Maria Addiss, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (N.E./N.Y. Metro Region) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 20, 1999
01971051 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 20, 1999)

01971051

10-20-1999

Maria Addiss, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (N.E./N.Y. Metro Region) Agency.


Maria Addiss v. United States Postal Service

01971051

October 20, 1999

Maria Addiss, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01971051

v. ) Agency No. 1A-118-1011-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(N.E./N.Y. Metro Region) )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant filed a timely appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on

the bases of reprisal (prior EEO activity), and physical disabilities

(cervical lumbar sprain, bilateral knee injury), in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.

Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when she was terminated

on November 13, 1995 from her position as a transitional mail processor.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the

following reasons, the agency's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a transitional mail processor at the agency's Melville, New York

station.

Believing she was the victim of discrimination, the appellant sought

EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on January

23, 1996. At the conclusion of the investigation, the appellant was

provided a copy of the investigative file and informed of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively,

to receive a final decision by the agency. The appellant requested that

the agency issue a final agency decision on May 2, 1996.

In its decision, the agency concluded that the appellant failed to

establish a prima facie case of reprisal because it claimed that she

failed to show that management employees involved in her termination

knew of her protected activity.

The agency also concluded that the appellant was not a qualified

individual with a disability because her knee condition was considered

a temporary limitation. It stated that the appellant did not show she

was qualified for the position that she held and therefore, she failed

to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

The agency determined that it had proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for terminating the appellant, namely, that after she had been

cautioned about being absent from her work area without leave (AWOL)

she repeated the infraction by being 15 minutes late returning from

a break. The agency noted that she was not similarly situated to the

career regular mailhandler because she was a transitional employee and

was not entitled to the same privileges. The mailhandler had been issued

a letter of warning which was later reduced to an official discussion.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the agency understated the extent

of her injuries in that she had injured both knees and had a fracture

of the L-5 vertebrae. She also contends that her supervisor knew she

had filed a complaint on October 4, 1995 concerning his harassment of

her relating to her injuries.

The agency objects to the medical evidence submitted on appeal which it

states was not in evidence when the final decision was made. It states,

in response to the appeal, that the appellant had a "penchant for leaving

her assigned work area" and as a result, was terminated. The agency

also claims on appeal that the appellant was not doing the work she was

assigned to do and that her work performance was poor.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence does

not support the agency's final decision of no discrimination on the

basis of reprisal or disability. Applying the standards set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411, U.S. 792 (1973), Prewitt

v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981),

Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)

(applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal cases), we find that the appellant

established a prima facie case of reprisal in that she had engaged in

protected EEO activity, her supervisor knew of her protected activity

and she suffered an adverse employment action which was causally related

to her protected activities.

We also find that although the appellant was not disabled within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, she was perceived as disabled by her

supervisors due to her back, neck and knee conditions which led to her

termination.

The record establishes that the appellant was injured from a car accident

in September 1993, and then again in an on the job injury on or about

May 4, 1994 when she fell over plastic bands lying on the workroom

floor. As a result, she suffered from a cervical lumbar sprain,

a condition known as spondylolithesis, and contusions to both knees.

She was restricted from lifting anything over 25 pounds and was put in

a limited duty position at that time.

The record reflects that the appellant took some time off from work due

to these injuries but there is no evidence that the time she took was

not approved. She returned to work in July 1995 from knee surgery and

according to her, began to experience harassment from her supervisors TN

and SG by being closely watched and monitored in her time and attendance.

This caused her to file an EEO complaint on October 4, 1995. There is

no indication that she was not able to perform her duties at that time

only that a co-worker was required to drive her to and from the job site.

The record reflects only one other incident in September 1995, prior to

the incident in question in which the appellant was charged with being

AWOL for one and half hours. This was later reduced to leave without

pay after the appellant filed a grievance and established that she was

working in another area.

The appellant disputed the facts set forth by the agency surrounding the

incident that led to her termination. She contends that she and the other

employee were not late returning from a break but had left later than

the supervisor thought. The time of their departure was corroborated by

the other employee and was argued by the union steward in her grievance.

In any event, at most the incident concerned a 10 minute span of time. The

agency issued only a warning to the other employee and later reduced

the written warning to an official discussion. This tends to support

the conclusion that the alleged lateness was a de minimus violation.

The agency's comparatively light discipline of the mailhandler also

contradicts the agency's supposed intent to crack down on a perceived

abuse of break time. In addition, the agency's much harsher treatment

of the appellant under the same circumstances heightens our suspicion

surrounding her termination.

The union steward for postal service clerks, KZ, appealed the appellant's

dismissal through the grievance process on the grounds that the

appellant had a clean record and there was a disparity in treatment

of the two employees involved. He also asserted that past practice

allowed employees to take 30 minutes for breaks which meant that by

management's calculations the appellant had not been late. Finally,

the union steward reported a statement made by supervisor AH that

three supervisory employees, BW, FB and DH were waiting to "pounce"

on the appellant. Union steward RF who represented the mailhandler

involved in the incident, also reported direct statements made to him by

supervisors DH and AH that they were out to get the appellant supposedly

for violating break time. The absence of any record of the appellant's

abuse of the break time, however, raises serious questions regarding

the real aims of these supervisors. Their statements coupled with the

close proximity to her filing of a complaint, lends substantial credence

to her claims of reprisal.

Finally, we do not find any credibility in supervisor SG's denial

that he knew the appellant had filed an EEO complaint against him

and another supervisor. His contention that he did not know of the

complaint until he was approached by the EEO Counselor with a settlement

agreement two days after the appellant was fired cannot be believed.

It is not likely that he would be presented with a settlement agreement

without having first spoken to the EEO Counselor on a prior occasion.

In fact, union steward KZ, indicates that he was present with the EEO

Counselor and the appellant on November 9, 1995, four days prior to her

firing, when the EEO Counselor called supervisor SG about a settlement

of the appellant's complaint. With his knowledge that the appellant had

filed an EEO complaint against him along with the lack of a credible

reason for the appellant's termination, and the unrebutted statements

of supervisors that the appellant was being targeted, we are persuaded

that the termination was in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint.

We are also persuaded that the appellant's supervisors targeted her

because she was perceived as disabled as explained below.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a)(2) defines a person who is disabled

as one who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits

one or more major life activities. A physical impairment includes, any

physiological disorder or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the

body systems such as the musculoskeletal or cardiovascular systems. 29

C.F.R.�1614.203(a)(2)(i). Major life activities means functions such as

caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing

speaking, breathing, learning and working. 29 C.F.R.�1614.203(a)(3).

Given these parameters, we find that the record does not establish that

the appellant is disabled within the meaning of the law because she was

not substantially limited in a major life activity at the time of her

termination.

We do find that the appellant was perceived as disabled under 29

C.F.R.�1614.203(a)(5) due to the injuries she sustained prior to

her termination. Even though the appellant was able to perform the

essential duties of her job, her supervisors perceived her as a problem

employee because she had back and knee injuries. By their statements and

actions toward her it was clear their motivations to end her employment

were related to her physical condition and not because she was a poor

employee. For example, the appellant stated that when she attempted to

ice her knee at work, her supervisor became hostile and would not allow

her to. Supervisor TN claimed not to know that the appellant had lifting

restrictions even though she had already been placed in a light duty job

prior to her surgery. As a result, he required her to lift trays which

she had not done before the knee surgery. On the other hand, the agency

claimed that the appellant was a poor performer and did not do the job

she was asked to do, but failed to produce any concrete evidence of her

failures.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the agency's final decision and

REMAND the case back to the agency for further action as noted below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

(1) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency is directed to offer appellant the option of either

reinstatement into her transitional mail processor position or of having

her records credited to reflect that she served to the completion of

her appointment.

(2) The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay,

with interest, and other benefits due appellant, pursuant to 29

C.F.R. �1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the date

this decision becomes final. The appellant shall cooperate in the agency's

efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due, and shall

provide all relevant information requested by the agency. If there is

a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits, the

agency shall issue a check to the appellant for the undisputed amount

within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the agency determines the

amount it believes to be due. The appellant may petition for enforcement

or clarification of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification

or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address

referenced in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision."

(3) The agency shall expunge from appellant's personnel file the the

notice of removal issued in November 1995, as well as any references to

this document.

(4) The agency shall post at the Melville, New York Post Office copies

of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The

original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

(5) The agency shall provide training to the RO in the obligations and

duties imposed by the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII.

(6) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation that the

corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. s1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29

C.F.R. s1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the

agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the

agency - not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of

Federal Operations-within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision

becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's

fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report

shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. s1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to

file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order

prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See

29 C.F.R. ss1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ss1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. s2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See

29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (Q0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. It is the position of the Commission that you have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date you receive this

decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions

have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL

TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in

court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not

the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to

file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. s2000e

et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ss791,

794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion

of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

10/20/99

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director,

Office of Federal Operations