Maria Navarro, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 27, 2009
0120070538 (E.E.O.C. May. 27, 2009)

0120070538

05-27-2009

Maria Navarro, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Maria Navarro,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070538

Hearing No. 451-2006-00092X

Agency No. 4G780003206

DECISION

On November 3, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

September 29, 2006 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Sales Service/ Distribution Associate at the South Texas Medical

Center Station in San Antonio, Texas. Complainant began working at

that station on August 8, 2005, pursuant to an EEO settlement agreement

that she reached with her prior management officials at another postal

facility.

On September 8, 2005, a supervisor from the Mail Services Department at

San Antonio's University of Texas Health Science Center (UTHSC) reported

to the agency that one of his employees had an "unpleasant experience"

with complainant. Specifically, complainant refused to individually scan

each piece of certified mail for UTHSC, as was the standard practice.

After complainant was told that she had to do so, she was allegedly very

rude to the UTHSC employee. The UTHSC supervisor reported that something

similar had happened with complainant and two of his other employees on

or around August 9, 2005.

On September 9, 2005, complainant's supervisor (S1) discussed with

complainant the UTHSC supervisor's allegations. On September 14, 2005,

S1 instructed complainant to close her window, turn in her money, keys,

and badge, and to clock out. S1 walked complainant out the door and

observed complainant until she drove off the premises.

Subsequently, complainant was placed on administrative leave. On November

18, 2005, complainant received a Notice of Removal, charging her with

continued unacceptable work performance and continued inappropriate

conduct towards agency customers.

The agency asserted that complainant's removal was in line with

progressive discipline, as her current disciplinary record revealed

similar past disciplinary issues. For example, on December 1, 2004,

complainant was issued a Notice of Removal that was subsequently

reduced to a 30-day suspension for continued unacceptable work

performance and continued inappropriate conduct towards customers.

On October 20, 2004, complainant was issued a 14-day suspension for

unacceptable and inappropriate conduct towards customers. On September

11, 2004, complainant was issued a 7-day suspension for unacceptable

work performance conduct. On January 22, 2004, complainant was issued

a letter of warning for unacceptable attendance and failure to maintain

a regular work schedule. And on October 9, 2003, complainant was issued

a letter of warning for unacceptable conduct.

On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she

was discriminated against on the bases of race (Hispanic), disability

(cervical fusion surgery), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity when:

1. On September 14, 2005, she was placed off the clock and walked out

of the station; and

2. On November 19, 2005, she received a Notice of Removal based on

continued unacceptable work performance, and continued inappropriate

conduct towards agency customers.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on September 1, 2006

and issued a bench decision on September 5, 2006. The AJ found

that complainant failed to establish her prima facie cases of race,

disability, and reprisal discrimination. The agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

Here, we do not find adequate reason to overturn the AJ's credibility

determinations.

Complainant alleged that she was discriminated against on the bases

of race, disability, and in reprisal for prior protected activity

when she was placed off the clock and escorted out of the building,

and when she was issued a Notice of Removal. A claim of disparate

treatment such as this is examined under the three-part analysis first

enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Here, the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions. Specifically, management officials escorted complainant

out of the building and subsequently issued her a Notice of Removal

because she continuously acted inappropriately towards customers and

had an unsatisfactory work performance.

Complainant must now establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext

for discrimination. Complainant asserted that she was never told

that her job performance was unsatisfactory, and management officials

encouraged the customers to make up the allegations against her. The AJ

found complainant to be "absolutely not credible" because she stated in

her affidavit that she had never been subjected to disciplinary action

in the past, when she had a lengthy history of disciplinary action.

Further, complainant stated that she had never been confronted about

performance issues, when the record established that complainant

had been confronted about performance issues on numerous occasions.

We agree with the AJ that a preponderance of the evidence of the record

supports the agency's articulation that complainant repeatedly acted

inappropriately towards customers and was repeatedly informed that her

performance was not satisfactory. Additionally, the record establishes

that complainant had a lengthy disciplinary history for similar issues,

and the removal was in line with progressive discipline.1 The record is

devoid of evidence that would suggest that a discriminatory or retaliatory

animus more likely than not motivated the agency's actions. Therefore,

we find that discrimination or retaliation did not occur as alleged.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the agency's

final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

3. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

4.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 27, 2009

Date

1 At the hearing, complainant provided a document which she asserts is

an agreement entered into between herself and an agency official in which

they agreed that the 30-day suspension issued to complaint on December 1,

2004, would be expunged from complainant's record. Complainant asserts

that, accordingly, reliance on the 30-day suspension was inappropriate

for issuing progressive discipline. The agency denied entering into

this agreement. The AJ determined that this document raised numerous

authenticity questions because the official whose signature was on the

document denied signing or preparing the document, and numerous Union

officials testified that the document was "unusual," "puzzling," and

unlike their normal documents because it only contained the signature

line of the agency official and not complainant, and the document did

not reference a grievance or complaint number. Further, the document

referenced that the Notice of Removal was reduced to a 30-day suspension,

even though the Notice of Removal had not yet been reduced to a 30-day

suspension as of the date of the document. As a result, the AJ decided to

not give the document evidentiary weight. After reviewing the record,

we agree with the AJ that the document raises numerous questions of

authenticity, and as a result, no evidentiary weight should be given to

the document.

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0120070538

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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