Marco Polo Resort Motel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 1288 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Marco Polo Resort Motel and Hotel, Motel, Restau-
rant, Hi-Rise & Bartenders Union Local 355, AFL-
CIO. Cases 12 CA-7771 and 12-CA-8066
June 19. 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUISI)AI.F
On March 19. 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings. findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Marco Polo Resort Motel,
Miami Beach, Florida, its officers, agents, successors.
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge: This con-
solidated proceeding involves allegations that the above-
named Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) by sus-
pending one Marie Soles because of her union activities and
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by suspending one Lois Ragland and
suspending and discharging one Lillian Nieves pursuant to
the enforcement of a unilaterally adopted rule. Addition-
ally. Respondent is alleged to have engaged in acts and
conduct independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The proceeding was initiated by a charge filed by the
above-named Union in Case 12-CA-7771 on June 24.
1977 pursuant to which complaint issued on August 2,
1977. which complaint was amended on January 17. 1978.
On February 9. 1978, the Union filed the charge in Case
12-CA-8066 and complaint thereon issued on February 28,
1978. On March 2, 1978. an order issued consolidating the
two cases for hearing and hearing was held on April 4 and
5. 1978.
Upon the entire record. including my observation of the
witnesses. and upon consideration of the briels filed by the
parties. I hereby make the following:
FINI)IN(iS ()O FA( I
I. li I A( It A SI IIN(i
Respondent is engaged in the operation of a motor hotel
in Miami Beach. Florida. and is a member of' the Southern
Florida Hotel & Motel Association.' On or about Decem-
ber 25, 1976, employees of various members of the Associ-
ation, but not Respondent's employees, went on strike. In
January 1977. a contract was agreed to and employees re-
turned to work. The complaints allege certain independent
81a)( I ) conduct preceding and following the strike and un-
lawful suspensions and discharge referred to earlier.
11. tie AEE I(L) NIlAIR ABOi(R RA( tl('liS
A. The Alleged Inter/erence. Restraint, nd Coercion
Charles Rosen is manager of Respondent and Mildred
Card is the housekeeper. Both are stipulated to be, and at
the times material herein were, supervisors within the
meaning of Section 2(I 1) of the Act.
On December 24. according to Marie Soles. a maid em-
ployed by Respondent. a meeting of Respondent's employ-
ees was held at which Rosen distributed a leaflet to the
employees concerning what he understood was strike action
scheduled for December 25. The leaflet explained how the
Association had met virtually every union demand. but that
the parties were deadlocked over the issue of mandatory
tips for maids to be imposed on citywide conventions. The
leaflet explained why the proposal was unacceptable.
According to maids Lois Ragland and Lillian Nieves. at
this same meeting. Rosen asked how many employees were
going out if the hotel went on strike and stated that anyone
not striking could have a room in the hotel until the strike
was over, that if employees went out on strike they could
lose their seniority and benefits, that he did not have to hire
them back, and that they had no contract and could not go
to the Union with anything.
Rosen admitted to having a meeting of employees where
the question of a strike was discussed and where he distrib-
uted General Counsel's Exhibit 2. He testified he told the
employees he did not believe the employees of the Marco
Polo would go out on strike and that he answered ques-
tions. He denied making the remarks attributed to him by
Nieves and Ragland. As to the hotel room offer, he testified
it was made in response to questions from the employees.
He admitted stating that employees would get the same
benefits whether union or no union.
Jurisdiction is not in issue. Respondent admits that it meets the Board's
standard fir the assertion of jurisdiction over motels
242 NLRB No. 186
1288
MARCO POLO RESORT MOTEL
I credit Rosen. Of the 20 to 25 employees present at the
meeting, only 3 testified, and I, Soles, did not attribute to
Rosen the remarks attributed to him by Nieves and Rag-
land. Apart from that, Nieves and Ragland demonstrated
differences in recollection which rendered the accuracy of
their testimony questionable. Accordingly, as I find nothing
violative in the remarks Rosen admitted making. I shall
recommend dismissal of the allegations of paragraph 5(a) of
the complaint in Case 12-CA-7771.
Ragland and Nieves also testified that after the meeting
Card asked them if they would go out if the hotel went on
strike. Card denied this. I credit Nieves and Ragland. I can
really see no reason for them to single out Card and to
charge her falsely. Nevertheless, I shall recommend dis-
missal of the allegation in paragraph 5(c) of the complaint
in Case 12-CA 7771. As the Board indicated in Mosher
Steel Company, 220 NLRB 336 (1975), questions about em-
ployee strike intentions are not per se unlawful, but must be
judged in light of all the relevant circumstances. Here, a
strike was imminent and the query was not made under
circumstances which would render it coercive.
As noted earlier, a strike did occur and a contract was
agreed to some time in January. Toward the end of Janu-
ary, Rosen held a meeting of employees to tell them about
the contract. According to Soles, he told the employees that
the contract the Union had agreed to was a bad contract,
that there was no more seniority, and that he could change
employees' days off and hours of work.
Nieves corroborated Soles, but testified that Rosen also
said he could fire employees if he thought they were not
qualified, that employees could not talk to one another on
company time or talk to the union steward on company
time, and that the union representative could not come in
without his permission.
Ragland corroborated part of Soles' and part of Nieves'
testimony.
Rosen admitted having a meeting of the employees which
he testified was to inform the employees of the results of the
strike because they had not been informed. In essence, his
testimony was that all the things he said, and he admitted
to mentioning the matters described above although he de-
nied saying it was a bad contract, were read from passages
in the contract (an assertion corroborated by General
Counsel's witnesses).
I credit Rosen. I am persuaded that the testimony of
General Counsel's witnesses represents their interpretation
of his remarks. I find nothing unlawful in Rosen's conduct
in this particular and shall recommend dismissal of the alle-
gations in paragraph 5(b), subsections (I) through (5), of
the complaint in Case 12-CA-7771.
General Counsel amended the complaint at the hearing
to allege that in February 1977, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by telli'ig employees they could
not talk to the shop steward while on company property
and could not talk to each other about the Union while on
company property. Two witnesses gave testimony which
supports this allegation. One, Nieves, testified that there
was a stanger on the premises on a day in February and
Card heard about it and asked Nieves if he had talked to
her. Nieves said she had, but that she did not understand
what he had said. Card told Nieves that she wanted the
employees to sign a paper that they were not to talk to
anyone from the outside about union business. The next
day a paper was sent around for employees to sign, on
threat of suspension, stating they would not talk to anyone
from the outside or among themselves. Nieves did not say
that the paper referred to talk of union business, but impli-
citly that is what the paper said. Ragland gave testimony
generally along the same lines, albeit mistaken about the
date.
Card was not asked about any specific conversations with
Nieves and Ragland: rather, she was asked whether at any
time she told any employees that theN could not talk to
each other about a union on company property or talk to
the shop steward while on company property. and she de-
nied that she had. She also denied that any paper was
passed around. I have difficulty in believing that Nieves and
Ragland made up an incident such as they described and I
am persuaded it occurred and credit their testimony. Ac-
cordingly, as the restriction announced by Card was overly
broad and undertook to restrict employees' union activities
on company property on nonwork time, I find that Respon-
dent thereby violated Section 8(aX I) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that beginning in December 1976,
and continuing through January and February 1977, Re-
spondent, by Rosen and Card, instigated and encouraged
employees to sign letters revoking union dues-checkoff au-
thorizations. This allegation appears to be predicated on
the testimony of Nieves and Ragland that on the day Rosen
had a meeting of employees after Christmas, inspectress Pat
Mabry told them, separately. that some employees had got-
ten out of the Union and she asked them if they wanted to
get out. She told them if they did they could go to Card's
office and sign a paper which would remove them from the
checkoff.
On some unspecified date or dates, the Union received
form letters from 12 employees indicating that the signato-
ries were resigning from the Union and cancelling their
dues-checkoff authorizations. Six of those were dated Janu-
ary 28. 1977. and one February 1, 1977. Union representa-
tive Feder testified that about June 6 he had a meeting with
Card at which assistant housekeeper Lucy Simpson and in-
spectresses Mabry, Nadine Engart, and Mary Jones were
present. Feder testified he first discussed an employee sus-
pension, then brought up the matter of the letters of resig-
nation. Thereupon, Mabry interjected that she understood
he was accusing her of handing out the letters and she gave
him a letter purportedly signed by a number of maids stat-
ing they had not received the letters from her. Mabry added
that one day she found the resignation forms on the house-
keeper's desk and as maids came to work and checked in
she handed them a form. Feder testified further that in the
discussion he remarked to Card about the change of atmo-
sphere at the hotel and she said Rosen was following the
contract to the letter. Feder asked her what that had to do
with the resignations and Card said "it was given out by the
house. That the house was responsible for it."
Card denied making the remarks attributed to her by
Feder. None of the individuals who Feder said were present
was called to testify, except Mary Jones. and she denied
being in a meeting with Feder on June 6. Although i have
discredited Card in other matters, I credit her in this in-
1289
DE('ISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
stance. I was not favorably impressed by Feder and am
unable to accept his uncorroborated testimony.
Although I credit Card, there remains uncontradicted
testimony that the resignation forms were in the office of
the housekeeper and employees were solicited to sign them,
albeit by other employees and not by supervisors. This cir-
cumstance, when considered with the fact that the typewrit-
ten form used could not have been prepared by the maids
and had to be the product of assistance, suggests a partici-
pation by Respondent in the decision of employees to with-
draw from the Union. However. suspicion is no substitute
for proof. Accordingly. I shall recommend dismissal of the
allegation in this particular.
B. The Alleged Unlasfid Suspensions and Discharge
I. The suspension of Marie Soles
a. The Jacts
As noted earlier. Marie Soles was a maid employed by
Respondent. She was a member of the Union and was shop
steward. She testified that on January 20, about 2:30 p.m..
in the linen room, a new maid named Marion asked her if
the Union was a good thing and Soles told her it was and
that she was shop steward. Marion said she might join the
Union and Soles told her she could not put her into the
Union for at least a month because she had to see how good
a maid Marion was.
On January 26, Soles was called to a meeting with Rosen
and union representative Bucky Timperio. where she
learned that one Marion Haase had accused her of harass-
ing her. Soles denied it and described her brief encounter
with Haase. Rosen told her she should not have been con-
ducting union business on hotel time. On February I, Card
told her she was suspended for 5 days because of the lIaase
matter.
b. A nalysis and conclusions
The complaint alleges that Soles was suspended because
of her union activities. Respondent admits, in effect, that
Soles was suspended because of her union activities, but
argues that the Union had waived the statutory right to
engage in such activities by reason of Article Ill, Section 3
of the contract which provides in relevant part:
Shop stewards, except in emergencies, shall not be per-
mitted to conduct union business on work time.
General Counsel and the Union contend, rightly, that a
waiver will not be readily inferred but must be in clear and
unmistakable language. They argue that the phrase "union
business" is too broad and indefinite to meet that test. In
my judgment, it is not necessary to decide whether or not
there was a waiver, because the phrase "union business"
cannot reasonably by construed to prohibit the conduct
which Soles described. Soliciting membership in a union is
obviously "union business," but this is not what Soles did.
According to her testimony, and it is the only testimony on
the subject, she was merely asked about joining the Union
by an employee. 2 She replied to the question. A contention
that in so doing she engaged in union business and was
subject to discipline cannot be viewed seriously.
In fact, it is clear, and I find, that the incident was used
by Respondent as a pretext to harass the Union and im-
press on employees the ineffectiveness of the Union as a
bargaining representative. I predicate this finding on the
fact that without any showing of a need for it. Respondent
obtained a sworn statement from Haase before confronting
Soles. thereby suggesting that it was building a record: the
fiact that after Soles' denial of the accusations, Respondent
conducted no investigation, nor did it confront Haase; the
fact that Respondent undertook to suspend Soles, an em-
ployee with a 10-year employment history, on the basis of
accusations by a new employee with Soles had denied; and
the uncontradicted testimony of Timperio that a few days
after Soles was suspended he spoke to Haase. and she told
him that she had been forced to sign the paper accusing
Soles of misconduct.'
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the suspension of
Soles was violative of Section 8(a)( I) and (3) of the Act.
2. The suspension and discharge of Lillian Nieves
a. he /ral.s
Lillian Nieves began working for Respondent in March
1975 and was employed as a maid. It appears that she regu-
larly worked on the sixth floor, cleaning rooms. On June I,
housekeeper Mildred Card told her that she was being sus-
pended for 2 days for not cleaning rooms 824 and 825 prop-
erly (apparently this was an additional assignment which
was given to Nieves on May 31).
Nieves returned to work on June 6. She testified she was
told by inspectress Nadine to clean room 624, and that she
told Nadine that her assignment sheet indicated that room
624 was to be inspected only. Nadine persisted in telling her
it had to be cleaned. Nieves complained that she had been
suspended for not cleaning rooms 824 and 825 properly and
she did not think it was fair that she had to clean a room
that someone else had cleaned, that the maid to whom that
assignment had been made should be suspended. Later,
housekeeper Mildred Card asked Nieves if she had cleaned
the room and Nieves told her no and repeated her com-
plaint that it was not fair. Card asked her if she was going
to clean it and Nieves testified she told her she would. A
few minutes later. Nieves was called to ('ard's office and
found that union representative Larry Feder was present.
lie asked her what the problem was and she repeated what
she had told Card earlier. Feder asked ard why Nieves
had been given this assignment and Card said it was be-
cause it was in her section. Whether or not Nieves cleaned
the room is not clear from her testimony. In any event.
Nieves worked on Tuesday'. June 7 and ,was off work
Wednesday, Thursday. and Friday. days on which she was
not scheduled to work. She worked again on Saturday. June
II. through June 14. On none of those workdays was any-
Ilaase did not estily tier sworn statement Va, receked in evidence, but
not ior Ihe ruth iof he matters contained therein
Ihis tesimn was hearsay. but was receiNed without objection
1290
MARCO POLO RESORT MOTEl'.
thing said to her about room 624. On June 17, she was told
by inspectress Pat Mabry not to report to work on Satur-
day, nor to return until she talked to Card. About 2 weeks
later, according to Nieves, she was called by Card and told
that Rosen had said to fire her 2 weeks earlier. Nieves testi-
fied that the reasons given were an incident in February in
which Nieves had refused to clean a cleaning bucket on the
request of an inspectress, the incident involving rooms 824
and 825, and the incident involving room 624.
b. .A nalvsis and conclus.ions
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by suspending and discharging Nieves.
The theory of the case is that her suspension and discharge
were attributable to the enforcement of a rule unilaterally
adopted by Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.4 Respondent denies that it promulgated a new rule
and asserts that the suspension was therefore lawful. It con-
tends that the discharge was lawful because it was predi-
cated on an existing policy of discharge after three warn-
ings.
It is undisputed that on or about May 15. Respondent
posted a rule. According to General Counsel's witnesses.
Nieves. Feder, and Ragland. the rule essentially stated that
any maid who was sent back to do her work over would be
suspended. According to Respondent. such was not the rule
posted on May 15. Assuming, arguendo, that it was, a find-
ing that in posting it Respondent was promulgating a new
rule is not warranted. because the record shows that Marie
Soles, as far back as February 27. 1975, had been sus-
pended for 3 days for having to be sent back three times to
reclean a room. Thus, whether posted or not, there was a
rule providing for the suspension of maids sent back to re-
clean rooms, and Nieves' suspension cannot be held to be
attributable to the promulgation of a new rule.
According to Card, the rule she posted on or about May
15 was not as described by Nieves. Feder, and Ragland.
Card testified the rule she posted stated:
Please tO' to cooperate
It has been brought to my attention that pickup rooms
are really being done poorly.
A pickup room is your room for that da,. and should
be as important as one of your own.
It is necessary to warn all of you. If the inspectress
sends you back, please go willingly and without atti-
tude or you will be reprimanded with a daby or two off
on suspension.
And after 3 reprimands it could lead to termination.
4The complaint does not allege. nor does General Counsel contend in his
brief, that the suspension and discharge were iolali.e of an) other suhsec-
tion of Section 8. nion representative Feder testified that when he called
Respondent about Nieves' discharge, he spoke to assistant housekeeper
Simpson and she told him that Nieses could not return to work hecause
charges were pending against the hotel. IOn June 8. the t nion had filed an
8(a)l1) and (5) charge in (se 12 CA 7752 alleging. inter alii. unilateral
changes In working conditions.) On the hasis ot such testimons. which wias
not contradicted. the Utnion contends that a finding o(, an
8
(a)(
4
1 llatllon is
warranted The contention is rejected. The complaint does not allege such
violation. which presents issues ,f tact different from the issues presented hb
the allegations in the complaint. and the mattel was not ullv litigated: e g.
Simpson did not testils
I credit Card and find that the above notice is what was
posted on or about May IS and not that described by Gen-
eral C(ounsel's witnesses, who did not agree on the contents
of the notice. General Counsel contends that the rule as
described by Card was different from that pursuant to
which Soles was suspended and that therefor its unilateral
promulgation was unlawful and Nieves' suspension pursu-
ant thereto was unlawful. The rule has two elements: sus-
pension and termination. It is clear from the discussion
above that suspension of employees in connection with the
recleaning of rooms was not a new matter. As to termina-
tions. Rosen testified, without contradiction, that it was his
policy to terminate employees after the third warning.
Thus, it would appear that even in the matter of termina-
tions the rule was not new.
More important than the foregoing, the record indicates
that the Respondent. in its contract with the Ulnion, has
retained the right to promulgate new rules. Thus. article III,
section 4, provides:
The employer maN from time to time make. continue
and change such reasonable rules and regulations as it
maN deem necessary and proper in the conduct of its
business. The Employer's reasonable exercise of judg-
ment in this regard shall be conclusive and binding;
provided. however, that such rules and regulations are
in no wal inconsistent with an, of the provisions of
this Agreement. All such rules and regulations shall be
obsersed. obeyed and abided by, by all employees.
notwithstanding any past practice or precedent.
General Counsel contends that this is not a defense to
Respondent's conduct, because it is a claim of waiver and
the quoted provision does not constitute a clear and un-
equivocal waiver. The language of the contract is, in my
judgment, very clear. An) construction of it which would
prohibit Respondent from promulgating the rule here in
question would render the provision meaningless.
For the foregoing reasons as there is no allegation that
Nieves was suspended or discharged tfor discriminator rea-
sons, I find that her suspension and discharge were not vio-
lative of the Act.
3. The suspension of Lois Ragland
On June 1. Ragland was suspended for 2 days for having
been sent back too many times to reclean a room. The com-
plaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that her suspen-
sion was unlawful on the same theory as Nieves' suspen-
sion. or the reasons given above in connection with
Nieves' suspension. I find no merit to the allegation.
(C. The A4lleged Rii.val TO Bargain
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(I) and (5) of the Act b unilaterally, and without no-
tice to and consultation with the Union, instituting a rule
providing for automatic suspension of a maid sent back to
reclean a room. 'or the reasons given above in connection
with Nieves' suspension and discharge I find no merit to
the allegation
1291
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ill, till IFll('AI Of liIL UNFAIR ABi()R PRA( it'IS t t()N
(0OMMI R( 'I
The activities of the Respondent set iorth in section I.
above occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed therein. have a close. intimate and substantial rela-
tionship to trade. traffic and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
I . iIll RMI)Y
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices in violation of Section 8(a)( I) and (3) of the
Act. I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In particular. in
connection with the suspension of Marie Soles. I shall rec-
ommend that he be made whole for any loss of pay she
suffered by reason of her unlawful 5-day suspension by pay-
ment to her of the wages which she would have earned
during that period. to which shall be added interest to be
computed in the manner prescribed in F. f" U;1oofls'rlh
Conyam',. 90 N LRB 289 (1950)1. and floridal Sel (or/orta-
lion, 231 NI.RB 651 (1977).'
CO()N( t ISt S)NS O()I .AWV
I. Marco Polo Resort Motel is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. Hotel. Motel. Restaurant. Hi-Rise & Bartenders
Union Local 355, AFL CIO. is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of' the Act.
3. By telling employees they cannot talk to the shop
steward or among themselves about the Union while on
company property, Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained. and coerced employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby violated
Section 8(a)( 1I) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By suspending Marie Soles because of' her union ac-
tivities, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in. un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) I)
and (3), and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. General Counsel has failed to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Respondent violated Section
8(a(1I) and (3) of the Act by the suspension of I.illian
Nieves and ois Ragland and the discharge of Lillian
Nieves and has failed to establish that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent. Marco Polo Resort Motel, Miami
Beach. Florida. its officers, agents, successors, and assigns.
shall:
See, generalls. Ima Plumbing & Hea'ing (',. 138 N L RB 716 (1962)
t In the event no ecepitins are iled as pl,s ided b) Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulaltins ot' the Nall an.l I.al or Relations Board. the findings.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
by telling employees that they cannot talk to the shop stew-
ard or to one another about the Union on company prop-
erty.
(b) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of Hotel. Motel, Restaurant. Hi-Rise & Bartenders Union
l.ocal 355. AFIL ('10. or an' other labor organization of its
employees. bh suspending employees because of' their ac-
tivities on behalf thereof. or otherwise discriminating in re-
gard to the hire or tenure of employment or any terms or
conditions of employment of its employees.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights of self'
organization or to form, join, or assist labor organizations.
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to retrain from
any or all such activities.
2. ake the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Marie Soles whole for the wages she lost by
reason of her unlawful suspension.
(h) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
National abor Relations Board and its agents, for exami-
nation and copying. all payroll records, social security paN-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and reports and
all other records relevant and necessary to a determination
of the amount of hackpay due under the terms of this rec-
ommended Order.
(c) Post at its Miami Beach. Florida. facility, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said
notice. on forms provided by the Regional Director lbr Re-
gion 12. after being duly signed by the Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof' and maintained by it fbr 60 consecutive days there-
after. in conspicuous places. including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered. defaced. or covered by any other material.
It IS I I RIIIIR Rk OI()MMI Nl1)1: that the allegations of the
complaint found not to have been sustained by a prepon-
derance of the e idence are herewith dismissed.
conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall. as pro ided in Sec 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. he adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions. and Order, and all bjectians thereto shall be deemed
waived fbr all purposes
In the event that this Order is enforced h a Judgment of ta I'nited States
Court oa Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted bh Order of the
National abor Relaions Board" shall read "Posted Pursuan t a udgment
of the United Stales Court or Appeals Enforcing an Order oat the National
Labor Relations Board"
APPN DIX
NO l( it To EPI Ot'I:S
POSIIAI) BI' ORI R OI I I1
NAII()NA LAI(OR RIIAII()oS BARI)
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence. the National I.abor Relations Board
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MARCO POLO RESORT MOTEL
has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to
post this notice.
WE WILtL NOT tell employees that they cannot talk to
the shop steward or talk to one another about the
Union while on company property.
WE WILL NOT suspend employees because of their
activities on behalf of Hotel, Motel, Restuarant. Hi-
Rise & Bartenders Union. Local 355, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, and w. Wll.l make
whole Marie Soles for any loss of pay which she suf-
fered by reason of her unlawful suspension.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. as amended.
You are free to become and remain members of Hotel.
Motel. Restaurant, Hi-Rise & Bartenders Union, Local 355,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
MARCO PI.O RESORT Mo)IFl
1293