Markle Mfg. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 2, 1979

239 N.L.R.B. 1142 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Markle Manufacturing Company of San Antonio and
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local
1000. Cases 23-CA-5890, 23-CA-6056, 23-CA-
6330, 23-CA-6411, and 23-CA-6504
January 2, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS. PENELLO. AND MURPHY
On August 24, 1978, Administrative L.aw Judge
Robert C. Batson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Markle Manufacturing
Company of San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not
found herein.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
In the absence of exceptions, the Board adopts proforma the Administra-
tive Law Judge's finding that Respondent's failure to reinstate Marvin
O'Neil, a striking employee, did not violate the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT C. BATSON. Administrative Law Judge: This con-
solidated proceeding under the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., herein the Act,
was heard before me at San Antonio, Texas, on various
dates in August and September 1977, upon charges filed by
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 1000, herein col-
lectively the Union, against Markle Manufacturing Com-
pany of San Antonio, herein Respondent or Company, and
complaints issued thereon.' An order consolidating all
cases for hearing issued on June 21, 1977.
The complaints, as' amended at the hearing, allege refus-
al by Respondent to furnish the Union with requested in-
formation concerning the subcontracting of unit work: a
list of bargaining-unit employees who worked in excess of
40 hours a week or 8 hours a day during a specified period
of time; lists of employees including the names of those
recalled from strike and the jobs to which they had been
recalled; and information with respect to layoffs and repri-
mands given employees during a 6-month period, all in
violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. Also alleged
to violate Section 8(a)(5) is a layoff of certain employees
without notification to or consultation with the Union; a
unilateral change in working hours, rules. The complaint in
23-CA-5890 alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to reinstate 47 named
unfair labor practice strikers upon their unconditional of-
fer to return to work. The complaint in 23-CA-6504, is-
sued 18 months later, alleges the refusal to reinstate 16
named strikers, all of whom were named in the first com-
plaint, to their former positions when those positions be-
came available in accordance with their rights as economic
strikers. The nature of the strike, which commenced on
July 8, 1975, and ended with an unconditional offer on
behalf of all strikers to return to work on December 20,
1975, was litigated in Cases 23-CA-5460, et al, in Decem-
ber 1975, before Administrative Law Judge James L. Rose,
whose Decision issued March 26, 1976, JD-187-76. Judge
Rose declined to find the strike an unfair labor practice
strike, and the issue is now before the Board on exceptions
by both the General Counsel and Respondent. To avoid
further delay in issuing the Decision in this case, I assume,
without deciding, for purposes of this Decision, the cor-
rectness of Judge Rose's Decision and Order in the prior
case with respect to the nature of the strike and will decide
the reinstatement issue raised by the complaint in 23-CA-
6504.
It appears that these cases constitute merely another
chapter in the ongoing struggle between these parties to
I The charge in Case 23-CA-5890 was filed on December 23. 1975, and
amended January 20, 1976. Complaint thereon issued on March 19. 1976.
The charge in Case 23-CA-6056 was filed on May 17. 1976, and complaint
thereon issued on July 8. 1976. The charge in Case 23-CA-6330 was filed on
December 29, 1976. and complaint thereon issued on April 18. 1977. The
charge in Case 23-CA-6504 was filed on May 5. 1977. and amended on
June 10. 1977. Complaint thereon issued on June 21, 1977.
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MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
achieve the amicable collective-bargaining relationship en-
visioned by the Act-or perhaps, as each party charges the
other, to frustrate such relationship. Respondent charges
the Union with engaging in harassing tactics, citing the
numerous unfair labor practice charges it has filed which
were dismissed or withdrawn-thus, it contends these friv-
olous and groundless charges frustrated the bargaining re-
lationship. While it is true that the Union has filed numer-
ous charges which were apparently found to be without
merit, it is also true that the General Counsel has issued
complaints based upon 13 such charges since the parties
began negotiations for a second contract. On the other
hand, the Union charges Respondent with engaging in di-
latory tactics, most of which have been alleged in various
complaints.
The allegations of the complaints in the prior cases are
similar in some respects to those of the instant case.
All issues were fully litigated at the hearing; all parties
were represented throughout by counsel or other represen-
tatives and were afforded full opportunity to present evi-
dence and arguments and to file briefs. Briefs have been
received from counsel for the General Counsel and Re-
spondent.
Upon the entire record, including careful consideration
of the briefs, upon my observation of the testimonial de-
meanor of the witnesses testifying under oath, and upon
substantial reliable evidence, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE sUSINEss OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a Texas corporation, having its principal
place of business at San Antonio, Texas, where it is en-
gaged in the manufacture of metal products. During the 12
months preceding issuance of the complaints herein, which
is a representative period, Respondent purchased and re-
ceived goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
from points located directly outside the State of Texas. The
complaints allege, Respondent admits, and I find that Re-
spondent is now and at all times material herein has been
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaints allege, Respondent admits, and I find
that International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 1000 are labor or-
ganizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Background
In 1973 the Union mounted an organizational campaign
among Respondent's employees, which resulted in a
Board-conducted election and certification of the Union
on September 7, 1973, in an appropriate unit.2 Subsequent
negotiations resulted in the execution of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement on February 22, 1974, which, by its
terms, remained in force and effect from February 6, 1974,
to February 6, 1975, and thereafter from year-to-year un-
less either party at least 60 days prior to the expiration date
gave notice in writing to the other party of its desire to
terminate the contract. Paul Javior, representative of Local
1000, served timely notice of intent to terminate the con-
tract. Thus, the contract expired on February 6, 1975.
The unfair labor practice allegations of these complaints
span a period of almost 2 years and will be treated by
subject matter.
B. Alleged Refusals To Furnish Information
1. Subcontracting
On two occasions, October 17 and December 22, 1975,
the Union requested Respondent to furnish it certain infor-
mation with respect to its subcontracting practices, which
information was necessary to the performance of the
Union's statutory duty as a bargaining agent. By letter dat-
ed October 17, 1975, Union Representative Paul Javior
wrote to Roland Friese, Respondent's general manager,
with a copy to Attorney Manitzas, stating in relevant part:
I am writing as the collective bargaining agent rep-
resenting the employees at Markle Mfg. Company
within the bargaining unit for the following informa-
tion for collective bargaining, and responsible agent.
2. I am requesting a complete list of items being
sub-contracted, date subcontract originated, and
name of sub-contractor being sub-contracted to, work
that has been and is being produced by any one of the
following classifications at Markle Mfg. Company San
Antonio, Texas Lead-person, Maintenance, Tool
checker, Machine Operator, Helper, Fitter, Welder,
Burner, Bldg. & Gds., Painter, Crane Operator, Fitter
Helper, or Truck driver, but is now being sub-con-
tracted out of your plant, or is sent direct rather than
produced by your operation, but was to be produced
by your operation within the bargaining unit.
By letter dated October 23, 1975, Manitzas responded to
Javior's request, in pertinent part as follows:
Your request for information relating to subcon-
tracting of work is hereby denied. In this regard, your
attention is directed to Article IV, Management
Rights, of the expired collective bargaining contract.
Specifically bearing on this matter are the following
sections of the said provision: Section I, Section 3,
and Section 5.
Having been denied the requested information in Octo-
ber, on December 22, 1975, 2 days after the Union uncon-
2 The certified unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, including group leaders,
leadmen. shop clerks, truck drivers, shipping and receiving clerks, weld-
ers, burners, fitters, lay-out men, and inspectors, but excluding all other
employees, including all office clencal employees, guards, watchmen
and supervisors as defined in the Act, employed by the Respondent at
its San Antonio, Texas. plant.
1143
DEICISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ditionally offered the return to work of all striking employ-
ees, Javior again wrote Manitzas, with a copy to Friese:
I am writing to requesting [sic] that as the collective
bargaining agent representing the employees in the
bargaining unit, I am requesting that you provide me
with a list of all the sub-contracting and contracting
work being formed [sic] out of the bargaining unit at
this time that the employees in the following classifica-
tions otherwise would be performing leadmen. ma-
chine operators, fitters, Welders, Operators, Helpers
and Maintenance. The purpose specifically that I need
this information is to represent the employees in the
bargaining unit concerning Article IV, and its Section
4. I1 need this information as soon as possible, so that I
may full fill [sicl my legal obligations to represent the
members of IUE- AFL-CIO and its Local 1000 repre-
senting the bargaining unit established in Case No.
23-RC-3986 and the employees and classification
therein.
On December 24, 1976, Manitzas replied by letter, stat-
ing:
This is in response to your letter dated December
22, 1975, requesting information relating to subcon-
tracting of work. We question the propriety of this
request for such information, particularly in light of
the contractual provisions of Article IV, Management
Rights, of the expired collective bargaining contract.
In any event, the Company's current practices regard-
ing subcontracting of work are in accordance with
past practice and pursuant to the rights and preroga-
tives accorded to the Company under the terms of the
expired collective bargaining contract.
The General Counsel contends that the information
sought by the Union is relevant and reasonably necessary
for the intelligent performance of its statutory function as a
bargaining agent and argues "there can be no question, [of
the right to the information] since a prime concern of the
Union was the preservation of bargaining unit work." Na-
tional Woodwork Manufacturers Association, et al. v.
N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612. (1967)." Respondent, on the other
hand, argues that it had no obligation to furnish the infor-
mation sought relating to subcontracting of bargaining-
unit work, since the Union, by agreeing to the management
rights clause, article IV,3 in their only collective-bargaining
3Said article reads, in pertinent part:
Article IV. Section 1, The Company retains and reserves to itself all the
rights, powers, privileges, prerogatives and authority which it possessed
prior to the certification of the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, except only those which are specifically limited by the terms
of the provisions of this Agreement as they are expressly set forth
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to limit the Company's
sole and exclusive right to take any action it deems appropriate in the
management of the plant, the assignment, disposal and the use of its
facilities and equipment, the direction of the work force and of all
employees, except only as expressly limited in this Agreement.
Section 3. The Company shall have the exclusive right to determine
and control all matters pertaining to products to be manufactured and,
or sold, services to be performed. places of business or performance of
work, the sources, classes and types of materials. parts. components,
and pre-assemblies. contracting and/or subcontracting of work. the
scheduling and assignment location of work, the structure and assign-
agreement, had "waived its statutory right to bargain with
respect to the subject, [and] was not entitled to information
pertaining to the sub-contracting of unit work by Respon-
dent." Respondent further contends that the request for
this information was rendered moot when the Board, upon
investigation of unfair labor practice charges relating to
subcontracting and the diminution of bargaining-unit
work, "confirmed" that Respondent's practices were con-
sistent with its past practices. 4
There is a general obligation on an employer to provide
information needed by the bargaining representative for
the proper performance of its duties. This duty extends
beyond the period of contract negotiation and applies to
labor-management relations during the term of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. N.L.RB. v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). As the Court there said at 435-
436:
There can be no question of the general obligation
of an employer to provide information that is needed
by the bargaining representative for the proper perfor-
mance of its duties. N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149. Similarly, the duty to bargain unquestion-
ably extends beyond the period of contract negotia-
tions and applies to labor-management relations dur-
ing the term of an agreement.
The obligation of an employer to furnish such informa-
tion is one created by Section 8(d) of the Act, and not by
agreement between the union and the employer. However,
its exercise may be affected by provisions of collective-
bargaining agreements. The test of relevancy is "the proba-
bility that the deisred information [is] relevant, and that it
would be of use to the Union in carrying out its statutory
duties and responsibilities." Acme Industrial Co., supra at
437.
Where the information sought, such as wage and related
ment and scheduling of work crews and shifts, the methods, processes.
means and machinery to be used or any changes therein and the intro-
duction of new or improved methods or facilities. all without liability to
the Union or to the employees. The Company shall have the unre-
stricted nght and privilege to suspend. transfer, cease, relocate or re-
sume. at its discretion, the operation of its business, or use of its equip-
ment and facilities, or any part thereof, without liability to the Union
or to the employees. The above. while not an exclusive designation of
the Company's prerogatives. are the exclusive nght of determination of
the (Company. except only as expressly limited by this Agreement.
Section 5. It is expressly agreed by the parties that nothing in this
Agreement shall prohibit the Company from contracting and/or sub-
contracting out existing or new work or operations, or Company for
materials. components, assemblies complete orders, services or portions
of orders, to other firms or individuals for any economic factors which,
in the Company's judgment, warrant such action.
Contracting and /or subcontracting shall be at the sole and exclusive
option and determination of the Company, however, the Company
agrees that it will not exercise this right for the sole and exclusive
purpose of causing a lay-off or avoiding the recall of employees.
4 At the hearing Respondent asserted, as an additional and "principal"
reason for refusing to furnish this and other information to the Union, its
alleged good-faith doubt that the Union continued to represent a majority
of employees in the unit, which doubt was based in pan upon the fact that
the Union had not requested Respondent to bargain for over 2 years. As
noted supra., at the time the request for this information was first made the
Union was engaged in a strike, which, whether ultimately determined to be
economic or an unfair labor practice strike, is clear evidence that the Union
was requesting Respondent to bargain. Moreover, the unfair labor practices
found herein preclude Respondent from raising such defense.
!144
MAKKLE MANUFACTUR'NG COMPANY
information, pertains to employees in the bargaining unit,
there is a presumption of relevance, and no specific show-
ing of relevance is required. However, where as here, the
information sought pertains to matters occurring outside
the bargaining unit, relevance is required to be more pre-
cise. See Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Wright Aeronautical
Division v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
Respondent does not contend that the subcontracting of
unit work formerly done by unit employees is not a manda-
tory subject for bargaining, since such practice clearly in-
volves the preservation of unit work, 5 but relies instead
upon the contention that the Union had clearly and unmis-
takably waived its right to bargain about the subcontract-
ing of work by the agreement executed February 22, 1974,
citing N.L.R.B. v. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Inc., and Advertis-
er Publishing Co. Ltd., d/b/a Hawaii Newspaper Operators
372 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1967). Respondent's reliance on
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Inc., is misplaced on the facts of
this case, where the contract had expired. The court there
held, "Since the Company was given discretion as to that
particular matter [bonus plans], that matter was removed
from the scope of collective bargaining during the term of
the contract." [Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.] As-
suming, arguendo, that during the term of the contract the
Union had waived its right to obtain information pertain-
ing to Respondent's subcontracting practices, such waiver
expired with the contract. Therefore, Respondent's first de-
fense is without merit.
Likewise, Respondent's contention that the Union's re-
quest became moot when the Board (the Regional Office)
determined during the course of investigating an unfair la-
bor practice charge relating to its subcontracting practices
that such practices were consistent with its past practice is
not valid. The issue here is not whether Respondent's prac-
tices in that respect had changed but the right of the Union
to obtain the information as to what those practices were in
order that it could fulfill its statutory duty to fairly repre-
sent the employees.
I find that by failing and refusing to timely furnish the
Union the information it sought on October 17 and De-
cember 22, 1975, with respect to the subcontracting out of
unit work Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of
the Act, as alleged.
2. Request for list of employees working over 40 hours
per week
On March 17, 1976, by letter to Respondent's general
manager, Friese, Javior requested, inter alia, a list of all
unit employees who worked in excess of 40 hours per week
or 8 hours per day since December 15, 1975. Javior assert-
ed two reasons for requesting this information: (I) to veri-
fy reports that the plant was operating 6 or 7 days a week
and, if so, ascertain whether there was an equal distribu-
tion of the overtime work and (2) to verify the Company's
claimed economic reduction in force, which left approxi-
mately 50 former strikers without jobs. On March 19, 1976,
Respondent's attorney, Manitzas, replied by letter, refusing
Fiberboard Paper Products Corp v N.I..R. B.. 379 U S. 203 11964)
to furnish the information on the grounds that it related to
the Union's unfair labor practice charges of unlawful dimi-
nution of the unit then being investigaged by the Board's
Regional Office. Manitzas stated the pertinent information
had been submitted to the Board and asserted, "In any
event, there has been no change in the company's policy or
practice regarding hours of work, overtime or days of
work." On April 29, 1976. Javior reiterated his request, and
on May 6, 1976, Manitzas refused for the reasons stated in
his March 19 lette;.
Respondent in its brief contends that the Board's deter-
mination that the Union's charges of unlawful diminution
of the unit was without merit disposed of the Union's pur-
ported need for the information and aruges that it had no
duty to furnish such information, since its "practices did
not represent any unilateral deviation from or inconsisten-
cy with its practice: as they existed both during and prior
to the existence of the collective bargaining agreement."
The information sought here by the Union is clearly rele-
vant to the performance of its representational obligations
to employees. Although the collective-bargaining agree-
ment had expired, the Union's duty to fairly represent the
employees continued, as did Respondent's duty to bargain
in good faith with the Union. While it may be argued that
in the absence of a contractual provision providing for the
equal distribution of overtime work the Union would not
be entitled to the requested information to ascertain wheth-
er such work was equally distributed, in my opinion the
Union is entitled to the information under the circum-
stances here to enable it to intelligently bargain with the
employer concerning the distribution of overtime work.
Furthermore, the Union is entitled to the information for
the second reason stated, i.e.. to determine whether the em-
ployer has departed from its past practice with respect to
overtime in order to forestall the recall of some 50 former
strikers who had unconditionally offered to return to work.
Respondent's defense, that it had supplied the requested
data to the Board's Regional Office in connection with its
investigation of an unfair labor practice charge involving
the same issue and been exonerated of unlawful conduct, is
irrelevant to the issue of the duty to furnish the informa-
tion to the Union. Indeed, had Respondent furnished the
Union the requested information, which was, even without
any stated reason, potentially relevant 6 to the Union's
ability to intelligently bargain with Respondent, the unfair
labor practice charge might never have been filed.
I find that by failing and refusing to furnish the Union
the information it sought on March 17 and April 29, 1976,
with respect to overtime worked since December 15, 1975,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
3. Requests for other information
On December 11, 1976, Javior, by letter to Manitzas,
requested that Respondent furnish the Union: (I) a com-
plete and updated list of all employees in the bargaining
unit, showing name, seniority, classification, rate of pay,
department, last raise, age, sex, and race, a- of December
11, 1976: (2) the jobs recently recalled strikers held in July
See T7h BrooAlin I nin (;l t(rompanl 220 NI.RB 8X9 (1975).
1145
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1975; (3) the jobs recently recalled strikers filled when
they returned to work; (4) a list of all reprimands, layoffs,
terminations, or quits in the last 6 months; and (5) the
reasons for the reprimands, layoffs, or terminations in the
past 6 months. On March 14, 1977, by letter to Manitzas,
Javior requested a list of employees recalled from layoff
within the past 30 days, including the jobs to which the
employees were recalled, rate of pay, and date recalled. On
April 13, 1977, Javior, by letter to Manitzas, reiterated the
above requests and added a request for a list showing
which employees recalled from the strike in 1976 did or did
not receive a Christmas bonus in 1976. On February II,
1977, Javior, by letter, renewed in substance the December
II request and also requested copies of the recall letter
Respondent had sent to some of the former strikers.
Javior admits that on November 10, 1976, he obtained
from Manitzas, by telephone, the names of all the strikers
who had been recalled as of that date, but such informa-
tion did not include the positions to which they had been
recalled. On February 15, 1977, Respondent furnished the
Union a roster of the bargaining-unit complement includ-
ing the name, employment dates, classification, age, sex,
race and/or national origin, present rate of pay, and date
and amount of the last wage increase of each, as requested
by the Union. In addition, Respondent furnished the
Union with copies of the letters it had sent to I I strikers
and the names of 3 who declined the offer of reinstate-
ment.
The complaint in Cases 23-CA-5460, et al., heard by
Administrative Law Judge Rose, in December 1975 and
January 1976 (JD-187-76) contained an allegation that
since July 25, 1975, Respondent had refused to furnish the
Union with information apparently identical to that re-
quested here in (I) above. Administrative Law Judge Rose
concluded that the information was relevant to the Union's
performance of its collective-bargaining duty but that Re-
spondent had furnished the information prior to the hear-
ing. I allude to this finding only to place in perspective the
Union's frequent requests for this type of information and
Respondent's response to the requests. I also note that in
Javior's October 17, 1975, letter requesting the subcon-
tracting information discussed in section III, B above, a
request was also made for this same information. Manitzas'
October 23 reply stated that the Company was in the pro-
cess of preparing the requested information. Presumably
such information was supplied to the Union at that time.
Respondent apparently concedes that it has a duty to
furnish the Union a bargaining-unit roster setting forth the
information requested in (1), above, and contends that it
has complied with that duty. I find that by furnishing the
Union the information it did on February 15 and 20, 1976,
Respondent did not refuse to furnish the Union the infor-
mation it sought. While there was a 2-month interval be-
tween the first request and the time the information was
furnished, I find it was not unreasonable and did not ham-
per the Union in the performance of its duty. In view of
this finding, I need not decide whether Respondent had a
duty to supply the Union with information pertaining to
the age, sex, and race of the unit employees.
With respect to the information pertaining to the jobs
recently recalled strikers held at the time of the strike, Re-
spondent contends, and it is not disputed, that it supplied
the Union with that information some 3 weeks before the
strike and suggests that there were no changes between
June 15, 1975, and the date of the strike. I find and con-
clude that the infornmation provided the Union on June 15,
1975, indicating the jobs striking employees held as of that
date, was sufficient to enable the Union to intelligently
fulfill its representative functions. With respect to the jobs
recently recalled strikers filled when they returned to work,
I find that the information on the roster furnished the
Union on February 15, 1976, setting forth as it did name,
classification, and department, was sufficient for the Union
to determine the jobs in which recalled strikers had been
placed. Having found that Respondent furnished this in-
formation to the Union, albeit not in the most desirable
form, I need not deal with Respondent's arguments that it
had no duty to furn sh such information.
Respondent contends that it has no duty to furnish the
Union information with respect to reprimands, layoffs, ter-
minations, and quits and the reasons therefor, as requested
in the December 11, 1976, letter. I disagree. Although the
collective-bargaining agreement had expired, the Union re-
mained the duly designated collective-bargaining represen-
tative of the employees and as such was clearly entitled to
this information to intelligently perform its representative
functions. Likewise, the Union was entitled to a list of em-
ployees recalled from layoff and the positions to which
they were recalled as requested in the March 14 and April
13, 1977, letters. The same is true with respect to the names
of employees who did and did not receive a Christmas bo-
nus. It is well settled that the requested information need
only be of potential relevance to mandate an employer to
provide it. The Brooklyn Union Gas Company, supra There-
fore, Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) by refus-
ing to furnish the Union the information it requested, as
found above.
C. Unilateral Changes and Layoffs
On or about January 25, 1977, without notice to or con-
sultation with the Union, Respondent laid off several em-
ployees and unilaterally changed the hours of work, from 7
a.m. to 5:30 p.m. to 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. On or about April
25, 1977, Respondent unilaterally posted 10 general safety
rules which applied to unit employees.
On January 25, 1977, Respondent posted in its plant a
notice to all shop employees advising them that effective
January 27, 1977, there would be a layoff of indefinite du-
ration due to economic conditions and naming 15 employ-
ees who would be laid off. The same notice advised the
employees that the workweek would be reduced to 40
hours and the work hours would be 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Javior testified that he learned of the change in work hours
and his information about a layoff was confirmed when
Manitzas supplied him that information on February 15,
1977. The expired collective-bargaining agreement pro-
vides that the employer will notify the Union 3 working
days prior to any impending layoff. Respondent does not
address these issues in its post-hearing brief. The General
Counsel contends Respondent violated Section 8(a)5) and
(I) by failing to notify the Union 3 working days in ad-
!146
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
vance of the layoff in accord with the collective-bargaining
agreement and past practice and also by changing the
working hours without notification to or consultation with
the Union.
Respondent has a duty to notify the Union with respect
to changes in wages, hours, and conditions of employment
in order to afford the Union an opportunity to bargain
about same. It appears also that Respondent has a duty
under the expired collective-bargaining agreement and past
practice to notify the Union 3 days prior to any layoff.
This, it admits, it did not do. Accordingly, I find and con-
clude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)5) and (1) by
failing to notify the Union concerning the layoff and the
change in work hours.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the
alleged unilateral implementation of the safety rules on or
about April 22, 1977. Respondent deals extensively with
this issue in its brief, while the General Counsel does not
address it at all. It appears that this same issue was litigated
in the prior case with respect to another date.
On April 22, 1977, Respondent posted copies of the fol-
lowing, throughout the plant:
You are working for an organization which is sincere
in its desire to conduct all of its operations in the saf-
est manner possible. Compliance with the General
Safety Rules listed below will assist us in achieving
this objective. These rules are the minimum guides for
working safely. Your continued awareness and coop-
eration in loss control is a vital part of your job. It is
your duty to apply these and all accepted standards of
loss control.
1. Whenever you are involved in any accident that
results in personal injury or damage to property, no
matter how small, the accident must be reported. Get
first aid promptly.
2. Report immediately any condition or practice
you think might cause injury or damage to equipment.
3. Do not operate any equipment which, in your
opinion is not in a safe condition.
4. All prescribed safety and personal protective
equipment should be used when required and main-
tained in a working condition.
5. Obey all company rules, governmental regula-
tions, signs, markings, and instructions. Be particu-
larly familiar with those that apply directly to you. If
you don't know-ask.
6. When lifting, use the approved lifting technique,
i.e., bend your knees, grasp the load firmly, then raise
the load keeping your back as straight as possible. Get
help for heavy loads.
7. Don't horseplay; avoid distracting others; be
courteous.
8. Always use the right tools and equipment for the
job. Use them safely and only when authorized.
9. Good housekeeping should always be practiced.
Return all tools, equipment, materials, etc. to their
proper places. Disorder wastes time, energy, and ma-
terial, and will often result in injury.
10. The use of drugs and/or intoxicating beverages
are prohibited.
It is undisputed that Respondent first posted these no-
tices throughout the plant in late 1974. Respondent further
established that it had throughout its existence displayed
safety posters relating to each of the 10 rules set forth
above.
There is no evidence or contention that the general
safety rules which were first posted in 1974, apparently
during the term of the collective-bargaining agreement, be-
came dormant or were otherwise rescinded. Therefore, the
rules were not newly promulgated in April 1977, as alleged,
and there was no duty on Respondent to notify or bargain
with the Union. Even assuming that these specific general
safety rules had not been posted continuously since 1974, it
is undisputed that safety posters displayed throughout the
plant conveyed the same message. Thus, the rules were
merely a codification of rules which had been in existence
for several years, a-id their posting does not constitute a
unilateral change in working conditions about which Re-
spondent must bargain with the Union.
D. The Reinstatement of Strikers Issue
The outcome of this case with respect to the reinstate-
ment rights of all striking employees as of December 20,
1975, as unfair labor practice strikers, depends upon the
Board's decision in Cases 23-CA-5460, et al., JD-187-76,
on the issue of whether the July 8, 1975, strike was caused,
and/or prolonged, by the unfair labor practices alleged
and litigated in those cases.
If the Board finds in the earlier case, wherein the nature
of the strike was litigated, that the strike was not an unfair
labor practice strike because it was not caused or pro-
longed by any unfair labor practices found therein, then
the allegations of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the complaint in
Case 23-CA-5890 should be dismissed and the reinstate-
ment rights of the strikers should be decided under the
allegations of the complaint in Case 23-CA-6504. If, on
the other hand, the Board finds the strike there in issue to
be an unfair labor practice stnke, then paragraphs 16 and
17 of the complaint in Case 23-CA-6504 should be dis-
missed and the issue decided under the allegations of the
complaint in Case 23-CA-5890, which would require the
immediate reinstatement of all striking employees for
whom jobs were available after the displacement of re-
placements.
The evidence before me in this respect deals entirely
with the alleged failure of Respondent to recall 16 strikers
in accordance with their rights to reinstatement as econom-
ic strikers when their former, or substantially equivalent,
positions became available after being vacated by perma-
nent replacements.
The undisputed evidence and stipulations before me es-
tablish that on July 8, 1975, there were 75 to 78 employees
occupying positions within the described unit, and such
employees constituted a full complement. On December
20, 1975, Union Representative Javior, by mail-O-gram,
made an unconditional offer on behalf of all striking em-
ployees to return to work. On December 22, 1975, Respon-
dent's vice president, Friese, replied by letter, asserting in
substance that all strikers had either been permanently re-
placed, or their positions'were not presently available due
1147
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to economic considerations, and added that certain strikers
were not eligible for reinstatement due to their participa-
tion in strike violence or misconduct. At this time there
were 49 employees working in unit jobs, consisting of 25
nonstriking employees, 4 employees who had abandoned
the strike and returned to work prior to this time, and 20
replacements who had been hired between July 8 and De-
cember 20, 1975. Counsel for the General Counsel stipulat-
ed that the diminution of the unit during the strike was the
result of legitimate economic considerations and that no
other jobs or positions were available in the unit.
The General Counsel contends that if the strike is found
to be an unfair labor practice strike the 49 jobs available
on December 22, 1975, should be apportioned among the
striking and nonstriking employees, after removal of all
replacements, on a nondiscriminatory basis, citing Lytron
Incorporated 207 NLRB 554, 560 (1973). As previously
noted, the issue of the status of the strike is now before the
Board in its review of the previous case. It appears that
Respondent's defense of its failure to reinstate some of the
strikers, such as those it charges with strike misconduct, is
a defense it would assert regardless of the nature of the
strike and that resolution of these issues would be neces-
sary in any event.
The complaint in Case 23-CA-6504, as amended at
hearing, alleges that Respondent refused to reinstate 16
strikers in accordance with its duty to reinstate economic
strikers. Ten strikers were never offered reinstatement, six
because of alleged strike misconduct and four because of
unsatisfactory work records. Four strikers were recalled af-
ter new employees had been hired in positions the General
Counsel contends should have been offered to these indi-
viduals. Two strikers were recalled and subsequently, the
General Counsel contends, were improperly denied rein-
statement.
Robert Castro
On March 22, 1977, Vice President Friese sent a letter
via certified mail to Robert Castro requesting his return to
work on or before April 4, 1977. The letter was properly
addressed to Castro at the last address known to Respon-
dent. The letter' was returned to Respondent marked by the
postal service "Moved, not forwardable," "forwarding has
expired." Castro testified that he had moved from that ad-
dress 15 months earlier and admits that he did not notify
the Company of his change of address but contended that
his telephone number had remained unchanged. Castro
learned about 2 months later that strikers were being re-
called and went to the plant to inquire about his recall.
Superintendent Louis Acros advised him that his recall let-
ter had been returned because of his change of address,
obtained his new address and telephone number, and told
Castro that no jobs were available then, but he might be
called when work picked up.
The General Counsel, while reciting the above facts in
his brief, does not address any theory with respect to why
Respondent had not fulfilled its obligation to recall Castro
by the March 22 letter. At the trial the General Counsel
appeared to take the position that Respondent had a fur-
ther duty, after the return of the letter, to attempt to tele-
phone Castro with a message of his recall.
It is well settled that an employee awaiting recall under
Laidlaw has a duty, at a minimum, to keep the employer
informed of his current address in order to allow the em-
ployer to effectively notify him of recall by certified mail, a
means which has been approved by the Board. Indeed, if
such employee fails to maintain a current address with the
employer for this purpose, an employer may be justified in
assuming the employee is no longer interested in his job.
Assuming, as Castro testified, that Acros told him in June,
2 months after his recall letter was returned, that he would
call him when work picked up, such does not constitute an
extention of Laidlaw rights, and the issue of refusal to re-
hire an employee was neither alleged nor litigated. Accord-
ingly, I find that Respondent fulfilled its duty to recall
Castro when his job became available by the attempted
delivery of the April 22, 1975, letter. This is not a case
where the employer is remedying an unfair labor practice
such as offering reinstatement to an unlawfully discharged
employee, in which case the Board has held that an unde-
livered letter offering reinstatement does not constitute a
valid offer, Ertel Manufacturing Corp., 147 NLRB 312
(1964), and the employer must utilize all other reasonable
means to effectuate the offer of reinstatement. See Gladwin
Industries, Inc., 183 NLRB 280 (1970).
Joe Valdez
On April 4, 1977, the employer, by certified mail, offered
helper Joe Valdez his former position at the plant. Upon
receipt of the letter, Valdez, who had worked approximate-
ly I month prior to the strike, and his father, who was also
an employee, went to the plant and talked with Manager
Friese and Superintendent Acros. The elder Valdez, who
had also been recalled, declined to return to work and ad-
vised Friese and Acros that the younger Valdez, Joe, was in
school at the time and that when school was out in June he
would return to work. According to Valdez, he was told as
soon as school was out he could have his job back. Accord-
ing to Friese, he told Valdez he could not wait for him
under the provision of the recall, but that he could call
when he finished school and they might be able to use him.
In June Valdez went to the plant and talked with Acros,
who told him he had been replaced but could complete
another application for consideration for future employ-
ment. Valdez declined to do so, reasoning that "I already
had one there." Valdez testified that when he went to work
at Markle, in the summer of 1975, he was thinking about
quitting school in order to work. However, since he did not
have a job when school resumed in September, he returned
to school.
Again, counsel for the General Counsel does not address
a specific argument with respect to Respondent's duty to
hold Valdez' job for 2 months while he completed the
school year. However, it appears that he contends that the
duty arises from Friese's alleged promise to hold his job for
him. I find, based upon the credited testimony of Friese,
that he told Valdez that he could not hold his job for him,
but would consider him for other positions when they be-
came available. I do not believe that Valdez intentionally
gave false testimony on this point. His command of the
1148
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
English language was minimal, and he may well have un-
derstood from Friese's statement that his job would be
available in June. Clearly, if the employer needed the posi-
tion offered to Valdez filled at that time, it could not wait
for 2 months while Valdez completed the school year be-
fore filling it. It is equally clear that the employer, having
fulfilled its obligation to recall Valdez, considering the
state of its business at that time, could hardly guarantee
Valdez employment when he completed school. Accord-
ingly, I find that Respondent fulfilled its duty to recall
Valdez by the April 4, 1975, letter and has no further duty
to recall him under the Laidlaw doctrine. The issue of a
refusal to rehire Valdez in June 1977 was not alleged or
litigated.
Humberto Perales
Humberto Perales was employed in the maintenance
classification as an equipment maintenance man at the
time of the strike. At that time there were four employees
carried under the maintenance classification: a chief main-
tenance man, a janitor, a tool checker, and Perales. Perales
was the only employee in this classification to join the
strike. Prior to Perales' unconditional offer to return to
work, Harvey Zombro was hired in his classification as a
permanent replacement. According to Friese, Zombro quit
sometime in May 1977, but Perales was not recalled be-
cause the position did not need to be filled at that time. At
some point after this, Zombro was rehired and worked un-
til approximately July 8, 1977. On July 12, Perales was
offered his former position, which had been vacated for a
second time by Zombro. Also pertinent to the General
Counsel's contention with respect to Perales is the fact that
after the strike Gonzales, the janitor who was carried under
the maintenance classification, retired and was replaced by
Esparza. The General Counsel contends that Respondent
should have offered Perales the janitor position when it
became vacant, since it was in the maintenance classifica-
tion, and/or have offered him his former position when
Zombro quit the first time. In its brief Respcndent con-
tends that it had no duty to offer Perales the janitor posi-
tion, since it had never hired an equipment maintenance
man to perform janitorial duties. Without addressing
Zombro's first "quit" as testified to by Friese, it contends
that Perales was properly reinstated when Zombro quit in
July 1977.
There is no evidence in the record before me dealing
with the comparability of the janitor job with that of equip-
ment maintenance. such as wages and duties of the jobs.
The 1974 contract between the Union and the employer
provides for a wage range in maintenance of from $2 to
$3.70 an hour. However, other evidence in the record, spe-
cifically Respondent's June 15, 1976, reply to the Union's
request for information, which includes wages and classifi-
cations of all employees, shows that as of that date Gon-
zales, the janitor, was earning $2.80 an hour and Zombro,
Perales' replacement, was earning $3 per hour. The defi-
ciencies of this comparison are obvious, since Gonzales
was far senior to Zombro and such could affect the wage
rate. The burden is upon Respondent to establish either
that the job was not substantially equivalent or that Perales
was not reasonably well qualified to perform the janitorial
duties. This burden it has failed to sustain. I find and con-
clude that Respondent had a duty to offer the janitor posi-
tion to Perales on May 27, 1977, when it hired a new em-
ployee to fill the vacancy. In any event, Perales had a
paramount right to his former position when Zombro quit
the first time and was rehired at some point after May 27,
1977.
Juan Morales, Jose Hinojosa, and Bob Jones
Juan Morales and Jose Hinojosa were employed in the
"helper" classification at the time of the strike, and Bob
Jones was a welder. On December 20, 1975, permanent
replacements had been hired to Hinojosa's and Jones' posi-
tions and Morales' position had been eliminated due to the
economic diminution of the unit. The counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel contends that Respondent failed to recall
these strikers until after it had hired new employees in their
respective classifications.7 Respondent admits that 10 new
employees had been hired in the helper classification and 2
in the welder classification when it recalled Morales, Hino-
josa, and Jones on July 12, 1977. Respondent contends that
it had "legitimate and substantial business reasons" for its
failure to recall these three strikers before hiring new em-
ployees. The only business consideration advanced is
"their poor performance records and their undesirability as
employees." Other than the conclusional testimony of
Friese, no evidence was adduced in support of this conten-
tion. There is no contention by Respondent that Morales,
Hinojosa, and Jones would have been disciplined by terrm-
nation, layoff or otherwise, had they not participated in the
strike.
It is well settled that permanently replaced economic
strikers who have unconditionally offered to return to work
are entitled to their jobs upon the vacation of the jobs by
the permanent replacements and to be placed on a prefer-
ential hiring list for recall to like, or substantially equiva-
lent, positions. The employer may, however, deny such re-
instatement for substantial and legitimate business reasons.
N.L R.B v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938); N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375
(1967). In my view, the reasons asserted here are not sub-
stantial and legitimate business reasons. Respondent may
not rely upon asserted work deficiencies, for which there is
no evidence the employees would have been disciplined
absent their participation in a strike, to deny them their
proper recall rights. Respondent's reliance upon Plymouth
Cordage Co. d/b/a Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Company,
151 NLRB 949 (1969), is misplaced. In that case a number
of employees were laid off due to economic reasons and
the employer refused to recall from layoff four employees,
asserting work deficiencies and their undesirability as em-
ployees as reasons therefor in defense against a complaint
alleging that the refusal to recall stemmed from their union
activities and was violative of Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
The Board considered the defense and, as to one employee
The record discloses that new employees were hired in the helper classi-
fication on April 7 and 18. May 9. 20, 24. 25(2). and 31, June 7, and July I I,
1977. and in the welder classification on June 13 and July I I. 1977.
1149
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Rodgers), affirmed the trial examiner's finding that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of discrimi-
nation in light of the credited evidence of his undesirability
as an employee. There is no duty imposed on an employer
by operation of the Act to recall economically laid-off em-
ployees, other than to refrain from discriminating against
them because of their union or protected concerted activi-
ties. Such duty, if any, arises out of a contractual relation-
ship. Whereas the Act, by operation of the interpretation
enunciated in the Laidlaw concept imposes a duty to recall
economic strikers when their jobs, or substantially equiva-
lent jobs for which they are reasonably well qualified, be-
come available, I know of no cases, and Respondent cites
none, where the Board has permitted an employer to reev-
aluate an economic striker's desirability as an employee
and assert its determination that he is an undesirable em-
ployee as a legitimate and substantial business reason for
denying him his right to be recalled to his job when the job
becomes available.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent has not met its bur-
den of proof that the delay in the recall of Morales, Hino-
josa, and Jones was for legitimate and substantial business
reasons. Morales and Hinojosa should have been nondis-
criminatorily recalled to the first two helper positions for
which new employees were hired and Jones to the welder
position filled by a new employee on June 13, 1977.8
Jesus Gonzales, Mike Ulloa, and Eulalio Palacios
Respondent admits that it has refused to recall machine
operator Jesus Gonzales and helpers Mike Ulloa and Eula-
lio Palacios, whose jobs had been eliminated on December
20, 1975, and that it has hired new employees in those
positions. Respondent refused to reinstate these employees
for the asserted reason of unsatisfactory employment rec-
ords, including excessive absenteeism and tardiness. Gon-
zales was given 33 slips between January and July 1975
and, in June 1975, received a 3-day suspension for absen-
teeism. Palacios was absent 12 times during the 4-month
period prior to the strike, and Ulloa was absent or late 7
times during a 2-month period. According to Plant Manag-
er Friese, Respondent has a progressive disciplining system
wherein, it appears, attendance records are reviewed at 2-
month intervals and if such review reveals the employee
has been unexcusably tardy or absent five times he is given
a warning letter admonishing that his attendance must im-
prove. If during the next 2-month period he has five or
more unexcused absences, he is given what is called a "1-
day letter," which, according to Friese, means that if his
In its brief Respondent asserts that Jones was not offered reinstatement
because "it bad received information that Jones had secured other employ-
ment." The only evidence presented in support of this contention was the
following testimony by Friese:
Q. (By Mr. Manitzas) "To your kno ledge. was he (Jones) working
prior to the time you offered him recall?"
A. "Yes, you hear these things, but you can't be sure. As far as I
know, he's working."
Such evidence is clearly insufficient to establish that Respondent possessed
any reliable evidence that Jones had secured regular and substarnially
equivalent employment to bring him within that exception of the Laidlaw
doctinne.
attendance does not improve during the next 2-month pe-
riod he will be laid off for 2 days. During the next 2-month
period, if his attendance has not improved he will be laid
off for 3 days, and at the end of the following 2-month
period, if improvement is not shown, the employer has the
option to fire him. The progressive disciplinary policy de-
scribed above is extremely liberal and possibly encourages
lax attendance. While there is little evidence in the record
before me to determine the extent of absenteeism and tar-
diness. Administrative Law Judge Rose, in the prior case,
JD-187-76 (p. 10, sl. op.) observed "the record is clear,
that absenteeism, tardiness and the like are common at the
Markle Plant. Yet few, if any employees are ever disci-
plined for this, much less dishcarged. An occasional em-
ployee may not be given a raise at the end of the proba-
tionary period if he misses too much work, and other
employees, after substantial absenteeism, have been repri-
manded and some have been disciplined by lay-off."
Respondent's refusal to recall these employees in accor-
dance with their rights as economic strikers is tantamount
to discharge. It is evident that Respondent departed from
its progressive disciplinary policy in terminating these em-
ployees for excessive absenteeism. Assuming that a respon-
dent may in some cases go behind the economic strike and
establish legitimate and substantial business considera-
tions, which burden is on Respondent, for refusing to recall
employees from strike by showing that an employee's work
record or habits were sufficient to warrant his discharge,
Respondent has failed to sustain that burden here.
Denial of reinstatement to economic strikers is inherent-
ly destructive of important Section 7 rights, including the
right to strike. If an employer may seize upon a lawful
strike to review strikers' competency and desirability as
employees and, if they are found to be less than adequate,
assert such finding as a substantial business reason for not
reinstating them, where it is not established that such em-
ployees would have been forthwith discharged, the result is
inherently destructive of the right to strike. Any employee
with less than an exemplary work record, which work rec-
ord is frequently not known to the employee, would be
fearful to engage in this protected activity and afford the
employer an opportunity to review his work record and
deny him reinstatement. In my opinion, a better rule would
be to preclude a struck employer from asserting as a legiti-
mate business consideration any work deficiencies or un-
desirable habits known to it at the time of the strike as a
basis for denying reinstatement to its employees.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent has
not met its burden of establishing substantial business just-
ifications for refusing to recall Gonzales, Ulloa, and Palac-
ios before hiring new employees in their former positions
for which they were reasonably well qualified.
Teofilo Guzman
Respondent contends that it was justified in not offering
reinstatement to Teofilo Guzman because it was notified
by Guzman's insurance company in December 1975 that
he had filed a claim for disability and was not able to work.
Guzman was a machine operator at the time of the strike.
Guzman sustained a work-related injury to his back in
1150
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
1974 and did not work for several months, but returned
about March 1975 and worked until the strike on July 8,
1975. After the strike ended, in January 1976, Respondent
received a copy of Guzman's claim for disability filed with
his insurance company. In November 1976, Respondent
also received notice that Guzman had visited at least two
physicians for treatment for pain in his legs. It appears that
he was also treated for related problems in 1977. Respon-
dent contends that it had never been notified by Guzman's
physician that he had been released from his claimed dis-
ability.
There is nothing contained in the information Respon-
dent had in its possession to indicate that Guzman was
claiming permanent disability, or indeed that his claim for
disability had been sustained by the insurance carrier.
I find and conclude that Respondent has not established
a substantial business reason for not offering Guzman his
own position or one for which he was reasonably well qua-
lified when such position became available.
Feles Cantu, Robert Pineda, Guillermo "Willie" Suarez.
J. Navarro, Albert Almaraz, and Marvin O'Neal
Respondent denied reinstatement to strikers Feles Can-
tu, Robert Pineda, Guillermo "Willie" Suarez, J. Navarro,
Albert Almaraz, and Marvin O'Neil for alleged strike mis-
conduct and violence. The conduct claimed by Respon-
dent to be so egregious as to make these employees unsui-
table for employment is set forth in the allegations of
paragraph 8(a) through (h) and 9 of the complaint issued in
Case 23-CB-1773 on February 3, 1976. Disposition of that
case was achieved by formal settlement. On April 13, 1976,
the Respondent Union therein, the Charging Party (Re-
spondent herein), and the General Counsel entered into a
settlement stipulation subject to the approval of the Board,
providing for the entry of a consent order by the Board
and a consent judgment by any appropriate United States
Court of Appeals. The parties waived all further proce-
dures they may be entitled to before the Board. The settle-
ment stipulation contained a nonadmissions clause. On
June 15, 1976, the Board entered its Decision and Order
based upon the settlement stipulation, and on July 15,
1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit entered judgment enforcing the Board's Order.
In its answer to the complaint in Case 23-CA-6504, at
the hearing, and in its post-hearing brief, Respondent con-
tended that the complaint issued by the General Counsel in
Case 23-CA-1173, the all party settlement stipulation, the
adoption of the settlement stipulation by the Board, and
the entry of its consent Order and of the consent judgment
by the court of appeals create a collateral estoppel on the
General Counsel to allege in the instant case that the strik-
ers named in the CB compalint were entitled to reinstate-
ment, thereby placing in issue the question of whether they
had engaged in disqualifying misconduct. Respondent fur-
ther contends that the position now taken by the General
Counsel is inconsistent with and contrary to the position
taken by the General Counsel in the prior CB case and that
such constitutes an "intentional self-contradiction and is
an affront to the sanctity and dignity of judicial proceed-
ings."
At the hearing I denied Respondent's motion to preclude
the General Counsel's adducing testimony from these strik-
ers to explain the circumstances surrounding the miscon-
duct alleged in the CB compoaint or to deny that they had
been guilty of it, and to dismiss the complaints with respect
to Respondent's refusal to reinstate them. I concluded
then, as now, after further consideration and research, that
Respondent was entitled to rely upon the allegations of the
prior CB complaint with respect to the strike misconduct of
these employees, and the dispisition thereof by consent or-
der and judgment, only to establish the good-faith belief
that they had engaged in disqualifying misconduct and
shift the burden to the General Counsel to establish by a
preponderance of evidence that they had not in fact en-
gaged in such conduct under the criterion approved by the
Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 379
U.S. 21, 23 (1964), as enunciated by the Board in Rubin
Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 NLRB 610 (1952). Relying upon its
contention of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, Re-
spondent adduced no evidence of misconduct of these six
strikers.
Respondent's argument for collateral estoppel on the
facts here has some appeal. However, I find no support for
the application of collateral estoppel on these facts in the
Federal courts or Board decisions or in other authorities on
the subject.9 The General Counsel argues in substance that
the settlement stipulation here ran only to the Union and
not to the individuals named as agents of the Union. In
other words, the strikers who are alleged as discriminatees
herein were not parties to the prior proceeding. Mosher
Steel Company, 226 NLRB 1163 (1976), enfd. in part, de-
nied in relevant part 532 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1976), cited by
the General Counsel, is inapposite on the facts. In Mosher
there had been a prior hearing based upon a charge and
complaint against the Union wherein the Administrative
Law Judge made findings of fact that certain strikers had
engaged in conduct attributable to the Union in violation
of Section 8(bXIXA).' ° No exceptions were filed. In the
subsequent proceeding, the issue of the relitigation of the
facts found in the CB case, with respect to the conduct of
strikers who had not testified in the prior case, was raised
by the complaint allegation of a violation of Section 8(aX3)
and (1), predicated on Respondent's refusal to reinstate the
strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to work
after a strike. The Board adopted without comment the
Administrative Law Judge's conclusions that the General
Counsel was not estopped from relitigating their conduct,
since the alleged discriminatees were not parties to the
prior proceeding, although named as agents; had not been
served with notice of hearing; were under no obligation to
appear unless subpenaed; were not privies for purposes of
estoppel; had no interest in the CB proceeding; and bad
not offered to return to work at the time of the CB hearing,
and since the issue of the denial of reinstatement was not
ripe for litigation. Respondent there, as in the instant case,
declined to adduce evidence to rebut the alleged discrimi-
natees' denials that they had engaged in disqualifying mis-
conduct. In denying enforcement of this part of the
9See Moore's Federal Practice. lB. 4009 Sec 0.444 (31.
iOCase 23-CA 1158. not reported
1151
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board's Order, the court observed that "collateral estoppel
is applicable only if the same parties or their privies are
involved in both actions and if it was foreseeable that the
facts to be the subject of estoppel would be of importance
in future litigation." The court found that the employee
whose conduct had been litigated in the previous case de-
rived his protection from the Union in the latter case and
that the Union had prosecuted both cases.
Thus, unlike the instant case, in Mosher the same con-
duct of the striker had been litigated in a previous case
before an Administrative Law Judge and findings of fact
made thereon, and the court accepted the findings of fact
made by the Judge and considered the employee's eligibili-
ty for reinstatement in light of those facts.
Of greater precedential value here is the Board's decision
in W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 220 NLRB 593 (1975), enfd. in
relevant part 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977). In McQuaide,
Respondent contended that a contempt of court citation
by a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas justified its dis-
charge of three strikers. The court made no findings of fact
but provided merely that the Respondents therein "are ad-
judged to be in contempt of court." The Board, after not-
ing that not all misconduct in the course of a strike de-
prives an employee of his right to reinstatement, stated at
594 that "in so evaluating the conduct by strikers, the
Board will not abdicate its statutory responsibility to weigh
the aforementioned considerations to another tribunal
whose decision may be predicated on different considera-
tions from those pertinent to our inquiry." In enforcing this
part of the Board's Order, the court of appeals stated at
526 "We agree with the Board, that, in the absence of spe-
cific findings of fact by the Ebensburg court, the contempt
rulings are not controlling." The court then quoted with
approval the language of the court in N.L.R.B. v. Cambria
Clay Products Company, 215 F.2d 48, 54 (6th Cir. 1954): "It
is not the fact that there was a violation of the injunction
that determines whether they should or should not be rein-
stated, but the type of conduct they engaged in, and the
manner and nature and seriousness of their violation of the
order." In Cambria the court stated, "While the amount of
the fine and the ten days of imprisonment imposed by the
court of common pleas would seem to indicate a serious
offense, there is no proof as to the facts. We wish to know
what the conduct actually was; whether it resulted from
improper motives, and was of a violent or of such serious
character as to render the employees unfit for further ser-
vice."
Thus, even where it has been found by another tribunal
that a striker has engaged in some misconduct, the courts
have approved the Board's position that it is the Board's
statutory responsibility to assess and weigh the nature of
the conduct and whether it was so serious and egregious as
to justify discharge. I have found no cases, and Respon-
dent has cited none, wherein the Board has found striker
misconduct merely alleged in a Board complaint to rebut
live credible testimony of the strikers that such conduct did
not occur.
Finally, it appears that the Supreme Court has rejected
in general the blanket application of collateral estoppel ar-
ising from a settlement agreement and consent judgment.
In United States v. International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502,
506 (1953), the Court said, "[A] judgment entered with the
consent of the parties may involve a determination of fact
and law by the court. But unless a showing is made that
that was the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so
far as collateral estoppel is concerned, than any judgment
entered only as a compromise by the parties."
Accordingly, I find and conclude the General Counsel
was not estopped from litigating the misconduct of these
six alleged discriminatees. Respondent was so advised at
the trial and chose to take the risk that a finding would be
made that they had not engaged in the misconduct alleged
in the CB case or that such conduct was not so egregious as
to deprive them of reinstatement. As noted, Respondent
chose not to call any witness to testify with respect to the
alleged misconduct.
I turn now to the complaint allegations in the CB case,
upon which Respondent asserted a good-faith belief that
six strikers here involved had engaged in strike misconduct,
and to the General Counsel's evidence denying or explain-
ing such conduct.
Feles Cantu
It was alleged in the CB complaint that Cantu "followed
a group of nonstriking employees from the employer's
premises in his automobile on Interstate Highway 35
South, . . . cutting back and forth in front of said vehicle
in a hazardous manner and in an attempt to block the
vehicle in which the nonstriking employees were driving."
Cantu. who was president of Local 1000 when the 1975
strike commenced, was also alleged to have been present
during the occurrence of the other allegations of the com-
plaint. He denied that he at any time during the strike
followed any group of nonstriking employees on the San
Antonio freeways or undertook to block or assault any
nonstriker on the San Antonio freeways or engaged in any
similar activity. Cantu also denied being present during the
occurrence of any misconduct by other strikers." Respon-
dent declined to cross-examine Cantu, asserting, "We don't
intend to litigate 23CB-1773 in this proceeding."
Although Cantu's denial that he had engaged in the con-
duct alleged in the prior CB complaint was elicited by lead-
ing questions by counsel for the General Counsel, I find
that such does not debilitate Cantu's credibility, in view of
his impressive testimonial demeanor and the record evi-
dence as a whole. Accordingly, I find and conclude that
the General Counsel has sustained his burden of going for-
ward with the proof that Cantu did not in fact engage in
misconduct sufficient to disqualify him for employment,
and Respondent's failure to properly reinstate him violates
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Robert Pineda
There are no specific allegations with respect to Pineda's
personal conduct, but he, as secretary-treasurer of Local
u Cantu testified specifically regarding an allegation involving strikers
Guillermo "Willie Suarez. and J. Navarro. and employee Francisco Escam-
illa. This testimony will be considered with other testimony concerning this
event.
!152
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
1000, is alleged to have been present on the picket line
during the occurrence of the misconduct of other strikers.
Pineda denied having witnessed any misconduct on the
part of any striker. He also testified to the circumstances
surrounding the allegation involving nonstriker Escamilla.
I credit Pineda's denials that he witnessed any striker mis-
conduct. I need not decide for purposes of this decision
whether Pineda's merely witnessing misconduct on the part
of other strikers without evidence of condonation or assis-
tance would make him ineligible for employment. Accord-
ingly, I find and conclude that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(aXI) and (3) of the Act by refusing to properly
reinstate Pineda.
Albert Almaraz
Almaraz is alleged in the CB complaint to have threat-
ened nonstriking employees entering Respondent's plant
on three occasions and to have threatened a nonstriking
employee with "physical violence" away from the prem-
ises. Almaraz denied having threatened in any manner a
nonstriking employee. I credit his denial and find and con-
clude that Respondent violated Section 8(aX)(I) and (3) of
the Act by refusing to properly reinstate him.
Guillermo "Willie" Suarez and J. Navarro
Suarez and Navarro are alleged in the CB complaint to
have threatened a nonstriking employee with "physical vio-
lence" and to have "physically beat" nonstriking employee
Escamilla and threatened to kill him if he reported the
incident to the police.
Employee Francisco Escamilla abandoned the strike in
September and returned to work. According to Cantu, Es-
camilla became unhappy with the Union and the strike, in
part because the Union's strike benefits and pay for walk-
ing picket was less than Escamilla expected. At some point
Escamilla informed Cantu that he carried a gun and would
not take anything from anybody. After abandoning the
strike, Escamilla taunted the strikers by laughing and wav-
ing his paycheck as he crossed the picket line. Cantu ad-
monished the strikers not to become involved in arguments
or any altercation with Escamilla, since he carried guns.
Suarez testified that in October Escamilla stopped his
car at the picket line and he observed a gun in Escamilla's
hand. According to Suarez, in November Escamilla, who
was drinking beer at the time, was returning to the plant
shortly after noon and stopped his car at the picket line
and began yelling obscenities against Suarez and and the
Union. Escamilla threatened to kill Suarez and reached un-
der the seat of his car. Suarez, asserting that he feared for
his life, reached in and slapped Escamilla twice with his
open hand, then ran behind his automobile. According to
Suarez, Jesse Navarro drove up about that time but appar-
ently was not involved in the altercation. Suarez denied
that he at any time had a gun on the picket line. Suarez was
indicted by the Criminal District Court for the State of
Texas for assault with a deadly weapon. The indictment
was subsequently dismissed. Suarez denied that he threat-
ened any employee with physical violence. Upon the fore-
going findings, I conclude that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by refusing to properly rein-
state Suarez and Navarro. Although Navarro did not testi-
fy, the allegations of the CB complaint place him and Sua-
rez together in the alleged misconduct, and based upon
Suarez' testimony as to Navarro's lack of involvement in
the Escamilla incident, I conclude that the General Coun-
sel has sustained his burden of establishing that Navarro
did not engage in the conduct alleged.
Marvin O'Neil
The CB complaint alleges that O'Neil threatened non-
striking employees that "those employees engaging in the
strike would get them." O'Neil did not testify at the hear-
ing. Such threat may or may not, depending on the sur-
rounding circumstances, constitute disqualifying miscon-
duct. While it may be argued that such conduct violated
Section 8(a)(1)(a) of the Act only because committed in the
presence of union agents or officers and, in view of Cantu
and Pineda's denials that they observed such conduct, that
the General Counsel has sustained his burden of proof that
such conduct on the part of O'Neil did not occur, I find
and conclude that general denials by the union officers of
having observed such conduct is insufficient to sustain that
burden. Accordingly, Respondent did not violate the Act
by refusing to reinstate O'Neil.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Jurisdiction is properly asserted in this proceeding.
2. By failing and refusing to timely furnish the Union
with requested information which was necessary to the
Union's performance of its statutory duty as a bargaining
agent pertaining to Respondent's subcontracting practices;
a list of employees who worked overtime from December
15, 1975, to March 17, 1976; lists of employees who had
received reprimands, been laid off, been terminated, or
quit and the reasons for such reprimands, layoffs, termina-
tions, and quits; a list of employees recalled from layoff
and the positions to which they were recalled; and the
names of employees who did and did not receive a Christ-
mas bonus in 1976, Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By unilaterally changing the hours of work of its em-
ployees and laying off some 15 employees on February 27,
1977, without prior notification to and consultation with
the Union, Respondent has further engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing to reinstate Albert Almaraz,
Feles Cantu. Jesus Gonzales, Teofilo Guzman, Jose Hino-
josa, Bob Jones, Juan Morales, J. Navarro, Eulalio Palac-
ios, Humberto Perales, Robert Pineda, Guillermo "Willie"
Suarez, and Mike Ulloa to the positions held by them prior
to the July 8, 1975, strike when such positions became
available, as found above, Respondent has violated Sec-
tions 8(a)(3) and (I) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
1153
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent unlawfully refused to fur-
nish the Union with certain information which the Union
duly requested, as set forth in section 11I, B of this decision,
which information was necessary to the Union in the per-
formance of its obligations as the statutory bargaining
agent of the employees of Respondent. To remedy this vio-
lation, Respondent should be ordered to cease and desist
from refusing to furnish the Union with this, and any
other, information which is potentially relevant to the
Union in its collective-bargaining negotiations with Re-
spondent, and Respondent should be ordered to immedi-
ately furnish the Union with the requested information,
and where applicable such information should be updated
to the date Respondent complies with this Order. It having
been further found that Respondent, unilaterally and with-
out notification to or consulation with the Union, changed
the hours of work of its employees and laid off 15 employ-
ees at a time when the Union was the duly designated col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees, Re-
spondent should be ordered to cease and desist from
making these and other changes in terms and conditions of
employment without first notifying the Union in order to
afford the Union an opportunity to bargain about such
changes. Respondent should further be ordered, upon re-
quest by the Union, to bargain in good faith with the
Union concerning the effect of such changes.
Finally, it has been found that Respondent unlawfully
refused to reinstate to their former positions, or positions
for which they were reasonably well qualified, when such
positions became available, its employees named in item 4
of the section of this Decision entitled "Conclusions of
Law," who had made unconditional offers to return to
work from strike. Respondent should further be ordered to
make these employees whole for any loss of earnings such
employees may have suffered by reason of Respondent's
failure to reinstate them when such jobs became available,
by payment to them of a sum of money equal to what each
would normally have earned from the date each should
have been reinstated to the date each actually was rein-
stated, as found in section III, D, of this Decision, less each
employee's net earnings during each backpay perioo. Back-
pay shall be computed with interest thereon in the manner
set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950, and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977).12
Additionally, because Respondent's unfair labor prac-
tices go to the very heart of the Act, Respondent should be
ordered to cease and desist from in any other manner infr-
inging on rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7
of the Act. N.LR.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532
(4th Cir. 1941).
Respondent should further be ordered to post the usual
informational notice to employees, attached hereto as an
appendix.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following:
11 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
ORDER 3
The Respondent, Markle Manufacturing Company of
San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns. shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with International Union of
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC,
and its Local 1000, by failing and refusing to furnish the
Union duly requested information, which is relevant to the
Union's performance of its statutory duty as a bargaining
representative, pertaining to the subcontracting of unit
work; by failing and refusing to furnish the Union request-
ed information concerning employees working overtime;
by failing and refusing to furnish the Union requested in-
formation concerning employees given reprimands, layoffs,
or terminations and quits and the reasons therefor; by fail-
ing and refusing to furnish the Union requested informa-
tion concerning employees recalled from layoff and the po-
sitions to which they were recalled; and by failing and
refusing to furnish the Union requested information con-
cerning employees who did not receive a Christmas bonus
in 1976.
(b) Refusing to bargain with the aforementioned Union
by unilaterally changing its employees' hours of work and
laying off its employees without notifying the Union and
affording the Union an opportunity to request bargaining
over such acts.
(c) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of Local 1000 and its International, or any other labor or-
ganization; or interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act by failing and refusing to reinstate its
striking employees to their former positions when such po-
sitions become available, or to other substantially equiva-
lent jobs for which such employees are reasonably well
qualified, upon their unconditional offer to return to work;
or by discriminating against employees in any other man-
ner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
the above-named Union or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Furnish to the above-named labor organization the
requested information concerning unit work being subcon-
tracted from the period October 17, 1975, to the date of
compliance with this Order.
(b) Furnish to the above-named labor organization the
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclu-
sions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
1154
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
requested information concerning reprimands, layoffs, ter-
minations, and quits of its employees and the reasons
therefor.
(c) Furnish to the above-named labor organization the
requested information concerning employees who had
been recalled from the January 27, 1977, layoff and the
positions to which they were recalled.
(d) Furnish to the above-named labor organization the
requested information concerning employees who did and
did not receive Christmas bonuses in 1976.
(e) Offer to its employees Albert Almaraz, Feles Cantu,
Jesus Gonzales, Teofilo Guzman, Jose Hinojosa, Bob
Jones, Juan Morales, Jr., J. Navarro, Eulalio Palacios,
Humberto Perales, Robert Pineda, Guillermo Suarez, and
Mike Ulloa immediate reinstatement to their former jobs
or, if those jobs are no longer available, to substantially
equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights, and make them whole for any loss of earnings
they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against them in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(f) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary or useful in analyzing the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(g) Post at its San Antonio, Texas, facility a copy of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 23, after being duly signed by Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.
IT is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein.
14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United
States CQurt of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees
these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist unions of their choosing
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any and all of these things.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with In-
ternational Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 1000, by re-
fusing to furnish the above-named Union with infor-
mation requested which is necessary to the perfor-
mance of its bargaining obligations.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization by unilaterally and
without notice to the Union changing the hours of
work of our employees or laying off our employees
without notifying the Union and affording it an op-
portunity to bargain about such changes in terms and
conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT. upon their unconditional offer to re-
turn to work, refuse to reinstate our employees who
engage in a lawful strike to their former jobs when
those jobs are available or to substantially equivalent
jobs for which they are reasonably well qualified.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union the information it re-
quested concerning our subcontracting of work per-
formed by unit employees.
WE WILL furnish the Union the information it re-
quested concerning employees who worked overtime.
WE WILL furnish the Union the information it re-
quested concerning reprimands and layoffs given to
our employees and employees who were terminated or
quit and the reasons therefor.
WE WILL furnish the Union the information it re-
quested concerning the employees who did and did
not receive a Christmas bonus in 1976.
WE WILL offer our employees Albert Almaraz, Feles
Cantu, Jesus Gonzales, Teofilo Guzman, Jose Hinojo-
so, Bob Jones, Juan Morales, J. Navarro, Eulalio Pa-
lacios, Humberto Perales, Robert Pineda, Guillermo
Suarez, and Mike Ulloa immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, without loss of
seniority or other rights and privileges, and WE WILL
make each of them whole for any loss of earnings they
may have suffered by reason of our discrimination
against them.
MARKLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF SAN ANTO-
NIO
1155