MARATHON PETROLEUM CO., D/B/A CATLETTSBURG REFINING, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 1, 2016

09-CA-162710 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 1, 2016)

JD–84–16
Catlettsburg, KY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
MARATHON PETROLEUM CO., d/b/a
CATLETTSBURG REFINING, LLC
and 09–CA–162710
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED
INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, AND ITS
LOCAL 8-719
John Duffey, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Eric Gill, Esq.,
for the Charging Party.
Raymond Haley, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Thomas M. Randazzo, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Catlettsburg,
Kentucky, on April 26, 2016. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, and its Local 8–
719 (the Charging Party, Union, or Steelworkers) filed the instant charge on October 26, 2015,1
and the General Counsel issued the complaint on February 25, 2016, alleging that Marathon
Petroleum Co., d/b/a Catlettsburg Refining, LLC (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by, since on or about May 21, 2015, refusing to
furnish the Union with information it requested which was necessary and relevant to the
performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit
employees. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the Respondent failed and refused to furnish:
“. . . the wage/roll up/overhead costs of [the] contractor employees. . . [including] any premiums

1 All dates are in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
JD–84–16
2
and margins paid to the contractor firms and any bonus/completion milestones paid to them.”
(GC Exh. 1(c).)2
On the basis of the entire record,3 my determination of credible evidence,4 and after
considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Union, and the Respondent, I make the 5
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION10
The Respondent, a limited liability corporation with a principal office in Findlay, Ohio,
and a place of business in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, has been engaged in the business of refining,
transporting, and marketing gasoline and other petroleum products throughout the United States.
In conducting its operations, the Respondent annually sold and shipped from its Catlettsburg, 15
Kentucky facility, goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
20
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
The Respondent operates an oil refinery facility in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, where it 25
employs 743 employees. The Union represents 391 of those employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining. The Union and Respondent have a bargaining relationship that dates back
to the 1940s, and the Respondent has recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in a unit consisting of operating and maintenance
employees. That recognition has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements. 30
In the parties’ 2012—2013 collective-bargaining agreement, article I, section 3 specifically
describes the collective-bargaining unit as:
Refinery Employees, hereinafter referred to as “employees,” shall consist only of
operating, maintenance, and hourly employees on special assignments such as but 35
not limited to Fire and Rescue, Oil Response, Air Monitoring and other such
assignments at the Catlettsburg Refinery who now or later shall be working in

2 At the trial, the General Counsel amended par. 6(a) which reads “Include any previous and margins
paid to the contractor firms,” to correctly read “Include any premiums and margins. . . . ” Complaint par.
4 was also amended to allege the Respondent’s maintenance manager’s last name was correctly spelled
“Estep.” (Tr. 10.)
3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “U. Exh.” for the Union’s Exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “GC Br.” for
the General Counsel’s brief; “U Br.” for the Union’s brief; and “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
4 In making my findings regarding the credible evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, I
considered the testimonial demeanor of such witnesses, the content of their testimony, and the inherent
probabilities based on the record as a whole.
JD–84–16
3
classifications listed in this agreement and such other classifications of a similar
nature as may be added to this Agreement by written agreement. This shall
include all employees at the former No. 1 Refinery, formerly known as the Leach
Refinery (including the United Fuel Gas Company property adjacent to the Leach
Refinery); on the property of the old Tri-State Refinery in Kenova, W.Va.; at the 5
New Lube Plant; at the New Loading Rack, Roofing Plant and related marketing
tanks at Viney Branch; and the refinery tankage and processing equipment in the
former Dump Area, the former No. 2 Refinery (constructed for the Defense Plant
Corporation), the North Product Tank Farm, the former H-Coal property and the
No. 1 storeroom employee(s), but shall not include supervisory employees, 10
clerical employees, storeroom employees at the current No. 2 Refinery
(warehouses), laboratory employees other than Process Control Laboratory
employees, technical service employees, guards, technically and professionally
trained employees employed as such working in their profession, co-ops, and
trainees for positions not covered by the Agreement. The word “employees” as 15
used in the Article shall include such operating and maintenance employees as the
company may assign construction in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement. (R. Exh. 1 (2012-2015 CBA).)
The Respondent is part of a multiemployer bargaining association that bargains with the 20
International Union over a “National Oil Bargaining Policy” (“NOBP”). (Tr. 16, 94.) The most
recent negotiations between the multiemployer bargaining association and the Union included
efforts by the Union to return contracted out routine maintenance work to the bargaining unit.
(Tr. 101) After the parties’ 2012–2015 collective-bargaining agreement expired on January 31,
2015, the Union went on strike from February 1 to April 3, 2015. The nationwide strike against 25
the Respondent and certain other selected employers was motivated in part by the erosion of the
bargaining unit due to maintenance work being awarded to outside contractors.
On March 12, 2015, the multiemployer bargaining association and the International
Union reached an agreement on the basic parameters of a collective-bargaining agreement 30
(referred to as a “pattern agreement”). On April 1, 2015, the parties signed a tentative agreement
for the Respondent’s Catlettsburg location, which incorporated the pattern agreement. (GC Exh.
2; Tr. 16–18.) That most recent agreement is effective by it terms from February 1, 2015,
through January 31, 2019, and the bargaining unit’s ratification of that agreement on April 3,
2015, resulted in an end to the strike. 35
One provision of the pattern agreement consisted of a “Letter Agreement” regarding
“Maintenance Training and Development” applicable only to the Union represented refineries
and chemical plants, such as the Respondent’s Catlettsburg plant. (GC Exh. 2, p. 2.) Respondent
Human Resources Manager Greg Jackson testified that one of the Union’s major proposals 40
during the negotiations was to convert contractor employees to unit employees, and that
essentially resulted in the letter agreement on maintenance training and development after the
strike. (Tr. 101.) That letter confirmed the parties’ understanding regarding maintenance training
and development, and maintenance craft needs. In it, the parties recognized “that skilled
maintenance workers are essential to ensuring safe, efficient, and reliable operations,” and the 45
parties agreed to meet to “discuss ongoing opportunities in the area of maintenance recruitment,
development and day-to-day routine maintenance craft needs.” Such discussions were to be
JD–84–16
4
concluded within 180 days of the date of ratification. (GC Exh. 2, p. 2.) In that letter, the parties
also specifically agreed to meet within the same specified time period to discuss “[w]ays in
which day-to-day routine maintenance work currently performed by contractors could be
efficiently performed by bargaining unit employees.” Finally, the parties agreed that, at the
conclusion of such discussions, the Respondent would develop and share the projected 5
maintenance hiring plans and timelines for implementing such plans with the local union. (GC
Exh. 2, p .2.)
The Letter Agreement further provided that “the information relevant to this discussion
may be considered confidential and proprietary, and may require the signing of a Confidentiality 10
Agreement.” (GC Exh. 2, p. 3.) In addition, a dispute resolution provision was discussed, stating
that:
In the event either party fails to discuss and share the data identified above … the
matter may be referred by either party to the USW Chair of the National Oil 15
Bargaining Program and the Company’s Senior Human Resources Representative
(the Chairs) who shall meet and attempt to resolve such issue. Should no
resolution be reached, the USW Chair shall retain the right to have the union file
and process a grievance regarding the dispute into an expedited procedure to be
developed by the Chairs. (GC Exh. 2, p. 3) 20
While this provision provides that either party “may” submit failures to share information to a
dispute resolution process, it does not require it as a mandatory action, and the parties did not
utilize it with regard to the information requested in this matter.
25
On April 8, 2015, Union Recording Secretary Roy Claar hand delivered a letter to
Jackson, requesting that pursuant to the tentative agreement and its National Oil Bargaining
Policy letter on maintenance training and development, the Respondent discuss and bargain over
the ways in which routine maintenance work currently being performed by contractor employees
might be performed by bargaining unit employees. (GC Exh. 3; Tr. 19–21.) In an April 20, 201530
email, Jackson informed Claar of his agreement to meet and bargain pursuant to the Union’s
request. (GC Exh. 3A.)
On May 21, 2015, Claar hand delivered a written information request to Jackson
pertaining to the upcoming bargaining over maintenance, training and development and the 35
parties’ discussions for returning routine maintenance work to the bargaining unit. (GC Exh. 4.)
The Union’s request for information consisted of 9 items, the second of which requested that the
Respondent:
Provide the wage/roll up/overhead costs of these contractor employees. Including 40
any premiums and margins paid to the contractor firms and any bonus/completion
milestones paid to them.” (GC Exh. 4.)
The “roll up costs” refer to the costs that go into a contractor’s billable rate, such as: base wage
rates paid to the employees; fringe benefit payments; workers’ compensation costs; social 45
security costs; federal and state unemployment insurance costs; overhead costs for the contractor;
and profit for the contractor. (Tr. 124.) Claar and Local Union President Brett Queen credibly
JD–84–16
5
testified that the purpose for requesting the information was related to the tentative agreement
and National Oil Bargaining Policy Letter Agreement on Maintenance Training and
Development, and the ways in which day-to-day routine maintenance work currently performed
by contractor employees could be efficiently performed by the bargaining unit employees. (Tr.
24–26, 70–73; GC Exh. 2.) Queen further credibly testified that the information requested in 5
Item No. 2 would be reflected in the “roll up” costs, and that inherent in the roll up overhead
costs of the contractor employees are the premiums and margins paid to the contractor firms and
the bonus completion milestones paid to them. (Tr. 81–82.)
The Respondent acknowledged that some of its contracts with outside vendors for the 10
performance of routine maintenance work at the Catlettsburg facility contain the cost plus roll-up
information broken down as requested by the Union in the second item of the information
request, but that some contracts contain only “all-in” costs that are not broken down by category.
(Tr. 124–125.)
15
On August 6, 2015, as set forth in the tentative agreement, the parties executed a
confidentiality agreement to provide protection for the information to be provided in response to
the Union’s May 21 information request. (GC Exh. 5.) The confidentiality agreement, consisting
of three full pages and a signature page, was executed by Jackson on behalf of the Respondent
and Claar on behalf of the Union. The agreement provides, inter alia, that: all information 20
provided to the Union must be kept confidential and cannot be disclosed without the
Respondent’s written consent; the information shall only be transmitted to those who “need to
know” the information; the Union is responsible for any breach of the agreement by its
representatives; the Union must disclose to Respondent if it is required to disclose information
via subpoena so that Respondent may seek a protective order; the Union must keep a record of 25
persons who are permitted to access the information; the Respondent shall not have liability to
the Union as a result of the use of the information; the Respondent is entitled to specific
performance and injunctive relief upon breach of the agreement; and if the Union is required to
disclose the information by court order the Union shall move the court to file it under seal or
through some comparable protective mechanism. (GC Exh. 5.) 30
On August 7, 2015, the Respondent provided the Union with information in response to
all of the May 21 requests, with the single exception of the wage, roll up, and overhead costs of
the contractor employees requested in the second item. Instead of furnishing that information,
the Respondent wrote:35
We do not understand the relevance of this request; please explain. Contracting
supplemental workers is a means to expand and contract our workforce to meet
the cyclical nature of our business, and the costs do not alter the Company’s need
to maintain that operational flexibility. In addition, this request involves highly 40
sensitive, confidential information involving the Company’s business
relationships with third parties. Disclosing such information could damage the
Company’s ability to reach agreements with these third parties. (GC Exh. 6; R.
Exh. 4 (with attachments).)
45
On August 13, 2015, the parties met to bargain as required by the tentative agreement.
Jackson and several of Respondent’s other representatives met with the Union’s representatives,
JD–84–16
6
which included Claar, Queen, International Union Representative Alan Sampson, and Union
Vice-President Dave Martin. In that meeting, Jackson asked Sampson to start looking for ways
that the bargaining unit employees could efficiently perform day-to-day routine maintenance
work. (Tr. 102–103.) Sampson told Jackson that the Union needed him to do the same, and
Jackson responded that he believed the outside contractors were already performing the work 5
efficiently. (Tr. 102–103.) Jackson testified that Sampson then said he had everything he needed
from the information request.5 (Tr. 104.)
On September 14, 2015, the parties met again to bargain over the return of routine
maintenance jobs to the bargaining unit. Jackson, Respondent Maintenance Manager Mark 10
Estep, and other managers were present on behalf of the Respondent. Claar, Queen, and Martin
were present among those representing the Union. In that meeting, the Union proposed “a list of
jobs that may be returned to and performed only by bargaining unit members.” Those listed jobs
consisted of approximately 25 routine maintenance positions. (GC Exh. 8.) Jackson asked the
Union officials to explain why bargaining unit employees should do maintenance work presently 15
being performed by contractor employees. Claar informed Jackson that the bargaining unit could
perform the work more efficiently and that the unit employees were more familiar with the plant
and the maintenance work than the contractor’s employees. (Tr. 30.) Claar testified that Jackson
told the Union officials they had to prove that the unit employees could do the work more
efficiently. (Tr. 31.)6 Union Committeeman Wes Kinder told the Respondent’s officials “we 20
have no information on the contractors and what they cost.” (Tr. 118; GC Exh. 7.). Claar
testified that when the Respondent stated that the Union had to prove the unit employees could
do the work more efficiently, he responded that the Union “need[ed] those contractor rates to
prove that we [the unit employees] can do the work more efficiently.” (Tr. 31.)7 In response,
Estep stated: “we can’t give that to you,” and he asserted the information was confidential. (Tr. 25
31–32.) Claar reiterated that the Union needed the information for the Respondent’s “efficiency
demand,” and he reminded Respondent’s officials that the Union had signed a confidentiality
agreement. (Tr. 31; GC Exh. 7.) Jackson testified that he then informed the Union that the

5 Jackson’s testimony that Sampson stated he “had everything he needed” from the information
request was unrebutted. However, the evidence fails to show why Sampson would make such a statement
when the evidence clearly establishes that the Union continued to seek the disputed information. As
discussed more fully below, contrary to Sampson’s statement, on September 14 Claar informed Jackson
that the information was needed to prove the unit employees could perform the work more efficiently (Tr.
31). In addition, the fact that the Union renewed its request for that information on September 18
contradicts Sampson’s assertion that he “had everything he needed.” Finally, on October 5, after Jackson
received the Union’s second request for the information, he never informed the Union that he would not
provide it because Sampson already said he had everything he needed. Instead, Jackson informed the
Union that he believed there was a failure to demonstrate “a legitimate purpose for the requested
subcontracting costs. . . . ” (GC Exh. 12.) If the union officials truly had everything they needed from the
information request, it is reasonable to believe Jackson would have told them that they already conveyed
their satisfaction with the documents provided. Since the undisputed record establishes that the Union
continued to seek the information requested in Item 2, even after Sampson’s statement, I provide no
weight or significance to Sampson’s statement the he “had everything he needed.”
6 Claar’s notes from the meeting reflect that Jackson said “you all need to tell us how you can do this
work more efficiently.” (GC Exh. 7.) Jackson did not dispute Claar’s assertion, testifying that he said
“show us how. . . or something like that. . . .” (Tr. 118)
7 Claar’s notes reflect that he stated “If we are going to compare efficiency we need the pay rates.”
(GC Exh. 7, p. 2; Tr. 31.)
JD–84–16
7
contractors gave the Respondent flexibility to expand and contract its workforce, and that cost
was only part of the equation. (Tr. 110–111.) Specifically, Jackson testified that he informed the
Union “. . . the use of supplemental contractors and the expanding contracting of our workforce
is necessary for our flexibility, and the cost was only part of that.” (Tr. 110–111.)
5
In an email dated September 18, 2015, Claar again requested that Respondent provide the
information from the second item of the May 21 request to the Union by September 29. (GC
Exh. 9) On September 29, Jackson sent a letter to Queen stating that the Respondent intended to
hire zero to four craft workers, but he did not provide any of the information requested by the
Union in its May 21 or September 18, 2015 written requests. (GC Exh. 10.)10
In a letter dated October 5, 2015, Jackson informed Queen that he had received the
Union’s second request for “wage/roll-up/overhead costs of these contractors’ employees.” (GC
Exh. 12.) In that letter, Jackson stated:
15
[I]n our meeting on September 14, Ray [sic] Claar and Alan Sampson stated that
this information was needed to be able to prove that the Union can do things more
efficiently. I again responded that contracting supplemental workers is a means to
expand and contract our workforce to meet the cyclical nature of our business,
and the costs do not alter the Company’s need to maintain that operational 20
flexibility. (GC Exh. 12, p. 1.)
Jackson then stated that since the Union allegedly failed to “demonstrate a legitimate purpose for
the requested subcontracting costs, and because cost is not the primary determinative factor for
the Company contracting this work, we do not believe the Union has met it obligation to 25
establish the relevance of this information.” (GC Exh. 12, p. 2.)
On January 8, 2016, the union representatives, including Claar, and Respondent’s
representatives, including Jackson, met again concerning the Union’s information request. In
that meeting, the Respondent provided the Union with a document it alleged to be a comparison 30
of the average billable rate it paid to contractors for certain maintenance job classifications to the
average billable rate for the unit employees. (Tr. 39–40.) The classifications on the document
consisted of laborer, millwright, crane operator, carpenter, and electrician. (GC Exh. 11.) The
list of classifications was not accompanied by supporting documentation or records. The
Respondent also did not present the Union with an opportunity to review or inspect the 35
documents upon which the summary list was based. (Tr. 78.) In that meeting, Jackson told the
union officials that the list was in response to their information request, but Claar told him the
list was not sufficient to satisfy the request. In addition, both Claar and Martin told Jackson that
the information was not helpful because it was an average rate, and it did not indicate which
contractors were being paid or the amounts paid. (Tr. 39; 77.) Furthermore, the Union informed 40
the Respondent that the list did not include the classification of instrument tech or mechanic, one
of the three “core crafts” in the Respondent’s maintenance groups and Respondent’s second
largest maintenance job classification. (Tr. 40.) Finally, the Union informed the Respondent that
the summary did not show what costs were included and excluded in calculating the averages, or
what “rolls into this number.” (Tr. 41.) 45
JD–84–16
8
It is undisputed that the Respondent never provided the wage, roll up, and overhead costs
of contractor employees that the Union requested on May 21 and September 18, 2015. James
Nelson, the Respondent’s director of global procurement, testified that he was aware of the
information the Union requested regarding maintenance contractor costs, but he did not provide
it because he viewed that information as “confidential.” (Tr. 128–129.) Instead, Nelson testified 5
that he presented the Union with a weighted average billable rate for six different classifications
in “summary form.” (GC Exh. 11.) As an explanation of why Nelson deemed the information
confidential, he testified that if the Respondent disclosed such requested information, it “could
compromise the trust that we have with our contractors.” (Tr. 129.) He further testified that the
Respondent had several internal confidentiality policies that he had the authority to implement 10
and follow. (Tr. 131; R. Exhs. 7, 8, and 9.) Nelson, however, failed to explain why the
confidentiality agreement the Respondent signed with the Union did not satisfy the Respondent’s
concerns for confidentiality of the information requested.
The Union did not file grievances over the use of contractors performing routine 15
maintenance work, and the Union did not submit the Respondent’s failure to provide the
information requested to the National Oil Bargaining Program’s dispute resolution procedure.
B. Analysis
20
1. The legal precedent
It is well settled that an employer’s duty to bargain collectively under Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act includes the duty to supply requested information to a union that is the collective-
bargaining representative of the employer’s employees if the requested information is relevant 25
and reasonably necessary to the union’s performance of its responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956);
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); see also Central Soya Co., 288 NLRB 1402
(1988). This duty is not limited to contract negotiations but extends to requests made during the
term of the contract for information relevant to and necessary for contract administration and 30
grievance processing. Beth Abraham Health Services, 332 NLRB 1234 (2000). The standard for
determining the relevancy of requested information is a liberal one and it is necessary only to
establish “the probability that the desired information is relevant, and that it would be of use to
the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.” Id. at 437. See also Leland
Stanford Junior University, 262 NLRB 136, 139 (1982), and cases cited therein. Therefore, the 35
information must have some bearing on the issue between the parties but does not have to be
dispositive. Kaleida Health, Inc., 356 NLRB 1373, 1377 (2011).
Where the union’s request is for information pertaining to employees in the bargaining
unit, that information is presumptively relevant and the Respondent must provide the 40
information. However, where the information requested is not presumptively relevant to the
union’s performance as the collective-bargaining representative, the burden is on the union to
demonstrate the relevance of the information requested. Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB 1256,
1257–1258 (2007); Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304 (2000); Associated Ready Mixed
Concrete, Inc., 318 NLRB 318 (1995), enfd. 108 F. 3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1997). Where the 45
requested information pertains to matters outside the bargaining unit and is not presumptively
relevant, the information must be provided if the surrounding circumstances put the employer on
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9
notice as to the relevance of the information or if the union shows why the information is
relevant. National Extrusion & Mfg. Co., 357 NLRB 127 (2011). Where a showing of relevance
is required because the request concerns non-unit matters, the burden is “not exceptionally
heavy.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994). Leland Stanford Junior
University, 262 NLRB 136, 139 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1983). This burden is 5
satisfied when the union demonstrates a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence, that
the requested information is relevant. Disneyland Park, supra at 1258; Knappton Maritime
Corp., 292 NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988).
The Board has held that information requested pertaining to subcontracting agreements, 10
even if it relates to the bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment, is not
presumptively relevant, and therefore a union seeking such information must demonstrate its
relevance. Disneyland Park, supra at 1258; Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304, 1305 fn.1
(2000). Specifically, on the subject of subcontracting situations, the Board in Disneyland Park
held that a broad, discovery-type standard is utilized by the Board in determining the relevance 15
of requested information, and that potential or probable relevance is sufficient to give rise to an
employer’s obligation to provide information. Id. In that regard, in Disneyland Park, the Board
held that to demonstrate relevance, the General Counsel must present evidence either (1) that the
union demonstrated relevance of the non-unit information, or (2) that the relevance of the
information should have been apparent to the Respondent under the circumstances. Disneyland 20
Park, supra at 1258; See also Allison Co., 330 NLRB 1363, 1367 fn. 23 (2000); Brazos Electric
Power Cooperative, Inc., 241 NLRB 1016, 1018–1019 (1979), enfd. in relevant part 615 F.2d
1100 (8th Cir. 1980). Absent such a showing, the employer is not obligated to provide such
requested information.
25
The Board has also held that “[t]he union’s explanation of relevance must be made with
some precision; and a generalized, conclusory explanation is insufficient to trigger an obligation
to supply information.” Disneyland Park, supra at 1258, fn. 5; Island Creek Coal, 292 NLRB
480, 490 fn. 19 (1989); see also Schrock Cabinet Co., 339 NLRB 182 fn. 6 (2003). For a union
to show the relevance of an information request, it must do more than cite a provision of the 30
collective-bargaining agreement. It must demonstrate that the contract provision is related to the
matter about which information is being sought, and that the matter is within the union’s
responsibilities as the collective-bargaining representative. Disneyland Park, supra at 1258.
2. The information requested by the Union was necessary and relevant to the performance 35
of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees
Since the information requested in this case pertains to the various costs associated with
Respondent’s use of outside contractors to perform routine maintenance work, it is not
presumptively relevant, and the Union must demonstrate its relevance. Disneyland Park, supra at 40
1258. In this matter, however, I find the relevance of the information sought has been clearly
established by the surrounding circumstances which put the Respondent on notice as to its
relevance. It is undisputed that in the nationwide strike that occurred, the Respondent’s use of
contractors to perform maintenance work was one of the underlying issues of that labor dispute,
and that issue had subsequently been resolved by the parties’ signed agreement to bargain over 45
ways in which such work could be returned to the bargaining unit employees. Such
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circumstances were clearly sufficient to put the Respondent on notice that the requested
information was relevant and should have been produced.
In addition to the surrounding circumstances, the Union also specifically and
unequivocally demonstrated the relevance of the information sought. The pattern agreement that 5
the Respondent and Union negotiated contained a “Letter Agreement” concerning maintenance
training and development, by which the parties specifically agreed to meet and bargain over the
ways the contracted out routine maintenance work could be efficiently performed by unit
employees and thereby be returned to the bargaining unit. Consistent with that agreement, on
April 8, 2015, the Union requested that the Respondent bargain over the ways in which such 10
maintenance work could be performed by unit employees, and in response, Jackson agreed to
bargain over that subject. As mentioned above, in a bargaining session on August 13, Jackson
specifically asked the Union officials to show how the bargaining unit employees could perform
the routine maintenance work more efficiently. In that connection, in the bargaining session on
September 14, 2015, Union Officials Claar and Kinder explained to the Respondent’s officials 15
that the Union needed the information in order to respond to Respondent’s request that the Union
show how it could allegedly perform the maintenance work more efficiently than the outside
contractors.
Based on the above, I find that the Union established the relevance of the information 20
under the legal standard set forth in Disneyland Park, supra, by not only presenting evidence
demonstrating the relevance should have been apparent to the Respondent under the
circumstances, but also by presenting specific and precise evidence establishing that the Union
conveyed and explained to Respondent the relevance of the material sought. Disneyland Park,
supra at 1257–1258. Accordingly, the Union demonstrated the probability that the desired 25
information was relevant, and that it would be of use to the Union in carrying out its statutory
duties and responsibilities.
The Respondent argues in its brief that the information requested is not relevant because
the Union did not file a grievance over the subcontracting. The Respondent contends that since 30
there is an “absence of any real or contemplated grievance” concerning subcontracting, the
information is “neither relevant nor necessary.” (R. Br. p. 10.) This argument, however, lacks
merit. The Respondent’s reliance on the filing of a grievance is misplaced because whether the
Union filed a grievance over the subcontracting is immaterial. In this case, the relevance was
clearly shown by the parties’ agreement to bargain over ways in which maintenance work could 35
be returned to the unit, and by the Respondent’s request during bargaining that the Union show
or prove that such work could be done more efficiently by the unit employees.
The Respondent also argues that since it allegedly utilizes contractors for the flexibility
they offer and the “variability of maintenance demands,” rather than the lower costs of 40
subcontracting, the information sought is not relevant. (R. Br. p. 10.) This argument is likewise
baseless and must be dismissed. In the first place, Respondent’s assertion that costs were not a
factor in subcontracting the work is not supported by the record. In fact, that assertion is
specifically belied by the admission of Respondent witness Jackson, who stated in his letter to
the Union dated October 5, 2015, that cost was not “the primary determinative factor” in 45
Respondent’s decision to utilize contractors, thereby suggesting that cost was at least a secondary
factor. Jackson also admitted in his testimony that cost is at least part of the Respondent’s
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consideration for using subcontractors for maintenance work when he stated “…cost is only part
[of subcontracting].” (Tr. 110–111.) Finally, even if the Respondent utilized contractors because
of the flexibility they may offer, such a factor does not negate the relevance that has already been
demonstrated by the surrounding circumstances and the direct evidence that Respondent
requested during bargaining that the Union show or prove that the unit employees could do the 5
maintenance work more efficiently. The wage, roll up, and overhead costs of the contractor
employees certainly had potential or probable relevance with regard to the efficiency of such
work.
3. The Respondent’s confidentiality defense to supplying the information lacks merit and 10
does not preclude its obligation to provide the information requested
In the Respondent’s August 7 written response to the Union’s information request for the
wage, roll up, and overhead costs of the contractor employees, besides claiming the information
was allegedly irrelevant, it also asserted that the information “. . . involves highly sensitive, 15
confidential information involving the Company’s business relationships with third parties. . .
[and] that “[d]isclosing such information could damage the Company’s ability to reach
agreements with these third parties.” (GC Exh. 6.) Despite that assertion, in its post-hearing
brief the Respondent failed to elaborate on this confidentiality claim and it failed to provide any
case law in support of an alleged confidentiality defense. 20
Under Board law, in issues of confidentiality a party may refuse to furnish confidential
information to the other party in a collective-bargaining relationship under certain conditions.
The refusing party must initially show that it has a legitimate and substantial confidentiality
interest in the information sought. Northern Indiana Public Power, supra; Pennsylvania Power 25
Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105 (1991). If that showing is made, the Board balances the need of the
party requesting the information against any “legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests”
established by the refusing party. Howard Industries, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 111, slip op. 2 (2014),
citing Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 315, 318–320 (1979); See also Kaleida Health,
Inc., 356 NLRB 1373, 1378 (2011). The Board has found that the balance must then favor the 30
party asserting confidentiality. Detroit Edison, supra; Detroit Newspaper, supra. When a party is
unable to establish confidentiality, the balancing of interests is not required and the information
must be disclosed. Detroit Newspaper, supra. Finally, even if such conditions are satisfied, the
party may not simply refuse to provide the requested information, but must instead seek an
accommodation that would allow the requesting party an opportunity to obtain the information it 35
needs while protecting the party’s interest in confidentiality. Northern Indiana Public Power,
supra; Borgess Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1105, 1106 (2004).
In Detroit Newspaper Agency, 317 NLRB 1071 (1995), the Board defined some types of
information that give rise to a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest:40
Confidential information is limited to a few general categories: that which would
reveal, contrary to promises or reasonable expectations, highly personal
information, such as individual medical records or psychological test results; that
which would reveal substantial proprietary information, such as trade secrets; that 45
which could reasonably be expected to lead to harassment or retaliation, such as
JD–84–16
12
the identity of witnesses; and that which is traditionally privileged, such as
memoranda prepared for pending lawsuits. Id. at 1073.
In Detroit Newspaper, the Board was clear that information accorded confidential status “is
limited to a few general categories” as those described above. The Board dismissed an 5
employer’s claim of a confidentiality interest in that case pertaining to an internal environmental
safety audit report because it “falls outside these general categories.” Id.
In Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 347 NLRB 210, 211 (2006), the Board held
however, that its formulation set forth in Detroit Newspaper was not intended to be exhaustive. 10
In that case, the Board held that it has “considered whether the information was sensitive or
confidential within the factual context of each case.” Id. In Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,
supra, the Board was presented with the issue of whether an employer must comply with a
union’s request for copies of notes from interviews conducted by the employer in investigating a
bargaining unit employee’s complaint of threatening conduct in the workplace. Id. at 210. In that 15
case, the Board majority found the information was confidential and the employer’s interest in
the confidentiality of such notes outweighed the union’s need for the information. Id. at 211. In
finding that a confidentiality interest had been established, the Board majority relied, inter alia,
on the fact that the notes of the alleged threats of workplace violence were created under the
express promise of confidentiality, and the fact that witnesses testified they would have provided 20
less information if they had not been assured of confidentiality. Id. at 211–212. The Board also
reasoned that such investigations are often necessary for safety in the workplace and without
such statements the employer would be handicapped in protecting its employees from harm by
verifying and correcting workplace misconduct. Id. at 212. Moreover, the Board reasoned that
an individual’s participation in such an investigation, whether as complainant or as a witness, 25
may subject that individual to intimidation and harassment by coworkers or supervisors. Id. As
such, the Board determined in that case that there was sufficient evidence that gave rise to a
legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest. Id.8
The wage, roll up, and overhead costs of contractor employees requested by the Union in 30
the instant case do not fall within the “general categories” of information set forth in Detroit
Newspaper Agency which would give rise to a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest.
In addition, the Respondent failed to present evidence establishing that the requested information
warrants a legitimate and substantial interest in confidentiality. The Respondent asserted in its
August 7 letter to the Union that the request involves “highly sensitive, confidential information 35
involving the Company’s business relationships with third parties. . . [and]. . .[d]isclosing such
information could damage the Company’s ability to reach agreements with these third parties.”
However, it only offered the testimony of Nelson, the Respondent’s director of global
procurement, who stated that the Respondent had several internal confidential policies that he
had the authority to implement and follow, and he simply testified that he deemed the requested 40

8 In other decisions following Detroit Newspaper, the Board in GTE California, Inc., 324 NLRB 424
(1997), also recognized a confidentiality interest in the names and unlisted telephone numbers of
customers whose complaints led to an employee’s discharge, and in West Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB
585 (2003), enfd. in part 394 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2005), recognized a confidentiality interest in an
investigative report concerning an altercation between two employees..
JD–84–16
13
information “confidential” based on his assertion that if such information were disclosed, it
“could compromise the trust that we have with our contractors.”
Other than those vague assertions, the Respondent failed to present any specific evidence
establishing a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest that would prevent disclosure of 5
the information. In this regard, the record is devoid of any evidence showing that contractor
information such as wages, roll up, and overhead costs were to be kept confidential pursuant to
agreements, signed or otherwise, with the Respondent. The record likewise does not show that
the Respondent expressly conveyed promises of confidentiality for such information to its
contractors. The Respondent also failed to present evidence showing that disclosure of such 10
information would prevent the Respondent from reaching agreements with contractors or third
parties. The Respondent’s willingness to grant confidentiality to such documents cannot, by
itself, create a legitimate interest in confidentiality for purposes of avoiding disclosure of
otherwise relevant information to the Union.
15
Even assuming the Respondent presented credible evidence that it conveyed express
promises of confidentiality to its contractors, such evidence by itself would be insufficient to
establish a legitimate confidentiality interest. As mentioned above, while the Board majority in
Northern Indiana Public Service Co., supra, found that a promise of confidentiality is relevant to
the issue of whether the information will be considered confidential, that case involved other 20
factors beyond the vague assertion of confidentiality which is found in the instant case. For
example, in Northern Indiana Public Service specific evidence was presented, such as the fact
that witnesses testified they would have provided less information if they had not been assured of
confidentiality, that without such confidential statements the employer would be hindered in its
ability to protect its employees from harm by verifying and correcting workplace misconduct, 25
and that the employee’s participation in such an investigation, whether as complainant or as a
witness, may subject that person to intimidation by coworkers or supervisors. Northern Indiana
Public Service Co., supra at 212.
There is no Board precedent holding that a promise or assertion of confidentiality by 30
itself, converts otherwise nonconfidential information into confidential information. In the
collective-bargaining process, a union’s right to request and receive information relevant and
necessary to its duties as a bargaining representative is critical to that process, and an employer
cannot unilaterally limit that important right and insulate information from disclosure simply by
asserting or promising not to disclose such information to the union. Thus, I find that 35
Respondent’s general assertions, supported only by vague testimony, are insufficient to establish
a substantial and legitimate confidentiality interest in the contractor wages, roll up, and overhead
costs, and that information must be produced. Howard Industries, Inc., supra slip op. 2, fn. 4;
Detroit Newspaper Agency, supra at 1073–1074.
40
In addition, even assuming the evidence in this case established a substantial and
legitimate confidentiality interest in the contractor wages, roll up, and overhead costs, I find the
evidence is nevertheless insufficient to establish that the Respondent’s confidentiality interests
would outweigh the Union’s need for the information. As mentioned above, the Respondent’s
general assertion of confidentiality and vague testimony, without more, is insufficient to 45
overcome the Union’s strongly established need for the information which is relevant and
JD–84–16
14
necessary to Respondent’s request during bargaining that the Union show or prove that the
bargaining unit employees could perform the work of the contractors more efficiently.
4. Even if Respondent established a confidentiality interest and that interest outweighed the
Union’s need for the information, the alleged confidentiality defense lacks merit because 5
Respondent failed to establish that the parties’ executed confidentiality agreement was
insufficient to address its confidentiality concerns
In addition, even assuming that Respondent satisfied both requirements that it show a
legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest in the information sought, and that its 10
confidentiality interests outweighed the Union’s need for the information, the analysis does not
end there. As mentioned above, even if those conditions are satisfied, the Respondent may not
simply refuse to provide the information. Instead it is required to seek an accommodation that
would allow the requesting party an opportunity to obtain the information it needs while
protecting the party’s interest in confidentiality. United States Postal Service, 364 NLRB No. 27, 15
slip op. at 2 (2016); Northern Indiana Public Power, supra; Borgess Medical Center, supra; See
also Olean General Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 62, slip op. at 6 (2015) (an employer’s
confidentiality interest “does not end the matter;” the employer must also notify the union in a
timely manner and seek to accommodate the union’s request and confidentiality concern).
20
The record in this case establishes that the parties did, in fact, establish an
accommodation to address any confidentiality concerns of the Respondent. As set forth in the
tentative agreement, they negotiated a confidentiality agreement on August 6, 2015, to provide
protection for the information to be provided in response to the Union’s May 21 information
request.9 In that confidentiality agreement, the Union agreed that if it sought certain documents 25
that were confidential or proprietary in connection with the collective-bargaining, it would keep
those documents confidential. (GC Exh. 5) The confidentiality agreement is detailed and
extensive, providing inter alia, that: all information provided to the Union must be kept
confidential and cannot be disclosed without the Respondent’s written consent; the information
shall only be transmitted to those on a “need to know” basis; the Union is responsible for 30
breaches of the agreement; the Union must inform Respondent if it is required to disclose
information pursuant to a subpoena so that Respondent may seek a protective order; the Union
must keep a record of those who are permitted access to the information; the Respondent has no
liability to the Union as a result of the use of the information; the Respondent is entitled to
specific performance and injunctive relief upon breach of the agreement; and if the Union is 35
required to disclose the information by court order the Union shall move the court to file it under
seal or through some comparable protective mechanism.
Although the Union signed the confidentiality agreement in this case, there is no evidence
that the Respondent ever approached the Union to discuss or bargain over why it may have 40
considered that agreement inadequate to protect the information requested in Item No. 2 of the
request, or that it requested bargaining over another confidentiality agreement that might offer

9 In fact, in Jackson’s written response to the information request, he specifically referenced the
parties’ confidentiality agreement, stating: “The parties having now agreed to a Confidentiality
Agreement and subject to the terms of that agreement, dated August 6, 2015, the Company provides the
following response to the Union’s May 21, 2015 request for information. . . .” (GC Exh. 6; R. Exh. 4.)
JD–84–16
15
greater protection for those documents. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence that the
executed confidentiality agreement was in any way insufficient to address the Respondent’s
claim that the requested contractor wages, roll up, and overhead costs were confidential.
Likewise, the record establishes no objection, contention, or assertion from Respondent that the
confidentiality agreement reached was in any way deficient, or that the agreement was in any 5
way unenforceable or not applicable to the information requested in this case. I find that if in
fact the confidentiality agreement negotiated and agreed to by the Union was insufficient or
inadequate, it was incumbent upon the Respondent to notify the Union of that fact and to request
bargaining over an agreement that offered more protection. It is undisputed that the Respondent
failed to take any such action, which I find is yet another basis to dismiss its confidentiality 10
defense as meritless.
5. The Respondent’s defense that it allegedly complied with the information request by
providing the Union with a “summary,” also lacks merit and must be dismissed
15
Finally, the Respondent argues that it satisfied its obligation to provide the information
when it supplied the Union with a summary consisting of “[a]ggregate weighted average costs of
core craft workers supplied by outside parties. . . .” (R. Br. p. 11.) In that regard, instead of
providing the information requested in Item No. 2, the Respondent presented the Union with a
weighted average billable rate for six different classifications in “summary form.” (GC Exh. 11.) 20
The record clearly establishes that Respondent did not provide the information that the
Union requested. In addition, I find that the summary the Respondent provided was not
responsive to the Union’s request, and the summary failed to satisfy the Respondent’s obligation
to provide the Union with the relevant and necessary information requested in Item 2 of its 25
information request. Initially, I note that the information was incomplete as the classifications in
the summary consisted of laborer, millwright, crane operator, carpenter, and electrician, and it
did not include the classification of instrument tech or mechanic, one of the three “core crafts” in
the Respondent’s maintenance groups. In addition, union officials Claar and Queen credibly
testified that the summary did not supply the information requested, and that they informed the 30
Respondent that the summary was insufficient and unresponsive to the request. Specifically, the
union officials testified that because the summary set forth an average rate and it did not indicate
which contractors were being paid or the amounts paid, it failed to provide the information
requested. (Tr. 39; 77.) Furthermore, the union officials informed the Respondent that the
summary did not show what costs were included and excluded in calculating the averages, or 35
what “rolls into [that] number.” (Tr. 41) Finally, it is undisputed that the summary list was not
accompanied by supporting documentation or records, and the Respondent did not provide the
Union with an opportunity to review or inspect the documents upon which the summary was
based. (Tr. 78.)
40
Board precedent also holds that the summary provided was not responsive to the Union’s
request, and it was insufficient to satisfy the Respondent’s obligation to provide the information
requested. The Board has long held that an employer does not satisfy its obligation to provide
relevant information under the Act by offering the union summaries of the information requested
or alternate documents. See Merchant Fast Motor Line, 324 NLRB 562, 563 (1997) (Board held 45
that a union was not required to accept a respondent’s declaration as to profitability or the
summary of financial information offered by the respondent); McQuire Steel Erection, 324
JD–84–16
16
NLRB 221 (1997) (payroll record summaries provided the union were found insufficient to meet
respondent’s statutory obligation to supply the requested information); New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co., 289 NLRB 318, 330–331 fn. 9 (1988), enfd. mem. NLRB v. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co., 872 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1989) (a summary of an employee’s absence records found
not to be acceptable and respondent’s failure to produce the requested absence records upon 5
which the summary was based violated Section 8(a)(5)). Thus, the Respondent’s asserted
defenses lack merit and are dismissed.10
Based on the above, I find that the Respondent failed and refused to provide or furnish
the wage, roll up, and overhead costs of the contractor employees including any premiums and 10
margins paid to the contractor firms and any bonus/completion milestones paid to them, as
requested by the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15
1. The Respondent, Marathon Petroleum Co., d/b/a Catlettsburg Refining, LLC, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
and Service Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, and its Local 8–719, is a labor organization 20
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
provide the Union with information requested on May 21, 2015, and again on September 18,
2015, which was necessary and relevant to the Union’s performance of its duties as the 25
collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees.
4. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
30
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act by failing and refusing to furnish
the Union with the information requested, and thereby engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to 35
effectuate the policies of the Act.

10 In its brief, the Respondent also argues as a defense that “[t]o the extent Marathon, in the interest of
labor relations, and in furtherance of the NOBP letter agreement, fully responded to all but one of the
[Union’s] May 2015 requests, it has fully satisfied its obligation to provide the information under Section
8(a)(5), and then some.” (R. Br. p. 11.) That contention, however, is unsupported by legal precedent and
is baseless. It is well settled that an employer does not satisfy its obligation to furnish all relevant
information by providing only some. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d
366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967).
JD–84–16
17
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended11
ORDER
5
The Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, 10
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO, and its Local 8–719 (the Union) by failing and refusing to provide
it with the information requested on May 21, 2015, and renewed on September 18,
2015, which is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as the
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s operating and maintenance 15
bargaining unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
20
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Furnish to the Union, in a timely manner, the information requested on May 21, 2015,
and renewed on September 18, 2015, described as “wage/roll up/overhead costs of
[the] contractor employees. . . [i]ncluding any premiums and margins paid to the 25
contractor firms and any bonus/completion milestones paid to them.”

(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Catlettsburg,
Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by the 30
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent 35
customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–84–16
18
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since May 21, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the 5
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 1, 2016
10

Thomas M. Randazzo
Administrative Law Judge
0/7
JD–84–16
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the United Steel, Paper and Forestry,
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union,
AFL–CIO, and its Local 8–719 (the Union) by failing and refusing to furnish it with the
information requested on May 21, 2015, and again on September 18, 2015, which is relevant and
necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of
our employees in the operating and maintenance bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, in a timely manner, furnish the Union with the information requested on May 21,
2015, and again on September 18, 2015, described as “wage/roll up/overhead costs of [the]
contractor employees. . . [i]ncluding any premiums and margins paid to the contractor firms and
any bonus/completion milestones paid to them,” which is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of our unit employees.
MARATHON PETROLEUM CO., d/b/a
CATLETTSBURG REFINING, LLC
(Employer)
Dated: ____________ By: ______________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
JD–84–16
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
John Weld Peck Federal Building
550 Main Street, Room 3003
Cincinnati, OH 45202-3271
(513) 684-3686
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CA-162710 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (513) 684-3750.