Maryann Sheehy, Complainant,v.Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander Director, National Security Agency, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 27, 2009
0420090007 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 27, 2009)

0420090007

11-27-2009

Maryann Sheehy, Complainant, v. Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander Director, National Security Agency, Agency.


Maryann Sheehy,

Complainant,

v.

Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander

Director,

National Security Agency,

Agency.

Petition No. 0420090007

Request No. 0520080753

Appeal No. 0120072655

Agency No. 01-017

DECISION ON A PETITION FOR CLARIFICATION

On December 9, 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC or Commission) docketed a petition for enforcement to examine the

enforcement of an order set forth in Maryann Sheehy v. National Security

Agency, Request No. 0520080753 (October 12, 2008). This petition for

clarification is accepted and GRANTED by the Commission pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.503.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency's promise to pay complainant all back pay from June

22, 1998 until her retirement date includes paying her for the period

in which she was in an unpaid status.

BACKGROUND

On or about April 19, 2002, complainant filed a complaint in which

she alleged that the agency discriminated against her on the bases

of sex (female), disability (Fibromyalgia), and in reprisal for prior

EEO activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., when

the agency directed her to report to its Fort Meade, Maryland facility

rather than continue working at a site in Northern Virginia. Complainant

further alleged that the agency discriminated against her on the basis

of sex when the agency selected a male employee to perform the same

functions she previously performed at the Northern Virginia facility.

After the investigation of complainant's complaint, she requested a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ), and on September 21,

2004, the AJ issued an order in which she stated that the accepted

issues in complainant's complaint were: (1) did the agency unlawfully

discriminate against complainant on the bases of sex and disability,

by treating her in a disparate manner when the agency ordered her

to report to its Fort Meade, Maryland, facility rather than continue

to assign her duties at a work site in Northern Virginia; (2) did the

agency fail to provide complainant with a reasonable accommodation when

it ordered her to report to its Fort Meade facility; (3) did the Agency

unlawfully discriminate against complainant on the basis of sex when a

male was selected to perform the same or similar functions for the agency

in Northern Virginia which complainant had previously performed at that

site; and (4) did the agency unlawfully discriminate against complainant

by subjecting her to a continuing pattern of harassment based on reprisal

following her contact with an EEO counselor in January 2001.

On December 20, 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement,

and complainant withdrew her complaint. The December 20, 2004 settlement

agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

Within sixty (60) days after the AGENCY counsel of record receives

the fully executed original of this AGREEMENT, the AGENCY will cause

to be entered into the appropriate personnel system at the Agency

that the COMPLAINANT was promoted to the grade of GG-13, step 4 on 21

June 1998, and will effectuate any step increases as would normally

be earned for satisfactory performance up to 22 June 2001, the date

of her disability retirement. COMPLAINANT will receive all back pay,

along with any applicable interest normally associated with back pay

awards, from this date, 21 June 1998, until her disability retirement

date on 22 June 2001 the Agency will cause all the necessary payroll

actions, including the appropriate deductions and contributions. Also

within sixty (60) days after the AGENCY counsel of record receives the

fully executed original of this AGREEMENT, the Agency will cause that

Complainant will be paid $5,000 in costs. To satisfy this payment,

the AGENCY will issue COMPLAINANT a lump sum payment of Five Thousand

Dollars ($5,000), payable to COMPLAINANT and her counsel of record by

U.S. Treasury check. Said Treasury check will be delivered by overnight

mail express to COMPLAINANT'S counsel of record . . . . Because of the

very complicated nature of retroactive promotions and corresponding back

pay entitlements and because some actions necessary to cause COMPLAINANT

to be paid are outside of the scope of the AGENCY'S control, the AGENCY

cannot guarantee with any specificity when COMPLAINANT will be paid.

By letter to the agency dated March 7, 2007, complainant alleged breach.

Specifically, complainant alleged that the agency failed to pay her

promised back pay and applicable interest and benefits. Complainant

further alleged that the agency had not paid appropriate contributions

to her Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Complainant also alleged

that the agency failed to promote her to a GG-14, Step 4 position,

although her promotion to that level was discussed in pre-settlement

conversations and documents.

In its April 19, 2007 FAD, the agency found no breach. The agency

concluded that, although complainant maintained that she was entitled to

a GG-14, step 4 promotion instead of a GG-13, step 4 promotion because

the parties discussed this during pre-settlement negotiations, the terms

of the agreement only guaranteed that complainant would be promoted to

the GG-13, step 4 level effective June 21, 1998. The agency further

determined that on or about February 18, 2005, it issued checks to

complainant and her former attorney for the $5,000.00 lump sum and

$21,237.57 for back pay and applicable interest associated with her

retroactive promotion. The agency stated that complainant informed

the agency that she did not cash the checks because her bank stated

that her former attorney must be present in order to cash the checks.

The FAD stated that the agency would reissue a check for the back pay

to complainant and a check for the lump sum to her former attorney

within three weeks. The FAD further stated that it was recalculating

the appropriate contributions to complainant's TSP account and that she

would be notified when the computations were completed.

Complainant appealed the agency's final decision to the Commission.

On appeal, complainant argued that the settlement agreement should

be voided because the agency failed to comply with the Older Workers'

Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). Complainant claimed that she alleged age

discrimination in her underlying complaint but that the agency failed

to provide her with a reasonable time period in which to consider the

terms of the agreement or revoke the agreement, as mandated by the OWBPA.

Complainant further argued that the agreement should be voided because

it is the product of fraud or mistake. Complainant maintained that the

pre-settlement notes of the Administrative Judge (AJ) and complainant's

former attorney reflected that the agency would provide her with a GG-14

level promotion, and she "never would have signed the written settlement

had she known that it provided her with a lower retroactive promotion."

The Appellate Decision

In a decision dated July 31, 2008, the Commission first determined

that the settlement agreement was not governed by the OWBPA because

complainant's underlying complaint did not include a claim of age

discrimination. Maryann Sheehy v. National Security Agency, EEOC Appeal

0120072655 (July 31, 2008). The Commission also determined that despite

complainant's claim that the agreement should be voided because it

contained the wrong retirement date, the agreement was enforceable but

reformed with respect to the parties mutual agreement that the correct

retirement date is November 1, 2001. The Commission determined that the

agreement was not the result of fraud and noted that complainant was

represented by an attorney throughout settlement negotiations; signed

the agreement and attested that the agreement was binding; attested that

she did not rely upon any representation or statement made by the agency

with regard to the subject matter, basis, or effect of the agreement

except as specifically stated in the agreement; and, attested that she

thoroughly discussed all aspects of this agreement with her attorney,

carefully read the agreement, and understood and voluntarily agreed to

all of the agreement's terms and provisions.

The Commission also determined that the agency complied with its promise

to retroactively promote complainant to GG-13, step 4 effective June 21,

1998 and grant complainant any step increases she would have received

from the date of the retroactive promotion to the November 1, 2001 date of

her retirement. However, the Commission further determined that, because

the agreement did not provide that back pay would be reduced because

complainant was AWOL or otherwise in unpaid status, the agency breached

the agreement when it failed to pay complainant back pay, benefits, and

interest for the entire period from June 21, 1998 to November 1, 2001.

Finally, the Commission noted that although complainant did not

receive checks from the agency for the lump sum and back pay until late

September 2007, the delay was apparently caused by the check-cashing

policy of complainant's bank and various challenges in delivering mail

to complainant. At that time, complainant had still not cashed the

checks for the lump sum and back pay. In light of the circumstances, we

found that ordering the agency to comply with the terms of the agreement

was the appropriate remedy in this case. Specifically, the Commission

ordered the agency to undertake the following actions to the extent that

it had not already done so:

1. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for back pay and

interest for her retroactive promotion from June 21, 1998 until her

November 1, 2001 retirement date. The agency shall not reduce the back

pay award because of AWOL or other non-pay status.

2. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall make appropriate deductions and contributions

to complainant, including contributions to complainant's TSP account.

3. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall pay complainant $5,000.00 in costs.

The matter was assigned to a Compliance Officer and docketed as Compliance

No. 0620080784 on or about August 1, 2008.

Request for Reconsideration

On August 25, 2008, complainant filed a request for reconsideration of

our appellate decision. Maryann Sheehy v. National Security Agency,

EEOC Request No. 0520080753 (September 12, 2008). In that request,

complainant argued that the appellate decision erred in finding that

she did not validly raise an age discrimination claim in her complaint

that voided the agreement under OWBPA and ignored the mutual mistake of

fact regarding complainant's retirement date that should have voided the

agreement. Complainant further argued that the agreement should have

been voided because the agency delayed paying her the amount of money

she was entitled to receive for almost three years.

On September 4, 2008, the agency also filed a request for reconsideration

with the Commission. In that request, the agency argued that our

appellate decision erred in holding that the agency breached the

agreement when it did not award complainant back pay during the period

when complainant was absent without leave (AWOL). The agency argued

that although the appellate decision correctly held that complainant

was in non-pay AWOL status from March 28, 2001 through June 22, 2001,

and the settlement agreement did not contain any specific terms regarding

this status period, the Commission erred when it held that the agreement

requires the agency to pay complainant back pay for the non-pay status

period.

Additionally, the agency opposed complainant's request for

reconsideration. The agency argued that complainant did not validly

raise an age discrimination claim in her underlying complaint because

complainant only cited sex, disability, and retaliation as bases for

her complaint in her interrogatory response. The agency further argued

that there was no mutual mistake of fact here regarding complainant's

retirement date; instead, the agency contends that the retirement date

reflected in the agreement was the result of a typographical error and

both parties knew at the time that the settlement agreement was executed

that November 1, 2001 is the correct retirement date.

In a decision dated September 12, 2008, the Commission denied

complainant's request for reconsideration and ordered the agency to

comply with the orders set forth in our appellate decision.1

Petition for Clarification

On December 9, 2008, the agency submitted the petition for enforcement

at issue herein. In its petition, the agency contends that our

reconsideration decision should be clarified because it only mentioned

complainant's request for reconsideration but did not mention the agency's

request for reconsideration. The agency further reiterates its argument

that the Commission erred in its appellate decision when it held that

the agency must pay complainant for the entire period from March 28, 2001

through November 1, 2001, without deducting complainant's AWOL period.

In response, complainant argues that the Commission should again

reconsider its appellate decision and reiterates arguments made in her

initial request for reconsideration. Complainant further argues that

the agreement should be voided because the agency still has not paid

her back pay.

On July 14, 2009, the agency replied to complainant's response and

reasserted arguments contained in its previous submissions. The agency

notes that complainant is not entitled to any further appeal of the

appellate decision and cannot use her petition for clarification as a

mechanism to reattempt reconsideration.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As an initial matter, we note that our reconsideration decision

inadvertently failed to acknowledge that the agency also requested

reconsideration. Although the Commission considered and rejected the

agency's reconsideration arguments before issuing our decision in EEOC

Request No. 0520080753, we find that it is appropriate to clarify the

decision by addressing the specific arguments and contentions raised by

both parties.

In requesting clarification of our previous decision, the agency

reiterates its reconsideration argument that complainant should not

be paid back pay for the period that she was AWOL or in unpaid status.

The agency notes that in Jenkins v. Department of Education, 0120062001

(September 13, 2001), the Commission held that a settlement agreement

must specifically address changing a period of unpaid status to a

period of paid status in order for a complainant to receive back pay

for that period. However, in Jenkins, the agency merely agreed to "pay

complainant back-pay less appropriate deductions, for the retroactive

period of the promotion to the date of her retirement," whereas in this

case, the agency agreed that "complainant will receive all [emphasis

added] back pay, along with any applicable interest normally associated

with back pay awards, from this date, 21 June 1998, until her disability

retirement date." By agreeing to comprehensively provide complainant

with all back pay for the period from June 21, 1998 until complainant's

disability retirement date on November 1, 2001, the agency specifically

promised to pay complainant back pay for the entire period without

regard to any previously-designated unpaid status. Thus, the agency

must pay complainant back pay for the entire period from June 21, 1998

until November 1, 2001.

In response to the agency, complainant contends that the agreement

should be voided because her underlying complaint contained a claim

of age discrimination, and the agency failed to provide her with the

protections of the OWBPA before entering into the agreement with her.

As our appellate decision noted, complainant "tangentially" mentioned

age discrimination for the first time in the narrative of an October 20,

2001 investigative affidavit and in a November 19, 2001 amendment to

her investigative affidavit.

In her request for reconsideration, complainant noted that during

discovery, the agency asked her the following interrogatory question dated

September 23, 2002: "If you contend that you were discriminated against

based on disability, sex, age, or retaliation when your employment at

the Agency was terminated, describe in detail each and every act and/or

omission on the part of the Agency, which you contend constitutes the

basis for your claim, include within your description the identity

of the alleged perpetrator(s)." However, complainant failed to note

that in her November 4, 2002 response to the interrogatory, she did not

mention age discrimination at all, and answered the direct interrogatory

question by stating that the agency's "motive for transferring me was

discrimination because I was a woman, because I had a disability, and

intentional malicious retaliation for filing an initial EEO complaint."

There was no mention of age discrimination in complainant's response.

We further note that in complainant's prehearing statement dated September

7, 2004, she stated that although there "has been some confusion"

about the her claims, the agency's October 4, 2004 identification of

complainant's claims properly identified her claims as: 1) whether

complainant was subjected to illegal discrimination based on sex

when she was directed to return from her reassignment and a higher

grade male employee was selected for her previous decision; 2) whether

complainant was subjected to retaliatory harassment after she contacted

an EEO counselor; and, 3) whether the agency failed to accommodate her

disability, which led to her termination. The pre-hearing statement

further stated that "in effect, it terminated [complainant] for not

being physically able to accept her reassignment" and replaced her

with a male employee. There was no mention of age discrimination in

this pre-hearing statement, which was submitted three months before the

settlement agreement was executed. Likewise, complainant's September

7, 2004 motion for summary judgment does not cite age as a basis of

discrimination.

The pre-hearing statement was complainant's last articulation of her

claims before the settlement agreement was executed. In that statement,

complainant expressly stated that she sought to resolve any confusion

about the characterization of her claims and identified disability,

reprisal, and sex discrimination as the bases for her complaint, but there

was no mention of age discrimination. Thus, on September 21, 2004, the AJ

identified the issues raised by complainant as alleging discrimination

on the bases of sex, disability (including failure to accommodate),

and reprisal, but again, there was no mention of age discrimination.

Finally, we are also persuaded that age was not a basis of complainant's

underlying complaint by the terms of the December 20, 2004 settlement

agreement negotiated and signed by complainant. The agreement stated

that complainant agreed to settle claims of discrimination arising

from Title VII, the EPA, and the American's with Disabilities Act

[sic], but there is no mention of the ADEA. Likewise, the agreement

describes complainant's settled complaint as alleging discrimination

on the basis of disability, reprisal, and "an Equal Pay Act violation,"

but yet again, there was no mention of age discrimination. We find that

it is unreasonable to expect the AJ and agency to afford complainant

OWBPA rights for a basis that complainant herself failed to raise to

their attention despite being given ample opportunities to do so.

Additionally, complainant claims that our finding that there was a

mutual mistake regarding complainant's retirement date means that we

must void the agreement. However, we did not find that the mistake was

the result of bad faith or fraud, as complainant claims. Therefore,

reformation is a viable equitable remedy here because there is clear

and convincing evidence that both parties misidentified complainant's

retirement date in the agreement but agreed that her retirement

date should be November 1, 2001. Indiana Insurance Company v. Pana

County. Unit School Disrict. No. 8, 314 F.3d 895, 903-04 (7th Cir.2003)

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, � 155, cmt. a (1981));

27 Williston on Contracts � 70.54 (4th ed.); Philipine Sugar Estates

Development Company v. Government of Philipine Islands, 247 U.S. 385, 389,

38 S.Ct. 513, 62 L.Ed. 1177 (1918) (noting that "[i]t is well settled

that courts of equity will reform a written contract where, owing to

mutual mistake, the language used therein did not fully or accurately

express the agreement and intention of the parties," and that "[t]he fact

that interpretation or construction of a contract presents a question

of law and that, therefore, the mistake was one of law is not a bar to

granting relief."). In this case, we determine that voiding the entire

settlement agreement would have been an inappropriately harsh remedy.

Therefore, we conclude that the agreement was appropriately reformed

with respect to the retirement date.

With respect to attorney's fees, complainant is a prevailing party with

respect to the March 21, 2007 appeal because the Commission found that the

agency breached the agreement. However, complainant should not receive

attorney's fees associated with her request for reconsideration because

her request was not granted by the Commission. Likewise, complainant

is not entitled to attorney's fees associated with this request for

clarification because she is not a prevailing party with respect to

this matter. Thus, complainant is only entitled to attorney's fees and

costs associated with the initial appeal.

Finally, complainant also maintains that the agency has engaged in bad

faith because it has not paid her the $5,000.00 lump sum and the back

pay award. The record reveals that on February 18, 2005, the agency

mailed two checks to complainant that were written to complainant

and her attorney, a check for $5,000.00 and a check for $21,237.57.

In November 2006, complainant notified the agency that she could not

cash the checks because both checks were written to two people, and

she wanted the agency to issue the checks to her alone. Additionally,

the agency conducted an audit to correct its failure to make the proper

amount of TSP contributions to complainant's account. On July 16, 2007,

the agency reissued the two checks solely to complainant, a check for

$5,000.00 and a check for $22,959.68. Complainant maintained that she

did not cash the checks because she was on vacation when the checks

were delivered, her mail should have been forwarded to her vacation

location, one of the checks was illegible because it was left outside

by the delivery service, and one of the checks was made to two people.

Thus, we determine that most of the delay in paying complainant is

attributable to problems delivering mail to complainant during her

vacation and understandable confusion over back pay calculations,

TSP contributions, and the check-cashing policy of complainant's bank.

Moreover, compliance has been delayed by the protracted dispute over the

interpretation of the agreement, which has included an appeal, requests

to reconsider, and a petition for clarification. 29 C.F.R. 1614 � 502

(b)(2). We do not find any evidence that the agency acted in bad faith

in this case.

Therefore, we now order the agency to pay complainant in accordance with

this decision and the order set forth below. We further warn complainant

that if she henceforth does not accept and deposit checks presented to

her in accordance with this agreement, we will not order the agency to

issue any further checks to her pursuant to the agreement.

Accordingly, the petition for clarification is GRANTED. The agency shall

comply with the Order set forth herein.

ORDER

To the extent that it has not already done so, the agency is ORDERED to

undertake the following actions:

1. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for back pay and

interest for her retroactive promotion from June 21, 1998 until her

November 1, 2001 retirement date. The agency shall not reduce the

back pay award because of complainant's AWOL or other non-pay status.

Complainant shall cooperate with the agency's efforts to compute the

amount of back pay and interest due, and shall provide all relevant

information requested by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the

exact amount of back pay and/or interest due, the agency shall issue a

check to the complainant for the undisputed amount within thirty (30)

calendar days of the date the agency determines the amount it believes

to be due. The complainant may petition for enforcement or clarification

of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement

must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in

the statement

2. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall make appropriate deductions and contributions

to complainant, including contributions to complainant's TSP account.

3. Within thirty (30) calendar days after the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall pay complainant $5,000.00 in costs.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the "Implementation of the Commission's Decision. The report

shall include all supporting documentation verifying that the corrective

action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Complainant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees

associated with the initial appeal. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award

of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency. The attorney shall

submit a verified statement of fees to the agency -- not to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within

thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The agency

shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____11/27/09_____________

Date

1 We note that on September 27, 2008, complainant filed a statement

with the Commission in which she opposed the agency's request for

reconsideration. In that statement, complainant argued that the agency

should not deduct the period she was in non-pay status from her back

pay because, by agreeing to pay her all back pay from June 21, 1998,

until her disability retirement date, the agency agreed not to deduct

any money for this period of time. The complainant further requested

attorney's fees for successfully appealing his settlement breach claim

to the Commission.

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2

0420090007

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

11

0420090007