Margeret M.,1 Complainant,v.Ryan K. Zinke, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 18, 20180120171684 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 18, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Margeret M.,1 Complainant, v. Ryan K. Zinke, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120171684 Hearing No. 520-2012-00267X Agency No. NPS100191 DECISION On April 12, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s March 19, 2017, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Supervisory Facility Operations Specialist, GS-1640-13 (also referred to as "Facility Manager" or "Maintenance Chief'') at the Agency’s Gateway National Recreation Area, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island Unit facility in Staten Island, New York. She had been employed by the Agency for twenty-three years, and supervised approximately twenty-eight employees, including two subordinate supervisors. The Program Manager for the New York Harbor Parks was Complainant’s immediate supervisor. On February 26, 2010, Complainant filed an EEO complaint, which was amended, alleging that: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120171684 2 1. The Agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female) in the form of a hostile work environment and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when: a. On August 24, 2009, and January 19, 20, and 22, 2010, a manager interfered or undermined Complainant's supervisory authority and responsibilities; b. Complainant's work projects received more scrutiny as compared to male counterparts; c. On November 1, 2009, Complainant was issued a low work performance rating as compared to male counterparts; and d. On January 4, 2010, the Agency issued Complainant a 5-day proposed suspension letter. 2. The Agency discriminated against her in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when on August 23, 2010, a manager attempted to discuss subject matters related to her previously filed EEO complaint. After the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s October 2, 2012, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 6, 2017. The Agency dismissed claims 1(a) – 1(c) for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The AJ found that Complainant had contacted the EEO counselor on January 19, 2010, which was more than 45 days after the alleged incidents in August and November 2009. The AJ also found no discrimination for claims 1(a) – 1(c). Regarding claim 1(d), the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of illegal employment based on sex or retaliation. The AJ added that even if it assumed Complainant established a prima facie case, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for issuing the proposed suspension letter, which was later reduced to a letter of reprimand via a formal Agency grievance process. As for claim 2, Complainant alleged that, after she filed her EEO complaint underlying this case, the Program Manager acted in retaliation when he attempted to discuss subject matters related to her EEO complaint. Complainant claimed that the Program Manager tried to persuade her that there was nothing inappropriate about her staff visiting his office especially as it concerned a theft report. Complainant further stated that when she tried to end the meeting, he "nastily" told her to remain seated and continued the conversation. 0120171684 3 The Program Manager denied Complainant’s account of the conversation, contending it involved management issues and that he did not address matters subject to the EEO complaint. He also denied engaging in any threatening or angry action. The AJ found that there were no identified witnesses who could confirm or undermine the two versions of what was actually said or done during the conversation. The AJ found no retaliation for claim 2. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. We find that the issuance of a decision without a hearing in this case was proper. We find that claim 1(c) was properly dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2) for untimely EEO Counselor contact. On the merits, we find no error in the AJ’s analysis of Complainant’s claims in 1(a) and 1(b) that the Program Manager undermined her authority as a supervisor when he met or spoke with Complainant's subordinates on January 19, 20, and 22, 2010. Complainant alleged that the Program Manager repeatedly broke the chain of command by meeting with her subordinates without her knowledge. Specifically, she noted that when a maintenance mechanic, her subordinate, reported a theft at the shop to the Program Manager on January 19, 2010, she was not informed of the meeting, nor included in the remediation. She also noted that on January 20, 2010, the Program Manager informed her of a fire inspection at a building under her responsibility and required creation of a project to correct the findings, but she was not involved in the inspection. Finally, she noted that on January 22, 2010, the Program Manager met with members of Complainant's staff to discuss allegations that Complainant and a male supervisor were knowingly permitting employees to leave work early. 0120171684 4 The Program Manager explained, with respect to the meeting with Complainant’s subordinate on January 19, 2010, that the employee came to him to report a theft and he accompanied the employee to the Park Police, who conduct investigations of such matters. The Program Manager stated that the Park Police recommended confidentiality and, in accord with this recommendation, the Program Manager did not notify Complainant about the investigation. He further explained that he did not inform Complainant about the January 22 meeting with her subordinates because there had been allegations implicating her and a male supervisor in the misbehavior being investigated. We find that Complainant failed to show that discrimination motivated any of the actions in claims 1(a) or 1(b) or that the specific conduct alleged was sufficiently severe as to constitute a discriminatory hostile work environment. Regarding claim 1(d), the January 4, 2010 proposed suspension for "Disrespectful conduct towards another employee" and "Disrespectful conduct towards your supervisorâ€, we concur with the AJ that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for issuing this discipline and that Complainant failed to show these reasons were a pretext for sex discrimination or reprisal. The record revealed that in August 2009, a female subordinate supervisor (FSS) reported to Complainant that a male maintenance employee had called her a “bitch†in front of staff. Dissatisfied with Complainant’s handling of her complaint, FSS reported the matter to the Program Manager and a meeting was held. During the discussion, FSS asked Complainant "what would you do if I called you a bitch?" and Complainant admitted that she said, "I would probably call you one back." Additionally, on December 22, 2009, Complainant's subordinate supervisor sent a message to the Program Manager which alleged that Complainant had made disparaging remarks about the Program Manager being “the devil†and that he and his wife were “swingers†in the presence of staff employees. The Program Manager and a Human Resources representative met with Complainant to discuss the accusation, and Complainant admitted making the disparaging remarks about the Program Manager. On August 13, 2010, the Deputy Superintendent issued her decision concerning Complainant's January 4, 2010 proposed suspension letter. The Deputy Superintendent noted that in a subsequent discussion between Complainant and the Program Manager, Complainant told the Program Manager that he had not “worked here long enough to give me advice." Accordingly, based upon Complainant's conduct and behavior in the workplace, the Deputy Superintendent said that she determined that the described incidents were "inappropriate and disrespectful" and that formal discipline was necessary to correct the situation. However, based upon such factors as length of Complainant’s Agency service and lack of prior disciplinary record, as well as the fact that Complainant had apologized to her subordinate supervisor, Complainant's formal discipline was reduced from a suspension action to a letter of reprimand. Based on these facts, we have no basis for finding that Complainant’s sex or prior EEO activity was a factor in this disciplinary action. Complainant has not shown that the Agency’s discipline decision was motivated by discrimination. 0120171684 5 Finally, with respect to Complainant’s contention in Claim 2 that the Program Manager retaliated against her when he attempted to discuss matters related to her EEO complaint, we concur with the AJ that the alleged discriminatory conversation concerned workplace matters that fell within his managerial authority. In the absence of any evidence or witness statement that Complainant’s EEO complaint was mentioned or that she suffered any adverse action because of this conversation, we concur with the AJ that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of reprisal. There is no persuasive evidence that the content of the conversation occurred as alleged by Complainant. Therefore, we cannot find that Complainant was reasonably likely to be deterred from pursuing the EEO complaint process. CONCLUSION The Agency’s decision is AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120171684 6 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency†or “department†means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 18, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation