Marovets, Jack L.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 24, 2020

14680601 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/680,601 04/07/2015 Jack L. Marovets Jack Marovets-P0004 9665
133690 7590 01/24/2020
Goodhue, Coleman & Owens, P.C.
12951 University Ave
Suite 201
Clive, IA 50325
EXAMINER
BOYCE, ANDRE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@dockettrak.com
docketing@goodhue.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JACK L. MAROVETS
Appeal 2019-002604
Application 14/680,601
Technology Center 3600
Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, AMBER L. HAGY, and RUSSELL E. CASS,
Administrative Patent Judges.
QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 111. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Jack L. Marovets.
Appeal Brief filed Dec. 14, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to making available media files. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter (with
limitation identifiers added in brackets for ease of reference in our analysis
below):
1. A method for making available media files, the
method comprising:
[A] distributing an application to a plurality of computing
devices for making available the media files to users of the
computing devices;
[B] making available a user interface through the
application for accessing a set of media files, wherein the user
interface allows for each of the media files to be voted on with
a like or a dislike and wherein the user interface allows for each
of the media files to be forwarded to another user of the
application;
[C] assigning a number of flushes to each of the media
files at a server;
[D] receiving from multiple users using the computing
devices votes for or against the media files and [E] tracking
forwards from the multiple users at the server;
[F] maintaining a count of the number of flushes for each
of the media files by reducing the number of flushes for each
vote against each of the media files and increasing the count of
the number of flushes for each occurrence of forwarding the
media file to another user; and
[G] removing from the set of media files, media files
once the count of the number of flushes reduces to zero.
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REJECTION
Claims 111 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter. Final Action mailed Aug. 24, 2018 (“Final
Act.”) 29.

OPINION
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, Appeal No. 2009-00613, at 9, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1075 (BPAI, Feb. 26, 2010) (precedential). To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). For
example, here Appellant argues claims 111 together, relying on the
arguments presented for claim 1. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 14 (stating that “since
claims 211 are dependent on claim 1 and claim 1 is believed to be
allowable, therefore the rejections of claims 211 under 35 USC 101 should
be reversed, and the claims allowed”). We therefore decide the appeal for
this rejection based on claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
To determine whether a claim falls within an excluded category, the Court
has set out a two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–
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18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
75–77 (2012)). That framework requires us to first consider what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites (1) any judicial
exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018))).
Guidance at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
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whether the claim recites an inventive concept, by determining whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See Guidance at 56. With these principles in mind, we turn to the
Examiner’s § 101 rejection.
(a) The Judicial Exception—Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Guidance
The Guidance breaks the Alice/Mayo test for identifying claims
directed to judicial exceptions into two prongs. Guidance at 53. Step 2A,
Prong 1, asks whether the claim recites a judicial exception. Guidance at
52–54.
The Examiner finds that the claim recites at least one judicial
exception as follows:
This abstract ideas, including the distributing, accessing,
assigning, receiving, maintaining and removing steps are
similar to concepts involving an idea of itself, and human
activity relating to concepts involving delivering user-selected
content to portable devices (e.g., Affinity Labs v.
Amazon.com), concepts involving organizing and
manipulating information through mathematical correlations
(e.g., Digitech Image Tech), concepts involving organizing
information (e.g., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., and
Ultramercial v. Hulu), and concepts involving data recognition,
collection, storage and management (e.g., Content Extraction,
TLI Communications, and Electric Power Group), all of which
have been found by the courts to be abstract ideas.
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Final Act. 3.
Appellant’s brief states that the invention “is directed towards a
specific improvement of making media files available using flush voting and
maintain[ing] a count of the number of flushes a media file has.” Appeal Br.
12. Appellant further argues that the claims are not directed towards “any
form of making media files available.” Id. Rather, Appellant focuses on the
limitation “maintaining a count” as having nothing to do with “distributing,
accessing, assigning, receiving, maintaining and removing media files or
generic, routine and conventional computer functions.” Id. at 13. We are
not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims do not recite a
judicial exception.
Referring to the added claim designators, limitations [A] and [B]
recite steps of distributing an application that allows users to “vote” on
whether they like or dislike media files and allows media files to be
forwarded to other users. Steps [C][F] recite receiving and tabulating the
information regarding the votes and forwards of the media files to obtain a
“count” of the “number of flushes.” Step [G] recites removing a media file
when the “count of the number of flushes reduces to zero.”
Limitations [C] and [F] recite mental processes of tabulating the votes
and counting the number of flushes for each song available to a user. The
Specification provides an example of these processes:
-$50 gets you 100 flushes.
-Each Forward=2 extra flushes.
-Each Pass=0 extra flushes.
-Run out of flushes and the uploaded song is gone.
Here are some examples:
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Example 1: Listener 1 Forwards Song A, Song A would
now have to be flushed 102 times to be removed from the
site.
Example 2: Song A is passed on 100 times and flushed
100 times, that song is gone from the site.
Example 3: Song A was Forwarded 100 times[.] It will
now take 300 flushes to get the song removed from the
site.
Spec. 39:717. These examples illustrate that the subject matter claimed
includes an evaluation of voting actions performed by users (i.e.,
like/dislike, forward, pass) in order to determine, numerically, whether a
particular song has received a threshold number of dislikes. In other words,
these limitations involve actions that may be performed practically by the
human mind, or with the aid of pen and paper. For instance, a human person
decides whether they “like or a dislike” a song, a human person also may
tally the votes of the various users, keep track of whether the song was
shared with another user to determine the number of flushes for each shared
song, and compute the total number of votes and flushes for the song.
Consequently, we determine that these limitations recite mental processes,
which is a category of abstract ideas identified by the Guidance. See
Guidance at 52.
Limitation [C] recites that the assignment of flushes is performed “at a
server,” while limitation [F] does not recite any particular technology for
maintaining the count. Notwithstanding the recitation of a “server,” we note
that the claim still recites a mental process because the Specification, in the
above-quoted examples, describes the steps as a concept merely performed
on a generic server. See Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software
LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the steps of
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voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation are human
cognitive actions despite their claimed performance on a generic computer);
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942
(available at the USPTO’s website at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”) at 8 (“The courts
have found claims requiring a generic computer or nominally reciting a
generic computer may still recite a mental process even though the claim
limitations are not performed entirely in the human mind.”).
Additionally, limitations [A][G] recite certain methods of organizing
human activity. As stated in the October 2019 Update to the Guidance,
examples of this category of abstract ideas include managing personal
behavior, relationships, or interactions between people. Update at 4.
According to the Update, this sub-grouping encompasses activity that
involves multiple people (such as a commercial interaction). Id. at 5 (further
noting examples of this sub-grouping to include a set of rules for playing a
dice game, and the process of voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the
vote for tabulation).
Limitations [A]-[G] here fall under the sub-category of managing
personal behavior, relationships, or interactions between people. As the
Specification explains, the invention relates to a website that allows listeners
(consumers) to enjoy free music while artists upload and pay for their
creations to be voted on by the consumers. Spec. 38:2739:10. The users
interact with the website to “click, listen, vote and have fun.” Id. at 39:45.
The voting process allows users to decide “who will be the next stars and
who won’t.” Id. And the users can forward a song they like, and the system
rewards the forwards by increasing the number of flushes for each song. Id.
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at 39:12-17. Thus, the claimed process, implemented through a website,
provides the means by which users can engage with the artist’s music,
participate in voting for or against the songs, and forward liked songs to
others, and the process determines which songs remain available and which
ones get “flushed.” The artists interact with potential consumers of their
creations by “upload[ing] their music or videos for a ‘flush’ fee, and in
return they get feedback, stats, and possibly a fan-base, and also possibly a
chance at stardom.” Id. at 39:1819. The consumers and artists, therefore,
use the claimed method to interact with each other, directly or indirectly.
The method allows for users to interact with other users, and manages the
particular behavior of the consumers and artists by accepting votes for the
media, tracking the media that is shared, tallying the votes, and determining
which media files are removed based on the votes. Consequently, we find
that the claim recites certain methods of organizing human activity, which is
an abstract idea.
In conclusion, we determine that claim 1 recites mental processes and
certain methods of organizing human activity, which are categories of
abstract ideas.
(b) Integration into a Practical Idea—Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Guidance
Step 2A, Prong 2, asks whether the claims are “directed to” a judicial
exception or whether the claims integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (explaining the practical
application test responds to “a growing body of decisions . . .
distinguish[ing] between claims that are ‘directed to’ a judicial exception . . .
and those that are not”). A practical application is one where the claim “will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
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meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 54.
For example, limitations that are indicative of “integration into a practical
application” can include:
1) Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field—see MPEP § 2106.05(a);

2) Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine—see MPEP § 2106.05(b);

3) Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing —see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and

4) Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment, such that the claim as a
whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception—see MPEP § 2106.05(e).

In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” may include:
1) Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a
computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an
abstract idea—see MPEP § 2106.05(f);

2) Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception—see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and

3) Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use—see MPEP
§ 2106.05(h).
Appellant argues that the claim is directed to a practical application
because the claim provides “a specific solution to problems associated with
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downloading or sharing a media file from an electronic device.” Appeal
Br. 14. Appellant further argues that the claim is directed to “an improved
user interface” that is used to “promote[] an efficient user interaction for
determining the popularity of the media file and for removing an unpopular
media file.” Id. at 15. Appellant takes issue with the Examiner’s findings
that the claims are not directed to a technological improvement because the
Specification states alleged technical benefits of enabling “listeners
(consumers) to vote ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ using a novel ‘flush’ voting
mechanism” and enabling:
[an] artist [to] upload[] music, and/or video, to the web-based
application to get notifications . . . that give them information,
such as, but not limited to, number of listens, number of
downloads, etc., which can be provided as certified proof to a
record label as to how well their music, and/or video, is liked.
Id. at 16 (citing Spec. 18:2123, 19:1520).
We do not agree with Appellant that the claims are directed to either
providing a technical solution or implementing a technical improvement.
First, the claim’s recitation of the user interface alludes only to the generic
functions of voting and forwarding a media file. The claim lacks detail of
any technical implementation that limits the functional description to a
particular aspect of the computing environment or to programming of the
application. The solution alleged by Appellant—downloading and sharing
of media files from electronic devices—is not addressed by merely
providing a user interface that allows for voting on whether a song is liked
or disliked. Furthermore, as to forwarding the song from one user to others,
that is part of the abstract idea of organizing certain methods of human
activity. Additionally, the sharing of media is not a technical solution in the
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computer environment, especially when the claim recites the forwarding of
media files merely as an allowable feature of a generic application. For
instance, generic e-mail applications also forward media. Rather, the user
interface is an attempt to link the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is no more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Second, as stated above, the Specification broadly describes the
concepts of voting and tallying the votes for the media files. To the extent
Appellant argues that the novelty lies in the concept of the “flush” voting
method, such a method is not a technological improvement. Rather the
alleged improvement is in the abstract idea itself, not in any technology. See
BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 128788 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
(emphasis omitted)).
Furthermore, even if there was novelty in the “flush” voting method,
such a method is not implemented in any particular machine, such that we
could say that the claim applies the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that a general-purpose processor that
merely executes the judicial exception is not a particular machine); see also
MPEP § 2106.05(b). We note here that the claim recites the additional
element of a server that determines the results of the votes and the number of
flushes. This server, however, is not recited with any particularity, and there
is no evidence in the Specification that the server itself operates in any
improved manner. See Spec. 8:10–22 (describing the servers used in the
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invention as being implemented using generic hardware and software). As
stated by the Examiner, with whom we agree, the claim here is not directed
to any technological improvement. See Ans. 8 (finding that “here, there are
no specification teachings that the claimed invention achieves other benefits
over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search
times, and smaller memory requirements, nor is there any improvement here
defined by logical structures and processes” (internal quotes omitted)).
Concerning limitation [G], we are persuaded that this limitation,
individually, or as a part of the whole, does not transform the claim into a
practical application of the judicial exception. This limitation requires
removing the media files once the count of the number of flushes reduces to
zero. The removal of media files is from the set of media files referred to
earlier in the claim as the set of media files available in the application (in
limitation [A]). The Specification does not describe how this removal is
performed, but only that the “song [is] removed from the site.” Spec.
39:1617. Thus, the limitation, interpreted broadly in the context of the
Specification, results in the website display not including a song that has
received sufficient number of flushes. Such a limitation, therefore, is merely
the display result of the calculation of flushes for a media file. There is no
description in either the claim or the Specification that identifies how the
removal operation is performed. Thus, this limitation is result oriented,
without any technical detail of how a computer accomplishes the claimed
removal. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850
F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “[o]ur law demands more” in
situations where result oriented solutions lack sufficient technical detail for
how a computer performs the resulting feature). Further, without technical
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detail, the limitation broadly recites a display-oriented result and therefore
involves insignificant post-solution activity. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191–92 (1981) (“[I]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform
an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”).
As for the rest of the limitations—limitation [A], making available a
user interface through an application in limitation [B], and limitation [D]—
these constitute extra-solution activity. These limitations are directed to
distributing data and collecting data, which alone or in combination, do not
transform the recited abstract ideas into a patentable process. See Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981) (“[I]nsignificant post-solution
activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process.”).
We conclude, based on our analysis above, that the additional
elements, alone or in combination, do not apply the abstract idea in a
meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. For these reasons, we conclude that
claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical
application within the meaning of the Guidance and, therefore, is directed to
an abstract idea.
(c) Inventive Concept—Step 2B of the Guidance
Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is “directed to” an
abstract idea, we consider whether any additional element (or combination
of elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood, routine, or
conventional (“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the additional
elements simply append WURC activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance,
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84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner’s finding that an additional element (or
combination of elements) is a WURC activity must be supported with a
factual determination. Id. (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d), as modified by the
Berkheimer Memorandum2).
Appellant argues that “the Examiner has not provided any factual
evidence that Applicant’s claimed invention is conventional, routine[,] or
well understood.” Appeal Br. 18. Nevertheless, Appellant acknowledges
that the Examiner cites to the Specification at page 56, lines 616 to support
the finding that the claims require no more than a general purpose computer,
performing generic computer functions. Id., Final Act. 4. According to
Appellant, the cited paragraph of the Specification “does not describe the
flush voting mechanism.” Appeal Br. 19. Appellant argues that there is no
showing that the “flush number recited by Applicant was well-understood,
routine, or conventional.” Id. We do not agree with Appellant.
The claim recites the “flush number” in limitation [F] (concerning
maintaining the count of the number of flushes) and in limitation [G]
(concerning removing the media file once the count of the number of flushes
reduces to zero). Limitation [F] is recited as being performed at the server,
while the performance of limitation [G] is not tied to any particular
technology. In the inventive concept analysis, we address whether the
additional elements addressed in step 2A, prong 2, alone or as a combination
of elements provide an inventive concept. See Guidance at 56. The
additional element considered above is the recited server, which we noted is

2 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.),” April 19, 2018 (hereinafter “the Berkheimer Memorandum”).
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recited generally, and in a conventional manner. And the “number of
flushes” may be part of a voting algorithm programmed in the recited server
using Web App 130, which is described generically as “an application that is
accessed over a network such as the Internet,” or a “computer software
application that is hosted in a browser-controlled environment (e.g., a Java
applet) or coded in a browser-supported language (such as JavaScript,
combined with a browser-rendered markup language like HTML) and reliant
on a common web browser to render the application executable.” See Spec.
46:20–24; see also id. at 53:12 (describing Web App 130 as providing a
method “for a system to enable listeners (consumers) to vote ‘like’ or
‘dislike.’”). However, the Specification provides no description of the
algorithm for the Web App or any other application with a user interface and
there are no flowcharts of instructions for the “number of flushes” that
would inform us as to the inventiveness of the algorithm’s construction or
execution. The claim simply uses a generic computing device, i.e., a server,
and generic software (Web App 130) to perform a calculation of the number
of flushes.
Even if the concept of a number of flushes has not been used before in
the sense of voting for songs, that concept is part of the abstract idea, as
discussed above. Additionally, the implementation of such a concept is no
different than the issue in Parker v. Flook, where the Court held that a
mathematical formula for computing alarm limits in a catalytic conversion
process was patent ineligible. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). As stated by the Court:
“Respondent’s application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values.” Id. at 59495. The same can be
said of the claims here. If Applicant contends that the “inventive concept”
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lies in the novelty of using the “number of flushes”—then the claim is
directed to nothing more than a novel way of counting forwards of a song
and adjusting the number of flushes accordingly. And under the rationale of
Parker v. Flook, even though counting the number of flushes is applicable to
a specific purpose (to remove a song from being available to a user), the fact
remains that counting the number of flushes still constitutes a mental process
or a certain method of organizing human activity (judicial exception) using a
generic server that performs generic functions.
As the Examiner finds, and we agree, the Specification describes that
the Web App runs on a database and a server, each of which are described
generically as a collection of computers that are able to provide functionality
for the present invention. Spec. 56:616. The Specification further provides
that the servers “can include multiple similar and distinct hardware
components or models, such as but not limited to Dell, IBM, Sun, HP and
required operating system software such as but not limited to UNIX,
Microsoft Windows, Redhat Linux and other required supportive operating
systems.” Id. These factual findings by the Examiner, supported by the
Specification, confirm our determination that the claimed “server” is a
generic computer recited as performing well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity.
With regard to the recited application and user interface, we are
similarly persuaded that these additional elements, alone or as an ordered
combination, are also recited generically and perform well-understood,
routine, conventional activity. The user interface in the application refers to
the Web App described above as running on a database and server. Thus,
the Web App may embody the algorithms for voting and allowing the
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forwarding of songs. See Spec. 46:2024, 46:12. The claim as a whole,
however, does not provide “details as to any non-conventional software for
enhancing” the voting and forwarding of songs, i.e., there is no “inventive
concept.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1057
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). Here, again, the claim as a whole does
not recite any particular inventive technology for performing the computer
algorithms.
We, therefore, conclude that the additional elements of claim 1
beyond the abstract idea, considered either individually or as an ordered
combination, do not include an inventive concept.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we conclude that claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does
not recite an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For the same reasons, we also
sustain the § 101 rejection of dependent claims 211, which are not argued
separately.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
111 101 Eligibility 111

Appeal 2019-002604
Application 14/680,601

19
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED