Massachusetts Institute of Technology

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 15, 1954

110 N.L.R.B. 1611 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 1611
4. By refusing on June 6, 1952, and at all times thereafter to bargain collectively
with the aforesaid Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees
in the aforesaid unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its em-
ployees, and thereby discouraging membership in the above-named Union, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Appendix A
Date reinstated
Aksamiteski, Chester*
Ambrose, Edw. P.
Bayle, Eva
Botna, Frank -------- August 8, 1952
Brummelhoff, Fern
Dowgal, Joseph ------ August 4, 1952
Garvey, Herbert
Golembeski , Edmund
Grey, Walter D.
Gunn, Howard______ August 5, 1952
Henk, Anna --------- August 16, 1952
Huebner, Ann_______ August 5, 1952
Johnson, Benjamin ___ August 6, 1952
Koenig, Grace ------- Sept. 15, 1952
Ludwick, Andrew
Lynch, Pauline______ August 7, 1952
*The record shows that this employee was
reveal the date.
Date reinstated
Marczynski, Casimer
Morris, Mary
Pawleski, Evelyn____. May 25, 1953
Polega, Bertha -- ----- August 7, 1952
Ropelski, Alice______ August 7, 1952
Rozek, Rosa
Shoemaker, Thelma
Sief, Peter
Smigiel, Marie
Smith , Harold_______ August 8, 1952
Taylor, Homer
Terkat, Peter________ August 6, 1952
Thompson, Georgia__ August 7, 1952
Venneman, Joyce
Witham, Mildred
Workman, Gladys
reinstated in August 1952, but does not
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (LINCOLN LABORATORY)
and INDEPENDENT UNION OF PLANT PROTECTION EMPLOYEES IN THE
ELECTRICAL & MACHINE INDUSTRY , PETITIONER . Case No. 1-RC-
3693. December 15,195/
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Robert E. Greene, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology is a nonprofit educational
institution located at Cambridge, Massachusetts. In 1951 the Insti-
tute undertook a research project, known as Project Lincoln, for the
Department of Defense because of the national emergency. Research
for the Project is conducted at Lincoln Laboratory, alone involved in
110 NLRB No. 232.
1612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this proceeding, which is situated at Lexington, Massachusetts, ad-
jacent to Hanscomb Field, a United States Air Force installation 18-
miles from Cambridge. This research comprises about one-half of
the Institute's total sponsored research activity. Because of its nature,
the Project is not intimately associated with the educational activities
of the Institute. The remainder of the Institute's sponsored research,
on the other hand, is highly integrated with its educational activities.'
Lincoln Laboratory has a separate personnel office and payroll for its
1,600 employees. The Project is wholly financed by the Government
on a year-to-year basis. Over the past year, the Project utilized over-
$2,000,000 worth of materials, 15 to 20 percent of which calve directly
from outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Employer, while agreeing in its brief that it meets the tests
recently announced by the Board for the exercise of jurisdiction over
establishments affecting national defense,' nonetheless urges that j uris-
diction should not be asserted over it because it is a nonprofit educa-
tional institution engaged at its Lincoln Laboratory in Government-
sponsored research for national defense, as distinguished from research.
of a commercial nature for industrial concerns. The Employer looks
for support principally in the Columbia University case,3 in which,
the Board held that it would not assert jurisdiction over a nonprofit-
educational institution where the activities involved are noncom-
mercial in nature and intimately connected with the educational activi-
ties of the institution. We find no merit in the Employer's contention.
The fact that the activities involved relate to national defense and are
not purely commercial in nature constitutes no justifiable reason for
declining jurisdiction over the Employer. Indeed, only recently in
the Maytag case' the Board had occasion to reiterate its view that
"Federal intervention in labor disputes which have a real impact
on national defense is especially warranted, particularly in these
times. . . ." It is clear, therefore, that, upon the facts set forth above,
and as conceded by the Employer, the Lincoln Laboratory activities
of the Employer bring it within the Board's new criterion for the
exercise of jurisdiction over establishments affecting national defense.
Accordingly, we find that the Employer's Lincoln Laboratory activi-
ties affect commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
' Of this half, about 93 percent is sponsoied by the Government, 3 percent by nonprofit
foundations, and 4 percent by industrial concerns.
2 See Maytag Aircraft Corp., 110 NLRB 594
3 Trustees of Columbia University, 97 NLRB 424 See also California Institute of Tech-
nology, 102 NLRB 1402, Armour Research Foundation, 107 NLRB 1052
4 Maytag Aircraft Corp , sups a
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 1613
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9
(c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The parties are agreed upon a unit of full-time guards employed
at the Lincoln Laboratory but disagree as to the placement of so-
called part-time and summer guards. The Employer's contention,
which is disputed by the Petitioner, is that the former are regular
part-time employees and the latter seasonal employees entitled to
inclusion in the unit.
There are eight part-time guards who are used, when available, on
the swing and night shifts to supplement the regular guard force
in emergencies and as sickness and off-day replacements. Almost all
of these supplemental guards have regular teaching jobs. There are
also six other guards who have worked the swing shift regularly
during the past summer months as vacation replacements for regular
full-time guards and in connection with special tests run in the sum-
mer. Although the Employer states that it wants to rehire these sum-
mer guards next summer, all but perhaps 1 or 2 were hired for the
first time last spring and most of them have full-time teaching jobs.
From the foregoing and upon the entire record, we conclude, con-
trary to the Employer, that the eight so-called part-time guards are
not regular part-time employees but rather intermittent employees.
We further find that the six summer guards are temporary or casual
employees. Therefore, in accordance with the Board's policy, we
shall exclude the so-called part-time and summer guards from the
unit hereinafter found appropriate.
We find that all guards on the payroll of the Employer's Lincoln
Laboratory at Lexington, Massachusetts, including guards at field
stations, wherever located, but excluding part-time and summer
guards, all other employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
CHAIRMAN FARMER and MEMBER RODGERS, dissenting :
We dissent from the decision in this case to assert jurisdiction over
a Government project operated by a nonprofit educational institu-
tion. lire do not believe that Congress intended the Board thus to
extend the exercise of its jurisdiction. This is persuasively indicated,
in our opinion, by the legislative history of the nonprofit hospital
exemption contained in Section 2 (2) of the Act as amended in 1947.
Thus Section 2 (2) of H. R. 3020 as originally passed by the House
contained the specific enumeration of various nonprofit organizations
to be excluded from the statutory definition of "employer" as follows :
1614 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The term `employer' . . . shall not include . . . any corporation,
community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the bene-
fit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial
part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation.'
The bill as amended by the Senate, and as finally passed by both
houses of Congress, omitted the several specific exclusions of the orig-
inal House bill and in place of such exemptions excluded only "any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual." 5 The Conference Report, in explanation of the adoption of the
Senate amendment, stated that :
The conference agreement . . . follows the Senate amendment in
the matter of exclusion of nonprofit corporations and associations
operating hospitals. The other nonprofit organizations excluded
under the House bill are not specifically excluded in the confer-
ence agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in con-
nection with purely commercial activities of such organizations
have any of the activities of such organizations or of their em-
ployees been considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.7
It is apparent that the Conference Report thus expressed its ap-
proval of assertion by the Board of jurisdiction over nonprofit organ-
izations, including, among others, those for educational or scientific
(i. e., research) purposes, "only in exceptional circumstances and in.
connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations."
Both before and since the 1947 amendments of the Act, the Board, al-
though it has asserted jurisdiction over nonprofit educational insti-
tutions, has done so only in cases where some substantial portion of
the 'specific activities involved were "purely commercial"-that is,
they were sponsored by, or were for the benefit of, private industrial
concerns.' Where the activity was not commercial in this sense, the
5 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 161 . See also
The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York , 97 NLRB 424.
8 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Section 2 (2).
7 House Conference Report No . 510, 80th Congress , 1st Session , p. 32; 1 Legislative
History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 505, 536.
8 Henry Ford Trade School, 58 NLRB 1535; 63 NLRB 1134 ( vocational school engaged
in manufacturing and repairing tools for an industrial concern ) ; Illinois Institute of
Technology, 81 NLRB 201 (nonprofit research foundation , affiliated with college, con-
ducting research for private industrial concerns ) ; Port Arthur College, 92 NLRB 152
(college operating commercial radio station ) , California Institute of Technology, 102
NLRB 1402 ( nonprofit educational institution operating a wind tunnel project for the
benefit of five sponsoring aircraft companies).
KENNETH CHEVROLET COMPANY 1615
Board has not asserted its jurisdiction over such an institution despite
the fact that its operations may have been the indirect cause of a sub-
stantial flow of materials across State lines.' We do not believe that
the Board should further extend the exercise of its jurisdiction by as-
serting it in this case.10 As the enterprise here involved consists of
the noncommercial activity of a nonprofit educational institution, we
would not assert jurisdiction but would dismiss the petition.
s The Trustees of Columbia University, supra ; see also Armour Research Foundation
of Illinois Institute of Technology, 107 NLRB 1053.
10 The Board has, of course , asserted jurisdiction over typically commercial enterprises
engaged in activities for the United States Government or related to the national de-
fense . See, for example, Columbia Reporting Company, 88 NLRB 168 ; E. C. Williams, 88
NLRB 620; General Electric Company, 89 NLRB 726 at 736; The Zia Company, 94
NLRB 214; The Lewis Engineering Company, 101 NLRB 484; Maytag Aircraft Corp.,
110 NLRB 594 . The present case , however, is distinguishable both from such cases and
from those mentioned in footnote 4, supra, in that here neither the Employer nor the ac-
tivity concerned is "commercial " within the meaning of that term as it is related to the
Board's jurisdictional policy. We know of no previous case in which the Board has
asserted jurisdiction upon the basis of facts such as are present here.
KENNETH CHEVROLET COMPANY, HARRY MANN CHEVROLET COMPANY,
SPREEN OLDSMOBILE CADILLAC (COMPANY), AND MURPHY OLDSMO-
BILE COMPANY and AUTOMOBILE SALESMEN 'S UNION, LOCAL 404,
RCIA, AFL, PETITIONER. Cases Nos. 21-RC-3545, 21-IBC-3567,
01-RC-3568, and 21-RC-3574. December 15,1954
Decision and Order
Upon separate petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, separate hearings were held in the above-
entitled cases before Carl Filter, hearing officer. The hearing officer's
rulings made at the hearings are free from prejudicial error and are
hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in these cases,: the Board finds :
All of the Employers in these cases are retail automobile dealers
in the Greater Los Angeles, California, area. None make sales di-
rectly or indirectly outside the State or to persons or firms engaged
in interstate commerce. None make total annual purchases directly
from outside the State in excess of $500,000. Although each purchases
over $1,000,000 worth of new automobiles annually, and one Employ-
er's purchases total over $2,000,000, delivery of all of these automo-
biles, with one exception, is taken from assembly plants located within
the State. Spreen Oldsmobile Cadillac receives cars valued at
$336,397, from outside the State. Forty-three percent by value of all
component parts used in assembling Chevrolet automobiles and 80
percent by value of the component parts of Oldsmobile automobiles
' The cases are consolidated herein for the purpose of decision.
110 NLRB No. 241.