Martin Marietta Energy Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 4, 1987

283 N.L.R.B. 173 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY
Martin Marietta Energy Systems and Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union, Local
3-288. Case 10-CA-21503
4 March 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 29 September 1986 Administrative Law
Judge Howard I. Grossman issued the attached de-
cision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the -Respondent, Martin
Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order.
Howard Trimble, Esq., for the General Counsel.
W Bruce Swain, Esq., of Bethesda, Maryland, for the Re-
spondent.
John Williams, District Director, of Knoxville, Tennes-
see, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Howard L Grossman, Administrative Law Judge. The
charge was filed on 21 January 19861 by Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 3-288
(Local 3-288), and complaint issued on 13 May. It al-
leges in essence that, Martin Marietta Energy Systems
(the Company, or the Respondent) unilaterally and with-
out bargaining with Local 3-288 implemented a health
benefit plan for its employees in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act).
A hearing was held before me on this matter on 24
June 1986 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs. On the
entire record, and on my observation of the demeanor of
the witnesses, I make the following
I All dates are in 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
173
The Company is a Maryland corporation with an
office and place of business in Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
where it is engaged in the operation of laboratories and
nuclear facilities for the Department of Energy. During
the past calender year, a representative period, the Com-
pany sold and shipped from its Oak Ridge, Tennessee, fa-
cility finished products valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly to customers located outside the State of Tennes-
see. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings establish and I find that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
Local 3-288 has been certified since 1946 as the repre-
sentative of hourly employees in the Department of En-
ergy's gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The contractor operating those facilities at that time was
Union Carbide Corporation, and Local 3-288 entered
into a series of collective-bargaining agreements with
that contractor, the last one terminating in October 1984.
In that year, the Respondent was awarded a contract to
perform these functions, and, in October 1984, entered
into a current collective-bargaining agreement with the
"International Union . . . and its Local 3-288."2
Two memoranda of agreement made a part of the con-
tract specify that the Company agrees to provide for its
employees as Special Medical Expense Plan and a Hospi-
talization and Surgical' Plan, both administered by Con-
necticut General Life Insurance Company. The cost of
the first plan is divided equally between the Company
and participating employees, and the cost of the second
plan is borne wholly by the Company. Employee partici-
pation in both plans is voluntary.3
Article XV Section 1 of the collective-bargaining
agreement reads as follows:
Sectionl. It is hereby agreed that this contract con-
tains the complete agreement between the parties or
their successors, and no additions, waivers, dele-
tions, changes or amendments shall be made during
the life of this contract except by mutual consent, in
writing, of the parties.4
Although the complaint, as noted, alleges the unfair
labor practices to be the Company' s unilateral implemen-
tation of a health benefit plan, at the hearing the General
Counsel asserted that a "broader issue" was involved, to
wit, a midterm change in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment in violation of the proviso to Section 8(d) of the
'2 0 C. Exh. 3
3 G.C. Exhs 2 and 3 (pp 87-88)
4 G.C. Exh 3, p 63.
283 NLRB No. 31
174 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR- RELATIONS BOARD
Act. Company counsel agreed that this was an issue, that
it had been advanced in the past by the General Counsel,
and the Company's position was that no "midterm
change, (was) involved."
B. December 1985 Meeting of the Parties Concerning
a New Health Benefit Plan
1. Company notice of the meeting
Local 3-288 protests lack of notice to its International
of meeting held on 19 December 1985 concerning a new
health' benefit plan offered by the Company. Company
Superintendent of Personnel Relations Donald H. Blan-
ton testified without contradiction that he called Local
3-288 President John Herron on 18 December 1985, and
told him that the Company and the Local needed to get
together so that ,the Company could communicate infor-
mation on health care. Herron made no response.
Company Personnel Director Harry G. Conner af-
firmed that company practice in the past had been to
inform the local president of such meetings. International
representatives appeared in such meetings from time to
time; however, the Company did not notify them sepa-
rately. Although International Representative John Wil-
liams stated that International representatives were
present at meetings, he agreed that the procedure on oc-
casion had been for the Company to notify the local
president, who then informed the International. Williams
asserted that he first learned of the health benefit meet-
ing on the day after it was held, i.e., 20 December 1985.
2. The December meeting
Representative of the Company, Local 3-288, and an-
other labor organization were present during the meeting
on company premises.. Company Director of Personnel
Administration Robert E. Burnett told the union repre-
sentatives that the Company intended to make a health
maintenance organization plan (HMO) available to em-
ployees beginning in January 1986. Although Burnett did
not discuss any specific HMO plan, he compared HMO's
generally with the existing indemnity health benefit plan
being administered by Connecticut General, and utilized
slides -in his presentation. Only those employees living in
counties serviced by the HMO would be eligible. How-
ever, there would be no change in the existing indemnity
benefit plan, and an employee could elect to continue
with that plan. Like the old -plan, the HMO program was
optional. However, an employee could not elect to be
covered by' both plans-if the employee opted to remain
under the indemnity benefit plan, he could not enroll in
an HMO program even if he paid for it himself.
Various union representatives asked questions of Bur-
nett and received answers. The principal factual issue is
whether the Company stated that its intention to intro-
duce HMO's was not negotiable, or whether it told the
unions that the provisions of, an HMO plan were not ne-
gotiable. Minutes of the meeting ! kept by Company
Labor Relations Specialist D. E. Anderton, affirmed by
him to be accurate, show that Burnett was asked wheth-
er HMO plans were negotiable. Burnett's reply: "They
are not negotiable. HMO's themselves decide what they
offer."5 Anderton's testimony elaborated on Burnett's
reply-"[t]he HMO's themselves decide what they put
into the package that they offered employees. We were
not a part of that. We were not in the decision making in
that aspect of the benefit plans package itself." An offi-
cer of Local 3-288, Mike Church, testified that he also
kept minutes of the meeting, and that Burnett's reply to
the question was that "benefits are strictly determined by
the HMO and are not negotiable."
On the basis of this consistent evidence, I find that the
Company did not tell the union representatives that its
decision to offer HMO's was not negotiable. Rather, it
informed them that details of an HMO plan were formu-
lated by the HMO's, and were not negotiable.
The evidence also shows that Local 3-288 did not
agree or disagree with Burnett's statements, and that
Burnett did not ask whether Local 3-288 had any objec-
tions. In response to a question on whether there would
be further meetings on this issue, Burnett replied that
there would be further information in the mail, and that
the HMO's themselves would schedule meetings to ex-
plain the HMO programs.6
C. Dissemination of Further HMO Information
A company newspaper dated 26 December 1985 stated
that the Company had been evaluating HMO's and
planned to offer one to "employees in the near future as
an alternative to the present group medical plan."7 On 6
January 1986, the Company sent letters to employees ad-
vising them that two HMO plans (Blue Cross and Whit-
taker Health Services) would be made available with the
enrollment period from 15 January to 15 February 1986,
and that coverage would be effective 1 March 1986. The
letter stated that employees could remain with the cur-
rent plan if they chose to do so.8 A notice further ex-
plaining the plans was placed on company bulletin
boards on 15 January 1986,9 and a local newspaper car-
ried a story giving similar information. t 0
D. Other Company Programs
Company counsel stated at the hearing that the HMO
plan was a"classic case of a new program offered to the
collective-bargaining agent for his acceptence or com-
ment." The Company elicited evidence of other such
programs. Thus, Personnel Relations Superintendent
Blanton testified to the implementation of a special acci-
dent insurance plan, a service award program, and -a
scholarship program.1 I Blanton averred that - Local , 3-
288 was made aware of these programs about the time of
their implementation, but never requested bargaining
about them.
5 it Exh. 1.
6 On the question of whether Burnett was asked about further meet-
ings, I credit Anderton's minutes-which state that Mike Walls, a
member of the other labor organization, asked this question-rather than
Anderton's dental during his testimony R. Exh. 1, p. 3.
7 R Exh. 1, p. 2.
R Exh. 2
R. Exh. 3.
10 R Exh. 4.
11 R. Exhs. 5, 6, 7, and 8
MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY
The Company document describing the special acci-
dent insurance plan states that it constitutes "supplemen-
tal coverage" in cases of death, dismemberment, or total
disability. The eligibility requirements do not exclude
employees who are already covered by the existing hos-
pital and surgical plan.12 Although the collective-bar-
gaining agreement also provides for dental, group insur-
ance, and pension plans, there is no special accident in-
surance plan other than treatment for injury caused by
accidents in the basic hospital and surgical plan.13 Blan-
ton testified that the service award program did not re-
place any benefit in the existing contract, and examina-
tion of that document shows that it does not contain a
service award program or a scholarship plan.'4
E. Legal Analysis and Conclusions
As set forth above, although the complaint alleges
only the Company's unilateral implementation of a new
health benefit 'program, counsel for the General Counsel
stated at the hearing and the Respondent's counsel
agreed that the issue is whether the Respondent engaged
in a midterm modification of the collective-bargaining
agreement violative of the proviso to Sec. 8(d).1 s
The Board has recently explained the different princi-
ples involved in allegations of this nature:
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) establish an employer's
obligation to bargain in good faith with respect to
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." Generally, an employer may not uni-
laterally institute changes regarding these mandato-
ry subjects before reaching a good-faith impasse in
bargaining. Section 8(d) imposes an additional re-
quirement when a collective-bargaining agreement
is in effect and an employer seeks to "modif[y] . . .
the terms and conditions contained in" the contract:
the employer must obtain the union's consent before
implementing the change. If the employment condi-
tions the employer seeks to change are not "con-
12 R. Exhs. 5 and 7.
18 G.C Exh. 3.
14 Ibid
is The proviso to the first paragraph of Sec. 8(d) reads as follows
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining con-
tract covering employees in any industry affecting commerce, the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party de-
siring such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice on the other party to the contract of
the proposed termination or, modification sixty days prior to the ex-
piration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expi-
ration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such
termination or modification,
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose
of negotiating, a new contract or a contract containing the proposed
modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within
thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simul-
taneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency estab-
lished to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Terri-
tory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been
reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or
lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a
period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
175
tained in" the contract, however, the employer's
obligation remains the general one of bargaining in
good faith to impasse over the subject before insti-
tuting the proposed change. [Illinois Coil Spring Co.,
268 NLRB 601, 602 (1984), enfd. sub noun. Auto
Workers Local 547 v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).]
The Respondent-argues there was no midterm modifi-
cation of the contract. "No change, occurred in the nego-
tiated medical insurance plan contained in the collective-
bargaining agreement." Accordingly, no provision "con-
tained in" the contract was modified.16 After receiving
notice of the Company's intention to offer a new health
benefit plan, "[t]he Union consciously chose to sit back
not protest and file charges with the NLRB after enroll-
ment in the HMO's had commenced."" -Local 3-288
thus waived its rights to bargain on the issue of the
HMO's. The Company cites authorities in support of its
position, and the General Counsel cites similar authori-
ties, but seeks to distinguish them on the ground that
Local 3-288 was given inadequate notice of the time and
subject matter of the December meeting. 16
The basic premises on which the Company's waiver
argument depends is its position that there was no mid-
term change in the contract. The record shows that
there was no change in "the negotiated medical insur-
ance plan"-the employees were free to continue with
the plan if they chose to do so. However, it does not
follow from this fact that there was no change in the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. The Respondent's substitu-
tion of an HMO plan for the existing indemnity benefit
plan constituted a unilateral change in the contract.
Further, as set forth above, the contract provides that
there shall be no "additions, waivers, deletions, changes
or amendments' (to the contract) . . . except by mutual
consent in writing." The Company's unilateral implemen-
tation of the HMO program, without Local 3-288's writ-
ten'or other consent, modified this provision of the con-
tract.
The other programs made available to employees
without Local 3-288's consent did not necessarily consti-
tute midterm modifications, because their subject matters
were not covered by the contract, and the employees
could receive the new benefits without sacrificing any
contractual right. Nor did Local 3-288's silence when
they were implemented constitute acquiescence in any
future modifications of the contract. In this case, an em-
ployee could sign up for an HMO plan only as an alter-
native to the contractual indemnity benefit program,
which would then be denied to him. It is clear that the
HMO plan was, thus an "addition" to, a "change" in, or
an "amendment" to the existing contract.19 Its imple-
18 R. beef, p 9.
17 Id. at 12.
18 G.C. brief, p 11
19, The Respondent's action would have been unlawful even if the em-
ployees had not been compelled to sacrifice the existing benefit plan. By
making a new plan available, the Respondent was adding an additional
and possibly advantageous feature to a benefit already covered by the
contract. It, is unlawful for an employer unilaterally to pay employees
Continued
176 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mentation without Local 3-288 's written consent consti-
tuted an abrogation of the contractual provision requir-
ing such consent , and thus further modified the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
None of the many waiver cases cited by the Respond-
ent20 or distinguished by the General Counsel21 in-
volved the midterm modification of a collective -bargain-
ing agreement . The issue is not whether Local 3-288
waived a bargaining right, but, rather , whether it aban-
doned a contractual right for which it had already bar-
gained and had obtained in a written agreement . In such
cases, the requirements of the proviso to Section 8(d) are
explicit, as set forth above . The Respondent did not
serve the required written notices , offer to , meet with the
other party , notify the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service, or continue in full force the existing agree-
ment. 22 The following language of an administrative law
judge has been accepted by the Board with judicial ap-
proval:
It is undisputed that Respondent implemented
changes in an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment without the Union 's consent . Such conduct is
violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act be-
cause Section 8 (d), which defines the duty to bar-
gain, prohibits such changes ... In this case, the
Union did not agree to Respondent's proposed
modifications . In these circumstances , the Board
and the Courts have clearly and consistently found
an employer's mid-term modification of a fixed term
contract to be unlawful . See Oak Cliff-Golman
Baking Co., 207 NLRB 1063 , 1064 ( 1973), enfd. 505
F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 826
(1975); C & S Industries, Inc., 158 NLRB 454, 457-
458 (1966); We-Care Trading Co., Ltd., 265 NLRB
No. 56, slip op . at 7 (1982). La Porte Transport Co.,
JD-152-84, quoted in Herman Brothers, Inc., 273
NLRB 124, 125 (1984), enfd . mem. 780 F.2d 1015
(3d Cir. 1985).23
more wages than the amount specified in the collective-bargammg agree-
ment. European Parts Exchange, 270 NLRB 1244 (1984). Making addition-
al benefits of the same nature available to employees without the Union's
consent stands on the same footing
20 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292
(1939); NLRB v. Island Typographers, 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. Spun-Jee Corp, 385 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Alva Allen Indus-
tries, 369 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1967) Charlie's Oil Co, 267 NLRB 764 (1963);
Talbert Mfg., 264 NLRB 1051 (1982), Towne' Plaza Hotel, 258 NLRB 69
(1981); K & S Circuits, 255 NLRB 1270 (1981); W G. Best Homes Corp.,
253 NLRB 912 (1980), Citizens Natl Bank of Willmar, 245 NLRB 389
(1979) Citizens Hospital of East Liverpool, 234 NLRB 58 (1978); Clarkwood
Corp, 233 NLRB 1172 (1977); Globe-Union, Inc., 222 NLRB 1081 (1976);
Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital, 221 NLRB 670 (1975); U.S Lingerie
Corp., 170 NLRB 750 (1968); American Bushnes, 164 NLRB 1055 (1967)
21 Cherokee Culvert Co., 266 NLRB 290 (1983), Hartmann Luggage
Co., 173 NLRB 1254 (1968)
22 Although this inaction was not specifically alleged in the complaint,
the latter "clearly encompassed Respondent's failure to comply with Sec-
tion 8(d) by its unilateral change and Respondent was not misled into fail-
mg to litigate this issue " Herman Brothers, 273 NLRB 124, 126 (1984),
enfd mem. 780 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir 1985)
23 See also Burger Pits, 273 NLRB 1001 (1984), enfd 121 LRRM 3305
(9th Cir 1986), Croft Metals, 272 NLRB 208 (1985) (note reference to
change in a health insurance plan at 213), enfd. 771 F 2d 849 (5th Cir
1985), Campo Slacks, 266 NLRB 492 (1983).
In accordance with my findings above, I make the fol-
lowing
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Martin Marietta Energy System is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 3-288 is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all relevant times the foregoing labor organiza-
tion has been and continues to be the exclusive represent-
ative of Respondent's employees in the following unit
found appropriate for the purposes of collective-bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All hourly employees, excluding guards and salaried
employees (monthly or weekly) employed by the
Respondent at its Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion
Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
4. At all relevant times the Respondent and the fore-
going labor organization have been parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement concerning employees in the
unit described above which, inter alia, provides for a
Special Medical Expense Plan and a Hospitalization and
Surgical Plan, and, further, provides that no additions,
waivers, deletions, changes or amendments in said agree-
ment will be made except by mutual consent, in writing,
of the parties to the contract.
5. By offering to the employees in the unit described
above and by implementing without the written consent
of said labor organization, a new Health Maintenance
Organization plan as an alternative to the foregoing con-
tractual rights, which would be sacrificed upon employ-
ees acceptance of the new plan, the Respondent thereby
unilaterally added to, deleted from, changed, or amended
said collective-bargaining agreement, and modified by
abrogation that section of the contract requiring that any
such modification be by mutual consent and_in writing.
6. The Respondent's action described above constitutes
a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(d) of
the Act, and thus constitutes, a violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act, in-
cluding the posting of the attached notice. I shall recom-
mend that the Respondent be ordered to rescind its un-
lawful modification of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment by withdrawing its offer of Health Maintenance
Organization benefits as an alternative to the existing
medical benefits under the contract.
It is the Board's established policy not to require re-
scission of an unlawful wage increase previously granted,
because of the injury thereby sustained by employees.
MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY ' 177
European Parts Exchange, supra, 270 NLRB at 1245. In-
asmuch as some of the Respondent's employees may
have accepted the new medical plan being administered
by third-party health maintenance organizations, and
abrupt termination of said plans might similarly be injuri-
ous to said employees, I shall recommend that nothing in
the Order be construed to require the Respondent to ter-
minate any such existing individual plan. However, the
evidence shows that such plans have coverage for a spe-
cific period of time, with employee option thereafter to
change to another plan. The rescission order recom-
mended shall apply to any subsequent renewal of the
new plan, absent the Respondent's compliance with its
contractual obligation to obtain the written consent of
the aforesaid labor organization.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed24
dix."2$ Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
ORDER
The Respondents, Martin Marietta Energy Systems,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, its officers; agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Offering or implementing new health benefit pro-
grams which offer benefits otherwise covered by its ex-
isting collective-bargaining agreement with Oil, Chemi-
cal and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 3-
288, without the written consent of said labor organiza-
tion.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the rights guaran-
teed then by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the, Act.
(a) Rescind its offer of a' Health Maintenance Organi-
zation plan made available to employees in the unit de-
scribed above, absent the written consent thereto by the
above-name labor organization, provided that nothing
shall be construed so as to require the Respondent to re-
scind an already existing individual plan prior the end of
the period when it expires according to its terms.
(b) Post at its Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Gaseous Diffu-
sion plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT offer or implement any new health ben-
efit plan which offers 'benefits otherwise covered by our
existing collective-bargaining agreement with Oil, Chem-
ical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 3-
288, without the written consent of said labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind our prior offer and implementation
of a new health benefit plan and will not renew it with-
out the written consent of the aforesaid Union, except
that we will not interfere with any existing individual
plans for the period of their existing coverage as speci-
fied in the said plans.
MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEMS