Manabe, Kota et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 27, 2020

2019003518 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/369,309 10/03/2014 Kota Manabe 116410.0253232 9245
23838 7590 05/27/2020
Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP/HAK
2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
EXAMINER
DIGNAN, MICHAEL L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1723
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uuspto@hunton.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KOTA MANABE, YUTAKA TANO, and
TOMOHIKO KANEKO

Appeal 2019–003518
Application 14/369,309
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, and
JEFFREY W. ABRAHAM, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1 and 5–9.1 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

The rejection of claims 1 and 5–9 under 35 USC § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Fujino (US 2009/0146493 A1, published June 11, 2009)

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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(“Fujino”) in view of Ieoka (JP 2008-265462, published June 11, 2008)
(“Ieoka”), and further in view of Bae (US 2010/0332060 A1, published Dec.
30, 2010) (“Bae”) or, alternatively in view of Ramamurthy (US
2013/0015800 A1, published Jan. 17, 2013) (“Ramamurthy”) is presented
for appeal.2
Appellant’s invention relates to a fuel cell system comprising a fuel
cell and a secondary cell as a power supply source to a load. (Spec. ¶ 1.)
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced
below:
1. A fuel cell system comprising a fuel cell and a
secondary cell as power supply sources to a load, the system
comprising:
a fuel cell power supply path that connects the fuel cell
and a first load;
a first converter provided on the fuel cell power supply
path, the first converter being capable of boosting an output of
the fuel cell;
a first secondary cell power supply path that connects the
secondary cell to a first connecting point on the fuel cell power
supply path located closer to the first load side than the first
converter;
a second converter provided on the first secondary cell
power supply path, the second converter being capable of
boosting an output of the secondary cell;
a second secondary cell power supply path that connects
a second load to a second connecting point on the first
secondary cell power supply path located between the second
converter and the secondary cell;
a circuit breaking part provided between the secondary
cell and the second connecting point on the first secondary cell
power supply path;

2 The complete statement of the rejection on appeal appears in the Final
Office Action (mailed June 20, 2018 (“Final Act.”). (Final Act. 2–15).
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a controller including first and second control parts, a
processor for executing programs stored in memory of the
controller, and for controlling the fuel system based on signals
input from a plurality of sensors located in the fuel cell system,
the controller is programmed to:
control the first converter with the first control part; and
control the second converter with the second control part,
wherein, during normal operation, the first control part
allows the first converter to control an output voltage of the fuel
cell, and the second control part allows the second converter to
control an output voltage to the first load side; and
wherein, during an occurrence of an abnormality of the
secondary cell, the first control part allows the first converter to
control an output voltage to the first load side, and the second
control part allows the second converter to control an output
voltage to the second load side, and
wherein, during an occurrence of an abnormality of the
secondary cell, the output voltage of the first converter is
controlled to be fixed at a constant voltage and the output
voltage of the second converter to the second load side is
controlled so as to match a requested output of the second load,
and the circuit breaking part is disconnected.

Appeal Br. 10–11, Claims App.

OPINION3
Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s
contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, as well as the Reply Brief, we
determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the

3 We limit our discussion to independent claims 1 and 6, and dependent
claim 8 as argued by Appellant. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant
presents arguments addressing claims 1 and 8 together and presents
additional arguments addressing claim 6. Claims 5 and 7–9 stand or fall
with independent claim 1.

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Examiner’s rejections of claims 1 and 5–9. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of
requiring Appellant(s) to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s
rejection). We sustain the rejections of these claims generally for the
reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the
Answer. (Ans. 3–19; see also Final Act. 4–14.) We add the following
primarily for emphasis.
Appellant’s principle argument is the cited references fail to teach or
suggest “wherein, during an occurrence of an abnormality of the secondary
cell, the output voltage of the first converter is controlled to be fixed at a
constant voltage.” (Appeal Br. 5–6.) Appellant also argues that although
Ieoka discloses that the control unit switches to the low-speed running mode
when the battery does not operate properly, Ieoka fails to disclose that the
engine speed is fixed at a constant in the low-speed running mode. (Appeal
Br. 6; Ieoka ¶¶ 54, 55.)
Appellant’s arguments lack persuasive merit. Appellant has not
disputed the Examiner’s finding that Fujino describes a fuel cell system
comprising a fuel cell and a secondary cell as power supply sources to loads
that differs from the claimed invention by the failure to describe an
abnormality of the second cell and during the abnormality controlling the
output voltage of the first converter to a fixed constant voltage. (Appeal Br.
generally; Ans. 3–5.) Fujino describes conditions where the voltage control
means performs the fuel cell running routine in which only the output of the
fuel cell and the capacitor is used for running the system without assistance
of the battery. (Fujino ¶ 60.) The Examiner finds Ieoka describes the
operation of a fuel cell system under an abnormality of the secondary cell.
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The Examiner also finds Ieoka teaches that during an abnormality of the
secondary cell the voltage supplied from the inverter generator operates at a
predetermined system voltage. (Ans. 5–6.) Ieoka specifically discloses:
It is preferable that the aforementioned control means controls
the rotational speed of the aforementioned engine at the time of
the aforementioned traveling motor driving so that the voltage
supplied from the aforementioned inverter generator is held
near the aforementioned predetermined system voltage, when
the aforementioned power storage means was not operating
normally and the aforementioned judging means judges. If the
feed voltage by a power storage means is suspended and
inverter control is suspended in an inverter generator, the
system voltage in industrial truck will change according to
engine rotational speed. Since according to the above-
mentioned composition engine rotational speed are held so that
predetermined system voltage when the power storage means is
operating normally may be supplied from an inverter generator
when a traveling motor drives, industrial truck runs stably.
(Ieoka ¶ 13.)
The Examiner also cites Bae and Ramamurthy for describing fuel cell
systems wherein the fuel cell converter is set to a constant voltage under
abnormality conditions. (Ans. 6.) The Examiner determines, based on the
teachings of the cited prior art, that it would have been obvious to operate a
fuel cell system, such as described by Fujino, operating under abnormality
conditions by controlling the first load side voltage to a constant
(predetermined) voltage. (Ans. 7.) The prior art cited by the Examiner
establishes that the operation of a fuel cell system under conditions wherein
the secondary battery has malfunctioned (abnormality) was known to
persons of ordinary skill in the art. The Examiner properly determines Ieoka
discloses that during an abnormality the engine rotational speed is held so
that predetermined system voltage is utilized to operate the system. While
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Ieoka does not expressly disclose controlling the output voltage of the first
converter to a fixed constant voltage, a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have reasonably expected that to hold the engine rotational speed at a
specific value the voltage must also be held at a specific value. Appellant
has failed to direct us to evidence establishing that a system voltage can vary
when an engine is held to a predetermined rotational speed. Furthermore,
the claimed invention does not set a specific time period required for
controlling the output voltage of the first converter to a fixed constant
voltage. Appellant has not directed us to evidence in Ieoka that establishes
the voltage of Ieoka is not constant as required by the claimed invention.
Addressing claim 6 Appellant argues Fujino does not teach a circuit
breaking part between the secondary cell and the second connecting point on
the first battery supply path, wherein the circuit breaking part is
disconnected during an occurrence of an abnormality of the secondary cell.
Appellant argues Ieoka does not teach the fuse and relay is located between
the secondary cell and the second connecting point on the first secondary
cell power supply path. (Appeal Br. 8.)
It has been established that the predictable use of known prior art
elements performing the same functions they have been known to perform is
normally obvious, and the combination of familiar elements is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[T]he [obviousness] analysis
need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of
the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”); see
also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference
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stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one
of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw
therefrom).
The purpose and function of a circuit breaking part, such as the fuse
and relay described by Ieoka, is to cut off the flow of electricity. It cannot
be reasonably argued in view of the prior art cited that one with ordinary
skill in the art would not have readily recognized that in the situation
wherein the secondary cell is malfunctioning, such as providing an excess
amount of energy to the system, a circuit breaking part would have been
suitable to disconnect the secondary battery so as to prevent the overflow of
electricity into the circuit. Appellant has not introduced evidence otherwise.
Thus, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
obviousness determination of claims 1 and 5–9. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417
(the predictable use of known prior art elements or steps performing the
same functions they have been known to perform is normally obvious; the
combination of familiar elements/steps is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results); see also In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800
F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established
by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references.”); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544,
1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the
references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under
review.”).

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CONCLUSION

In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5–9 103

Fujino, Ieoka, Bae,
Ramamurthy
1, 5–9

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED