01994837
01-29-2002
Mattie P. Biddix, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Mattie P. Biddix v. United States Postal Service
01994837
January 29, 2002
.
Mattie P. Biddix,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01994837
Agency No. 1C-431-0009-98
Hearing No. 220-98-5270X
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final
decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final
decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant was discriminated
against on the basis of disability (arthritis in neck and back and carpal
tunnel syndrome of the left wrist) when she was denied end tour overtime
because she was on light duty on the following dates: October 2-6, 9-13,
16-20, 23-27, 30-31, 1997; November 1-3, 6-10, 13-14, 22-24, 28-29,
1997; and December 5-7, 12, 1997.
BACKGROUND
The record reflects that complainant worked as a part time flexible
(PTF) mail processor in pay location 114 in the 030 manual unit on light
duty at the agency's Columbus, Ohio Processing & Distribution Center.
Effective November 22, 1997, she became a full time flexible mail
processor in pay location 111.
In July 1997, complainant presented the agency with documentation from
her physician requesting light duty due to numbness in her hand and arm.
Complainant's restrictions included bending and repetitive grabbing
motions with her left hand. The record reflects that the agency placed
complainant on light duty at that time.
Complainant averred that, on August 7, 1997, her supervisor (the
Supervisor) advised her that she was not allowed to work overtime because
she was on light duty. Complainant noted that other light duty employees
in her unit were allowed to work overtime. The record reveals that, on
or about August 7, 1997, the agency made the decision with respect to the
030 unit to utilize PTFs only after exhausting the overtime desired list.
The Supervisor admitted that he informed complainant that she was not
allowed to work overtime. The Supervisor explained that, in order to
reduce his overtime usage, he told the manual unit supervisors that the
light duty PTF mail processors (the light duty PTFs) in pay location
114 could not work overtime. He scheduled a five day work week for the
light duty PTFs because they were unable to work the overtime needed in
the automation unit, and his goal was to reduce the usage of overtime
hours.<1> The Supervisor averred that, to his knowledge, none of the
other PTFs from pay location 114 were working overtime in the 030 unit.
The Supervisor maintained that, after complainant became a full time
flexible mail processor, the outgoing unit would not utilize her because
she was on the pay location 111 overtime desired list.
The Distribution Operations Manager (the Manager) averred that the agency
did not allow complainant to work end tour overtime from October 2,
1997 through November 12, 1997 because complainant could not work on
the machine in the automation unit. The Manager further stated that
she told her managers to control the use of overtime in their units
and advised them that the light duty PTFs in pay location 114 should be
assigned overtime after the overtime desired list full time employees.
Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on January 20,
1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced
above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a
copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ assumed arguendo, that complainant established a prima facie case
of disability discrimination, and concluded that the agency articulated
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The AJ found
that complainant was denied end tour overtime based on business reasons
regarding the control and usage of overtime hours, specifically, she
was not on the overtime desired list and her restrictions prevented
her from working on the machines. The AJ noted that complainant worked
some end tour overtime during the relevant period and that she worked
a comparable number of end tour overtime hours as the two light duty
employees she cited as comparators.<2> The AJ determined that complainant
failed to show that the agency's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was
pretext for discrimination. The agency's April 14, 1999 final decision
implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant contends that: (1) the witnesses she identified
were not interviewed by the investigator; (2) the Supervisor said that
no one on light and/or limited duty would be assigned overtime; and (3)
other units allowed light and/or limited duty employees to work overtime.
The agency makes no statement on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to
affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.
In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ
may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that
the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced
the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Although complainant
argues that the witnesses she identified were not interviewed by the
investigator, the record reflects that she failed to provide statements
from her witnesses to the AJ or to the Commission. We further note that,
while other units may have allowed light and/or limited duty employees
to work overtime, complainant has failed to show that her unit's stated
business reasons were untrue. Complainant has failed to present evidence
that any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus
toward complainant's disability. Therefore, we discern no basis to
disturb the AJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
January 29, 2002
__________________
Date
1 The record reflects that PTFs were not contractually entitled to
overtime work.
2 The record reflects that the named comparator who worked more end tour
overtime than complainant did so without agency authorization.