Matthew Ocko

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 7, 2020

2019006159 (P.T.A.B. May. 7, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/895,731 09/30/2010 Matthew Ocko ZYNGP005 8261
101444 7590 05/07/2020
MPG, LLP and Zynga Inc.
710 Lakeway Drive, Suite 200
Sunnyvale, CA 94085
EXAMINER
EVANS, KIMBERLY L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/07/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MATTHEW OCKO
___________

Appeal 2019-006159
Application 12/895,731
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR. and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 is appealing the final rejection of claims 1–11, 13–18, 20
and 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 2. Claims 1, 8, and 15
are independent. Claims 12, 19 and 21 are cancelled. Appeal Brief 29, 32.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Zynga Inc., as the real party in interest.
Appeal Brief 4.
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Introduction
According to Appellant, the invention is directed to “apparatuses,
methods, and systems for user online behavior monitoring.” Specification
¶ 5.
[T]o process a virtual security clearance request, the OBM
[Online Behavior Monitor] may obtain user online gaming
pattern data including gaming actions and their associated
timestamps, user online social activities and their associated
timestamps; sand virtual security clearance evaluation rules. The
OBM may generate a social-gaming activity timeline using the
gaming actions, social activities and timestamps. By applying the
virtual security clearance evaluation rules to the social-gaming
activity timeline, the OBM may calculate evaluation scores. The
OBM may compare the evaluation scores to the evaluation score
thresholds to generate virtual security clearance flags, and may
determine whether any virtual security clearance flags were
generated based on the comparison. The OBM may, upon
determining that no virtual security clearance flags were
generated, obtain user online gaming action input and user
gaming environment data, and generate updated user gaming
environment data using the user online gaming action input.

Specification ¶ 8 (Emphasis added).
[A] customer service request evaluator 205 may monitor the
social activity of various users of a social networking application
103a and/or an online gaming application 103b to determine if a
user’s 201a customer service request 202e is legitimate and/or if
the user 201a can be trusted 204a.

Specification ¶ 39.

Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (bracketed step lettering
added):
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Representative Claim2
1. A processor-implemented customer service request evaluation
method, comprising:

[a] obtaining a customer service request from a user that currently
plays an online game over a gaming social network, wherein the user is
authorized to play the online game, wherein the customer service request
comprises a gaming input for the online game provided by the user when
playing the online game;

[b] obtaining, for processing the customer service request, at least:
user social data including graph data identifying co-users that
currently play the online game, social networking actions of the user
and the co-users performed in a social network separate from the
gaming social network and associated social networking action
timestamps, the social networking actions performed separate from
the gaming social network, wherein the social networking actions and
social networking action timestamps are obtained from a social
network server accessed through an application program interface
(API), wherein the gaming social network operates separate from the
social network;

online game actions of the user and the co-users and associated
game action timestamps, wherein the online game actions and the
game action timestamps are obtained from a gaming database
associated with the gaming social network; and

customer service request evaluation rules and associated
customer request evaluation score thresholds that relate to predefined
suspicious online social behavior by the user, wherein the rules and
thresholds are obtained from an evaluation rules database;

2 For the § 101 rejection, Appellant argues claims 1–11, 13–18, 20 and 22–
24 as a group, focusing on subject matter common to independent claims 1,
8 and 15. See Appeal Brief 4–10. We select independent claim 1 as
representative of Appellant’s arguments for the § 101 rejection of claims 1–
11, 13–18, 20 and 22–24. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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[c] generating, in response to the customer service request, social-
gaming activity timelines for each of the user and the co-users using the
online game actions of the user and the co-users and the associated game
action timestamps, as well as the social networking actions of the user and
the co-users and the associated social networking action timestamps;

[d] generating a social-gaming activity thread for the user using the
social-gaming activity timelines for the user and the co-users, the co-users
being at whom the activities of the user were directed, the social-gaming
activity thread including social and gaming behaviors of the user, and social
and gaming behaviors between the user and the co-users, wherein the social-
gaming activity thread correlates one or more social networking actions of
the user and co-users with one or more online game actions of the user and
the co-users based on related game action timestamps and social networking
action timestamps in the social-gaming activity timelines for the user and the
co-users;

[e] calculating customer service request evaluation rule scores by
applying the customer service request evaluation rules to the generated
social-gaming activity thread for the user;

[f] detecting fraud by the user by comparing each customer service
request evaluation rule score to its associated customer request evaluation
score threshold to generate rule violation flags; and

[g] processing the customer service request when rule violation flags
were not generated.

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References
Name3 Reference Date
Thatcher US 6,954,860 B1 October 11, 2005
Cottrell US 2009/0208181 A1 August 20, 2009
Lester US 2009/0265198 A1 October 22, 2009
Scipioni US 2010/0010823 A1 January 14, 2010
Allen US 2012/0202587 A1 August 9, 2012

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–11, 13–18, 20 and 22–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent–ineligible subject
matter. Final Action 9–14.
Claims 1–3, 5, 8–10, 15–17 and 22–24 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Allen, Cottrell and Lester.
Final Action 14–27.
Claims 4, 11 and 18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Allen, Cottrell, Lester and Thatcher. Final
Action 28–29.
Claims 6, 7, 13, 14 and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Allen, Cottrell, Lester and Scipioni.
Final Action 29–31.

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update4 at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
2019 Revised Guidance at 52–55.

4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance at 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance at 52–56.

ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate Appellant’s arguments and the Examiner’s
determinations, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed February 7, 2019), the
Reply Brief (filed August 13, 2019), the Final Action (mailed August 23,
2018) and the Answer (mailed June 13, 2019), for the respective details.

35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines the claims are directed to patent ineligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Final Action 9 (“Claims 1–11,
13–18, 20,
and 22–24 are directed to the abstract idea for processing a customer service
request and monitoring online gaming behavior.”); see Alice, 573 U.S. at
217 (describing the two–step framework “for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts”).
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We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as
our own. We add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification
with respect to the Revised Guidance.

Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Step 2A, Prong One
The Examiner determines, in the Answer, after the publishing of the
2019 Revised Guidance, “The steps of obtaining, generating, calculating,
detecting and processing are not meaningfully different than the patent
ineligible concepts found in the [2019 Revised Guidance at 52] and the
organizing human activity group of abstract ideas in the MPEP
2106.04(a)(II). Thus, the claim recites an abstract idea.” Answer 9.
Appellant contends:
[T]he claims are not directed to “certain methods of organizing
human interactions, such as fundamental economic practices
[implementing] commercial and legal interactions; managing
relationships or interactions between people; and advertising,
marketing, and sales activities,” as provided in the 101
Guidelines. In particular, the claims are directed to managing an
online game by processing a customer service request using
information gathered both gaming activity and social network
activity. However, the claimed embodiments are not directed to
managing relationships or interactions between people, but
managing the online game by determining whether to process the
customer service request. Because the claims do not recite one
of the enumerated and categorized judicial exceptions, “then
the 101 analysis is essentially concluded and the [claims are]
eligible,” as provided in the guidance. No additional analysis
under Section 101 is necessary.

Appeal Brief 13.
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The Specification discloses:
The OBM may calculate customer service request evaluation rule
scores by applying the customer service request evaluation rules
to the social-gaming activity thread, and compare each customer
service request evaluation rule score to its associated request
evaluation score threshold to generate request evaluation flags.
The OBM may determine whether to process the customer
service request based on whether any request evaluation flags
were generated.

Specification ¶ 9 (Emphasis added).
Claim 1 recites a customer service request evaluation method
“wherein the customer service request comprises a gaming input for the
online game provided by the user when playing the online game.” Claim 1
recites obtaining a user’s social data identifying co-users that currently play
the online game, as well as, other data that identifies actions related to social
networking and timestamps in limitations [a] and [b] for processing the
customer service request. Claim 1 further recites generating timelines for
users and generating a social-gaming activity thread that includes the social
and gaming behaviors of the users in limitations [c] and [d]. Claim 1 recites
applying customer service request rules to calculate the customer service
request score to be used in detecting user’s fraud before processing the
customer service request in limitations [e]-[g].
These steps are tantamount to managing personal behavior or
relationships or
interactions between people (including social activities and following rules
or instructions); thus, the claim recites the abstract idea of “certain methods
of organizing human activity.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, Section I
(Groupings of Abstract Ideas); see also Answer 9. Our reviewing court has
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found claims to be directed to abstract ideas when they recited similar
subject matter. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335,
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that “[s]tanding alone, the act of
providing someone an additional set of information without disrupting the
ongoing provision of an initial set of information is an abstract idea,”
observing that the district court “pointed to the nontechnical human activity
of passing a note to a person who is in the middle of a meeting or
conversation as further illustrating the basic, longstanding practice that is the
focus of the [patent ineligible] claimed invention.”); Voter Verified, Inc. v.
Election Systems & Software, LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(finding the concept of “voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote
for tabulation,” a “fundamental activity” that humans have performed for
hundreds of years, to be an abstract idea); In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that “[a]pplicants’ claims, directed to rules for
conducting a wagering game” are abstract). Therefore, we conclude the
claims recite an abstract idea pursuant to Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019
Revised Guidance. See 2019 Revised Guidance, Section III(A)(1) (Prong
One: Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception)).

Step 2A, Prong Two
Under Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we must determine
“whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception.” 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2). It is noted that a “claim that integrates a judicial
exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial
exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
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exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019 Revised Guidance, Section
III(A)(2).
Appellant argues:
[T]he claimed embodiments provide a specific improvement to
the computer-related technological process of detecting fraud in
online gaming by encompassing a wider range of detectable
fraudulent activity (e.g., fraudulent activity occurring between a
user and co-users playing an online game, wherein the activity
occurs in a social network that is separate from the gaming social
network) when collecting and analyzing social networking
actions and online gaming actions of the user and co-users. That
is, the claimed embodiments include an additional element that
may have integrated the exception into a practical application.

Reply Brief 4.
We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive because Appellant does
not indicate additional elements that integrates the “recited judicial
exception into a practical application of the exception.” See 2019 Revised
Guidance, Section III(A)(2)(“If the additional elements do
not integrate the exception into a practical application, then the claim is
directed to the judicial exception (Step 2A: YES), and requires further
analysis under Step 2B (where it may still be eligible if it amounts to an
inventive concept).”
In McRO6, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” through the “use[] [of]

6 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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limited rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result in conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators; and the rules are limiting because they define morph
weight sets as a function of phoneme sub–sequences. McRO, 837 F.3d at
1313 (internal citations omitted).
We find no evidence of record here that the present situation is like the
one in McRO where computers were previously unable to make certain
subjective determinations, i.e., regarding morph weight and phoneme
timings, which could only be made prior to the claimed invention by human
animators. See Reply Brief 4; Specification 39, Figure 2. The Background
section of the McRO ‘576 patent includes a description of the admitted prior
art method and the shortcomings associated with that prior method. See
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303–06. There is no comparable discussion in
Appellant’s Specification or elsewhere of record. Put another way, we do
not agree that the purported improvements to the fraud detection process are
improvements to technology as a whole. The improvements, at best, are
improvements to the abstract idea. Although step [f] recites comparing a
rule score to a score threshold, we do not determine this to be like McRO
where computers where previously unable to perform fraud detection.
Additionally, we detect no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in Appellant’s representative claim 1 that integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2). For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements
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(e.g., processor, network) do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer
or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except
for a generic computer device); (3) do not effect a transformation of a
particular article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See
MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues:
[T]he Examiner’s Answer in the last paragraph addressing Step
2A, Prong Two provided that “simply implementing the abstract
idea on a generic computer is not a practical application of the
abstract idea. Thus, even when viewed as a whole, nothing in the
claim adds significantly more (i.e. an inventive concept) to the
abstract idea.” (Emphasis Added) (See page 16 of Examiner’s
Answer). It appears that the analysis in the Examiner’s Answer
is mistakenly applying Step 2B under Step 2A, Prong Two.

Reply Brief 5; see Answer 9–17 (“Step 2A-Prong 2”).
We do not find the Examiner’s inclusion of “nothing in the claim adds
significantly more” to be detrimental to the Examiner’s determination that
the claims fail to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application
in the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis. See Answer 16.
Accordingly, we determine the claim does not integrate the recited
judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2) (Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical
Application)).

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Step 2B identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
Appellant argues, “an analysis of ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activity’ to determine if the claims, as a whole adds
‘significantly more’ is improperly applied in Step 2A, Prong Two to reject
the claims under Section 101 in the Examiner’s Answer.” Reply Brief 5–6.
As we stated above, we did not find the Examiner’s inclusion of the
“significantly more” analysis or statement, to be detrimental to the
Examiner’s Step 2A, Prong Two analysis. See Answer 16. The Examiner
determines the claims fail to provide an inventive concept because the
claims fail to add significantly more to the judicial exception in the Step 2A,
Prong Two analysis. See Answer 17–22. Appellant does not address the
Examiner’s findings or determinations with any specificity other than
arguing the Examiner’s significantly more inclusion in the Step 2A, Prong
Two analysis was detrimental to both the Step 2A, Prong Two analysis, as
well as, the Step 2B analysis. See Reply Brief 4–6.
Consequently, we do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive
because, in determining if the additional element (or combination of
additional elements) represents well-understood, routine, or conventional
activity, the Examiner supported the determination based upon a factual
determination, citing to relevant case law and to the MPEP, that was not
challenged by Appellant. See Answer 17–22; see Reply Brief 4–6; see also
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78) (“we consider the
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elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether the claim includes “significantly more” than the
ineligible concept); see also BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“an inventive concept
can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
known, conventional pieces.”).
Accordingly, we conclude claims 1–11, 13–18, 20, and 22–24 are
directed to managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities and following rules or
instructions); thus, the claim recites the abstract idea of “certain methods of
organizing human activity” identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance; and
thus, an abstract idea with the claims failing to recite limitations that amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. We sustain the Examiner’s
§ 101 rejection of claims 1–11, 13–18, 20, and 22–24.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections
Appellant asserts, “Allen et al. reference missing obtaining for
processing the customer service request ‘social networking actions of
the user and the co-users performed in a social network separate from
the gaming social network,’ of independent claims 1, 8[,] and 15.”
Appeal Brief 15. Appellant argues, “the ‘social network user accounts [are]
connected to the online communal wagering game’ to ‘provide a common
infrastructure for social network user accounts from the different social
network websites to communicate with each other.’” Appeal Brief 15
(citing Allen ¶ 62). Appellant contends, in regard to Allen:
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[T]he social network and the wagering game server do not
operate separately as they act in cooperation in furtherance of the
communal wagering game, such that the social networking
actions of the user and the co-users are not performed in a
social network separate from the gaming social network, but
are controlled by the wagering game server to facilitate
communications in furtherance of conducting the communal
wagering game.

Appeal Brief 15–16.
The Examiner finds, “both Allen and Cottrell teach ‘social networking
actions of the user and the co-users performed in a social network separate
from the gaming social network,’ and that gaming and networking is obvious
and well known, not inventive nor novel.” Answer 25–27 (citing Allen
Figure 1, ¶¶ 45, 62, 65; Cottrell Figure 1, ¶¶ 19–21, 29, 48, 49, 54).
Appellant contends:
Allen et al. teaches a system including a wagering game server
and one or more social network servers operating cooperatively
to track online game actions performed either through the social
network servers to implement a communal wagering game. That
is, Allen et al. teaches a common infrastructure that combines the
social networks and the wagering game server for tracking only
online game actions to implement a communal wagering game.
More specifically, Allen et al. does not teach separate tracking of
online game actions and social networking actions of the user
and co-users to detect fraud, wherein the social network actions
are performed separate from the gaming social network, i.e., not
acting cooperatively to implement the online game.

Reply Brief 8.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Claim 1’s disputed
limitation – “social networking actions of the user and the co-users
performed in a social network separate from the gaming social network”
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only requires the user’s actions to be performed in a social network separate
from the gaming social network. Allen discloses the social network is
separate from the wagering game server (gaming social network). See
Allen, Figure 1.
Allen discloses:
[T]he wagering game server further comprises: a social
communications controller configured to control social
communications between the one or more social network
accounts hosted by the social network server in connection with
the online communal wagering game, and a social economy
controller configured to control transactions for exchangeable
wagering items the one or more social network accounts.

Allen ¶ 21 (Emphasis added).

[T]he system 100 can receive social communication data directed
between social network user accounts connected to the online
communal wagering game.

Allen ¶ 62 (Emphasis added).
Although Allen’s social network user accounts are associated with the
online communal game, they are still separate from the online communal
game. See Allen Figure 1. Further, the disputed claim 1 limitation does not
preclude the user’s social networking actions from being associated with the
online communal game, only that the actions be “performed in a social
network separate from the gaming social network.”
Appellant argues:
Allen et al. cannot teach a social-gaming activity thread for the
user of the claimed invention that is built on “social networking
actions performed separate from the gaming social network” and
“wherein the gaming social network operates separate from the
social network,” because the social communications of Allen
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et al. are performed for purposes of conducting the
communal wagering game as controlled through the
wagering game server (e.g.,, social communications controller).

Appeal Brief 16 (citing Allen ¶¶ 45, 62).

We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive because the claim
limitation, “social networking actions performed separate from the gaming
social network,” does not preclude Allen’s social communications (actions)
from being about the communal wagering game. The limitation requires the
social networking actions to be performed separate from the gaming social
network. See Allen, Figure 1, ¶¶ 21, 62.
Appellant argues, “Cottrell teaches only a gaming social network to
include the actions of players and their social connections made while the
players are playing the multi-player game in a multi-player gaming session”
and, therefore, “Cottrell also only teaches tracking of online game actions as
there is only a gaming social network.” Reply Brief 10–11. Appellant
further argues that, “[i]n addition, Cottrell does not teach multiple social-
gaming activity timelines for each of the user and the co-users.” Reply Brief
11. The Examiner finds, “Cottrell further teaches social networking actions
performed separate from the gaming social network.” Answer 30–31 (citing
Cottrell Figure 1, ¶¶ 19, 21, 22, 48, 49, 54).
Cottrell discloses:
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing a game play
timeline and resulting video content according to an embodiment
of the invention. In FIG. 5, players 1, 2, and n are shown
spawning, killing and being killed, and capturing a flag. The
events occur along a timeline. The event information is used to
generate video segments that are then combined to produce a
highlight video of the game.
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Cottrell ¶ 48.
The disputed claim 1 limitation requires, “generating, in response to
the customer service request, social-gaming activity timelines for each of the
user and the co-users using the online game actions of the user and the co-
users and the associated game action timestamps, as well as the social
networking actions of the user and the co-users and the associated social
networking action timestamps.” (Emphasis added). We find Appellant’s
arguments not persuasive of Examiner error because Cottrell discloses a
timeline in association with social gaming activities. See Cottrell Figure 5,
¶ 48. The limitation does not require a timeline for the social networking
action only timestamps. Cottrell discloses that “two or more players access
a game server 11 via a network 14, such as the Internet” and the “game
server includes a data store 12 that stores information about each player,
such as a profile, game statistics, and the like, as well as a game history
comprising, in one embodiment, a timeline that contains events that occurred
during a game session.” Cottrell ¶ 21. Cottrell further discloses, “[a]s game
play progresses (270), various events occur, such as crashes, kills, deaths,
and the like (210). As these events occur, they are noted in a history of the
game that is stored, as described above, along a game timeline (220).”
Cottrell ¶ 22. Further, we discern no meaningful distinction between the
claimed social networking action timestamps and Cottrell’s historic notation
of events on the game timeline.
Appellant contends, “there is no motivation to combine the online
communal wagering game that aggregates one or more social network
accounts into the wagering game, the generating and sharing of a highlight
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video of events performed in a video game, and the reputation evaluation of
an individual of Lester et al.” Reply Brief 13. Appellant further argues:
[T]here cannot be any rational connection for combining Cottrell
with Allen et al., as Cottrell is directed to actions performed after
the game has completed (i.e., generating a sharing a highlight
video of events in the game) and Allen et al. is directed to actions
performed during an online communal wagering game.

Appellant fails to see the rational connection for
combining Cottrell with Lester et al., as Cottrell is directed to
automated creation of videos by a game for interactive
entertainment and Lester et al. is directed to the reputation
evaluation of an individual.

Reply Brief 13.
We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive of Examiner error. The
Examiner supported both the motivations to combine the teachings of Allen
and Cottrell, as well as, the teachings of Allen, Cottrell, and Lester with
articulated reasoning and rational unpinning to support the Examiner’s legal
conclusion of obviousness. See KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988); see also Final Action 22, 24–25.
Further, Appellant’s dissection of the references by arguing the temporal
aspects of the references is not persuasive. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981)(“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”). We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of claim 1, as well as, independent claims 8 and 15, not argued separately.
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We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of dependent claims
2–7, 9–11, 13, 14, 16–18, 20 and 22–24, not argued separately.

CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13–
18, 20, 22–
24
101 Eligibility 1–11, 13–
18, 20, 22–
24

1–3, 5, 8–
10, 15–17,
22–24
103 Allen, Cottrell,
Lester
1–3, 5, 8–
10, 15–17,
22–24

4, 11, 18 103 Allen, Cottrell,
Lester, Thatcher
4, 11, 18
6, 7, 13, 14,
20
103 Allen, Cottrell,
Lester, Scipioni
6, 7, 13, 14,
20

Overall
Outcome
1–11, 13–
18, 20, 22–
24

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED