01995457
12-29-2000
Maria T. Vega, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Region) Agency.
Maria T. Vega v. United States Postal Service
01995457
December 29, 2000
.
Maria T. Vega,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Great Lakes Region)
Agency.
Appeal No. 01995457
Agency No. 1J-603-0027-97
Hearing No. 210-99-6065X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The
appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges
she was discriminated against on the bases of sex (female) and national
origin (Hispanic) when on December 18, 1996, her supervisor approached
and told her that she could not speak Spanish in the Post Office. For the
following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final decision.
The record reveals that complainant, a Flat Sorter Operator at the
agency's South Suburban Processing and Distribution Center in Bedford
Park, Illinois, filed a formal EEO complaint on June 10, 1998, alleging
that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced above.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a
copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision
finding no discrimination which the agency adopted as its final decision.
On December 18, 1996, complainant was engaged in conversation with a
male co-worker while preparing her workload for the Flat Sorter machine.
Both complainant and her co-worker were conversing in their native
language, Spanish. Complainant's supervisor approached them and told them
to stop speaking in Spanish. The AJ concluded that complainant failed
to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination since complainant
failed to identify a male employee who was treated less favorably than she
was, and since a male employee was also told to stop speaking Spanish, the
AJ declined to infer discriminatory intent. The AJ then addressed whether
a speak-English-only rule was in effect at the facility and determined
that no such rule was in effect. The AJ found that the statement was
an isolated comment. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ considered
the supervisor's testimony that she: was only "teasing" when she made
the remark; was unaware of any such rule being in effect; and has never
disciplined an employee for speaking Spanish. Complainant's co-worker
testified that he: believed the remark to be "inconsequential;" continues
to speak Spanish with co-workers who address him in Spanish; and had never
been prohibited from speaking Spanish. Complainant also testified that
she has never been prohibited from conversing in her native language.
Accordingly, the AJ determined that there was no evidence from which an
inference of national origin discrimination could be drawn.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings
by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted).
A finding that discriminatory intent did not exist is a factual finding.
See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record
and that her decision referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. There is no evidence in the record to support a finding that
the agency had a speak-English-only rule in effect.<2> Accordingly, we
discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful
review of the record, including arguments and evidence not specifically
addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Frances M. Hart
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
December 29, 2000
__________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in
the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2 Although we find that the agency did not, in fact, have a
speak-English-only rule in effect, we remind the agency nonetheless
that discrimination based on a speak-English-only policy is a legally
distinct type of national origin discrimination. Accordingly, we urge the
agency to ensure, via internal assessment, training and other appropriate
methods, that none of its facilities maintain, in policy or practice, an
English-only rule which violates Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. � 1606.7(b) (a
rule requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times must
be justified by business necessity); EEOC Compliance Manual, Volume II,
Section 623 ("Speak-English-Only Rules and Other Language Policies").