Manuel San Juan Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 812 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Manuel San Juan Company, Inc., Commonwealth In-
surance Company and United Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. and Gloria Rivera de Nieves and Gremio Puer-
torriqueno de Trabajadores .'Cases 24-CA-3314 and
24-CA-3318
June 21, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On January 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Paul L. Harper issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Manuel San Juan Company, Inc.,
Commonwealth Insurance Company, and United
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., San Juan, Puerto Rico, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's
recommended Order.
1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with
respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3, 1951). We
have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his
findings
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL L. HARPER, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 31, 1973,
and November 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 9,1973. The charge in Case
24-CA-3314 was filed on February 24, 1973, and amended
on October 2, 1973. The charge in Case 24-CA-3318 was
filed on February 23, 1973. Order consolidating cases and
complaint and notice of hearing was issued on October 3,
1973. The complaint presents questions as to whether the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1),(3), and (4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
In its answer and by stipulations entered at the hearing
the Respondent admitted certain facts with respect to the
jurisdictional aspects of the case but denied that it had
committed any unfair labor practices.
At the hearing all parties were represented by counsel
and were given full opportunity to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
parties waived oral argument. Briefs were submitted by the
General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case, and the briefs of
counsel, including my observation of the demeanor of
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that
Manuel San Juan Company, Inc., Commonwealth Insur-
ance Company and United Adjustment Bureau , Inc., are,
and at all times material herein, have been, a single
integrated enterprise engaged in the insurance business
with principal place of business in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
During the year preceding issuance of the complaint, a
representative period, the employer received gross income
from retail sales amounting to more than $500,000. During
the same period of time it purchased and caused to be
delivered to its place of business in Puerto Rico directly
from points outside thereof materials and supplies valued
in excess of $50,000.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Respondent concedes, and
I find, that Respondent is an employer within the meaning
of the Act.
H. THE UNION INVOLVED
Gremio Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores, located in San
Juan, Puerto Rico, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Issues
The complaint alleges, in substance, that:
(1) On February 9, 1973, Respondent discharged Hector
Delgado, Angela Quinones, Luisa Cumba, and Maria
Lopez because of their membership and activities in the
Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, herein Teamsters and/or
because of other lawful concerted activities;
(2) On February 14, 1973, Respondent refused reinstate-
ment, upon unconditional application, to six unfair labor
practice strikers; and
(3) On February 21, 1973, Respondent discharged
Charging Party Gloria Rivera de Nieves (Case
24-CA-3314) because of her membership and interest in
the Union and/or because of her participation in the strike
or other concerted activities; that thereafter Respondent
211 NLRB No. 109
MANUEL SAN JUAN CO.
refused to grant legally required severance pay to Rivera
because she filed the subject unfair labor practice charge.
Background
The General Counsel introduced evidence of certain
events occurring in the spring and summer of 1972, prior to
the 10(b) cutoff date on or about August 22, 1971, for the
purpose of shedding light on Respondent's alleged unlaw-
ful conduct, including its motivation for discharging and
refusing to reinstate the individuals named in the com-
plaint, in February 1973.
Sometime in the spring of 1972 the Teamsters conducted
an organizational campaign among Respondent's employ-
ees. Credible testimony reveals that Hector Delgado and
Angela Quinones were most active in getting other
employees to sign union authorization cards and otherwise
engaged in active support of the Teamsters' campaign.
As a result of this campaign the Teamsters on April 13,
1972, filed a petition for certification with the Board's
Regional Office in Puerto Rico. The petition was with-
drawn on July 18, 1972.1 The General Counsel contends
that certain events took place at meetings of employees
and management in April, May, and June 1972 which led
to the withdrawal of this petition and therefore are
pertinent to the issues in this case.
Such meetings took place at the Bankers Club, a
restaurant in the same building occupied by Respondent,
on several occasions, perhaps three or four, during April,
May, and June 1972. It is undisputed that the principal
subject matter of the discussions concerned the terms and
conditions of employment of Respondent's employees. It is
also clear from the composite and credible testimony of
several witnesses that Delgado was quite outspoken at
these meetings. As noted above Delgado, along with
Quinones, were the most active employees supporting the
organizational efforts of the Teamsters in 1972. Both
Delgado and Quinones were subjected to interrogation
about their union activities. On one occasion Delgado was
subjected to threats of physical violence. These matters are
discussed more fully below under the heading of each
discriminatee involved.
All of the above-alleged conduct attributed to the
Respondent occurred prior to the withdrawal of the
Teamsters petition on July 28, 1972 and thus prior to the
10(b) cutoff date of about August 22, 1972. It was offered
by General Counsel as background evidence to support the
theory of unlawful motivation on the part of Respondent
in discharging these employees in February 1973.
Sometime in January 1973 Delgado began talking to
representatives of the Union and some employees about
possible renewed interest in union organization. This
renewed interest was apparently generated because of
Respondent's continued delay in taking any action on the
employees' continued requests for salary increases. The
record evidence however does not establish that this
activity became known to management before February 9,
1973. Whether it suspected such activity or not the
evidence reveals that on February 8, 1973, Respondent
1 The parties stipulated such a petition was filed in Case 24-RC-4675
and withdrawn.
813
called another general meeting of its employees. At this
meeting Respondent's president, San Juan, Jr., announced
that the desire and request of the employees for a salary
increase was under study but that it would be several
months in the future before the results of such study was
known. The reaction to this announcement was predictable
and in fact a number of employees left the meeting before
it was over. The announcement generated considerable
dissatisfaction among the employees.
The next morning, February 9, 1973, on coming to work
and while riding an elevator along with a number of other
personnel of Respondent, including his former supervisor
Jaime Cuyar and also Josefina Cacho, secretary to
Respondent's personnel director, Delgado announced to
this group his intention of renewing his organizational
efforts. He was fired this same day along with Quniones,
Lopez, and Cumba.
On February 12, 1973, the employees formed a picket
line at the entrance to the office building occupied by
Respondent. The evidence establishes the sole reason for
the strike was because of the discharges of the four
individuals on February 9. On February 14 all employees
made unconditional applications to return to work on
advice of the Union's representative. Six strikers were
refused reinstatement 2 Whether the strike was an unfair
labor practice strike is one of the issues in the case.
Charging Party Gloria Rivera de Nieves was discharged
February 21, 1973. She was denied severance pay and
General Counsel alleges this is a violation of Section
8(a)(4) of the Act. The separate issues outlined above will
be discussed under the heading of the employee or
employees involved.
Hector Delgado
Delgado was first employed by Respondent in June
1970, discharged February 9, 1973. During this period he
progressed from the positions of accounts receivable clerk,
cancellation analyst, and service representative, to that of
accounts receivable analyst at the time of discharge. His
salary ranged from $275 to $350 monthly.
Respondent contends that Delgado's position was
eliminated due to an economy plan; that such a plan was
under study by a management committee during October,
November, December 1972 and January 1973; that the
execution of the plan was precipitated by the decision to
discharge Angela Quinones.
Respondent's stated reasons for its action must be
weighed however in the light of all the circumstances
surrounding the discharge, especially Delgado's known
union activities and the fact that he was scheduled at the
time of discharge to replace another employee during her
upcoming 2 to 3 week vacation. Also consideration must
be given to the fact that Respondent's records introduced
to show an economic necessity for a payroll cut back failed
to reveal such necessity; nor do I believe Respondent's
afterthought that in any event such a reduction of
personnel was necessary to fulfill a possible across-the-
board salary increase, since it had just announced the day
2 Awildo Soto; Myriam Ramos-Gonzalez; Gilds Velez ; Ana Hilda
Rodriguez; Jorge Olivo ; Efrain Sanchez-Pinto.
814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
before the discharges that such an increase was merely
under study and the results of the study would not be
known for several months.
The record evidence establishes beyond doubt that
Respondent was well aware of Delgado's past activities on
behalf of the Teamsters union. Delgado testified regarding
a conversation with Respondent' s President San Juan, Jr.,
sometime in April or May 1972. Orlando Lomba, adminis-
trative manager (assistant to the president since January
1973) was present . The conversation occurred in Mr. San
Juan's office. Delgado testified that San Juan told him if he
"continued what [he] was doing he would take measures
against [him ] (admitted reference to Delgado's union
activities) that San Juan became agitated and told him "for
$500 I could have somebody bum your car, for $1000.. .
have your bones ground and your car burned, and for
more money, your car, you, and your family" . . . that at
this point San Juan "took a pistol and put it at his waist
and another one and put it on the desk." When asked what
his response was Delgado testified San Juan "did not let
me say anything."
San Juan admitted calling Delgado to his office in the
presence of Lomba because he had heard that Delgado was
distributing a Teamsters circular among the employees. He
testified he had not seen the circular at the time but that
"by some expressions that had been made by some of the
people in the office" he considered the circular contained
"implied threats to the safety of the employees." San Juan
denied displaying any fire arms and denied telling Delgado
that for $500, $1000 or more he could have his car and
house burned. He further denied that he told Delgado he
could have him "beat up." This was in response however to
Respondent counsel's specific questions and use of the
specific words "beat up." Again counsel asked him "Did
you say anything in that respect?" and the witness
answered "No." Still again counsel asked San Juan "Did
you at any time threaten Mr. Delgado with physical harm
during that meeting or at any other time? The witness once
again replied "No." Apparently the witness would distin-
guish between "beating up" or "physical harm" and
"having Delgado's bones ground" because he admitted,
during one of the meetings with his assembled employees
at the Bankers Club, that in response to Delgado's request
that he repeat the threat in the presence of the group, "I
said it was not the bones, it was the little bones." He
further testified he considered the whole matter "in the
form of a joke." Apparently Delgado did not consider it a
joke when summoned to the office of the highest executive
of the company in the presence of another official.
Moreover I do not believe Mr. San Juan was really
concerned by any reports of alleged threats of violence to
other employees on the part of Delgado or any other union
adherent. He could recall the name of only one employee
alleged to have been subjected to such threats and that was
an employee by the name of Aguayo. Aguayo was referred
to in the Teamsters circular as "Guayo" or "grater,"
apparently a pseudonym for a stooge of management. San
Juan admitted he spoke to Aguayo about the reports of
such threats after his confrontation with Delgado. Further-
more the alleged "violence" between Delgado and Aguayo
was described by San Juan as his having heard these two
employees had "strong expressions" on one or more
occasions . Furthermore I am unimpressed with San Juan's
testimony he considered his remarks about crushing
Delgado's bones merely a joke when he admitted that "in
Puerto Rico crushing your bones means something like
killing a person."
In view of the contradictory nature of San Juan's
testimony as well as certain admissions I believe Delgado's
version of this episode the more accurate. I find San Juan's
remarks to constitute evidence of his knowledge of
Delgado's interest and activity in the Teamsters union as
well as his hostility to such activity. However, since the
event occurred outside the limitations of Section 10(b) of
the Act no finding of an unfair labor practice is made.
Nevertheless I find it establishes a background which
throws light on Respondent's unfair labor practices found
hereinafter to have occurred in February 1973.
As further background regarding Delgado's union
activities San Juan admitted that at one or more meetings
with his employees at the Bankers Club in the spring and
summer of 1972 Delgado "did talk about benefits that they
would have by having a union, why a union was better
..."and that the company "could give them increases in
salaries and what not." It is thus clear that Delgado was
well known by Respondent as a strong adherent of union
organization at the time of his discharge.
The question to be resolved is what actually motivated
Respondent to discharge Delgado on February 9; for the
reasons asserted by Respondent or because of his past
and/or renewed interest in organizing the employees just
prior to his discharge?
As noted above Delgado began to take a renewed
interest in union organization in January 1973. This time
his contacts were with the Charging Party rather than the
Teamsters. The evidence however does not establish that
Delgado's renewed interest and activity came to the
attention of management personnel until the morning of
February 9, 1973, the date of his discharge. It is significant
to note however that although San Juan denied knowing
about the "Gremio specifically" he did admit that in
January 1973 he "heard that there was some unrest among
the employees in general."
On February 8, 1973, as already mentioned, Mr. San
Juan called a general meeting of his employees late in the
afternoon on a Thursday, just before quitting time. The
next day, February 9, was payday. San Juan announced to
the employees that their request for a salary increase
(which had been under study since October 1972) was still
under study and because of certain expenses and losses,
including a Thanksgiving turkey given to each employee, it
would be at least another 3 months before any salary
adjustments could be made . Some of the employees left the
meeting before it ended.
On February 9 Delgado came to work as usual about
7:50 a.m. While riding the elevator with several fellow
employees, including Supervisor Jamie Cuyor, Delgado
announced his intention of renewing his union organiza-
tional efforts among the employees. He testified he said to
those present "this was happening to us [San Juan's
announcement of further delay in considering the employ-
ees' request for salary increases] . . . because we had not
MANUEL SAN JUAN CO. 815
brought in the Union and that I intended to bring it back
again." He was discharged about 4:45 p.m. the same day.
Supervisor Ctiyor testified in answer to the question if he
overheard Delgado's remarks in the elevator as follows:
"Frankly, I do not remember." At another point in his
testimony he testified he didn't remember if he was even in
the elevator with Delgado at the time Delgado made his
remarks about renewing union activities. Yet on cross-
examination his response to the question of whether he
remembered reporting such an incident to higher manage-
ment was "No, I didn't tell anyone." It seems clearly
apparent from this testimony Cuyor overheard Delgado's
remarks. I so find. I further find Cuyar's knowledge is
attributable to Respondent .3
Based on the above considerations, I find Respondent's
asserted reasons for discharging Delgado on February 9,
1973, to be pretextual of its unlawful motivation. Delgado's
union activities, both with respect to the Teamsters, and
later the Union herein, were well known to Respondent.
Respondent's hostility toward such activity is clearly
established by credible evidence in the record. I find that
Respondent 's announcement to employees on February 8,
1973, to the effect that consideration of salary increases
would be further delayed for a period of months triggered
predictable dissatisfaction among the employees and that
when it learned of Delgado's announced intention of
renewing organizational efforts it immediately took steps
to thwart such efforts. I find such unlawful motivation in
discharging Delgado to be in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
Angela Quinones
Quinones was first employed by Respondent on Septem-
ber 10, 1971. She was employed as cashier and remained in
that position until her discharge on February 9, 1973.
Respondent contends she was discharged for inefficiency
and other reasons discussed below . General Counsel
contends Quinones was terminated because of her known
past organizational activities on behalf of the Teamsters
and the assumption by Respondent that she would again
join with Delgado in renewed organizational efforts which
became known to Respondent on February 9; that her
discharge, along with that of Delgado, Lopez and Cumba
was designed "to nip the union movement before it
flourished."
The credible evidence contained in the record establishes
that it was Quinones who contacted the Teamsters in the
spring of 1972; obtained a supply of union authorization
cards; handed Delgado and two other employees a supply
of such cards; personally obtained signatures of other
employees and returned all the signed cards to the
Teamsters. As a result a petition for certification of
representatives was filed with the Board's Regional Office
in Puerto Rico on April 13, 1972. It is evident that
Respondent became aware of Quinones' union activities,
as shortly after the petition was filed she was called in to
Mr. San Juan's office in the presence of Mr. Orlando and
questioned about her reasons for wanting union represent-
ation. As in the case of Delgado this evidence furnishes
only a background to throw light on Respondent's
motivation in discharging Quinones and the others on
February 9, 1973.
Respondent, by memo dated February 9, 1973, from
assistant to the president, Lomba, to Personnel Officer
Sara de la Vega, stated "On February 9, 1973, management
made the decision to separate the above mentioned
employee from her position as cashier due to inefficiency."
In addition the memo contained comments about a prior
memo directed to this employee in June 1972 "wherein
serious mistakes committed by her are enumerated";
references to other interoffice memoranda concerning
Quinones' performance; and "Lastly, on February 8, Mr.
Escobar Zayas, comptroller, balanced the petty cash box
account and, as shown on the attached report, there was a
difference."
In his brief counsel for Respondent states "Angela
Quinones . . . was discharged due to a shortage in the
petty cash . . . which was found on February 8, 1973, by
the auditors." Respondent's counsel points out several
other reasons for Quinones' discharge, including not
following instructions by allowing "people who had
nothing to do with her functions within her workplace"
(cashier's cage); and inefficiency because of errors made in
her receipt book and errors made in certain bank deposits.
It is not clear in the record when the alleged acts of
inefficiency occurred but Respondent admits no written
reprimands concerning Quinones postdates June 8, 1972, a
period exceeding 8 months before her discharge. Moreover
the evidence establishes that Quinones received a $25 a
month raise in salary in October or November 1972. I can
find no substantive evidence to support Respondent's
contention that such alleged inefficiency played a control-
ling part in the decision to discharge this employee.
What then did the "shortage" have to do with Quinones'
discharge? First how much was the shortage and the facts
surrounding the shortage. The amount turns out to be the
handsome sum of 25 cents . Even more interesting are the
circumstances relating to the "shortage." Quinones was the
custodian of petty cash as part of her duties of cashier. She
freely admitted to the auditor (otherwise a near impossibil-
ity to prove) that she used the 25 cents as bus fare4 with
full intention of replacing the quarter the next day. Under
these circumstances could Respondent have been truly
concerned about this alleged "shortage?" I think not.
Moreover, I believe, and find, that the alleged past errors
and inefficiency of this employee were asserted by
Respondent to camouflage its true motivation in discharg-
ing her. That Quinones and Delgado were associated in the
mind of Respondent is revealed by Respondent counsel's
assertion in his brief that Delgado's discharge was
"precipitated by the decision to discharge Angela Qui-
nones on February 9, 1973." The only mutual activities
between Delgado and Quinones reflected in this record is
their interest and activity in union organization. Also the
assertion the decision to discharge Quinones was made on
February 9 contradicts Internal Auditor Adrian Torres'
3 Red Line Transfer & Storage Company, Inc., 204 NLRB No. 3; also see
Wiese Plow Welding Co., Inc., 123 NLRB 616.
4 Bus fare in Puerto Rico was 25 cents at the time of the heanng.
816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(chief accountant in February 1973) testimony such
decision was made "also in January."
Based on all the above considerations , including the
contradictory and pretextual reasons asserted by Respon-
dent for Quinones' discharge , I find Quinones ' discharge,
as in the case of Delgado , was motivated by Respondent's
desire and intent to abort its employees renewed interest
and activity in union organization , thereby violating
Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act.
Maria Belen Lopez
This individual worked for Respondent for a period of
about 4 years. She was discharged February 9, 1973.
General Counsel alleges it was because of her past interest
and activity in the Teamsters and renewed "concerted
activity" just prior to her discharge . Respondent's defense
is two-fold ( 1) that the discharge resulted from economic
considerations , and (2) that Lopez was a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act at the time of her discharge.
There is little doubt in my mind that Lopez, as well as
Luise Cumba discussed below , were both caught up in
Respondent 's efforts to rid itself of the known principal
union activists among its employees . However , inasmuch
as I find both Lopez and Cumba were supervisors within
the meaning of the Act, further discussion of the question
whether their discharges were or were not unlawful seems
superfluous. The discharge of a supervisor is unlawful only
under very special circumstances which are not present in
the subject case.
Thus the initial point for determination is whether, as of
the date of her discharge on February 9, 1973, Lopez, who
obviously did not exercise major management functions,
did have enough supervisory indicia to constitute her a
supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act. It is well
established such definition must be read in the disjunctive.
The General Counsel adduced evidence tending to show
that Lopez possessed only minimal authority to direct the
work of other employees and did not have the power to
exercise independent judgement to carry out her duties as
assistant to the accountant. The evidence adduced by
Respondent 's managerial witnesses tend to show just the
opposite . Although it was Respondent that presented the
testimony of two witnesses who worked directly under
Lopez, I believe, and find, that their testimony on this
subject is the more objective and I fully credit their
account of their employment relationship with Lopez.
Carmen Montalvo, accounts payable clerk, testified that
when she worked in the accounting department, for a
period of about a year from February 21, 1971, Lopez was
her immediate supervisor ; that she received all her work
assignments and instructions from Lopez; that she report-
ed to Lopez any reason for being absent or late for work;
that Lopez determined whether or not she worked
overtime; that on occasions Lopez would reprimand her
and she observed Lopez reprimanding other employees in
the department; that at the end of her probationary period
of 90 days Lopez reported her satisfactory progress to the
then Administrative Manager Lomba; that Lopez deter-
5 N.L.R.B. v. Elliott- Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460 , 463 (C.A 7, 1965).
e N.L.R.B. v. Fullerton Publishing Company, d/bla Daily News Tribune,
mined priorities of various work assignments ; checked all
her work and on occasion assigned her to perform the
duties of the cashier in the absence of the regular cashier.
Additionally Montalvo testified that Torres (admitted
supervisor of Lopez) was in charge of other sections of the
accounting department including accounts receivable, the
IBM section , and coding section.
Maria Teresa Ortez testified she worked in the book-
keeping section of the accounting department as secretary
from January 1970 to July 1972. She testified she received
work assignments from both Torres and Lopez , depending
on the nature of the work assigned ; that Lopez would
determine the priority of the work to be performed; that
she obtained permission to be absent or late from both
Lopez and Torres on each such occasion; that overtime
work was assigned to her by either of them ; and that on
occasion Lopez would reprimand her with respect to work
assigned to her by Lopez.
Thus the credited testimony of Montalva and Ortez
establish that Lopez , during material times herein , respon-
sibly directed the work of other employees in the
bookkeeping section of the accounting department; had
the authority to assign and reassign work to section
employees ; and to select employees to work overtime. In
performing such functions she exercised independent
judgment. It is well established that the existence of any
one of the indicia set forth in Section 2(11) of the Act is
sufficient to support a finding that the one possessing it is a
supervisor .5 I have also considered those cases in which the
Board considers the ratio of supervisors to employees in
determining supervisory or nonsupervisory status . Howev-
er the fact that there were only two or three employees at
any given time under the direction of Lopez is not a
decisive factor standing alone .6 Moreover, it is noted in
this connection that Respondent stipulated Maria Melen-
dez to be a supervisor although there were only one or two
employees under her direction.
Based on all the above considerations I find that at the
time of her discharge Lopez was a supervisor within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Accordingly, I
recommend the complaint allegations pertaining to Lopez
be dismissed.
Luisa Cumba
This individual, with tenure of over 10 years with
Respondent, was discharged February 9, 1973, along with
Delgado, Quinones, and Lopez. As stated above it is
almost certain, as in the case of Lopez , that she was caught
up in Respondent 's efforts to purge itself of all known
union activists . The threshold question however, as with
Lopez, is whether or not Cumba was a supervisor at the
time of her discharge.
The General Counsel contends that Cumba was not
clothed with genuine supervisory authority pointing out
that she punched a timeclock and never attended regular
meetings of higher management officials. There is no
dispute over these two points. Cumba did in fact punch a
timeclock and higher supervision did not. She did not in
283 F .2d 545 (C.A. 9, 1960). Cf. First National Bank of New Snyrna Beach,
204 NLRB No. 11.
MANUEL SAN JUAN CO. 817
fact attend supervisory meetings of departmental heads. It
is admitted, as with Lopez, she did not have the authority
to hire, tire or -proritdtii other employees or effectively
recommend such action. However, again as with Lopez,
the question that must be resolved is whether Cumba
possessed any one of the indicia of supervisory status set
forth in Section 2(11) of the Act.
Marco Palacios testified he worked in the central files
section under Mrs. Cumba for a period of about I 1 months
beginning in March 1972 . He testified Mrs. Cumba was his
immediate supervisor ; that she alone gave him his work
assignments ; instructed him in his duties and reassigned
work from one employee to another in the department;
that Cumba requested him to work overtime on occasions;
that he reported his absences or lateness to Cumba; that
occasionally Cumba reprimanded him for "a job poorly
done or taking too long to do something she had ordered
me to do" and he observed her reprimanding others under
her direction.?
Luz Alvarez, who worked as a clerk in central files from
June 1972 to February 1973, testified concerning her
employment relationship with Cumba as follows: Cumba,
and no one else, gave her work assignments and instruc-
tions; selected and instructed her to work overtime on
many occasions; and observed Cumba assigning work to
others in the department , instructing them and on
occasions giving verbal reprimands.
Based on the credible testimony of Palacios and Alvarez
I find that Luisa Cumba responsibly directed the work of
others and in so doing exercised discretion and independ-
ent judgement. Accordingly, I find Cumba was a supervi-
sor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act at the
time of her discharge and therefore recommend all
complaint allegations pertaining to Cumba be dismissed.
Gloria Rivera de Nieves
This employee started working for Respondent in
October 1969 as a policy typist in the accident and health
department. She was discharged February 20, 1973.
The General Counsel alleges Rivera was discharged
because she "joined and assisted the Union, and/or
engaged in the concerted work stoppage and strike . . . or
in other concerted activity." Rivera signed a Teamster card
back in April 1972 and although apparently her interest
and activity was known to supervision she was not
discharged on February 9 along with Delgado and the
other union activists. There is no evidence in the record to
support a finding that such prior union activities had
anything to do with her discharge. After the renewed
activities among Respondent 's employees, this time in the
Charging Party Union, Rivera signed an authorization
card and participated in the strike of February 12. The
authorization card is dated February 12 although Rivera
testified she signed the card earlier . I need not resolve this
discrepancy as I find neither the signing of the card nor her
r I have considered Palacios ' change of heart toward the Union after the
strike however I do not believe this in any way affected his credibility as a
witness.
8 At this point counsel for General Counsel asked for a short recess
stating that her witness was subject to migraine headaches and needed to
relax . While I sympathize with anyone subject to migraine I also must
participation in the strike had anything to do with her
discharge.
Counsel for General Counsel adduced testimony from
Rivera that "near the end of the year" [1972] her
departmental supervisor, Oliveras, interrogated and threat-
ened her about her signing the Teamsters authorization
card back in April 1972. She placed the scene of this
conversation in the departmental office and testified that
Maria Melendez and Maria Barroso were present. When
asked to describe this conversation Mrs. Rivera became
very tense and responded "Frankly, at this moment I do
not remember." After a short recess 8 Rivera was again
asked to relate "what he [Oliveras] said?" She responded
this time that "when [she] gave the statement" [to the
investigating Board agent] she remembered but "at this
moment I do not remember." After refreshing her
recollection by reading her previous statement she testified
that Oliveras stated in this conversation "That Mr. San
Juan had knowledge that we had asked for a union and
that pressure would be exerted on the employees."
Oliveras admitted that he had engaged in a conversation
with Rivera, Melendez, and Barroso but fixes the time
prior to the withdrawal of the Teamsters petition on July
18, 1972, therefore outside the 10(b) cutoff date. He
testified, credibly, that all present merely discussed the
Union in general terms and denied he said San Juan knew
who signed Teamsters cards or that the Company would
put pressure on those who signed Teamsters cards. It seems
to me more plausible that such a conversation about the
Teamsters would have occurred, as described by Oliveras,
before the withdrawal of its representation petition rather
than near the end of the year as testified by Rivera. I fully
credit Oliveras' version of this conversation over that of
Rivera.
On reporting to work Monday, February 12, Rivera
joined the strike of a majority of the work force in protest
of the discharges of the four fellow workers on February 9.
Admittedly her supervisors noticed Rivera, along with
many others, on the picket line. Fabio Pons, who became
acting supervisor of the accident and health department,
substituting for Oliveras during the latter's absence due to
illness, testified that he saw both Rivera and Secretary
Teresa Barroso on the picket line.
According to her own testimony Rivera abandoned the
strike before it ended about noon on February 14. She
reported for work at starting time about 8 a.m. that same
day and continued working until her discharge on
February 20.9 Secretary Barroso apparently reported back
for duty at the same time as Rivera.
Rivera testified that on the day of her discharge, but
before being notified, she had another conversation with
Oliveras. This time the alleged conversation took place in a
restaurant named the Palm Beach. She testified that
Oliveras "told me that they had had a meeting where he
was asked to discharge me" . . . "that he had said that he
was not going to discharge me because he knew that he did
consider that such a condition is often brought on or aggravated by stress,
such as existed here where the witness was called upon to relate events
which apparently she anticipated would be challenged or contradicted by
other witnesses.
9 Rivera returned to the office the next day, February 21, but was not
permitted to work.
818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not have any reason to" . . . "that they talked to Mr.
Fabio Pons to discharge me . . . and he very gladly agreed
to do it." Contradictorily , Rivera further testified that
Oliveras told her Pons had "volunteered to effect my
discharge" . . . further that Oliveras said she would be
fired that day "and that they were going to have a witness
that would come and bother me so that I would answer
back and then that person would be Mr . Pons' witness."
She then testified everything happened as predicted
"except that the witness did not appear."
It is most significant that nowhere in Rivera 's testimony
about this alleged conversation is the Union, her signing a
union card , or her participation in the strike, mentioned.
The subject matter of the conversation , as related by
Rivera , is suggestive of entrapment on the part of
Respondent in an alleged effort to so agitate or "bother"
her to the extent of provoking an act of insubordination
["so (she) would answer back"] and thus provide justifica-
tion for discharge.
Oliveras denied the existence of any such conversation
with Rivera and further denied he had been to any meeting
with other officials concerning her discharge prior thereto.
I credit his denials . His testimony there were no superviso-
ry meetings about her discharge is corroborated by the
testimony of Pons and lends support to the testimony of
other management officials concerning Rivera's termina-
tion . In fact Assistant to the President Orlando Lomba
called Pons to his office after the discharge to get a report
of the reason for the discharge . However, even if I were to
accept Rivera's testimony concerning this alleged conver-
sation I see no basis of an unfair labor practice finding nor
would I draw any inference, under all the circumstances
surrounding her discharge , of unlawful motivation.
Respondent contends Rivera was discharged primarily
because of continued acts of insubordination to Acting
Supervisor Pons and an aggravated incident of insubordi-
nation on February 20, the day of her discharge. There
were other complaints by Respondent of Rivera's work
habits , including extensive absence from her work station
and an incident of alleged unexcused absence around the
Christmas holidays in 1972. These other complaints will be
only lightly discussed as they provide merely a background
to the more serious and credible contention of insubordi-
nation.
The rather regular absences from her work station and
more particularly the unexcused absence during the
Christmas holidays (Rivera later buttressed her claim of
illness with a doctor's report , adding still more fuel to an
already deteriorated relationship between Rivera and
Pons) irritated Pons to the extent of considering discharg-
ing Rivera at that time . Nevertheless he gave Rivera
"another opportunity of proving your good faith as an
employee." 10
As noted hereinbefore Pons had been substituting for
accident and health department supervisor Oliveras for a
period of several months prior to Rivera 's discharge.
During January and February 1973 Oliveras was still
absent due to illness although he came to the office during
this period a day or so at a time . Apparently during these
10 Letter from Pons to Rivera dated February 20, 1973. Apparently the
letter was written after Rivera's discharge and at her request . I attach no
brief visits he did not take over from Pons, who was
substituting for him . It is inconceivable that Rivera was not
aware of Pons' status . She admitted that he made work
assignments to her and the evidence is clear that Pons
asked her to account for the alleged unexcused absence
during the Christmas holidays . It is also clear, from
Rivera's own testimony, that she refused to recognize Pons
as her supervisor . When asked if she was aware that Pons
was substituting for Oliveras during January and February,
Rivera responded , incredibly, "Not that I have knowledge
of . . . he was an employee like myself ." This is
contradictory to her testimony that she accepted work
assignments from Pons during this period.
Pons testified that after their encounter over her
Christmas holiday absence , Rivera continued her same
pattern of absences from her work station and continued to
refuse to recognize him as department head . He testified
that on February 20 Rivera "came in at 9 o'clock and went
out and came back at eleven ." When she returned Pons
told her he "had given [her] some opportunities but that I
could no longer accept her absences and it was then that
she got insubordinate." When asked "what was the nature
of her insubordination" Pons testified that Rivera told him
"She did not have to account to me , that her boss was
Orlando Oliveras." Pons asked Rivera to resign but,
according to Pons, "She said that she would not resign,
that I should give her a reason for discharging her, and I
did have a reason."
It is undisputed that Rivera continued to work, or at
least she remained in the office until quitting time. During
this time she demanded a discharge letter from Pons and
Pons agreed to prepare one (which Rivera acknowledged
she received on February 28). The following day she again
came to the office and once again Pons told her she was
discharged . Oliveras came to the office this same day and
spoke to Rivera advising her "the management of Manuel
San Juan Company had decided definitely that she could
not keep her job any longer ." Oliveras further testified that
Pons threatened to resign if management failed to back his
decision to discharge Rivera.
Based on all the above considerations surrounding the
discharge of Rivera I find that the employment relation-
ship between Rivera and Pons had become intolerable to
Pons and that on February 20, 1973 , after Rivera made it
crystal clear she did not intend to recognize Pons as her
supervisor he discharged her for insubordination . I find the
discharge entirely justifiable and in no way related to
Rivera's union or concerted activities. Accordingly, I
recommend the complaint allegations pertaining to Rivera
be dismissed.
The 8(a)(4) Allegation
The complaint alleges Respondent ". . . refused to pay
... Gloria Rivera de Nieves . . . a monetary benefit to
which she was entitled, in reprisal for her having filed a
charge under the Act."
Respondent admits it failed and refused to pay Rivera 1
month's severance pay required by law in Puerto Rico. It
significance to the letter in arriving at my conclusion herein
MANUEL SAN JUAN CO.
also acknowledged such payment was made to the other
dischargees . The difference in treatment, according to
Respondent 's position , resulted in the fact that such
payment was made to the other dischargees prior to their
filing charges with the Board ; that refusal to grant
severance pay to Rivera "was due to the fact that at the
time that all amounts due to her were calculated,
Respondent had already received notification that she had
filed an 8(a)(3) charge at the National Labor Relations
Board."
Respondent argues that it did not know the outcome of
such litigation , and since "In the event of reinstatement
Mrs. Rivera would not be entitled to severance pay under
State law No . 50" its refusal was not in reprisal for filing
the charges herein but a matter "of waiting for a final
disposition of the unfair labor practice charge in order to
ascertain whether or not the employee 's discharge is final
and there is no possibility or reinstatement before being
entitled to severance pay under Law No. 50."
Respondent does not consider what should be done
about the other dischargees who have already received
their severance pay and whose ultimate status is still
pending final litigation of their cases . It is clear however in
the record that such severance pay is deductible from any
backpay which may be due as a result of these proceedings.
I find no merit to Respondent 's contention and further
find that by refusing to grant severance pay to Rivera
because of her filing the unfair labor practice charges
herein Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
The strike of February 12, 1973
It is undisputed that when the employees of Respondent
reported for work on the morning of February 12 a picket
line had been established at the entrance to the office
building partly occupied by Respondent and a majority of
the employees were on strike . During the approximate 2-
1/2 day strike most of the employees, apparently on advice
of a representative of the Union, returned to work. A small
number, about 25, remained during the morning of the
third day, February 14. Before noon, most of these except
for a few stragglers , including those six named in the
complaint, had returned to work.
Thereafter, the six employees named in the complaint
returned and unconditionally offered to go back to work.
According to Personnel Director de la Vega, Respondent
"waited until about 8 : 10 and since some of the employees
still did not come up and since we needed to continue with
our work we decided to take [hire] some employees who
could do the work." She further testified "only four or five
persons were taken [hired ]. " Further, that about 1 p.m.
February 14 "all the employees who had been downstairs
reported to work" . . . and all were put back to work
"except four or five"; that four of the six named in the
complaint had been replaced; and that striker Sanchez'
position had been eliminated.
Whether all the strikers named in the complaint were or
were not replaced is a matter I do not find necessary to
resolve . The evidence establishes , and in effect Respondent
11 General Drivers and Helpers Union, Local 662, Teamsters [Rice Lake
Creamery Co.] v. N.LR.B., 302 F .2d 908 ,911 (C.A.D.C., 1962)
819
admits, that all six employees unconditionally offered to
return to work on February 14, 1973. The evidence further
establishes, and apparently Respondent admits, that the
strike was initiated because of the discharge on February 9,
1973, of the four individuals discussed hereinabove. I have
found that the discharge of Delgado and Quinones was in
violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. Since the
strike was occasioned solely to protest the unfair labor
practices found herein, I find the strike to have been an
unfair labor practice strike.(( Accordingly, the returning
unfair labor practice strikers who offered unconditionally
to go back to work on February 14, even if replaced, were
entitled to reinstatement and Respondent 's refusal to
reinstate them constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.12
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, found to constitute unfair labor practices occurring
in connection with the operations of Respondent described
in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade , traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
Hector Delgado and Angela Quinones on February 9,
1973, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer each of
these employees immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantial-
ly equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, and make each of them
whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them by payment to
them of a sum of money equal to that which they normally
would have earned from the aforesaid date of their
discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment, less net earnings during such period . Backpay and
interest shall be computed as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Having found that the strike which began on February
12, 1973, is an unfair labor practice strike and that the
Respondent unlawfully has refused to reinstate the six
strikers named in the complaint , I shall recommend that
Respondent offer said employees immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs , or, if those jobs no
longer exists, to substantially equivalent positions , without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
discharging, if necessary, persons hired on and after
February 12, 1973. I shall further recommend that
Respondent make said strikers whole for any loss of
12 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.LR.B., 350 U.S. 270 ( 1956).
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
earnings they may have suffered by reason of Respon-
dent's unlawful refusal to reinstate them to :heir former
jobs by payment to them of a sum of money equal to that
which they normally would have earned from noon
February 14, 1973 (that date being the day on which
unconditional application for reinstatement was made by
said striking employees), to the date of the Respondent's
offer of reinstatement less their net earnings during such
period. The backpay provided shall be computed on the
basis of the formula prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and interest of 6 percent per
annum shall be added to said backpay as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully refused to
grant severance pay to Gloria Rivera de Nieves after her
discharge on February 20, 1973, I shall recommend that
Respondent make whole this employee by paying her
severance pay she was entitled to on February 20, 1973,
and in addition thereto interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum shall be added to such payment.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Manuel San Juan Company, Inc. et al., an integrated
enterprise , is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Gremio Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily discharging Hector Delgado and
Angela Quinones, thereby discouraging membership in the
Union , the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in,
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
4. The strike by Respondent's employees which began
on February 12, 1973, was caused by Respondent's unfair
labor practices found herein.
5. By failing and refusing , since February 14, 1973, to
reinstate the six striking employees named above after they
made unconditional applications for reinstatement to their
former positions , thereby unlawfully discriminating against
them and discouraging membership in the Union, Respon-
dent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
6. By refusing to grant severance pay to Gloria Rivera
de Nieves after her discharge on February 20, 1973,
because she filed the subject unfair labor practice charge,
Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4) and
(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. Respondent has not violated the Act by discharging
Maria Lopez, Louisa Cumba, and Gloria Rivera de Nieves.
Nor has the Respondent violated the Act in any other
manner not specifically found herein.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 1a
Respondent Manuel San Juan Company, Inc., Common-
wealth Insurance Company and United Adjustment
Bureau, Inc., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Gremio Puertorriqueno
de Trabajadores, or any other labor organization, by
discharging any of its employees or otherwise discriminat-
ing against any of its employees in regard to their hire and
tenure of employment or other terms or conditions of
employment.
(b) Discouraging membership in Gremio Puertorriqueno
de Trabajadores, or any other labor organization, by
refusing to reinstate employees because of their union or
strike activities or in any other manner discriminating in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any terms or
conditions of employment.
(c) Discouraging employees in the exercise of their
statutory rights by refusing to grant severance pay to
discharged employees because said employees have filed
unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Hector Delgado and Angela Quinones
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if
those jobs no longer exists, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of unlawful
discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Offer to the employees named below who have been
found to be unfair labor practice strikers immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs , or, if those jobs no
longer exists , to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges,
and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason of unlawful discrimination against
them in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
Awilda Soto Ana Hilda Rodriquez
Myriam Ramos-Gonzalez Jorge Olivo
Gilda Velez Efrain Sanchez-Pinto
(c) Make whole Gloria Rivera de Nieves by payment to
her of an amount equal to her severance pay due on
February 20, 1973, plus 6-percent interest from said date to
the date of payment.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
conclusions, and recommended Order herein , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of waived for all purposes.
MANUEL SAN JUAN CO. 821
personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Post at its plant in San Juan, Puerto Rico, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of the
notice, in both English and Spanish, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 24, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
14 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Gremio
Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores, or any other labor
organization, by discharging any of our employees
because of their union or concerted activities, or. by
otherwise discriminating against them in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of their employment,
WE WILL offer Hector Delgado and Angela Qui-
nones immediate reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, and make them
whole for any loss suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion practiced against them by paying them backpay
with interest at 6 percent per annum.
WE WILL offer Awilda Soto, Myriam Ramos-Gonza-
lez, Gilda Velez, Ana Holda Rodriguez, Jorge Olivio,
and Efrain Sanchez-Pinto, immediate and full rein-
statement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges and make them whole for any loss
in pay suffered by reason of our refusal to reinstate
them on February 14, 1973.
WE WILL make Gloria Rivera de Nieves whole for
our refusal to grant her severance pay at the time of her
discharge on February 20, 1973, by payment to her of
an amount equal to such severance pay plus interest at
an annual rate of 6 percent from February 20, 1973,
until the date of such payment.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except as
permitted in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
MANUEL SAN JUAN
COMPANY, INC.
COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE
COMPANY AND UNITED
ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Pan Am Building - 7th
Floor, P.O. Box U U, 255 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Hato
Rey, Puerto Rico 00919, Telephone 106-622-0247.
1'