Marr Knitting, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 20, 1950

90 N.L.R.B. 479 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter of MARR KNITTING, INC. and UNITED FARM EQUIPMENT
AND METAL WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. O.
Case No. 18-CA-79.-Decided June 20, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 25, 1949, Trial Examiner Hamilton Gardner issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel
and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
supporting briefs.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner,
and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report,
the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommendations, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the find-
ings, conclusions, and order set forth below.
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, in violation
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. In so finding, we rely upon- the
independent 8 (a) (1) violations found by the Trial Examiner.2
In addition, we find that sometime in the fall of 1948, while the Union
was attempting to organize the plant, Urban Marr questioned em-
ployee Pearl Clements as to whether she had attended a union meeting
and what had happened there.3 As we have previously held, such
I Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel
[Chairman Herzog and Members Reynolds and Styles.].
IAs indicated below, we disagree with the Trial Examiner's 8 (a) (1 ) finding insofar as
it is based on the Respondent ' s alleged refusal to bargain with the Union.
3 The Trial Examiner makes no reference to these questions in discussing Marr's conver-
sation with Clements . However , Clements' testimony regarding them was uncontradicted,
and is not inconsistent with her further testimony noted in the Intermediate Report and
credited by the Trial Examiner , that Marr did not ask who had attended union meetings
and whether she had signed a union card.
90 NLRB No. 63.
479
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
inquiries by an employer about union matters have an inherently
restraining effect on employees, and are therefore per se violative of
Section 8 (a) (1) .1
2. On the record as a whole, we agree with the Trial Examiner that
the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) by threats to close
its plant.
As indicated in the Intermediate Report, on or about December 5,
1948, Plant Superintendent Doudna told employee Berdine Lockwood
that the plant might have to shut down and the employees might lose
their overtime if the plant was unionized. These remarks were clearly
coercive, and ordinarily we should find them violative of the Act.
About a week later, however, Urban Marr, the Respondent's presi-
dent, called Lockwood and another employee, Doris Brunner, into
the office and told them that rumors that the Respondent might close
its plant were false 5 At about the same time, he posted on the bulletin
board a notice to the employees stating that, contrary to any rumors
they might have heard, the mill- would "continue operation indefi-
nitely with no change in management, personal [sic] or policies."
We believe, as the Trial Examiner apparently did, that this action
by Marr was sufficient to counteract the effect of Doudna's coercive
statements and to assure the employees that they were free to engage
iii union activities without fear of reprisal. Accordingly, we do not
find that Doudna's remarks to Lockwood constituted an unfair labor
practice."
3. The Trial Examiner found that on and after November 24, 1948,
the Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union, in vio-
lation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. We do not agree.
The relevant facts are as follows : On November 15, 1948, Lloyd
James, a union representative, asked Marr to recogxlize the Union,
Marr refused to do so without all election. On November 24, the
Union repeated its request by letter, stating that it represented a ma-
jority of the employees in the proposed unit, but offering, if the Re-
spondent questioned its representative status, to prove its majority
"either by a cross-check of union designation cards against current
payroll or by consent election to be conducted by [the Board], or any
other impartial agency." A.few days later, the Union filed with the
' Jacksonville Motors, Inc., and Redmond Company, Inc., 88.NLRB 181 ; Empire Pencil
Company, Division of Hassenfeld Bros., Inc., 86 NLRB 1187; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher
Company, 85 NLRB 1358.
3 It is not entirely clear just when this incident occurred. The record indicates, however,
that it was about December 12.
6 The Trial Examiner relied, in part, upon Doudna's remarks to Lockwood in finding
that the Respondent made coercive statements to its employees. To this extent, his finding
on this point is reversed.
DIARR K ITTING, INC. 481
Board a petition for investigation and certification of representatives.'
The Respondent made no reply to the Union's letter; however, on
December 2, 1948, it entered into a consent election agreement with the
Union, providing for all election to be held under the supervision of
the Board on a date to be determined by the Regional Director.
Thereafter, the election was scheduled for December 17; election
notices, furnished by the Regional Director, were duly posted by the
Respondent; and the Respondent furnished to the Regional Director
a copy of its November 26 payroll to be used in determining eligibility
to vote.8 On December 14., however, the Union withdrew its consent
to the election and filed the original charge in the present proceeding ;
later, with the consent of the Regional Director, it withdrew its
petition.
Upon these facts and the record as a whole, we are not convinced
that the Respondent acted in bad faith in refusing to recognize. the
Union without an election. Admittedly, it had heard, before receiv-
ing the Union's request for recognition, that a majority of the em-
ployees had voted, in an informal poll, to join the CIO rather than to
form an independent plant organization. However, the results of
such a. poll are not conclusive evidence of a union's representative
status; and in this case the Union itself suggested, both on November
15, when it first asked for recognition, and on November 24, when it
repeated its request in writing, that an election might be held to estab-
lish its majority. The Respondent, on the first occasion, expressed its
unwillingness to grant recognition without an election.° On the see
and occasion, it made no reply. However, when the Union, only 2
days later, filed a petition with the Board, it promptly agreed to a
consent election. We find nothing in this conduct to persuade us that
the Respondent's preference for an election was motivated by a rejec-
tion of the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time
within which to undermine the Union, rather than by a bona fide doubt
of the Union's majority.'o
Furthermore, although the Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, as found above, we do not believe this unlawful con-
duct was sufficient, under the particular circumstances of this case, to
" The petition appears to have been filed on or about November 26, the date on which
the Respondent received the Union's letter.
s The Intermediate Report incorrectly states that the payroll was furnished by the
Union.
° The complaint did not allege , nor did the Trial Examiner find , that this conduct, which
took place before November 24, 1948, constituted a refusal to bargain.
10 Cf. Arteraft Hosiery Company, 78 NLRB 333, and cases therein cited ; Joy Silk Mills,
Inc., 85 NLRB 1263.
903847-51-vol. 90-32
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
establish that the Respondent was acting in bad faith in seeking an
election; 11 nor are we persuaded that it would have made a free elec-
tion impossible. Not only does the record fail to show that the
Respondent continued its unlawful conduct after receiving the Union's
formal request for recognition, but it shows that the management took
affirmative and authoritative action to contradict rumors that the
plant might close if it was unionized.12
We therefore find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the Re-
spondent did not refuse to bargain collectively with the Union, within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Marr Knitting, Inc., Osage,
Iowa, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating its employees with respect to unions and union
activities;
(b) Instigating and supporting the formation of a plant union;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its plant at Osage, Iowa, copies of the notice attached
hereto, marked Appendix A 13 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being
duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for
sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
11 Clem D . Johnston, d/b/a Roanoke Public Warehouse , 72 NLRB 1281.
12 In these respects , the case is distinguishable from Everett Van Kleeck & Company,
Inc., 88 NLRB 785.
n In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there
shall be inserted , before the words, "A Decision and Order ," the words , "A Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals enforcing."
MARR KNITTING, INC. 483
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material;
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed insofar as it alleged that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
MEMBER STYLES , dissenting in part :
I agree with the majority decision in holding that by interrogating
employee Clements and by the other conduct set forth in the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act. I part from my colleagues, however, in their conclusion that
the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) by threats to close
its plant, and in their reversal of the Trial Examiner and dismissal
of that portion of the complaint which alleges a refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8 (a) (5).
With respect to the threats to close the plant, the majority accepts
the uncontroverted testimony of employee Lockwood that, on or about
December 5, Plant Superintendent Doudna told her that the plant
might have to shut down and the employees might lose their overtime
if the plant was unionized. My colleagues conclude, however, that
the subsequent conduct of the Respondent's president, Marr, about a
week later, in advising Lockwood and another employee, Brunner, that
the rumors about the plant closing were false,. and in posting a notice
to that effect, was sufficient to counteract the coercive effect of Doudna's
statements. I cannot agree. Marr, in his conversation with Lock-
wood and Brunner, merely explained that various commitments he
had made in the community prevented his moving or closing the plant
and that the rumors were therefore false. Neither Marr's statements
nor the subsequent notice contain any general disavowal of the par-
tisan conduct by Doudna and other supervisors, nor do they provide
the slightest assurance that such conduct would be discontinued in
the future or that the employees were free to engage in union activi-
ties. In these circumstances I see no justification for regarding Marr's
action as sufficient to relieve the Respondent of responsibility for
Doudna's remarks, which we all agree were clearly coercive.
I find equally untenable the conclusion that the Respondent's re-
fusal to deal with the Union until its majority was proved in a Board
election was not in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. In the
circumstances of this case I would find that the Respondent's failure
to recognize the Union was not motivated by a good faith doubt of
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union's majority, but rather by, a rejection of the collective bar-
gaining principle; that the Respondent's willingness to enter into a
consent election was no more than a strategem to gain time in which
-to undermine the Union; and that the Respondent's conduct before
and after the consent election agreement made a free election impos-
sible.
Decisions of this Board undoubtedly establish that an eiiiployer
who has been asked to recognize a union may, with impunity, ques-
tion the union's majority and insist that the union's majority claim
be substantiated in a Board-conducted election, provided that in so
doing the employer is acting in good faith. And it is clear, of course,
that the determination of whether an employer entertains a good faith
doubt of the union's majority or is merely seeking to avoid collective
bargaining depends upon the particular facts in each case. I have
no quarrel with this principle, so long as it is applied in a realistic
manner. In particular, I would at least view with some suspicion
an employer's insistence upon an election where the record establishes
that he had facts at his disposal on the basis of which he could reason-
ably have concluded that the union in fact represents a majority of the
employees. And I would regard the .fact that an employer has com-
mitted unfair labor practices designed to cause disaffection from the
union as the strongest possible evidence that in questioning the union's
majority the employer has not acted in good faith. I join wholeheart-
edly in what was said by the majority in a very recent decision of this
Board: 14
We are not ready to require an election as a matter of "right" "
____________________ where to do so would permit an employer to
benefit by his unlawful efforts to destroy the union's majority.
It is because I believe my colleagues have given insufficient considera-
tion to these factors in applying the general rule that I feel constrained
to dissent from their dismissal of this aspect of the complaint.
The record before us establishes that almost immediately after the
Union began its organizing campaign in the fall of 1948 the Respond-
ent embarked upon a campaign of antiunion conduct which included
not only general statements urging employees that they did not need
the Union and that they could get the same benefits from a company
union but also two instances of interrogating employees about the
Union and its meetings which we have found specifically violative of
Section 8 (a) (1). About 5 days before the Union's initial request for
recognition, the Respondent called a meeting of its employees at which
these employees voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining the Union
' Everett Van Kleeck & Company, Inc., supra, footnote 12. See also The Valley Broad-
casting Company, 81 NLRB 1144.
MARR KNITTING, INC. 485
as against forming an independent labor organization. It is signifi-
cant that, although no representatives of the Respondent were present
when this vote-was taken, the record established that the results of
this ballot came to the attention of the Respondent's president and of
its superintendent. The Union's initial request for recognition on
November 15 was refused in the absence of an election. Its second
request of November 24, in which the Union offered to prove its ma-
jority by cross-check or election, was unanswered. It is true that on
December 2 the Respondent entered into a consent election agreement;
but no less than 3 days after this agreement was concluded, the Re-
spondent threatened its employees with closing the plant and depriv-
ing employees of overtime under circumstances which, as noted above,
I would find violated Section 8 (a) (1).
On these facts I see no basis for the conclusion my colleagues have
reached that the Respondent's doubt of the majority was made in
good faith. The Respondent raised this issue after it had already
been apprised of facts (the ballot on the issue of an independent union
versus the instant Union) on the basis of which it had reasonable
grounds for concluding that the Union indeed represented a majority.
It raised the issue after it had already interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in violation of the Act; and in my view, it con-
tinued such violation even after it had entered into the consent election
agreement. On strikingly similar facts a majority of this Board
recently observed 15 that such unfair labor practices :
... stamp the Respondent's willingness to enter into a consent
election agreement and the agreement itself as no more than a
self-serving gesture, indulged in by the Respondent at a time
when it had already created a coercive atmosphere and made a free
choice of representatives impossible.
For my colleagues, the Board's decision in the Roanoke case 1e is
controlling. Whether or not I would have found a refusal to bargain
on the facts there present, I regard that case as clearly distinguishable
from the one before us. Among other things there is no indication in
that case that the employer had any knowledge of the union's ma-
jority before the request to bargain was made. Moreover, the viola-
tions of Section 8 (a) (1) which the Board found failed to reflect bad
faith on the employer's part in demanding proof of the union's
66 Everett Van Kleeck, supra, footnote 12. Even if I were to regard the action taken by
Marr as sufficient to relieve the Respondent of responsibility for Doudna 's threats that the
plant would be closed , I could not regard it as a general disavowal of the prior unfair labor
practices or an assurance that the employees were free to engage in union activities. As
such, I cannot attack the significance to it that my colleagues do in distinguishing this case
from the Van Kleeck decision.
16 Supra, footnote 11.
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
majority, were confined to two "anti-union remarks," both of which
occurred prior to the time at which the employer. raised the majority
issue.
On the basis of all of the foregoing I would find, in agreement with
the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent has refused to bargain in
violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees with respect to the
union or union activities.
WE WILL NOT instigate or support the formation of a plant
union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organ-
ization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid of protection, or to refrain from
any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
MARR KNITTING, INC.,
Employer.
Dated ---------------------- By ---------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Erwin A. Peterson, Esq., Minneapolis, Minn., for the General Counsel.
George D. Dann, Esq., Mason City, Iowa, for the Respondent.
Mr. Charles W. Robbie, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose upon a second amended charge filed on May 9, 1949, by
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, C . I. 0., against Marr
Knitting , Inc. Upon the basis of such charge, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, acting through the Regional Director of the Eigh-
MARR KNITTING, INC. 487
teenth Region (Minneapolis, Minnesota), issued a complaint against the named
Company on September 13, 1949. This alleged that the Company had engaged
in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
Labor Management Relations Act, (61 Stat. 136). Copies of the complaint
and of the charge upon which it was based, together with notice of hearing
thereon, were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.'
The complaint alleged in substance that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices: (1) On and since November 24, 1948, by refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees
in a proper bargaining unit; and (2) on and since November 2, 1948, by inter-
fering with, restraining, and coercing its employees through instigating the
formation of an unaffiliated plant union, through threats to deprive its employees
of overtime and to close its plant, through making unilateral wage increases,
through inaugurating a paid holiday plan and other changes in conditions of
employment, for the purpose of discouraging membership and activity in the
Union. Thereby, it is alleged, the Respondent had deprived its employees of
the exercise. of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The answer of the Respondent admitted that the Respondent was engaged in
interstate commerce in accordance with the Act ; pleaded lack of knowledge
as to the Union being a labor organization within the meaning of the Act;
and specifically denied the unfair labor practices set forth in the complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Osage, Iowa, on October 4 and 5,
1949, before Hamilton Gardner, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly desig-
nated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent
were represented by counsel, and the Union by an authorized representative.
Full opportunity was afforded all parties to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the
conclusion of the case in chief of the General Counsel the Respondent made a
motion to dismiss paragraphs 6, 7, and 8,of the complaint, alleging violation of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. Such motion was taken under advisement by
the Trial Examiner . It is now denied. At the conclusion of the hearing the
Trial Examiner granted a motion of the General Counsel, to which no objection
was entered, to amend the pleadings in minor matters to conform to the proof.
Oral argument was made at the ending of the hearing by counsel for the
Respondent. The parties were advised of their right to file proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and briefs. None has been filed.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The answer of the Respondent admitted the allegations of paragraphs 1 and
2 of the complaint with respect to its business.
Marr Knitting, Inc., is an Iowa corporation with its office and plant at Osage,
Mitchell County, Iowa. It is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
' References in this Report will be : United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of
America, C. I. 0., as the Union: Marr Knitting, Inc., as the Respondent or the Company ;
the General Counsel and his representative at the hearing as the General Counsel; the
National Labor Relations Board, as the Board ; the Labor Management Relations Act, as the
Act.
488 DECISIONS OF. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mittens and gloves. During 1948, the Respondent purchased raw materials con-
sisting principally of yarn, thread, and various supplies in excess of $100,000
of which approximately 90 percent was transported from points outside the
State of Iowa. During the same period sales of its products exceeded $250,000
of which about 80 percent was shipped to customers in States other than Iowa.
I find that the Respondent' is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was stipulated in open hearing that United Farm Equipment and Metal
Workers of America, C. I. 0., is a labor organization admitting employees
of the Respondent to membership. I so find.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The over-all background 2
1. Identity of persons involved
It will be helpful to identify the actors participating in the events pertinent
to the issues in this case.
a. Respondent
Urban Marr was the president of Marr Knitting Inc.; Robert (Bob) Doudna
acted as plant superintendent; and Agnes Weber was called "floor lady." At
one period in 1948, Frank Marr, brother of the president, assisted him in the
management of the factory.
b. Union
For the Union, Charles W. Hobbie was district president for Iowa, Lloyd
James and Glenn Marrs, international representatives, and Kenneth E. Parr,
an organizer and former steward.
2. The physical plant
Early in 1946, the Respondent began the construction of its plant at Osage,
Iowa. The employees came from Osage and the surrounding country, numbering
4 at first and increasing to about 40 or 45 at the time of the controversy. The
maintenance employees are almost entirely women. The manufacture of mittens
and gloves requires 10 specialized departments: Flat knitting, cutting, tipping,
shipping, cut-sewing, mating, circular, turning, brushing, and mending. The
mill building measures 44 by 107 feet, nearly all of which is in one open room.
Sales are by agents operating from their own homes.
3. Union drive
The Union's campaign to organize the Respondent's employees started in early
November 1948. On November 2, James and Parr held an evening meeting in a
local bank building and signed up a number of applicants after making speeches.
This was followed by solicitation of employees at their own homes. A second
similar gathering occurred on November 9, which in' turn was followed by
assemblies at the county court house and at the homes of employees. The record
is silent as to any union solicitation at or near the Respondent's plant.
2 Only such facts as are not in dispute in the evidence are included in this brief portrayal
of the over -all background of the case.
MARK KNITTING, INC. 489
B. The appropriate unit and representation by the anion of a majority therein
Following the union campaign in signing up membership applications in the
early part of November 1948, it made its first contact with the Respondent in a
long-distance telephone. call from Glenn Marrs, international representative.
He testified for the General Counsel that about November 15, he reached a Mr.
Marr at the plant, whom he believed to be Francis Marr, brother of the president.
Marrs stated, among other things, that a majority of the maintenance workers
of the plant had signed up with the Union and asked that it be recognized as their
bargaining agent. Frank Marr replied that he did not understand what Marrs
was talking about and suggested that a union representative come to Osage to
confer with his brother.
A very short time thereafter Lloyd James, also a union international repre-
sentative, appeared at Urban Marr's office. Concerning this meeting, the Gen-
eral Counsel presented no direct evidence whatsoever, although his witnesses,
Parr and Marrs, referred to it incidentally and a later letter from Hobbie, district
president, mentioned it. But Urban Marr, testifying for the Respondent, gave
some details. He fixed the date as about November 15. Doudna, his plant
superintendent, was also present. Neither James nor Doudna took the witness
stand. According to Marr, James stated he had applications for more than .a
majority of the employees and asked Marr to accept the Union as their nego-
tiating representative, and in case of refusal an election must be held. Marr
answered that he would not admit the Union had a majority of the workers
and refused to accept its representation without an election, if unionization
would mean changes in the mill. James stated he would carry Marr's answer
back to union headquarters.
On November 24, 1948, Hobbie, for the Union, wrote a letter to the Respondent
confirming James' previous oral request for union recognition and offered :
... to prove our majority either by a cross check of union designation cards
against current payroll Or by consent election to be conducted by the
[NLRB], or any other impartial agency.
So far as the record discloses, this letter was not answered by the Respondent.
Hobbie testified without contradiction that late in November the Union filed
a petition with the Board for. a representation 'election. Accompanying the
petition, he forwarded 27 union application cards signed by employees of the
Respondent, which were received in evidence. Of these, 8 are undated and
the balance show November 2, 3, or 4. With the petition, he also sent the Com-
pany's payroll of November 26, also of record, which discloses 43 employees.
As found later in this Report, the employees voted in a closed meeting shortly
after November 9, in favor of the C. I. 0., 37 to 10 as against a company union.
A majority is, therefore, clearly indicated.
There is no substantial credible evidence that any of the signatures on the
union cards were obtained by misrepresentation or that the majority status was
altered until December 14 when the original charge was filed.
Without objection, the General Counsel introduced into evidence a copy of an
"Agreement for Consent Election" between the Respondent and the Union. He
offered no proof of the circumstances under which it was signed. On its face
it shows the date of execution as December 2, 1948. Later the Board's Regional
Director fixed the time of election for December 17. The Director sent appro-
priate notices to the Respondent which it promptly posted.
On December 14, 1948, 3 days before the scheduled election, the attorneys for
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union notified the Respondent that they had that day filed with the Board
charges of unfair labor practices on the part of the Respondent. Simultaneously,
the letter stated, they had notified the Board that "because of, the company's
activities the union feels that a fair election cannot be held under the agree-
ment of the parties . . . Accordingly, the union hereby withdraws its consent
to such election."
Next clay, December 15, the Regional Director telegraphed the Respondent
concerning the charges and information received from the Union ; stated the
Union would not waive the charges ; cancelled the election ; and directed the
Company to remove the posted notices. It complied immediately.
Such are found to be the facts of record as to the appropriate unit and the
Union's representation of a majority.
In his oral argument at the close of the hearing, counsel for the Respondent
strongly challenged the Union's majority representation until an election should
be held. In part he urged :
The heart of the matter, we feel, is whether this union is entitled to
represent the employees without an election and all we are asking really
is that the employees decide for themselves whether it is the union they
want to represent them collectively or whether they don't want the union
to represent them.
The authorities, however, do not support this contention of counsel. Less than
a month before the hearing in this case, the Board handed down a decisions on
a set of facts very similar to those at bar, and held that the union representation
continued. Part of the decision reads :
. . . The Union represented a majority of the employees in the appro-
priate unit on September 24, 1948, when it made its initial request for rec-
ognition. The Respondent refused the request, insisting that the Union
prove its majority status in a Board-conducted election. The Board there-
upon filed a representation petition. . . The Respondent gave its con-
sent to an election. . . . However, beginning on October 12, and continu-
ing until the election, the Respondent . . . engaged in acts of interfer-
ence and coercion which made a free election impossible.
We have previously held that an employer may in good faith insist on
a Board.election as proof of the union's majority but that it "unlawfully
refuses to bargain if its insistence on such an election is motivated, not by
any bona fide doubt as to the union's majority, but rather by a rejection of
the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which
to undermine the union."' In cases of this type the question of whether
an employer is acting in good or bad faith at the time of the refusal is, of
course, one which of necessity must be determined in the light of all relevant
facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct 'of the employer, the
sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful
conduct.
Later findings in this Report show that both before and after November 24,
1948, which was the date of a written request to the Respondent that it engage
in collective bargaining with the Union : It completely ignored such request to-
gether with earlier similar requests made orally ; it made statements to its
employees of a coercive nature with respect to the Union ; and it endeavored
8 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 ( decided September 13, 1949).
4 The quotation is from Artcraft Hosiery Company, 78 NLRB 333 . See also the other
cases cited in the decision.
MARR KNITTING, INC. 491
to restrain its employees from joining the C. I. O. by attempting to induce them
to form a company union.
Under these precedents and on the present facts, I hold the arguments of
counsel to be without merit.
Accordingly, I find that those who were to be permitted to vote in the election
scheduled for December 17, 1948, were all production and maintenance employees,
excluding office employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisory employees under
the Act and that this was an appropriate unit under the Act for the purposes of
collective bargaining. I further find that on November 9, 1948, and at all times
thereafter, the Union was the duly designated bargaining representative of a
majority of the employees in said unit, and that, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union was on said date and thereafter,
has been and now is the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to pay, wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
C. The refusal to bargain
1. Union requests to Respondent to bargain
a. Marr's telephonic request
Mention has already been made of the telephone conversation about November
15 between Glenn Marrs, union international representative, and Frank Marr,
brother of President Urban Marr. Part of Marrs' request was that the Respond-
ent enter collective bargaining negotiations with the Union. Frank Marr's reply
was to invite the Union to send a representative to consult with Urban Marr.
b. Conference between James and Urban Marr
As to what occurred at this meeting, the record is dependent solely on the testi-
mony of Urban Marr for the Respondent, since the General Counsel offered no
proof about it. It has already been pointed out that there was considerable
testimony concerning talk between James and Marr regarding union representa-
tion. But nowhere in his direct testimony did Marr say a word about any
request by James to enter into negotiations for a contract. And on cross-exam-
ination the General Counsel never asked a single question about the James-Marr
conference. Moreover, neither James nor Doudna, also present, were called to
the witness stand.
In the absence of any direct testimony that James wanted to bargain with the
Company, do the circumstances fairly permit an inference that he did so? I be-
lieve they do. The sole and only purpose of James' seeking union recognition for
bargaining purposes was to bargain collectively. Otherwise it would be mean-
ingless. The proof of the content of the conversation is admittedly meager, but
in a way that makes the presumption stronger. Credence is added to this pre-
sumption by Hobbie's letter a short time later "to confirm by letter his [James']
oral request made to you and your company a few days ago," which ended in a
direct offer to bargain.
c. Letter of November 24, 1948, from Robbie to Respondent
As district president of the union, Hobble referred to James' previous con-
versation ; renewed the request for union recognition ; and stated in part :
We therefore offer to meet you at your earliest convenience for the purpose
of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.
I find that the Union did offer to bargain collectively with the Respondent,
at least as early as November 24, 1948, the date alleged in the complaint.
492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Actions of Respondent
What was the answer of the Respondent to these union requests to bargain?
To Marrs by telephone it merely asked that a representative be sent to Osage.
With James in person, there is no evidence whatsoever that it agreed to negotiate.
And, most important of all, it never answered the Union's letter of November 24.
It merely did nothing. Moreover, its negative conduct is colored by various state-
ments to its employees and its actions towards them during the meantime, as
will be pointed out hereinafter.
All this totals up to a refusal on the part of the Respondent to bargain collec-
tively with the Union. I so find.`
Conclusion as to Refusal to Bargain
I find that on November 24, 1948, and at all times thereafter, the Respondent
has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit ; and has thereby interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under
Section 7 of the Act.
D. Interference, restraint, and coercion
The complaint alleges the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) by making
certain coercive and threatening statements to its employees with respect to their
union adherence and by taking certain actions contrary to this part of the Act.
1. Coercive statements to employees
These statements were made primarily in connection with pqrticular actions
or policies of the Respondent relating to their employees, which are discussed
below.
a. Doudna, plant superintendent, to a meeting of employees
Two or three days after the first union meeting of November 2, Doudna
addressed a meeting of all employees at the plant during working hours. This
was the first such gathering ever held at the mill. According to Doris Brunner,
of the mating department, Doudna stated :
. . . He couldn't understand why we wanted to pay union dues when we
could have a union of our own and get the same benefits and still not pay
union dues .. .
Another employee, Bernadine Winkels, quoted Doudna as saying in his speech:
... He wanted to know why we girls wanted to join the CIO and he told
us about this idea that the girls could just as well form a union of their own
which would be just as good .. .
Eleanore Squier, also testifying for the General Counsel concerning the same
meeting, related the following version of Doudna's talk :
... He couldn't understand why they wanted a union . . . if we would
have a union of our own, we could get the same benefits and we wouldn't
have to pay any dues .. .
Doudna, although in Osage at the time of the hearing as shown by the record,
did not appear as a witness. No other proof was tendered regarding these
statements.
5 The drteraft Hosiery Company case, supra, is a pertinent authority for this finding.
See also Vulcan Forging Company , 85 NLRB 621.
1VIARR KNITTING, INC. 493
b. Doudna to Squier
About November 10, while Squier was working at her machine, Doudna, plant
superintendent, stopped to talk to her. She testified :
A. . . . He just asked me what I 'thought of the union, and I told him
that I didn't know very much about it yet.
Q. Did he ask you anything about the significance of signing a card?
A. He asked if I knew what they were about, and I said, "no", and he
told me that I should find out more about it before I signed anything.
No contradictory evidence as to this conversation was proffered.
C. Doudna to Brunner, Johanns, and Winkels
According to the testimony of Brunner and Winkels, Doudna called these two
employees and another, Gertrude Johanns, to the shipping room about November
17. Brunner related that he said:
... He told us that.he had been to Waterloo and Austin and had talked
with people that worked under unions and the majority of them didn't
like the way it was working out.
According to Winkels :
... He wanted to know what we girls knew about the merits of unionism,
and he told us about this plan about the girls. He said he thought that
would work out all right amongst ourselves, that we didn't need a union.
Again, this testimony was not disputed.
d. Doudna to Lockwood
Berdine Lockwood, senior employee in service and witness for the General
Counsel, asserted that Doudna called her into the rest room approximately on
December 5 and among other things told her:
. .. The company was too young to be unionized and pay the.higher wages
that the union would no doubt ask.... The plant might have to shut
down. . . . He mentioned the possible loss of overtime.. . .
No proof to the contrary was adduced.
e. Marr to Clements
Pearl Clements testified- for the General Counsel that she talked once with
Marr, president, with Doudna present. She could fix the date only as in the
fall of 1948, while the Union was attempting to organize the plant. Her direct
testimony was that Marr "didn't seem to object to [the] union." The rest of the
conversation. consisted of generalities about the desirability of good relations
with the employees. On cross-examination she admitted that Marr did not
ask her who had attended union meetings; whether she had signed a union
card ; did not threaten her if she joined the Union ; and did not speak of any
benefits to her if she remained nonunion.
I find nothing coercive in this conversation.
f. Marr to Dunley
For the Respondent, Dorothy Dunley took the witness stand. Her story
was that Marr called her to his office ; said he had heard rumors that she would.
be fired because she had signed a union card ; and assured her the rumor was
not true.
494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I regard this as purely negative proof that in Dunley 's case no coercion was
employed.
Marr made a general denial that he had ever threatened or coerced any of
his employees because of their union activities . But, with the two exceptions
noted, the statements quoted above go beyond the legitimate expression of opinion
concerning a union and contains definite elements of restraint and coercion. I so
find.
In a very recent decision 6 of the Board the remarks made by supervisors
were almost identical with those found in the present proceeding : " what all this
union talk was about" ; the Respondent was "partial to the plant " and "if these
union rumors get started around" it "would send it elsewhere" ; "Fry won't
stand for a union out here, that they will shut down first." These were held
to violate Section 8 ( a) (1).
2. Encouraging the formation of a plant union
The uncontradicted evidence shows, that for the first time in the history of
the plant, a meeting of all employees was held during working hours in the
shipping room. This occurred a few days after the first union meeting on No-
vember 2. Witnesses for the General Counsel testified that the "girls" were
notified of the assembly by Agnes Weber, floor lady. She admitted doing so.
Doudna addressed the employees and what he said regarding a company union
has been quoted in large part above.
Shortly after the second union meeting of November 9, the employees again
convened in the shipping room on company time. Weber also notified them of
this gathering' but was not present. Marr and Doudna left the plant. The
employees discussed the question of joining the C. I. 0. or of adhering to an
independent plant organization of their own. A written ballot was.taken which
resulted in 37 votes for C. I. 0. and "probably" 10 for the company union. All
this information soon reached Marr, Doudna, and Weber.
Marr testified that he first learned of union activity in the plant from
Doldna on Election Day, November 2, 1948. He denied that he ever "discussed"
the formation of a company union with either Doudna or Weber. But he ad-
mitted that he "talked" to Weber about the "girls" meetings and asserted he was
fully informed about them later. His testimony was that he had picked up
rumors of the balloting result in the second meeting but had not been "officially"
advised. Weber stated she was the first to suggest an organization among the
girls for the purpose of presenting grievances to Marr. As to Doudna, who did
not appear as a witness, it was stipulated by counsel that he would have
testified :
[Weber] and I discussed among ourselves the possibility of having the girls
represent themselves on rates or any other matters that bothered them. I
believe that I was the first one to mention to Weber, our floor lady, the idea
of the girls starting their own group in the back.
I don't recall whether or not I spoke to Urban Marr about this idea before
or after I communicated it to Agnes Weber, but Marr agreed to my plan.
In summation, it is found that the Respondent favored a company union in
preference to the C. I. 0.; through responsible supervisors it informed its em-
ployees of such preference ; it arranged meetings so to do, which were held at
the plant during the working period and the employees were paid during such
6Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 85 NLRB 1222.
MARK KNITTING, INC. 495
time; these gatherings suspiciously followed immediately after union campaign
meetings ; supervisors strongly urged the employees not to join C. I. 0., but to
set up a union of their own; all this was done with the knowledge and consent of
management.
It is well established that encouragement and instigation by the employer in
the organization of a local company union among its workers, where methods
are utilized such as in the present case, constitute interference with the employees'
rights under the Act and violate Section 8 (a) (1) '
3. Alleged improvement of overtime working policy as a result of union campaign
As to working overtime, some facts on the record are undisputed. The Re-
spondent's mill is operated and the employees are paid on a piecework basis.
Goods passing through the various departments in the process of manufacture
sometimes form a "bottle neck" at a particular stage. Overtime work is neces-
sary to clear this congestion.
Brunner, Winkle, and Squier testified for the General Counsel in very general
terms that before the Union began its drive in November 1948, the employees
were compelled to work overtime at the exclusive direction of the Company.
Weber, floor lady, a witness for the Respondent, denied this and stated that from
the beginning the employees had their free choice of working overtime or not.
Marr, the president, was specific in outlining the Respondent's policy on overtime
and presented numerous pay card records of employees at times before 1948,
showing that overtime work was not compulsory. Even Winkle stated, contrary
to her general assertion, that in 1947 some girls chose not to work overtime.
I credit the testimony of the Respondent on this point and find that its policy
on overtime work did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) .'
4. Alleged threats to' close the plant
On December 5, Doudna may have made a remark to Lockwood that if the
Union come in the Respondent might have to close its plant. A rumor to that
effect soon spread among the employees and reached Marc. He thereupon called
in Brunner and Lockwood shortly before December 17 and told them the rumors
were false. He explained that his obligations to his employees and his loans at
local banks completely prevented moving or closing the factory. About the same
time, on December 15, he had caused the following notice to be posted on the plant
bulletin board.
To OUR EMPLOYEES :
Contrary to any rumors which you may have heard this mill will continue
operation indefinitely with no change in management, personal or policies.
I find that the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) by threatening
to close its plant, in order to combat the current union drive.
5. The alleged unilateral wage increase
Compensation to the Respondent's employees was based on piecework output
and not by the hour or day. All witnesses for both parties agreed that no
general, over-all pay increase was put into effect by the Company in the period
7 N. L. R. B. v. Clark Phonograph Co., 176 P. 2d 341 (C. A. 3).
Overtime has previously been mentioned in this Report in connection with a statement
made by Doudna to Lockwood on December 5: "He mentioned the loss of overtime." (See
III, D, 1, d, above.) The two propositions are entirely different and separate.
496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
between the beginning of the union drive in early November 1948, and the
scheduled election on December 17. Brunner, Winkle, Lockwood, and Squier
testified for the General Counsel that, following the appearance of the Union,
wages were increased in certain departments. As against that, Marr explained
that the policy of wage adjustments had remained unchanged from the time
the factory began producing at its present scale. The difference of work in the
several departments occasionally resulted in a pay scale in one division dispro-
portionate, up or down, to what operators elsewhere in the shop earned. This
was caused by changes in style of the mittens and gloves and by other similar
factors. When such a contingency arose, he asserted, the Respondent investi-
gated and if convinced of the disparity, effected the appropriate adjustment.
He and Weber cited such instances occurring before November 1948, and after.
Among them was a conference he-called in early December with Brunner and
Lockwood, who also testified about it. A union representative had exhibited a
Dun & Bradstreet credit report to the employees, asserting it showed the Com-
pany could pay higher wages. Marr and a representative of Dun & Bradstreet
argued to the two employees that such was not the case. On the matter of
supposed wage increases I believe Marr's version.
I find that the Respondent did not put into effect any unilateral wage increase
for the purpose of coercing his employees not to join the Union.
6. The alleged installation of holiday and vacation pay
Three witnesses for the General Counsel, Brunner, Winkle, and Lockwood,
testified somewhat vaguely and generally that they had not heard of pay being
received for work on holidays and for vacation periods until the Union started
its solicitation. Weber denied their statements. But Lockwood admitted she
had seen a posted bulletin on the subject many months before. Marr pre-
sented a detailed history of the Company's policy and actions from the beginning.
Such pay was first discussed, he averred, late in 1946 or early in 1947, and
installed to a certain extent in 1947. It was modified in 1948, and the existing
plan was put into operation January 1, 1949. Three successive annual bulletins
about it had been posted. Payments had been made under it without interruption
and without any objection by workers.
I rely on the detailed, specific testimony of Marr and Weber, rather than
the generalities of the three employees.
I find, therefore, that the Respondent did not install or alter payment for
holidays and vacations as an inducement to its employees to remain nonunion.
7. Alleged adoption of seniority provisions
The same witnesses just mentioned asserted for the General Counsel that the
coming of the Union brought about seniority privileges not known before. Again
Weber and Marr contradicted them. The latter testified the Company had never
had a complete, defined seniority policy and did not at present, because no sub-
stantial layoff had ever occurred. But the current practice, he asserted, was
exactly what it always had been. When a vacancy in a department occurred, the
applicants were considered, and, other things being equal, the senior employee
was placed. Final decision was reserved for management.
I believe the. Marr version.
,MARK KNITTING, INC. 497
Accordingly , I find that the Respondent did not alter its seniority practice as a
means of influencing its employees not to affiliate with the Union.
Conclusion as to interference , restraint , and coercion
Under the facts thus set forth , I find that , in the two respects mentioned, be-
ginning November 2, 1948, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
I find that the activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above,
occurring in connection with its operations in Section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been
found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, it will be
recommended that the Respondent, upon request, bargain collectively with the
Union.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, C. I. 0., is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Osage, Iowa,
mill, excluding office clerical employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisory
employees, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, C. I. 0., was on
November 24, 1948, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in the unit hereinabove described for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of section 9 (a) of the Act..
4. By refusing on November 24, 1948, and at all times thereafter to bargain
collectively with United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, C. I. 0.,.
exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate. unit,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) pf the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
903847-51-vol. 90-33
498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I
recommend that the Respondent, Marr Knitting, Inc., its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Farm Equipment and Metal
Workers of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all production
and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Osage, Iowa, mill,. excluding
office clerical employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisory employees as defined
in the Act;
(b) Engaging in any manner in any other acts interfering with the efforts of
united Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, C. I. 0., to negotiate
for or represent the employees in the said unit as exclusive bargaining agent.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with. United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers of America, C. I. O., as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all the employees in the unit described herein, with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment ; and if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement;
(b) Post in conspicuous places at its mill at Osage, Iowa, copies of the notice
attached hereto, marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed
by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecu-
tive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region in writing within
twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that, unless on or before twenty (20) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report the Respondent notifies said Regional Direc-
tor in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the
National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respondent to take
the action aforesaid.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board any party may, within twenty (20) clays from the date
of service of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section
203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C.,
an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions
to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding
(including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together
with the original and six copies of a. brief in support thereof; and any party
may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in support
of the Intermediate Report. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of
exceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof
upon each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions and briefs shall des-
ignate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be
legibly printed or mimeographed, and if mimeographed shall be double spaced.
Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be
promptly made as required by Secttion 203.85. As further provided in Section
MARR KNITTING, INC. 499
203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board,
request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten ( 10) days
from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , recommendations , and recom-
mended order herein contained shall , as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules;
and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions,
and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
Dated at Washington , D. C., this 25th day of November 1949.
HAMILTON GARDNER,
Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT engage in any acts in any manner interfering with the efforts
Of UNITED FARM EQUIPMENT AND METAL WORKERS OF AMERICA, C . I. 0., to
negotiate for or represent the employees described in the bargaining unit set
forth below.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above -named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described herein with respect to wages, hours , and other terms and condi-
tions of employment , and if an understanding is reached , embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement . The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at the Osage, Iowa, mill, ex-
cluding office clerical employees , watchmen , guards, and supervisory
employees.
MARK KNITTING, INC.,
Employer.
Dated -------------------------- By --------------------- *
( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.