Manimark Corp

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1992

307 N.L.R.B. 1059 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1059
307 NLRB No. 166
MANIMARK CORP.
1 All dates are in 1991 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 NLRB 493 (1984), and Meyers
Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882 (1986).
3 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). The test stated in this case was ap-
proved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983).
4 We, however, do not rely on the judge’s findings that the Re-
spondent’s January 14 discharge memo itself constitutes an admis-
sion of an unfair labor practice.
5 This group meeting never occurred and the discharge letter notes
that Fields failed to schedule it. On January 11, Fields was asked
about scheduling the meeting and he told Morris that he did not have
the time. We adopt the judge’s finding that Fields’ statement was
protected under Sec. 7. See Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299
NLRB 1171, 1172 (1990).
Manimark Corporation and Hurley Fields. Case 7–
CA–31409
June 30, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On October 10, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief, cross-ex-
ceptions, and a supporting brief. The Respondent also
filed an answering brief to the cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
On January 14, 1991,1 the Respondent discharged its
route driver, Hurley Fields, for ‘‘disruptive behavior’’
and his ‘‘negative attitude towards criticism of that be-
havior.’’ Applying the principles of Meyers I and II2
and Wright Line,3 the judge found that the discharge
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In its exceptions,
the Respondent contends that the discharge was not
predicated on known concerted activity and that it
would have taken the same action against Fields in the
absence of any protected concerted activity on his part.
We adopt the judge’s finding of a violation. Contrary
to the Respondent, the credited evidence, as discussed
by the judge and further highlighted below, shows that
the General Counsel made the requisite prima facie
showing that Fields’ discharge was motivated by un-
lawful considerations4 and that the Respondent did not
meet its burden under Wright Line.
The Respondent admits that Fields’ discharge was
based, in part, on his January 4 and 11 encounters with
Gary Morris, the general manager, and Robin Merkel,
an office employee. Yet, on both occasions, Fields was
airing complaints about working conditions previously
discussed with and shared by other drivers, and Morris
had reason to believe that Fields was not acting alone
on either day. In particular, we observe that in the dis-
charge letter Morris noted that on January 4 Fields told
Morris he had complaints ‘‘as did another driver’’ and
during that encounter Morris himself suggested a
group meeting to further discuss the drivers’ com-
plaints.5 Additionally, at least one other driver, David
Morrow, actively participated in the January 11 protest
about company policy which Merkel fully reported to
Morris. Under these circumstances, the General Coun-
sel has presented a prima facie case under Wright Line.
Even though Morris testified that the protest to
Merkel on Friday, January 11, actually triggered
Fields’ discharge on the following Monday, the Re-
spondent contends that Fields’ habit of making dispar-
aging remarks about his coworkers, his response to
prior criticism about his machines’ cleanliness, and his
routine practice of mishandling dated warehouse prod-
ucts warranted his discharge in any event. Like the
judge, we find that the Respondent in asserting these
additional grounds was ‘‘stretching for an excuse rath-
er than a reason to discharge Fields’’ and that these
grounds were ‘‘pure makeweights.’’ In particular, we
note that the record shows that the Respondent had tol-
erated Fields’ blunt and outspoken manner throughout
his 2-year tenure with the Company and that he was
considered a good worker. In addition, the Respondent
let stand undisciplined similar conduct in the work-
place, including an offensive remark about a female
employee made by a supervisor and overheard by an-
other female employee. Accordingly, we find that the
Respondent’s exceptions lack merit and, in agreement
with the judge, that the Respondent did not meet its
Wright Line burden.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Manimark Corporation,
Belleville, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Ellen B. Rosenthal, Esq., for the General Counsel.
J. Michael Guenther, Esq., for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge. This pro-
ceeding was litigated before me at Detroit, Michigan, on
June 10, 1991, pursuant to charges filed by Hurley Fields on
January 17, 1991, and served on January 18, 1991, and com-
plaint issued February 21, 1991, alleging Respondent vio-
1060 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates are 1991 unless otherwise indicated.
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) by discharging Hurley Fields.
Upon the entire record, and after considering the demeanor
of the witnesses as they testified before me and the posttrial
briefs filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a Michigan corporation with its principal
office and place of business in Belleville, Michigan, where
it is, and has been at times material to this proceeding, en-
gaged in the serving of food vending machines and the con-
tract food service industry. During the calendar year ending
December 31, 1990, a period representative of its operations
during all times material hereto, Respondent purchased and
caused to be transported and delivered to its Belleville place
of business, food, soft drinks, and other vending machine
supplies valued in excess of $50,000, of which goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 were transported and
delivered to its place of business in Belleville, Michigan, di-
rectly from points located outside the State of Michigan. Re-
spondent is now, and has been at all times material herein,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Local 51, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL–CIO
(the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that
at all times material to this proceeding the following named
persons occupied the positions set opposite their respective
names, and have been and are now supervisors of the Re-
spondent, within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act,
and its agents:
Ralph Neil Krochmal President and Owner
Gary Lee Morris General Manager
Randy Smith Supervisor
Michael G. Bailey Supervisor
The complaint also alleges Robert Ebert is the warehouse
manager with similar supervisory and agency status. This the
Respondent denies. This issue is dealt with in the discussion
of the alleged unfair labor practice.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Hurley Fields was a route driver servicing vending ma-
chines at the metropolitan airport for about 2 years prior to
his discharge on January 14, 1991. He had begun his em-
ployment with Respondent on September 26, 1988.
When Fields returned from servicing his route on the
morning of January 14,1 he was called into the office where
Gary Morris, Respondent’s vice president and general man-
ager, in the presence of Supervisors Randy Smith and Jeff
Main, handed Fields the following document, and read it to
Fields at Fields’ request:
To: Hurley Fields
Re: Termination of employment, effective 1–14–91
Written By: Gary Morris, General Manager
As of the above date your employment with
Manimark Corporation is terminated because of your
disruptive behavior and your negative attitude towards
criticism of that behavior. Because of this negative atti-
tude and past violent reactions to discussions of same
it is felt there is no way to improve your nature and
your continued employment would only detract from
the positive direction Manimark wishes to take. Listed
below are some of your actions that influenced my de-
cision.
—Friday 1–4–91 we met in my office and you said
you had some complaints as did another driver you
knew of. I told you I would try to work out anything,
and asked you to set aside some time for you and any-
one else to discuss them over breakfast, lunch, dinner,
or whenever available. Friday 1–11–91 I asked you
when we were going to schedule a meeting and you
said you didn’t have the time. I assumed you had no
interest in working out problems.
—Friday 1–11–91 you challenged Robin Merkel
about the payment for unused sick days. This payment
is made the same time every year and Robin does not
set policy. Regardless, you chose to let her know, in
front of everyone in the warehouse, your disagreement
with the policy. You did this before asking anyone with
the authority to set policies.
—Your degrading remarks about other employees to
anyone who will listen. In a conversation with me you
referred to John Roberts, our cleaning person, as ‘‘the
drunk you’ve got cleaning the floors.’’ You asked
Randy Smith why the ‘‘butt brothers’’ got the new
trucks, refering to David Cheetam and Tony Cecale.
You have told me and others that the supervisors are
worthless and that Mike Bailey has favorites who get
everything. You have never chosen to work out any
problems with these people but instead make wise
cracks and vicious slurs about them.
—When I heard that your machines were getting
dirty, more so than normal, I asked you to take some
extra time to clean them up. I did not give you a writ-
ten or verbal warning, it was a comment as a result of
an inspection. Your reaction was rage. You said it was
not possible and how could I accuse you of that. All
I wanted was to make sure the machines were clean,
you could not accept these comments. You even gave
the mechanic who passed the information on to me a
hard time about it.
—Manimark Corporation is in the service business
and must have everyone working as a team. You are
only interested in yourself. An example of this is your
warehouse behavior. You refuse to take dated product
(milk and pastry) that is already in the warehouse but
wait for the new deliveries. You know that the oldest
product must be used first but because you have bullied
the warehouse personnel, no one stops you. This hap-
1061MANIMARK CORP.
2 Sec. 2(11) provides:
The term ‘‘supervisor’’ means any individual having authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in con-
nection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not
of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
3 See, e.g., Staco, Inc., 244 NLRB 461 (1979).
4 See House Calls, Inc., 304 NLRB 311 (1991).
5 Manimark Corp., 301 NLRB 599 (1991).
6 Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 NLRB 93 (1984), and Meyers
Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882 (1986).
pens not only to Bob Eberts but you did the same thing
to Robin Merkel when she filled in for Bob.
Your termination may seem like drastic action to
you, but I am spending too much time dealing with the
aftermath of your presence. Your disruptive behavior is
a detriment to the company, thus the necessity to end
your employment with Manimark Corporation.
The General Counsel argues that the real reasons for
Fields’ discharge were his union activity and other protected
concerted activity, Fields’ union activity was certainly not
outstanding, consisting of some rather vague conversations
with other employees concerning the desirability of union
representation and the receipt of a union telephone number
from another employee, which he never called. There is no
evidence Respondent knew of this limited union-related con-
duct by Field.
Contrary to the General Counsel, who adduced evidence
that Robert Ebert knew of Fields’ union leanings, Robert
Ebert is not a statutory supervisor nor has he been shown to
be an agent for anything other than ‘‘managing’’ the ware-
house, which ‘‘managing’’ is limited to monitoring what
goes in and out of the warehouse and ordering merchandise
from suppliers who have negotiated agreements with Ebert’s
superiors to replace stock taken by the drivers to service their
customers. Ebert supervises no one, wears the same uniform
as the drivers, is paid less than the drivers, and is directly
supervised by the same person who directly supervises driv-
ers. His job is essentially that of a stock clerk who routinely
checks to see that the supplies withdrawn from stock by the
drivers are consistent with the items listed on the requisition
sheets the drivers present. He also reminds drivers of Re-
spondent’s established rule that they should not pass over
older dated merchandise to take newer from the shelves, and
reports to his superiors those occasions when drivers do not
adhere to the policy concerning using the older merchandise
first. This reporting has not been shown to be an effective
recommendation requiring any use of independent judgment.
There is no independent discretion involved when Ebert or-
ders replacement merchandise. He merely calls the estab-
lished supplier and orders supplies sufficient to maintain an
established inventory level. There is no evidence he has any
independent authority to change that level which is deter-
mined by the sales volume and his superiors. Replacing a re-
moved item with another is hardly the type of decision dem-
onstrating the use of independent judgment. There is no per-
suasive evidence that he meets any of the criteria set forth
in Section 2(11) of the Act2 to establish supervisory status.
The burden of proof is on the party alleging supervisory sta-
tus,3 here the General Counsel. That burden had not been
met. Similarly, the General Counsel has not shown Ebert is
an express, apparent, general or even special agent of Re-
spondent for any purpose other than the performance of his
warehouse duties, which cannot be stretched far enough to
encompass a duty to report information concerning union
leanings. The General Counsel has not adduced evidence suf-
ficient to support a showing Fields could reasonably believe
Ebert was speaking for management,4 and the evidence re-
veals no sound reason to impute Ebert’s knowledge to Re-
spondent. Accordingly, I conclude knowledge of Fields’ ex-
ploratory foray into the general area of union activity, de-
scribed below, cannot be imputed to Respondent from
Ebert’s remarks to Fields around the first of the year to the
effect Ebert had heard about the Union and Fields should be
careful because he would be terminated if Respondent found
out about it as had happened to ‘‘Joe’’ whom Fields took to
be Joseph Butner who the Board has found was discharged
in 1988 because he was a union supporter.5 Moreover, there
is no other evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Respond-
ent was aware of Fields’ very limited union-related conduct
which consisted of only a few desultory conversations in-
volving him and other employees concerning the desirability
of a union, and his receipt of a union telephone number,
which he never used, from another employee who voluntarily
offered it to Fields.
Whether Fields’ discharge was in response to protected
concerted activity is a more difficult issue. The answer to
that question is found in an examination of the discharge no-
tice and the testimony of Fields and Morris, and others to
the extent relevant, and application of the controlling prece-
dent set forth in Meyers I and II6 and their relevant progeny.
Meyers I, supra at 887, sets the following guidelines:
In general, to find an employee’s activity to be
‘‘concerted,’’ we shall require that it be engaged in
with or on the authority of other employees, and not
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself. Once
the activity is found to be concerted, an 8(a)(1) viola-
tion will be found if, in addition, the employer knew
of the concerted nature of the employee’s activity, the
concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the ad-
verse employment action at issue (e.g., discharge) was
motivated by the employee’s protected concerted activ-
ity.
Meyers II, supra at 887, further explains:
We reiterate, our definition of concerted activity in
Meyers I encompasses those circumstances where indi-
vidual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to pre-
pare for group action, as well as individual employees
bringing truly group complaints to the attention of man-
agement.
The January 4 meeting referred to in the discharge notice
was convened by Morris to advise Fields that his method of
compensation was being changed. Fields objected to the
change, and went on to tell Morris that he and other drivers
were unhappy with the truck maintenance, the poor commu-
nications between supervisors and drivers, and the consist-
1062 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 American Poly-Therm Co., 298 NLRB 1057 (1990); Monarch
Water Systems, 271 NLRB 558 (1984).
8 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980); NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
9 See Hale Container Line, Inc., 291 NLRB 1195, 1205 (1988), for
Judge Roth’s disposition of a similar issue.
ently late arrival of the Hostess driver who daily supplied the
Manimark drivers with Hostess products which delayed Re-
spondent’s drivers from loading their trucks and going home
and resulted in them standing around and not getting paid for
time spent. Fields is credited that conversations among driv-
ers did result in these common complaints. Morris suggested
that Fields get a group of the drivers together to discuss their
complaints at a mutually convenient time.
When Fields returned from servicing his route on the
morning of January 11, Morris approached him and asked if
Fields had followed up on Morris’ suggestion to form a
group and meet with Morris. Fields replied that he had not
had time to so do. Morris left Fields without further com-
ment.
The witnesses do not agree on the date of the Merkel inci-
dent. The date is not crucial, but I conclude it probably took
place on January 11 as Morris testified because Merkel
places it a couple of days before Fields’ January 14 dis-
charge and Fields placed it on January 11 in a pretrial state-
ment given to the Board on January 22, just 11 days later.
According to Fields, he, Robert Ebert, and David Morrow
were talking when he wondered when they would be paid for
unused sick days. At that point, Robin Merkel, an office em-
ployee, entered the warehouse, causing Fields to say, ‘‘Well,
here’s our answer now,’’ and pose the question to her as to
when they would receive the sick day pay. She replied that
would happen when Respondent’s owner approved it. Fields
testified that he then said, ‘‘Well, that means if we have to
take a sick day now and we have an unused sick day from
the previous year can we use it now?’’ to which rather con-
voluted statement/question Merkel said, ‘‘No.’’ Fields says
he then opined, ‘‘Well, I think we should have been paid for
our sick days at the first of the year.’’ He recalls nothing
else being said.
Morrow recalls that Fields had just asked him when they
would get the pay for unused sick days when Robin Merkel
came up. He states that Fields asked her when they would
get it, and she said she wasn’t sure and would find out and
let him know. That is the extent of his recollection.
Robin Merkel testified that she believes Morrow said, as
she arrived on the scene, she might be able to explain how
sick time is paid. She recalls saying it was computed in Jan-
uary, and paid the first part of February or whenever they
decide to pay for it. To which Fields commented they should
then still be able to use last year’s sick time. Merkel says
she then said they could not because the cutoff date was De-
cember and the computation in January or February, with
which explanation Fields disagreed. She replied to this that
she did not make the policies and if he had a problem he
could talk to Morris or Krochmal, Respondent’s president
and owner, because they were the ones that decide when the
sick days were paid. Fields said he might have to do that.
She reported this conversation to the office manager who re-
ported it to Morris who called Merkel in and got her version
of what happened.
By anyone’s version, I do not detect any verbal abuse of
Merkel, or anything intimidating. She was asked, and gave
her answer. There is no great difference between the
versions. Merkel’s version is simply more complete and is
credited because it had the ring-of-truth and she was a forth-
right and believable witness with no apparent axe to grind.
Although the discharge memorandum alludes to degrading
remarks about other employees, Fields’ attitude when asked
to clean his vending machines, and Fields’ alleged habit of
taking the newer rather than the older merchandise from the
warehouse, Morris states it was this ‘‘confrontation’’ be-
tween Fields and Merkel that finally decided him to dis-
charge Fields.
The evidence supports a finding, which I make, that the
General Counsel has made out a prima facie case the dis-
charge of Fields violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As here-
tofore noted, Meyers II specifically included ‘‘individual em-
ployees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of
management’’ within the definition of concerted activity.
Truck maintenance, poor communications between super-
visors and employees, and the tardy arrival of the Hostess
drivers have all been shown to be matters of concern to
Fields and his fellow drivers. When Fields raised these mat-
ters to Morris he was bringing group complaints to the atten-
tion of management. That Morris believed these were matters
of concern to other employees as well as Fields is shown by
the reference in the January 14 discharge notice to com-
plaints harbored by Fields and another driver, and by Fields’
credible testimony that Morris asked him to form a group of
drivers to discuss their complaints. There would be no reason
for such a request if Morris believed that Fields was merely
stating his own views rather than views held in common by
him and other drivers. Moreover, Morris’ request that em-
ployees come together in a group to present their work- re-
lated problems amounts to recognition and solicitation of
protected concerted activity. As the discharge memo shows
in its recitation of January 4 and 11 events, Morris relied on
Fields’ conduct on those dates concerning the expression of
employee problems and his failure to assemble complaining
employees to meet with Morris as motivating factors in his
decision to discharge. With respect to the first item, Morris,
on behalf of Respondent, used Fields’ presentation of work-
related complaints, which Morris believed were the result of
group action as a basis for discharge. This is sufficient to
prima facie establish a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.7
The General Counsel has made out a prima facie case that
a belief there was protected concerted activity by Fields was
a motivating factor in Respondent’s decision to discharge
Fields. The burden therefore rests on Respondent to prove
Fields would have been discharged in the absence of pro-
tected activity.8 Respondent has not carried that burden. Reli-
ance on the January 4 meeting where Fields brought group
complaints to Morris is an admission that a motivating factor
in the decision to discharge was his concerted activity. Simi-
larly, Respondent’s use of Fields’ failure to schedule a group
meeting with other employees to discuss work-related prob-
lems as a reason for discharge renders the discharge unlawful
because the reason is unlawful. Fields had a Section 7 right
to refrain from engaging in such concerted activity. By rais-
ing this matter as a defense Respondent has therefore admit-
ted an unfair labor practice.9
1063MANIMARK CORP.
10 Elion Concrete, Inc., 299 NLRB 1 (1990); citing Shattuck Denn
Mining Corp., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 Under New Horizons, interest is computed at the ‘‘short-term
Federal rate’’ for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986
amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621.
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
With respect to the Merkel incident, it was nothing more
than a brief conversation among employees which seems not
to have particularly troubled Merkel. There is nothing in the
testimony of the participants that suggests anything in the na-
ture of an unreasonable confrontation, and it is difficult to
understand why such a meeting was considered sufficient by
Morris to trigger a discharge. I am inclined to believe that
here Morris was stretching for an excuse rather than a reason
to discharge Fields. The same is true I believe of the ref-
erence to the ‘‘degrading remarks’’ made by Fields, which,
standing alone, would not seem to constitute grounds for dis-
charge given the evidence that at least one supervisor de-
lighted in disparaging remarks about an employee. Likewise,
the raising of a several months old incident concerning the
cleanliness of Fields’ vending machine at that time with no
showing of such a situation since, and the unverified allega-
tion of Fields’ refusal to take dated product are pure
makeweights. In addition to the admissions indicating a vio-
lation of the Act in the January 14 memo, the failure of the
other reasons advanced, surrounded by conclusory remarks
with no evidentiary value, warrants an inference of unlawful
motivation.10 Respondent has failed to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Fields would have been discharged
in the absence of suspected or actual protected concerted ac-
tivity and the failure of Respondent’s reasons advanced for
the discharge serves to strengthen the General Counsel’s
case. The General Counsel has proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that Fields’ discharge violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by dis-
charging Hurley Fields because Respondent believed he en-
gaged in protected concerted activity, and because Fields
failed to engage in other protected concerted activity as re-
quested by Respondent.
3. The unfair labor practice found affects commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
In addition to the usual notice posting and cease and desist
requirements, my recommended order will require Respond-
ent to offer Hurley Fields immediate and full reinstatement
to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority,
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him. Backpay shall be calculated
and interest thereon computed in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).11 I shall fur-
ther recommend that Respondent be required to remove from
its files any reference to the discharge, and notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the discharges will
not be used against him in any way.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, Manimark Corporation, Belleville, Michi-
gan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against em-
ployees because they engage in protected concerted activity
or refrain from such activity.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Hurley Fields immediate and full reinstatement
to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the discharge
of Hurley Fields, and notify him in writing that this has been
done and that the discharge will not be used against him in
any way.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its place of business copies of the attached no-
tice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’13 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
1064 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
any employees because they engage in protected concerted
activity or refrain from such activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Hurley Fields immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his se-
niority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed
and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the dis-
charge of Hurley Fields, and notify him in writing that this
has been done and that the discharge will not be used against
him in any way.
MANIMARK CORPORATION