Margie C. Rodriguez, Complainant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 12, 2000
01986450 (E.E.O.C. May. 12, 2000)

01986450

05-12-2000

Margie C. Rodriguez, Complainant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Margie C. Rodriguez v. Department of the Air Force

01986450

May 12, 2000

Margie C. Rodriguez, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01986450

v. ) Agency No. AL900980755

)

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

The complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision

dated July 20, 1998, concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination on the basis of age (DOB September 1, 1955), in violation

of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1> The complainant alleges she was discriminated

against when: (1) she was denied medical attention on April 16, 1997; and

(2) she was forced to resign on April 25, 1997. The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37, 644, 37, 659 (1999) (to be codified at 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, the complainant was

employed as a waitress, at the agency's Smokin' Joe's Bar-B-Que Grill,

37th Services Squadron, Lackland AFB, Texas facility. The complainant

alleged that after she fell while on the job, her supervisor failed to

offer her medical attention and that she was yelled at and physically

poked to the point that she had to resign.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, the complainant sought

EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed a complaint on June 17, 1997.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the complainant failed to respond

to the agency's letter informing her of her right to request a hearing

or an immediate final decision. The agency issued its final decision

and the complainant's representative received it on August 4, 1998.

The agency concluded that the complainant's allegations were sufficient

to raise the issue of hostile work environment harassment based on age.

Without addressing whether she established a prima facie case, the agency

concluded that it had articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for its actions and that the complainant failed to show the reasons

were pretext.

On appeal, the complainant makes no new arguments, but requests a

hearing.<2> The agency requests that we affirm its final decision

finding no discrimination.

After a careful review of the record, based on McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003

(1st Cir. 1979); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292

(5th Cir. 1981), and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental

Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st

Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases), the

Commission agrees with the agency that the complainant failed to show

that she was discriminated against because of her age.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that in her sworn affidavit, the

complainant averred she was forced to resign because her supervisor

screamed at her to pick up her food orders and the acting supervisor

was constantly elbowing her as she passed her. Investigative File (IF)

at 39-43. She further averred that the supervisor: 1) made comments

about her to co-workers; and 2) stated that customers had made comments

about not hiring any more waitresses who were in their forties. Id.

The complainant averred that both her supervisor and the acting supervisor

treated a younger male waiter more favorably. Id. The complainant

further averred that when she fell on April 16, 1997, her supervisor

should have taken her to the doctor's because she had called Emergency

Medical Services when the acting supervisor fell.

We find that the agency correctly analyzed the complainant's complaint

as one of constructive discharge. The test adopted by the Commission to

establish a constructive discharge requires the complainant to show that:

1) a reasonable person in her position would find working conditions

intolerable; 2) conduct that constituted a prohibited discriminatory

act created the intolerable working conditions; and 3) her resignation

resulted from the intolerable working conditions. Taylor v. AAFES,

EEOC Request No. 05900360 (July 20, 1990).

Here, the record contains a sworn affidavit by the complainant's

supervisor, averring that she did not treat the complainant differently

than any other employee, except that the complainant required more

assistance and guidance because this was her first assignment as

a waitress. Moreover, the supervisor averred that she did not scream

at the complainant, nor did she see anyone intentionally elbow her and

that she was not aware of the complainant's age because she had been

transferred into that organization. The record shows that several

of the complainant's co-workers and the supervisor averred that when

food orders were ready, the name of the waitress would be called out,

that sometimes the place was noisy which required the waitress's name

to be called out in a loud voice. They also averred that at one time

sodas were in the kitchen and employees might bump each other while

passing into and out of the kitchen. The record further shows that the

complainant's co-workers all averred that the supervisor treated everyone

the same and that not one of them averred hearing the supervisor scream

at the complainant or saw anyone intentionally elbow her. IF at 44-68.

The record also shows that both the supervisor and the acting supervisor

averred that on the day the complainant fell, she got right back up and

completed her shift. The supervisor averred that when the complainant

fell, she immediately asked her if she was okay to which the complainant

responded that she was okay. The record shows that the complainant was

asked several more times during that shift if she was okay and each time

she responded she was.

The Business Operations Flight Chief who oversaw Smokin' Joe's averred

that the complainant's employment was terminated for abandonment because

she walked off the job and did not return. IF at 59. The record contains

the a copy of Air Force Manual 34-310, wherein Chapter 5 section 6 states

that "an employee who fails to report for work or notify management for

three consecutive workdays without a reasonable explanation is considered

to have resigned." IF at 85.

The Commission finds that the complainant failed to present evidence that

more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its actions

were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note

that there is no evidence in the record to support the complainant's

claims of discrimination and hostile work environment culminating in

her forced resignation.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including the

complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the

agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 12, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

____________________ _____________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 We note that the record shows that the agency's notice of rights along

with the investigative file were received by the complainant on April

24, 1998. The notice properly informed the complainant of her right

to request a hearing or an immediate final decision by the agency on

the record. On appeal, the complainant asserts that she was ill and

lost her house, but she knows she is entitled to a hearing. There is

no right to a hearing at the appeal level. Moreover, we find that the

complainant was given notice of her right to request a hearing and has

not shown why she could not exercise that right in a timely manner.

The complainant has presented no medical or other evidence that she was

so incapacitated at the time she was required to exercise her hearing

rights that she could not do so.