01a54625
11-15-2005
Maneke L. Purchase v. Social Security Administration
01A54625
November 15, 2005
.
Maneke L. Purchase,
Complainant,
v.
Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A54625
Agency No. 04-0087-SSA
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning her formal EEO complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
Complainant was hired as a Claims Representative, GS-7, at the agency's
Title 16 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in Goldsboro,
North Carolina, effective September 22, 2002, subject to a one-year
probationary period.
On December 4, 2003, complainant filed the instant formal EEO complaint.
Therein, complainant claimed that the agency discriminated against her
on the bases of race (African-American) when:
a. she was not afforded the same opportunities to learn her position
as her co-workers who were hired the same time as her;
b. management treated her differently than a similarly situated Caucasian
male trainee, by ignoring many of his errors; and
c. effective July 11, 2003, her position was terminated during her
probationary period.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of
her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge
or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When
complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29
C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.
In its May 16, 2005 FAD, the agency found no discrimination. Regarding
claim (a), the agency found that complainant failed to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination because she did not show that
she was treated differently than a similarly situated employee, not in
her protected class. Regarding claims (b) and (c), the agency found
that complainant established a prima facie case of race discrimination.
However, the agency found that management articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions which complainant did not
establish was a pretext for discrimination.
Regarding claim (a), the record reflects that complainant's supervisor
(S1) stated that complainant received the same training opportunities as
other employees and was not treated less favorably. S1 further stated
that the other three Representatives were in training at the same time
as complainant but on different protocols. Specifically, S1 stated
that while complainant was trained as a Title 16 Claims Representative,
two employees were trained as Claim Representatives and one employee
was trained as a Service Representative. S1 stated that complainant
received all required training material and advance training.
Further, S1 stated that because of the employees' workloads, the
amount of time mentors spend with trainees daily varied. S1 further
stated that complainant's mentor, a Technical Expert, was assigned to
mentor complainant. S1 stated that before he mentored complainant, the
mentor "mentored trainees, conducted some claim representative duties and
performed other training." S1 stated that no other employees complained
about complainant's mentor. S1 stated that complainant's second-line
supervisor (S2) indicated that complainant informed him that she felt
that her mentor did not treat her fairly. S1 stated that according to
S2, complainant felt that she was doing her job correctly but the mentor
"wanted her to perform his job duties." S1 stated that she inquired
into complainant's concerns and learned that while the mentor used
his cases as examples, complainant did not perform the mentor's work.
With respect to complainant's assertion that the mentor yelled at her,
S1 stated that she spoke with the mentor and that he acknowledged raising
his voice but denied yelling at complainant. S1 stated that the mentor
apologized to complainant for raising his voice.
The record further reflects that S2 stated that after complainant
complained about her mentor, he counseled complainant concerning training
and learning process. S2 further stated that he reminded complainant
"that the process takes time and patience and urged her to 'keep an open
mind' and work with [Mentor]." S2 stated that he shared complainant's
concerns about her mentor with S1, and asked her to observe the mentor's
interactions with complainant and "ensure that [Complainant] was being
treated properly." S2 stated that S1 monitored complainant's training and
"was satisfied that it was appropriate." S2 stated that after complainant
again complained that the mentor's expectations were unrealistic, he met
with the mentor. S2 stated that the mentor informed him that complainant
experienced difficulties listening and paying attention but "agreed to
make an extra effort to assist [Complainant] teach her what she needed
to be successful." Furthermore, S2 stated that the mentor provided
complainant proper training in class and practical experience at her desk.
Regarding claim (b), the record reflects that S1 and S2 stated that
management did not overlook an identified Caucasian male trainee's
performance problems errors because he performed satisfactorily.
Regarding claim (c), the record reflects that S2 stated that he was the
deciding official to terminate complaint during her probationary period
based on poor performance. S2 further stated that complainant did not
perform at the required level for a Claims Representative Trainee and
was terminated pursuant to agency regulations. S2 stated that despite
management's attempts to provide opportunities for complainant to
succeed, complainant did not consistently perform her required tasks.
Specifically, S2 stated that in March 2003, he and S1 began to counsel
complainant concerning her poor performance. Specifically, S2 stated that
representatives are required to input claims on various computer screens
but complainant failed to consistently complete the process, causing
applications to be rejected. S2 stated that between April and June 2003,
he counseled complainant concerning her poor performance, "hoping she
would improve her performance, but it did not help." Specifically,
S2 stated that complainant failed "to adequately control her workload,
failed to arrive at work on time and reported inaccurate arrival times."
S2 stated that he observed complainant during training and noted that she
"was unfocused and failed to pay attention to instructions." Furthermore,
S2 stated that complainant's race was not a factor in his determination
to terminate her during her probationary period.
The record further reflects that S1 stated that on April 24, 2003, she
issued complainant a Performance and Conduct memorandum "in hopes she
would improve her performance, but it did not help." Specifically,
S1 stated that on the same day, she began training and working with
complainant. S1 however stated that complainant repeatedly made the
same errors in SSA827 forms and "failed to send the correct number of
forms, resulting in a delay in processing the request." S1 stated that
the SSA827 "were consistently returned to [Complainant] for correction,
but her work performance did not improve." S1 stated that she counseled
complainant on several occasions concerning her poor work performance.
S1 stated that complainant "had difficulty and confusion understanding
questions she needed to ask client." S1 stated that complainant did
not receive correction or constructive criticism well. Furthermore,
S1 stated that complainant's race was not a factor in S2's determination
to terminate her from her probationary period.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to
the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the
complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder
by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of
a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether
complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
The Commission determines that the agency articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, as discussed above.
Moreover, we find that complainant has not demonstrated that the
agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for
discrimination. The agency noted that complainant asserted that her
performance was adequate, citing a certificate of completion of training,
and work lists. The agency determined that there was no dispute that
complainant completed an initial training program. Concerning performance
deficiencies, the agency further acknowledged that there are no specific
examples of errors in complainant's file. However, the agency stated
that complainant provided no evidence to support her contention that
her performance was adequate, other than reliance on work lists which
were �not dispositive.� The agency determined that no separate file was
necessary, as complainant had been adequately advised of deficiencies by
its letter dated April 24, 2003, discussed above. The agency determined
that complainant provided no evidence of improvement thereafter.
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 15, 2005
__________________
Date