MasterCard International IncorporatedDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 11, 20202020000620 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/958,951 08/05/2013 Peter J. Groarke P01086-US- UTIL (M01.239) 6153 125619 7590 08/11/2020 Mastercard International Incorporated c/o Buckley, Maschoff & Talwalkar LLC 50 Locust Avenue New Canaan, CT 06840 EXAMINER QAYYUM, ZESHAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/11/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): colabella@bmtpatent.com martin@bmtpatent.com szpara@bmtpatent.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte PETER J. GROARKE, MARK WIESMAN, JOHN DELTON CHISHOLM, THEUNIS JOHANNES GERBER, ISHFAQ A. LONE, and GREGORY WILLIAMSON Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JAMES A. WORTH, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. WORTH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10, which are all pending claims. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Mastercard International Inc. Appeal Br. 2. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 1, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 4, 2019), the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 5, 2019), and Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 19, 2019). Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 2 Claims 2, 6, 8, and 11–18 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Background Appellant’s application relates “to techniques for conducting secure online purchase transactions, and more particularly to techniques for providing 3-D Secure transactions on-behalf-of (OBO) merchants.” Spec. 1:2–4. The Claims Claims 1 and 7 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with added notations, is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A 3-D Secure on-behalf-of merchant authentication method, comprising: [(a)] receiving, by a 3-D secure on-behalf-of (OBO) merchant service computer from an access control server (ACS) computer, a payer authentication response (PARes) message associated with a remote purchase transaction which includes PARes data, a time and date of the remote purchase transaction, and a universal cardholder authentication field (UCAF); [(b)] storing, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, the PARes message in a database; [(c)] receiving, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer from a payment network, a purchase transaction authorization request message comprising PARes data; [(d)] comparing, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, the PARes data of the purchase transaction authorization request message to the stored PARes data; Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 3 [(e)] determining, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, that the PARes data of the purchase transaction authorization request message received from the payment network matches stored PARes data; [(f)] comparing, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, the time and date associated with the stored PARes message to a time and date of receipt of the purchase transaction authorization request; [(g)] determining, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, that the result of the comparison is one of equal to or less than a time period indicating timely receipt by the OBO merchant service computer of the purchase transaction authorization request message from the payment network; [(h)] generating, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer, an updated purchase transaction authorization request message by adding the UCAF associated with the stored PARes data to the purchase transaction authorization request message received from the payment network; and [(i)] transmitting, by the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer to the payment network, the updated purchase transaction request message for forwarding to an issuer financial institution for 3-D Secure purchase transaction authorization processing. Appeal Br. 27–28, Claims App. REJECTION ON APPEAL Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. DISCUSSION Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 4 However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 5 protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 6 If a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, then we consider whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Analysis Appellant argues the rejection of claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 as a group. See Appeal Br. 9–26. We select claim 1 as representative such that claims 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 stand or fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Step 1 Applying Step 1 of the Guidance (which is unchanged from the prior guidance) to the present case, we determine: independent claim 1 recites a “method,” which is a “process” falling within one of the categories enumerated under § 101. Step 2A, Prong One The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites concepts relating to certain methods of organizing human activity. Final Act. 3 (citing Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50, 52, 54). In reaching this determination, the Examiner states that the claims involve a series of steps for receiving and storing a PARes message; receiving a purchase transaction authorization request; determining by comparing data from the purchase transaction authorization request with the stored payer authorization response message; Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 7 generating an update purchase authorization request and the updated purchase authorization request message, which are performing the transaction and organizing the data, and more specifically involves comparing previously stored PARes message with the data in purchase authorization request and update the request and forward the request. Id. Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability because the Examiner failed to identify specific limitations and how they compare to the claims at issue in Alice. See Appeal Br. 20. Appellant particularly highlights the following claim language in arguing that the claims do not fall within the enumerated categories of the guidance: “a time and date of the remote purchase transaction,” “matches” stored PARes data, “compares the time and date associated with the stored PARes message to a time and date of receipt of the purchase transaction authorization request,” and “determines that the result of the comparison is one of equal to or less than a time period indicating timely receipt of the purchase transaction authorization request message.” Appeal Br. 18–19. We analyze the claim language, including that emphasized by Appellant, anew in view of the Guidance and applicable case law as follows. The Guidance instructs us first to determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claim. The Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human behavior such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. In context, claim 1 recites the idea of verifying a purchase transaction authorization request using PARes data and time information. In particular, the claim is a method in which the following steps are performed: (c) Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 8 “receiving . . . a purchase transaction authorization request message comprising PARes data”; (d) “comparing . . . the PARes data of the purchase transaction authorization request message to the stored PARes data;” (e) “determining . . . that the PARes data of the purchase transaction authorization request message received from the payment network matches stored PARes data”; (f) “comparing . . . the time and date associated with the stored PARes message to a time and date of receipt of the purchase transaction authorization request”; (g) “determining . . . that the result of the comparison is one of equal to or less than a time period”; (h) “generating . . . an updated purchase transaction authorization request message by adding the UCAF associated with the stored PARes data to the purchase transaction authorization request message received from the payment network”; and (i) “transmitting . . . the updated purchase transaction request message for forwarding to an issuer financial institution for 3-D Secure purchase transaction authorization processing.” In other words, the claimed method recites the steps as follows. Limitation (c) receives a purchase transaction authorization request including PARes data. Limitation (d) compares PARes data. Limitation (e) determines whether the PARes data from limitation (d) is a match. Limitation (f) compares time and date information from two sources. Limitation (g) determines whether the time and date information in limitation (f) is a match. Limitation (h) generates an updated purchase transaction authorization request with added information. Limitation (i) transmits the updated purchase transaction authorization request for authorization processing. Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 9 In this manner, claim 1 recites the idea of verifying a purchase transaction authorization request using payer authentication response data and time information. Similar to Bozeman where a set of claims was directed a method of verifying financial documents (i.e., a method of reducing check fraud by receiving financial transaction data from two sources including the point of sale and comparing that data to verify a transaction), we determine that the idea of verifying a purchase authorization request using payer authentication response data and time information is a longstanding commercial practice. See Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 955 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Appellant argues that the category of “certain methods of organizing human activity” does not cover human operation of machines. Reply Br. 3. However, we determine that the category applies regardless of whether it is being performed by computers. See also Bozeman, 955 F.3d at 978. Accordingly, we determine that the recited idea is a fundamental economic practice, which is one of a certain methods of organizing human activity, and an abstract idea recognized in the Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental economic practices and commercial interactions involving sales activities). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, we also determine that steps (d)–(g) recite mental processes, which is an abstract idea, as in Bozeman, where the claim involved the steps of comparing data from two different financial records in order to verify the transaction and was understood to be an abstract idea. See id., at 979–80 (collecting and analyzing information). In particular, we determine that the steps of comparing the payer authentication response data and associated time Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 10 information, and determining whether there is a match, can be performed in the human mind or with pen and paper, and is therefore a mental process, which is a form of abstract idea recognized in the Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (“Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.)”). Step 2A, Prong Two Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our analysis under the Guidance turns now to determining whether there are “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.” See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We use the term “additional elements” for “claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial exception.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24. When a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. A claim may integrate the judicial exception when, for example, it reflects an improvement to a technology or technical field. Id. at 55. Claim 1 recites the additional elements of an “on-behalf-of (OBO) merchant service computer” and an “access control server (ACS) computer.” The Specification indicates that the on-behalf-of (OBO) merchant service computer is a generic computer. For example, the Specification states: “The 3-D Secure OBO merchant service computer may be conventional in its hardware aspects but may be controlled by software to cause it to operate in accordance with aspects of the methods presented herein.” Spec. 12:9– 11. The Specification does not describe the access control server (ACS) computer with any greater specificity. Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 11 According to the Specification, the embodiments of the authentication process pertain to “card not present (CNP) transactions wherein a novel on- behalf-of (OBO) merchant service process operates to carry out a universal cardholder authentication field (UCAF) or a MasterCard advance registration program (MARP) (i.e., a 3-D Secure-type process) injection into a cardholder’s purchase transaction authorization request en-route to the issuer financial institution (FI), which operation would otherwise be carried out by the merchant and/or by the acquirer FI.” Spec. 6:29–7:6. The Specification describes a registration process to accomplish its goal. See id. at 7:21–8:19; 13:14–24. In a particular example, a merchant may decide that all consumers who purchase goods and/or services online with payment card accounts, including store accounts, will have their purchases processed in accordance with the 3-D Secure OBO merchants authentication service. Id. at 7:23–28. The store may therefore may enroll in the 3-D Secure on behalf- of (“OBO”) merchants authentication service by providing required merchant identification information to the entity providing the 3-D Secure OBO merchants authentication service (which may be, for example, a payments processing company). Id. at 7:28–8:1. The cardholders (and their financial institutions) may be unaware of the 3-D Secure OBO merchant service processing. Id. at 8:9–12. Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to improvements in computer functionality or other technology that are not abstract. Appeal Br. 21 (citing MPEP 2106.04(a)). Appellant argues that the method of claim 1 reduces merchant costs, improves the speed of online purchase transaction authorization processing, and provides an improved consumer shopping experience without sacrificing the security of the transaction. Appeal Br. 21. Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 12 Appellant argues that claim 1 requires a specific structure (which includes a 3-D Secure OBO merchant service computer, an access control server computer, a database, and a payment network) paired with a prescribed functionality (generating and then transmitting an updated purchase transaction request message to an issuer financial institution for transaction authorization processing) that is directly related to the structure, which results in a method that is patent-eligible. Id. at 21–22. Appellant argues that claim 1 recites an improvement to the functionality of a 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer by requiring interactions between the 3-D secure OBO merchant service computer and an ACS computer, a payment network, and a database to generate an updated purchase transaction authorization request message (by adding a UCAF associated with stored PARes data to the purchase transaction authorization request message) and transmitting it to the payment network to forward to an issuer FI (financial institution) for 3-D secure purchase transaction authorization processing. Id. at 23. As to the recited computers, we determine that these computers each serve as a generic processor. See Spec. 6:22–29, 7:17–20, 8:20–9:5. The mere presence of a processor does not necessarily indicate a technical solution. “[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent- eligible.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256. “Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015), quoted in Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 13 Claim 1 also recites the following additional limitations: (a) “receiving . . . a payer authentication response (PARes) message associated with a remote purchase transaction which includes PARes data, a time and date of the remote purchase transaction, and a universal cardholder authentication field (UCAF)” and limitation (b) “storing . . . the PARes message in a database”. Consistent with prior decisions of the Federal Circuit, we determine that these steps represent insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (obtaining information about transactions using the Internet to verify credit card transactions is mere data gathering); Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334 (storing and retrieving information in memory did not impose meaningful limits on the scope of the claims); Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (receiving or sending data over a network using was considered generic); see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84 (discussing post- solution components). Indeed, in Bozeman, the claim at issue also included the steps of receiving, storing, and displaying the data and were analyzed together with the other steps of verifying the financial transaction. See 955 F.3d at 979. To the extent that Appellant is relying on a network of computers to provide secure access, we determine that this use of networked computers is similar to the claim at issue in Prism Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., in which the use of an authentication server, an access server, and an Internet Protocol network combined with identity data did not to rise to the level of an inventive concept where the elements were indisputably generic. See 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017–1018. Nor does Appellant claim or describe Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 14 an advance in networking technology, as in BASCOM, where the court determined that there was an ordered combination of conventional components that provided for filtering of internet content based on the location of a filtering component in a network. BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step 2B Having determined under step 2A of the Guidance that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the Guidance whether claim 1 includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field, or merely appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities, specified at a high level of generality to the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The relevant inquiry is whether the claim includes additional elements, i.e., elements other than the abstract idea itself, that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). We find that the additional elements, taken individually or as an ordered combination, are well-understood, routine, or conventional. The Examiner determines that the combination of elements recited in the claims merely recite the concept of performing the transaction and organizing the data, and the use of these additional elements does no more than employ the computer as a tool to automate and/or implement the abstract idea. Final Act. 9. We agree. The Specification indicates that “a remote authentication process may include a process where a consumer is making a purchase or other transaction with a remote website or merchant server (e.g., over the Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 15 Internet) using a browser on a mobile device (such as a mobile telephone, smartphone, tablet computer, and/or laptop computer and the like).” Spec. 6:22–26. The Specification further states that “[a] remote authentication process may also include a process where a consumer is making a purchase or other transaction with a remote website or server using a browser on a personal computer or any other type of Internet-connected device (such as a television, household appliance, office device, or the like).” Id. at 6:26–29; id. at 12:22–23 (“data communications over conventional computer-to- computer data networks”). As described above, the 3-D Secure OBO merchant service computer and the access control server are described generically or referred to as “conventional” hardware or processors. See id. at 12:9–21. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Using a computer for receiving, storing, and analyzing data amounts to basic functions of a computer. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). All of these computer functions are well-known or routine activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ ... those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). Accordingly, we determine that the Examiner’s findings are supported by the Specification and are consistent with other cases in which the courts have found such additional elements to be conventional. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 16 & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Taken individually, and as an ordered combination, the claim does not provide significantly more than the recited abstract idea. See id. Appellant contends that the claims apply additional elements in a manner beyond what has been recognized by the courts as well-understood, routine, and conventional for computers and computing devices, resulting in claims that recite patent-eligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 22; Reply Br. 6. Appellant argues that the method of claim 1 provides a specific 3-D Secure OBO merchant authentication process that not only reduces fraud and risk, but that also permits merchants to avoid utilizing a merchant plug-in (MPI) application (thus saving costs) without sacrificing security. Appeal Br. 25; Reply 6. We are unpersuaded by this argument because Appellant is not relying on the additional elements for the inventive concept but is rather relying on the claimed idea itself for an inventive concept, which we have already found abstract, as addressed above in Step 2A, Prong One. See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). Appellant also argues that the claim is patentably distinct over the prior art because the Examiner withdrew previous obviousness rejections. Appeal Br. 25. However, non-obviousness under § 103, as argued, would be insufficient for proving non-abstractness. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89–90; SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself Appeal 2020-000620 Application 13/958,951 17 satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101, and claims 3–5, 7, 9, and 10, which fall therewith. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 § 101 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 Overall Outcome 1, 3–5, 7, 9, and 10 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation