01a41282
07-28-2005
Margaret J. Miranda, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.
Margaret J. Miranda v. United States Postal Service
01A41282
July 28, 2005
Margaret J. Miranda,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A41282
Agency No. 4F-926-0148-00
Hearing No. 340-2001-03082X
DECISION
Complainant initiated a timely appeal from the agency's final
order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, a Distribution Clerk at the agency's
Post Office located in Rosemead, California, filed a formal EEO complaint
on August 9, 2000, alleging that the agency discriminated against her
on the bases of disability and age (D.O.B. 03/19/45) when:
(1) on June 15, 2000, the Postmaster (P1) demanded a comprehensive
medical report from her;
on August 17, 2000, P1 issued her a letter of demand for $972.99 in
order to change 56 hours of annual leave to leave without pay (LWOP)
after her injury was approved by worker's compensation; and
the Injury Compensation Supervisor (S1) called the complainant's
physician's administrative staff to inform them that the agency has
an extensive modified work program and can accommodate all physical
restrictions except total bed rest.
On February 7, 2000, complainant suffered a neck and shoulder injury which
required her to miss work between May 15 and June 6, 2000. She charged
this time to her annual leave. On June 7, 2000, complainant returned
to work. On June 15, 2000, P1 sent complainant a written request for
a comprehensive medical report detailing her medical conditions and
related physical limitations. Additionally, S1 telephoned complainant's
physician's office and spoke to an employee there. She informed
this employee that the agency had a modified work program which could
accommodate any physical restrictions except total bed rest.
On or about July 5, 2000, after learning that her worker's compensation
claim was approved, complainant decided to buy back 56 hours of annual
leave and change those hours to leave without pay (LWOP). In processing
this request, the agency's payroll department sent complainant's facility
an invoice for the payroll-related debt. After receiving the invoice,
P1 issued complainant a demand letter for $972.99. This occurred on
August 17, 2000.
Complainant alleged that the above incidents constituted discrimination
based on disability and age. She contacted an EEO Counselor, and an
investigation was conducted. At the conclusion of the investigation,
complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a
decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.
The AJ found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination because she did not show that she is disabled
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The AJ further found that
complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
because she did not identify a similarly situated individual, not in
her protected class, who was treated more favorably. The agency's final
order implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant restates her previous arguments and raises
additional allegations against the agency. In response, the agency
restates the position and requests that we affirm its final order.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that
grant of a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine
dispute of material fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision
properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be
most favorable to complainant, we note that she failed to present evidence
of discrimination. This is because the agency's medical documentation
request described in claim 1 was permissible within the Rehabilitation
Act, and complainant fails to demonstrate that the agency's actions
described in claims 2 and 3 were motivated by discriminatory animus
toward her protected classes.
Claim 1: Medical Documentation Request
Claim 1 is properly viewed as a question of permissible medical inquiries
under the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act places certain
limitations on an employer's ability to request medical documentation.
When an employee's disability or need for an accommodation is not known
or obvious, an employer may ask an employee for reasonable documentation
about his or her disability, limitations, and accommodation requirements.
See Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
(July 27, 2000) (web version) (Guidance), at 14. An employer may require
an employee to provide documentation that is sufficient to substantiate
that he or she has a disability and needs the reasonable accommodation
requested, but cannot ask for unrelated documentation. Id. at 23.
Documentation is sufficient if it: (1) describes the nature, severity,
and duration of the employee's impairment, the activity or activities
that the impairment limits, and the extent to which the impairment limits
the employee's ability to perform the activity or activities; and, (2)
substantiates why the requested reasonable accommodation is needed. Id.
We also note that, in the context of medical inquiries, a complainant
need not establish that she is an individual with a disability in order
to prevail under the Rehabilitation Act. See Guidance at 5.
We find that the agency acted within the bounds of the Rehabilitation Act
when P1 sought medical documentation from complainant. According to his
affidavit, P1 submitted the request for medical documentation in order
to know what complainant's restrictions were. There is no indication
that P1 sought any information besides that which was relevant to
accommodating complainant's restrictions. According to complainant,
she had already submitted medical records prior to this; however, she
failed to substantiate this claim in any way. Complainant also never
alleged that P1 sought information beyond what was needed to accommodate
her restrictions.
Claims 2 and 3: Disparate Treatment
Claims 2 and 3 are properly analyzed under a disparate treatment analysis.
In a claim such as complainant's, which alleges disparate treatment
in violation of the ADEA, and where there is an absence of direct
evidence of such discrimination, the allocation of burdens and order of
presentation of proof follow a three-step process. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); McDonnells Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973). Under this analysis,
complainant initially must establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an
inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration
was a factor in the adverse employment action. See St. Mary's Honor
Cntr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Of particular significance
is evidence that the same management officials afforded more favorable
treatment to an employee outside of complainant's protected groups under
similar circumstances. If the complainant establishes a prima facie
cases, the agency must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenged actions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, if the agency is successful in meeting
this burden, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the reason proffered by the agency was a pretext for discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The ultimate burden of persuasion
remains at all times with complainant. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Complainant has failed to meet her burden with regard to both claims
2 and 3. Even assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima
facie case of disability and age discrimination, the agency proffered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and complainant
offered no evidence that the agency's stated reasons were unworthy of
belief. In claim 2, complainant contended that the agency discriminated
against her when P1 issued her a letter of demand after she changed
her annual leave to LWOP. In response, the agency submitted extensive
documentation demonstrating that this is consistent with agency policy.
Complainant offered no suggestion that this was untrue. In claim 3,
complainant maintained that the agency discriminated against her when S1
contacted her physician's administrative staff. In her affidavit, S1
claimed that it was consistent with standard agency practice to notify
medical offices about available accommodations at the agency. Again,
complainant offered no rebuttal. Thus, because complainant did not
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's proffered
reasons were pretext for discrimination, she has not demonstrated that
the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus.<0>
New Allegations Raised on Appeal
Finally, we note that appellant raises new allegations on appeal.
Complainant is advised that if she wishes to pursue, the additional
allegations she raised for the first time on appeal, she should initiate
contact with an EEO Counselor. The Commission will not accept a new
claim raised on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is the Commission's decision to AFFIRM
the AJ's decision and the agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 28, 2005
__________________
Date
0 1Although we find that complainant failed to prove discrimination
with regard to claim 3, we also find it worthwhile to note that nothing
in the Rehabilitation Act prohibits agency contact with an employee's
physician, even without his or her permission. See Jaskot v. Dept. of
Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01996450 (June 19, 2002)