Marsh Furiture Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 1977

230 N.L.R.B. 580 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Marsh Furniture Company, Inc. and Upholsterers'
International Union, AFL-CIO. Cases I1-CA-
6410 and I l-CA-6389
June 28, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On February 9, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Peter E. Donnelly issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief and cross-
exceptions and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,2 as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Marsh Furniture Company, Inc., High Point,
North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
i. Insert the following as paragraphs 1(d) and (e)
and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(d) Threatening employees to close the plant if
unionization occurred.
"(e) Illegally interrogating employees concerning
union matters."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Administrative Law Judge on the basis that he did not rely on the
demeanor of the witnesses. We find the General Counsel's exceptions
without merit since the Administrative Law Judge specifically stated that, in
evaluating the testimony of each witness, demeanor was a consideration (fn.
2 of his Decision). The Respondent has also excepted to certain of the
Administrative Law Judge's credibility resolutions. It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3,
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing his findings.
230 NLRB No. 86
2 The Administrative Law Judge made findings which were inadvertently
omitted from his recommended Order and notice and we shall modify his
recommended Order accordingly.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT create impressions of surveillance
or interrogate employees in order to discourage
membership in Upholsterers' International
Union, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to report on the
union activities of other employees on behalf of
Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to repudiate
Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees to close the
plant if the plant is unionized.
WE WILL NOT illegally interrogate employees
concerning union matters.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
MARSH FURNITURE
COMPANY, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PETER E. DONNELLY, Administrative Law Judge: The
original charge in Case 11-CA-6410 was filed by the
Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO, herein
called Union or Charging Party, on January 19, 1976, and
amended on February 17, 1976. A complaint thereon was
issued on February 27, 1976. The charge in Case I 11-CA-
6389 was filed by the Union on December 31, 1975. The
amended consolidated complaint herein, was issued on
May 19, 1976, alleging that Marsh Furniture Company,
Inc., herein called Respondent or Employer, violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Charles
Bullard, Jr., and by engaging in certain other misconduct
as detailed herein. Answers were timely filed by Respon-
dent. Pursuant to notice, the hearing was held before me at
High Point, North Carolina, on August 23, 24, and
September 10, 1976. Briefs have been timely filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent which have been duly
considered.
580
MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
Employer is a North Carolina corporation with a plant at
High Point, North Carolina, where it is engaged in the
manufacture of kitchen and bathroom furniture. During
the past 12 months, Employer purchased materials valued
in excess of $50,000 from points directly outside the State
of North Carolina and during the same period, Employer
shipped from its plants to points directly outside the State
of North Carolina, products valued in excess of $50,000.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
1. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The answer admits this allegation and I so find.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that on or about December 19,
1975, Respondent discharged Bullard in violation of
Section 8(aX3) of the Act. Further, the complaint alleges
that certain supervisors and officers of Respondent
engaged in coercive misconduct within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, including interrogation, threats,
impressions of surveillance of union activity, solicitation of
employees to repudiate the Union and to report on the
union activities of other employees.
A. Facts2
1. Allegations of coercion
Respondent employs some 250 production employees. In
April 1975, the Union made initial efforts to organize these
employees and a petition for an election was filed on
December I (Case I -RC-4114).
In September, George Marsh, president of Respondent
after consultation with labor counsel for Respondent, met
and spoke to some 12 groups of employees consisting of
from 18 to 30 employees per group. George Bullard, the
alleged discriminatee herein, testified that at the September
meeting of the shipping department employees George
Marsh stated, inler alia, that he would close the plant
before he would let a union come in. Another shipping
department employee, Jesse Clinton, testified that Marsh
told them that if a union got in they would close the doors.
Carl Adams, another shipping department employee,
testified that Marsh told them that the Company would not
operate with a union.
I All dates refer to 1975 unless otherwise indicated.
2 There is conflicting testimony regarding some of the 8(a)( I) allegations
of the complaint and relevant incidents surrounding Bullard's discharge. In
resolving these conflicts I have taken into consideration the apparent
interests of the witness. In this connection, in crediting the testimony of the
General Counsel's employee-witnesses, the fact that they were still
employed by Respondent against whom they testified was a factor
supporting their credibility particularly when weighed against the obvious
interest of the Employer. In addition I have considered the inherent
According to Marsh, he spoke to these employees from
handwritten notes which he had reduced from a speech he
had drafted based on conversation with counsel. Marsh
testified that while he did not read the speech verbatim he
used his notes with each of these groups to "hit each point
with each group." Marsh specifically denied having made
statements concerning the closing of the plant. While the
notes may not as written be coercive, indeed some are
without meaning except perhaps to the writer thereof,
Respondent concedes that the notes were not followed
verbatim and, based on the corroborated testimony of
Bullard, Clinton, and Adams, I conclude that these
statements were made.
On or about November 19, Bullard testified to a
conversation with Micky Carter, shipping department
foreman, outside of the shipping clerk's office wherein,
according to Bullard, he was asked by Carter what he
thought about a union, to which Bullard answered that he
was for it "all the way." During this same conversation
Carter told him that Everett Marsh, chairman of Respon-
dent's board of directors wanted to see him. Bullard went
to Marsh's office where a conversation ensued during
which Marsh observed that there were rumors circulating
about a union and Marsh expressed his unqualified
opposition to it. According to Bullard he said that before
he would let a union come in he would shut the door.
Further that the Company would not have anything else to
do with any employee who participated in "this union
stuff," and told Bullard he wanted him to talk to the other
employees about not supporting the Union. When Marsh
asked if he was getting through to Bullard, he responded in
the negative. Marsh concedes that he asked Bullard to
come to his office because he was an "influential" person
in the shipping department. Marsh denied having made the
specific statements attributed to him in the conversation,
but as to these incidents I credit Bullard, noting particular-
ly that Marsh was equivocal. As to the Carter incident, I
note that Carter did not testify about it. Further, Marsh
was somewhat vague, particularly in response to questions
about why he had called Bullard to his office.
Bullard also testified that from the time the Union's
organizational campaign began in April or May until he
was discharged on December 19, Bill Coleman, plant
supervisor, asked him from time to time if he was still a
unionman and Bullard replied, "Yes, all the way."
Coleman denies having so questioned Bullard, however, for
the reasons noted above I credit Bullard and conclude that
he was so questioned.
Clinton testified that, about a week after George Marsh's
September speech to the shipping department employees,
he was asked by Carter in the shipping office about a
union, to wit, had Clinton attended union meetings?
Clinton answered affirmatively. Carter told him that he
probabilities; the probabilities in light of other events; corroboration or lack
of it; and consistencies or inconsistencies within the testimony of each
witness and between the testimony of each and that of other witnesses with
similar or apparent interests. In evaluating the testimony of each witness, I
relied specifically on his demeanor and have made my findings accordingly
and while apart from considerations of demeanor I have taken into account
inconsistencies and conflicting evidence, my failure to detail each of these is
not to be deemed a failure on my part to have fully considered it. Bishop and
Malco, Inc., 159 NLRB 1159, 1161 (1966).
581
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
knew of two times that they had been down there, but he
did not identify "they." Carter also stated that Respondent
would close the doors if the Union came in. Noting that
Carter did not testify as to this incident, I credit Clinton
and conclude that the statement was made.
Clinton also testified that in December, about 2 weeks
before Christmas, he went to see James Marsh, Respon-
dent's vice president, to borrow money. During the course
of the conversation Marsh asked him if he had heard
anything about the Union? Upon receiving an affirmative
reply Marsh asked who was the leader. When Clinton
responded that he did not know, Marsh asked him to let
him (Marsh) know if he found out and Clinton agreed.
When asked how he would vote Clinton said he did not
know. Marsh denied having asked who the union leader
was and was not questioned as to the rest of the
conversation. For the reasons noted above, and because his
version was more complete, detailed, and, for the most
part, unrebutted, I credit Clinton.
Clinton further testified that on January 2, 1976, he told
Bill Coleman, upon inquiry, about the Union; that he did
not know how he would vote. Coleman also told him that if
he was asked by Everett Marsh if he were a company man
he should say that he was. Coleman denied that he made
these statements to Clinton. However, based on the above
credibility factors Clinton's version of the conversation
appears to me to be the more plausible and I credit it.
Employee James Bell testified that, in December, during
a conversation with Everett Marsh, he was told by Everett
Marsh that he (Marsh) knew that he was working hard for
the Union and asked what he knew about the Union.
Marsh also asked if they had enough union cards signed
for an election. Bell said he did not know. Everett Marsh
recalled the conversation with Bell, during which the
matter of the Union was discussed but denies making the
above statements attributed to him by Bell. Based on the
factors noted above, I credit Bell as to this conversation.
Bell also testified that on January 5 or 6, 1976, while
working at his machine, Coleman approached him and told
him that the "old man," meaning Everett Marsh, wanted to
know how he was going to vote. Bell replied that he did not
know. On the following day Bell was invited by Coleman to
his office where there ensued a conversation. Coleman
made the same inquiry and Bell replied that he had not
made up his mind how he was going to vote. Coleman
recalls the conversation with Bell concerning the union
election but maintains that it consisted of Bell volunteering
the information that he had 21 votes he could control and
Coleman opining that Marsh would do more for the
employees without a union than with a union. Bell's
version is more convincing and I credit him.
Employee Jimmy Morrison testified that, in early
October, he was called to the office of Everett Marsh where
he was asked "What is this I hear that you all are trying to
form a union here?" Marsh told him that he understood
that he was one of the main leaders and asked him what he
thought about a union. Morrison admitted that he had
been to union meetings but had not made up his mind
about it. When asked why the employees were forming a
union, Morrison told him that they wanted to better their
wages and working conditions.
On or about January 12, 1976, according to Morrison, he
was asked by Coleman to go to Everett Marsh's office. In
Marsh's office he was accused of taking employees' names
off timecards at lunchtime and giving them to Ted Davis,
the union organizer. He was asked by Coleman how he felt
about the Union and Marsh told him he was trying to help
himself, to make more money, and to get better working
conditions. Everett Marsh denied in general terms that he
ever questioned employees about what they were doing,
only gave them his opinions. He did not testify specifically
regarding the October conversation set out above, and he
denied having any conversation with Morrison about
taking names off timecards. However, for the reasons
noted above, I credit Morrison's version of these two
conversations.
Employee Emmett Moorefield testified that, on Septem-
ber 10, at or about 3:15 p.m., he was summoned to Everett
Marsh's office where Marsh told him he wanted to talk
about the Union. Asked how he felt about the Union,
Moorefield said he did not know; that he did not know that
much about unions. He inquired of Moorefield how strong
the Union was; how many people really favored it, and
Moorefield said he did not know. He told Moorefield not
to sign union cards or have anything to do with union
people when they came around. Marsh asked him how to
keep the Union out and Moorefield said he had no idea.
On October 30, at or about 11:15 a.m., Moorefield was
again called to Everett Marsh's office. Marsh charged him
with helping to destroy what he had spent a lifetime
building. He stated that he would not deal with the Union
and asked Moorefield to help him fight the Union.
Morefield further testified that, on November II 1, Marsh
came to him while he was working at his grinding machine,
tapped him on his shoulder, and asked him if he was
"working on the union." Moorefield said he was not.
Marsh told him that he had heard that Moorefield was
soliciting for the Union. Moorefield denied it and Marsh
told him that he did not want him working "on this other
thing on my time."
Everett Marsh testified that he had only one conversa-
tion with Moorefield in his office but that he frequently
had to talk to him on the floor to get him to stop soliciting
for the Union and to go to work. Marsh concedes that he
did not actually hear any of the "soliciting" but got his
information in hearsay fashion from other employees.
Marsh did not testify concerning the content of any of the
alleged conversations except as to one conversation in his
office which he described as a "pleasant talk." Moorefield's
testimony is essentially unrebutted as to these conversa-
tions and I credit his version.
2. Bullard's discharge
Bullard was first hired by Respondent in 1965. He quit
his employment and was rehired several times until his last
period of employment which began in July 1974.
As noted earlier the Union's organizational effort began
about April 1975. Bullard was a member of the in-plant
organizing committee. During the union campaign, Bullard
solicited some 50 employees to join the Union and sign
union authorization cards. About 20 employees signed
cards which were given to Davis.
582
MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY
At the time he was hired one of Bullard's duties was to
pull empty trailers across a public street to loading docks
where they were loaded and to pull them out and park
them after they were loaded. This trailer moving was done
with a tractor known as a "yard dog" and required a
chauffeur's license since the movements involved crossing
a public thoroughfare. At the time of Bullard's employment
in July 1974, he was taken by Respondent to obtain a
chauffeur's license which was paid for by Respondent.
In addition to the work of moving trailers which
consumed an hour to an hour and a half each day Bullard
was assigned work of pulling freight from the inventory for
loading and also the actual loading of trailers. Bullard
became dissatisfied both with the difficulty of his work and
the pay that he received for it. He expressed his dissatisfac-
tion to Carter about a month after he was hired and Carter
promised him some help. About a month later, in January
1975, he complained to Carter again and was told he was
doing a good job and that he would get some help for him.
This was the last time Bullard complained to management
about his job until the time of his discharge. It appears that
Bullard as well as others in the shipping department were
given raises. For Bullard, the amount of his raise was 15
cents per hour which he received in about October 1975.
Concerning the events immediately preceeding Bullard's
discharge it appears that on December 18, at or about 3:15
p.m., Kenneth Watts, leadman in the shipping department,
upon instructions from Carter, asked Bullard to back two
trailers up to the dock for loading. Bullard was pulling
freight at the time. Watts routinely made such requests on a
daily basis upon instructions from Carter since he had
more frequent contact with Bullard. At the time of this
particular request, Carter was attending a meeting with the
traffic manager at another location. Bullard responded that
he was tired of getting the "flunky jobs" and that he was
not going to back the trailers any more. Upon Carter's
return about 4 p.m., Watts reported to him that Bullard
was refusing to back in the trailers. Carter told Watts to
forget about it; that he would take care of it in the
morning.
On the following morning, December 19, about 8 a.m.,
Carter met Bullard and asked him to back in two trailers
when he got a chance. 3 Bullard told Carter that he was not
going to do it any more. When questioned about it Bullard
told him that he was tired of it and that Respondent was
taking advantage of him. When asked what he meant,
Bullard tojd Carter that he would just have to figure that
out for himself.
After this, Carter went to the main office and told
George Marsh about the incident. George Marsh told him
to take it up with Jimmy Marsh and Coleman. Thereupon,
Carter went to Coleman and told him about Bullard's
refusal to back in the trailers and explained that he needed
a man to back in the trailers. Coleman said that he would
get someone, and shortly thereafter, an employee named
Ron Kenley from the paneling department moved the two
trailers and returned to his own department. Kenley had
3 Since two trailers had been backed into the loading dock by
truckdrivers of Respondent during the night, there was no need for more
empty trailers until about 9 or 9:30 a.m.
4 Bullard testified that he never refused to do any job he was asked to do
previously done the job of moving trailers and had a
chauffeur's license. As Carter and Coleman were walking
back to the plant they met Jimmy Marsh. Coleman told
Marsh what he had been told by Carter and Marsh told
him to go handle it and also to talk to Bullard.
At or about 10 or 10:30 a.m. Coleman sent for Bullard to
come to his office. Coleman testified that in this conversa-
tion Bullard conceded that he had been asked by Carter to
back in the trailers. When asked by Coleman why he
refused Bullard said that the work was too hard and the
pay too low. When asked if he was still refusing to back in
the trailers Bullard replied, "Yes" and reiterated that he
was not going to move any more trailers. Coleman told
Bullard that he would have to report what Bullard had told
him to George Marsh and a decision would have to be
made on it.4
At or about 11 a.m. Coleman reported the problem to
George Marsh. David Irwin, an attorney retained by
Respondent in connection with the above-noted represen-
tation case, was also present. Coleman explained what had
transpired, including Bullard's contention that the work
was too hard and the pay too low. Coleman reviewed
Bullard's wages and the fact of his recent 15-cent wage hike
was discussed and a consensus reached that his wages were
in line with his duties. As to the difficulty of his work, the
matter was discussed and included comment to the effect
that he was hired to move trailers and that when he was so
employed it was the only duty he was performing. Coleman
and Marsh agreed that Bullard was a good employee,
capable of doing anything he wanted to do. Coleman
recommended that Bullard be discharged but no decision
was made at this meeting to fire him. Coleman and Marsh
conceded that as a matter of company policy employees
are free to discuss their problems with any level of
management and that every effort would be made to adjust
the matter. Further that no employee is discharged without
a thorough investigation. The substance of this company
policy appears in Respondent's handbook entitled "Per-
sonnel Policies" (G. C. Exh. 2).
Coleman also testified that while they discussed the
possibility of moving someone from another department to
move the trailers, the idea was rejected as unwarranted for
a job requiring only about I to 1-1/2 hours per day as part
of Bullard's duties.
When asked why Bullard was not brought into the
meeting in an attempt to adjust the problem Coleman
replied, "Well, we didn't feel like it was necessary, I had
already talked to Charles and he had flatly refused to move
the trailers. This was the big issue." Subsequent to having
reviewed Bullard's personnel folder and going over the
circumstances of the problem with Irwin, George Marsh
decided to discharge Bullard. Irwin advised Marsh that the
discharge was justified but that in view of the pending
union election, Respondent would probably draw an unfair
labor practice if Bullard was discharged.
At or about 3:40 p.m., George Marsh called Bullard to
his office for the purpose of discharging him. Marsh
on either December 18 or 19: however, while I have credited Bullard as to
certain allegations of coercion, I do not credit this testimony, particularly in
view of the mutually corroborating testimony of Watts, Carter, and
Coleman, all to the contrary.
583
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concedes that he had made the decision without first
speaking to Bullard. Inasmuch as three people had already
spoken to him and having discussed and investigated the
matter he felt it was a proper decision. Marsh told Bullard
that he was being discharged for refusing to move the
trailers. Bullard made no effort to defend his position and
responded negatively when asked if he had anything to say.
Marsh also testified that other employees had been
discharged in the past for refusing to perform assigned
work and he named three who had been discharged since
1973.
B. Discussion and Analysis
I. The 8(a)(1) allegations
Having credited the General Counsel's witnesses as to
those conversations containing the substance of the 8(a)(1)
allegations herein, I conclude that the General Counsel's
allegations of coercion have been established and that
Respondent thereby, with the exception noted below,
engaged in misconduct proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Respondent engaged in the illegal interrogation of
employees concerning union matters; created an impres-
sion of Respondent's surveillance of these employees'
union activities; threatened to close the plant if it were
organized; solicited employees to report to Respondent on
the union activity of other employees; and solicited
employees to repudiate the Union.
However, even crediting Moorefield, I cannot conclude
that the evidence establishes that Everett Marsh threatened
him for supporting the Union, and no inference of such a
threat is warranted on the facts herein.
2. Bullard's discharge
It is the position of the General Counsel that Bullard was
discharged because he was a leading union adherent.
Respondent contends that Bullard was discharged because
he refused to perform ajob for which he had been hired. In
my opinion, the evidence supports Respondent's position.
It is undisputed that at the time Bullard was hired, one of
his jobs was to move trailers. The Company arranged for
him to obtain the necessary chauffeur's license and paid for
it. When Bullard became unhappy with his pay and duties,
he simply refused to perform one of them, that of moving
the trailers to the dock for loading. The testimony of three
Respondent witnesses supports the conclusion that he
flatly refused to perform the work, which therefore had to
be done by another employee from another department.
The General Counsel, however, contends that the
discharge was a "classic case of a company's officials and
supervisors combining and conspiring to rid the company
of a known leading union adherent." General Counsel
argues that Respondent did not follow its own personnel
rules in discharging Bullard, since no effort was made to
investigate the matter or to adjust it with him prior to
discharge.
However, it appears that the matter of Bullard's pay and
the difficulties of the work assigned to him was the subject
of discussion by Respondent's management and counsel
before the decision to discharge him was made. This
decision also recognized the good quality of Bullard's work
but was not controlling as to the question of termination.
The General Counsel argues that George Marsh failed to
counsel with Bullard before discharging him or giving him
another chance, and that this was extraordinary so as to
indicate that he was discharged because of his union
sentiments. However, since Bullard had already refused
three times to three different people to move the trailers
and his pay and duties had already been examined, further
management consultation was not a prerequisite to
termination for such flagrant insubordination.
General Counsel also points out as a factor suggesting
Respondent's connivance that there was no immediate
need for the trailers to be loaded at the time that the
alleged request was made. While it is true that there was
loading work to be done, and that the trailers would not be
needed for loading for an hour or so, I cannot conclude
that making the request was other than a legitimate
exercise of business judgment in order to have trailers
available for loading as they became needed.
In summary, the evidence discloses that Bullard was a
union sympathizer and had engaged in activity on behalf of
the Union. Further, I am convinced that Respondent was
aware of Bullard's sentiments. It is apparent that Respon-
dent was strongly opposed to being organized. The
coercion engaged in by Respondent shows unmistakable
union animus. However, in order to establish that Bullard
was discharged for antiunion reasons, another element
must be established; to wit, that Bullard was discharged
because of his union sentiments or activities. It is the latter
element which is lacking. I cannot conclude that Bullard
was discharged because of his union activity where the
record reflects that he flatly refused on three different
occasions, to three different representatives of manage-
ment, to perform work assigned to him which he had been
hired to perform. While it may be that Respondent
welcomed the opportunity to fire a known union adherent,
the General Counsel has not met its burden of establishing
that the discharge was for antiunion considerations rather
than for cause. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent
did not violate Section 8(a)( 3 ) of the Act in discharging
Bullard.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and from infringing in any like
or related manner on its employees' Section 7 rights, and
that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
584
MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record in this proceeding, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. Employer did not otherwise violate the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER5
The Respondent, Marsh Furniture Company, Inc., High
Point, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Creating impressions of surveillance or interrogating
or threatening employees in order to discourage member-
' In the event no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
ship in and activities on behalf of Upholsterers' Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO.
(b) Soliciting employees to report on the activities of
other employees on behalf of Upholsterers' International
Union, AFL-CIO.
(c) Soliciting employees to repudiate Upholsterers'
International Union, AFL-CIO.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in High Point, North Carolina, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 11, after being duly signed by the Employer's
authorized representatives, shall be posted by it immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region II 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Company has taken to comply herewith.
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
585