MARSANO, SONIA et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 16, 202013337659 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/337,659 12/27/2011 SONIA MARSANO 2010P04418 1427 27350 7590 11/16/2020 LERNER GREENBERG STEMER LLP Box SA P.O. BOX 2480 HOLLYWOOD, FL 33022-2480 EXAMINER AGWUMEZIE, CHINEDU CHARLES ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@patentusa.com office@patentusa.com vrahimis@patentusa.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SONIA MARSANO and FRANCESCO RUSSO ____________ Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Sonia Marsano and Francesco Russo (Appellant2) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1–12, the only claims pending 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed December 21, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 10, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 11, 2019), and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 30, 2018). Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 2 in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Appellant invented a way of handling a computer software license, and more precisely of an improved management of software licenses in a computer network. Spec. para. 2. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 1. A method for managing a software license in a computer network according to client-server protocol, which comprises the following steps executed at a server side: [1] with a computer, instituting license types for each software application according to differently composed bundles of software applications to be licensed; [2] with the computer, calculating a price of each of the license types according to a specificity of software application, a size indicating a number of entities associated with one of the license types for which the price is calculated, and a weight assigned to increase in value depending on a bundle of a plurality of software applications that the software application belongs to; [3] with the computer, gathering from at least a software owner license keys connected to the licenses for using new software applications or using upgrades to new versions of the software applications; 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Appeal Br. 1). Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 3 [4] with the computer, storing collected license keys; [5] with the computer, checking unlicensed accesses to the software applications on every accessing client by a comparison between the collected license keys and the license keys installed locally to the client; [6] with the computer, sending first-type warning messages of license violation to unlicensed clients when unlicensed accesses to the software applications are detected; [7] with the computer, receiving requests for upgrading sizes of licensed software applications from licensees; [8] with the computer, calculating an equivalent number of credits for every size, which indicates a number of entities associated with one of the license types, in a request for upgrading a licensed software application that is received from a licensee, a free amount of which being purchasable by the licensees to be freely allocated to the software applications independently of their version and bundle; and [9] with the computer, comparing a calculated number of credits with an amount of credits available to the licensee, and if the calculated number of credits is greater than the amount of credits sending a second-type warning message of insufficient credits to the licensee. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 4 The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: Name Reference Date Aldis US 2004/0039916 A1 Feb. 26, 2004 Sweeney US 2009/0005001 A1 Jan. 1, 2009 Logan US 2010/0131558 A1 May 27, 2010 Vanderland US 2012/0011013 A1 Jan. 12, 2012 Claims 1–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.3 Claims 1–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aldis, Sweeney, Vanderland, and Logan. ISSUES The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired. The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether the applied art describes the claim limitations. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Facts Related to the Prior Art Aldis 01. Aldis is directed to the licensing of multimedia content and software, and more particularly, to using one or more 3 The Final Rejection only includes claims 1–11. Final Act. 4. Claim 12 depends from claim 1 and only recites request content, of no substantial consequence to the analysis. Neither party mentions this omission from the rejection. This is therefore taken to be a typographic error. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 5 clearinghouses to proactively facilitate licensing of digital content and/or software between content providers, upstream and downstream distributors, and end users, and providing reports and other support to users of the system and method as needed. Aldis para. 3. 02. Aldis describes creating a license in a license distribution network, offering the license for acquisition, acquisition or transferal via the license distribution network, optionally selling and otherwise providing the license through the license distribution network to an end user, bundling the license in the license distribution network, downloading the license to the end user, validating the license with the license clearinghouse and activating the license to be used by the end user. Aldis para. 17. Sweeney 03. Sweeney is directed to a feature credit. Sweeney para. 3. 04. Sweeney describes a billing system that shows wireless devices that may be completely or partially purchased with a credit total. The credit total may have incremented to the point that the user may redeem the credits completely to obtain a specified wireless device. Alternatively, the total credits may be insufficient to obtain a specified wireless device. As a result, the user may be shown a purchase price that may be paid in conjunction with the redemption of the total credits to purchase the specified device. For example, if a newly released smart phone/PC is available for 400 credits but the user only has 280 credits, the user may still be Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 6 able to use the smart phone/PC if willing to pay the dollar equivalent of 120 credits which may be $60. Sweeney para. 42. Vanderland 01. Vanderland is directed to the licensing and pricing of digital media, and more particularly, but not exclusively, to a system that unifies the pricing and licensing of digital media managed by a digital media system using cash or credits. Vanderland para. 1. 02. Vanderland describes a purchase interface that enables a customer to pay for a license to a digital media item using either cash or credits. Vanderland para. 8. 03. Vanderland describes a pricer that responds to requests for prices. Pricer obtains price information for one or more media items from purchase database. To provide a license price in cash for a media item, pricer first obtains the price in credits from price database and then looks up the associated cash value in the credits to cash conversion table. Pricing for a media item is based on the price tier to which it belongs and the size of the media item. There are three price tiers: a lower priced “value” price tier; a moderately priced “mid” price tier; and a higher priced “premium” price tier. Each different size of a media item has a different price within the price tier. Pricing is established by defining price tiers, and prices for different sizes within each price tier, rather than being established individually for each media item. Vanderland para. 65. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 7 Logan 04. Logan is directed to the management of copyright licensing in connection with businesses that display and/or perform copyrighted works. Logan para. 1. 05. Logan describes a system indicating whether an existing license with a licensing body is being adequately used and if not, the system suggesting that such license be terminated. Logan para. 142. ANALYSIS Claims 1–12 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more STEP 14 Claim 1, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. STEP 2 The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and 4 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 8 “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 1 At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method claim 1 recites instituting license types, calculating prices, gathering and storing license key data, checking data representing unlicensed accesses, sending message data, receiving request data, calculating credit data, Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 9 comparing data, and sending more message data. Instituting license types is generating and modifying data. Calculating price data and credit data are forms of mathematical analysis. Gathering data is receiving data. Checking and comparing data are rudimentary data analysis. Sending data is transmitting data. Thus, claim 1 recites generating, modifying, analyzing, receiving, storing, and transmitting data. None of the limitations recites technological implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means. From this we see that claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract idea are patent ineligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas include (1) mathematical concepts,5 (2) certain methods of organizing human activity,6 and (3) mental processes.7 Among those certain methods of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 1 recites the concept of 5 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 6 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 7 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 10 managing commercial licenses. Specifically, claim 1 recites operations that would ordinarily take place in advising one to adjust the number of licenses according to usage. The advice to adjust the number of licenses according to usage involves instituting license types for each software application, which is a commercially economic act, and calculating a price of each of the license types, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of commerce. For example, claim 1 recites “instituting license types for each software application,” which is an activity that would take place whenever one is commercially selling licenses. Similarly, claim 1 recites “calculating a price of each of the license types,” which is also characteristic of commercial licensing. The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to calculating a price of each of the license types and calculating equivalent number of credits available. Final Act. 5. The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for managing a software license. The steps in claim 1 result in managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. As to the specific limitations, limitations 3 and 7 recite receiving data. Limitations 1, 2, 4–6, 8, and 9 recite generic and conventional generating, modifying, analyzing, storing, and transmitting of license data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for adjusting the number of licenses according to usage. To advocate adjusting the number of licenses according to usage is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological operations. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 11 The Specification at paragraph 2 describes the invention as relating to handling a computer software license, and more precisely to improved management of software licenses in a computer network. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites managing commercial licenses. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a certain method of organizing human activity because managing commercial licenses is a way of commercially selling licenses. The concept of managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage is one idea for selling such licenses. The steps recited in claim 1 are part of how this might conceptually be premised. Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas when they recited similar subject matter. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (managing control over content usage). From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 1 recites managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage, which is a commercial and legal interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea. STEP 2A Prong 2 The next issue is whether claim 1 not only recites, but is more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 12 some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to, this concept, i.e., integrated into a practical application.8 At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more . . . . Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results, devoid of implementation details. Steps 3 and 7 are pure data gathering steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps 1, 4, 6, and 9 recite basic conventional data operations such as generating, updating, transmitting, and storing data. Steps 2, 5, 8, and 9 recite generic computer processing expressed in terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so present no more than conceptual advice. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those results. 8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 13 Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites the concept of managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage as performed by a generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The 24+ pages of specification only spell out different generic equipment9 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage under different scenarios. They do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply managing commercial licenses by adjusting the number of licenses according to usage using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. None of the limitations reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation 9 The Specification describes using servers and PC’s. Spec. para. 56. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 14 or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. We conclude that claim 1 is directed to achieving the result of managing commercial licenses by advising one to adjust the number of licenses according to usage, as distinguished from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. STEP 2B The next issue is whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter the analysis at Mayo step two. [T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 15 ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for generating, modifying, analyzing, receiving, storing, and transmitting data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.”). None of these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor does any produce some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 16 other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data generation-modification- analysis-reception-storage-transmission is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. We conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. REMAINING CLAIMS Claim 1 is representative. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 17 computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] . . . against” interpreting § 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. LEGAL CONCLUSION From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the commercial and legal interaction of managing commercial licenses by advising one to adjust the number of licenses according to usage, without significantly more. APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s determinations and analysis from Final Action 4–7 and Answer 3–4 and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “Appellants find nothing abstract about sending warning messages of license violation to unlicensed clients when unlicensed access to the software applications are detected. Moreover, Appellants find nothing abstract about sending a warning message of insufficient credits to the licensee.” Reply Br. 2. This is a conclusory argument. A warning message is perceptible only in the mind of the beholder. “Information, whether displayed in the form of price Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 18 values or P&L values, is abstract.´ Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “Claim 10 places specific limitations on the foundation server, the application server, and the license management server.” Reply Br. 2. The limitations are specific only in the sense they are specified using words. The limitations only recite software steps performed, and do not limit the physical structures. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “sending warning messages of license violation to unlicensed clients when unlicensed accesses to the software applications are detected is a practical application.” Reply Br. 3. We are similarly not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “sending a warning message of insufficient credits to the licensee is also a practical application.” Reply Br. 4. These are variations of the above argument that sending messages is not abstract, and are equally unpersuasive here. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “checking any attempt to violate a software license is a practical application.” Reply Br. 4. Appellant is arguing only that the abstract concept so described has some benefits. But this is not sufficient to confer eligibility. “That the automation can ‘result in life altering consequences,’ is laudable, but it does not render it any less abstract.” Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “sending back a warning for insufficient credits is also a practical application.” Reply Br. 5. This is a variation of the above argument that sending messages is not abstract, and is equally unpersuasive here. Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 19 Appellant describes much of the Specification in Reply Brief 5–7 without relating those descriptions to arguments for eligibility. As no arguments are presented, we have nothing pertinent to consider here. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that a free amount of the credits is purchasable by the licensees and is freely allocated to the software applications independently of their version and bundle. This provides greater flexibility for the customer, and results in a less complex and less restraining process for purchasing credits in order to upgrade software licenses. Additionally, since purchasing credits in order to upgrade software licenses is less complex, the invention avoids the consumer confusion that would otherwise result in a time consuming and human resource consuming call to a helpdesk for clarification. Also, the claimed invention enables the size of the applications to be changed without changing the existing licenses. Thus, the claimed invention provides a significant improvement in the technical field of managing software licenses. Reply Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). Managing licenses is a management field, not a technical field. This is a variation of the above argument that the concept so described is useful, and is equally unpersuasive here. Claims 1–12 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aldis, Sweeney, Vanderland, and Logan We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the art fails to describe limitations 7 and 8 of claim 1. Reply Br. 8–14. The Examiner applies Sweeney and Vanderland as describing these limitations. Final Act. 11–13. Although Vanderland does refer to size in determining prices, Vanderland refers to size of digital media, not size of the number of licenses as recited in the claims. Sweeney only describes the arithmetic aspects of these limitations. The cited art does not describe “calculating an equivalent Appeal 2019-004927 Application 13/337,659 20 number of credits for every size, which indicates a number of entities associated with one of the license types.” Limitation 8. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 1–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper. The rejection of claims 1–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Aldis, Sweeney, Vanderland, and Logan is improper. CONCLUSION The rejection of claims 1–12 is affirmed. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–12 101 Eligibility 1–12 1–12 103 Aldis, Sweeney, Vanderland, Logan 1–12 Overall Outcome 1–12 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation