01A00082
03-21-2002
Mary E. Trahan, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.
Mary E. Trahan v. United States Postal Service (Pacific Area)
01A00082
March 21, 2002
.
Mary E. Trahan,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A00082
Agency No. 1F-946-1014-94
Hearing No. 370-97-X2386
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final
decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
Complainant alleges she was discriminated against on the basis of her
disability (stress) when on November 6, 1993, her position was abolished.
For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final
decision.
The record reveals that at the relevant time, complainant was employed
as a General Clerk at the agency's Oakland, California, facility.
In July 1993, complainant requested a long-term light duty assignment of
a reduced work schedule due to stress resulting from demands of raising
three children as a single parent and working full time. Complainant
was granted a 20 hour per week schedule; in addition, certain duties
of her position (such as typing confidential disciplinary letters) were
reassigned after complainant expressed discomfort with performing such
duties in light of her background with the applicable union.
By letter dated October 5, 1993, complainant was notified that
her position as General Clerk would be abolished and the position
was abolished on November 6, 1993. Complainant filed a formal EEO
complaint with the agency on January 3, 1994, alleging that the agency
had discriminated against her as referenced above. At the conclusion
of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the investigative
report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
The AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of disability discrimination as complainant is not an individual with a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act. The AJ found that complainant
did not show that her impairment substantially limited any major life
activities. The AJ further concluded that even assuming complainant
established a prima facie case, the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant failed to
demonstrate were pretext for discriminatory animus. Specifically,
management officials at complainant's facility stated that under a
mandate from the Pacific Area Office, all overhead positions were
to be abolished. (Investigative Report, Exhibit 8). The Postmaster
at complainant's facility received notice in September 1993, that
complainant's position had been identified as an overhead position.
The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,
complainant contends that the AJ erred in finding that she is not an
individual with a disability as she was provided with a light-duty
assignment by the agency. Complainant further contends that her being
provided with a light-duty assignment of 20 hours per week shows that
the agency was aware she was substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. The agency requests that we affirm the FAD.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Here, we find that even assuming, arguendo, complainant has established
a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the agency articulated
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.<2> The record
reflects that the Postmaster of complainant's facility was instructed to
abolish all overhead positions by the Area office. Further, evidence
of record shows that complainant's position was determined to be an
overhead position by agency officials outside of complainant's facility.
Complainant has proffered no persuasive evidence to show that the
abolishment of her position was based upon unlawful discrimination.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds
that grant of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of
material fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized
the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. Construing the evidence to be most favorable to complainant,
we find that complainant failed to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that discrimination occurred. Thus, we affirm the agency's
final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 21, 2002
__________________
Date
1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment.
2 For the purposes of this decision, we need not address the issue
of whether complainant is an individual with a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act.