented

her from working on the machines. The AJ noted that complainant worked

some end tour overtime during the relevant period and that she worked

a comparable number of end tour overtime hours as the two light duty

employees she cited as comparators.<2> The AJ determined that complainant

failed to show that the agency's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was

pretext for discrimination. The agency's April 14, 1999 final decision

implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends that: (1) the witnesses she identified

were not interviewed by the investigator; (2) the Supervisor said that

no one on light and/or limited duty would be assigned overtime; and (3)

other units allowed light and/or limited duty employees to work overtime.

The agency makes no statement on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ

may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that

the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced

the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Although complainant

argues that the witnesses she identified were not interviewed by the

investigator, the record reflects that she failed to provide statements

from her witnesses to the AJ or to the Commission. We further note that,

while other units may have allowed light and/or limited duty employees

to work overtime, complainant has failed to show that her unit's stated

business reasons were untrue. Complainant has failed to present evidence

that any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward complainant's disability. Therefore, we discern no basis to

disturb the AJ's decision.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 29, 2002

__________________

Date

1 The record reflects that PTFs were not contractually entitled to

overtime work.

2 The record reflects that the named comparator who worked more end tour

overtime than complainant did so without agency authorization.