Mamerto P. Capil, Complainant,v.Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 9, 2006
01a55028 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 9, 2006)

01a55028

08-09-2006

Mamerto P. Capil, Complainant, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency) Agency.


Mamerto P. Capil v. Department of Defense

01A55028

August 9, 2006

.

Mamerto P. Capil,

Complainant,

v.

Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Commissary Agency)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A55028

Agency No. DECWP20030088

Hearing

No. 340-2005-00061X

DECISION

Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint in which he claimed that the

agency discriminated against him on the bases of his race (Filipino),

national origin (Filipino), sex (male), age (54) and in reprisal for

his previous EEO activity under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act when:

1. On June 19, 2003, complainant was not selected for the position of

Commissary Management Specialist (Merchandising) (GS-1144-07).

2. On June 19, 2003, complainant was not selected for the position of

Meatcutter Supervisor (WS-7404-07).

3. On July 22, 2003, complainant's annual leave request was denied.

4. On August 7, 2003, a certain individual became the Store Director

and complainant's supervisor.

5. On August 20, 2003, complainant's work schedule was changed.

The agency accepted and investigated claims 1-5 of the complaint and

thereafter referred the matter to an Administrative Judge (AJ), pursuant

to complainant's request for a hearing. Without holding a hearing,

the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination. The AJ found that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on

the alleged bases with regard to the two nonselections. The AJ found

that complainant did not apply for either of the positions at issue.

With regard to claim (3), the agency stated that complainant was denied

leave based on a staffing need. The agency claimed that two of the three

Computer Assisted Orderers were needed on duty at all times and that

one of the Computer Assisted Orderers was already taking leave during

the period sought by complainant. The AJ found that the agency set

forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying complainant's

leave request. With respect to claim (4), the agency stated that the

individual who became the Store Director and complainant's supervisor

was appointed to the position pursuant to a memorandum stating that all

Computer Assisted Orderer positions, in all stores, were to be realigned

under the Store Director. The AJ found that this was a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the appointment of the relevant Store

Director. The AJ found that complainant failed to establish that the

agency's articulated reason was pretextual or that the underlying reason

for making the relevant individual the Store Director and complainant's

supervisor was due to complainant's protected classes. As for claim (5),

the agency stated that the changes to complainant's schedule occurred

because of a need for adequate Computer Assisted Orderer coverage.

The agency stated that schedule changes were made to ensure there would

always be two Computer Assisted Orderers available to work everyday.

The AJ found that this constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the schedule changes. According to the AJ, complainant failed to

show that this reason was pretextual. The AJ observed that a female

Computer Assisted Orderer also had her schedule changed.

By final action dated July 28, 2005, the agency stated that it was fully

implementing the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

With respect to complainant not being selected for the two positions at

issue, we shall assume arguendo that complainant set forth a prima facie

case of discrimination on the alleged bases. The agency stated that

complainant was not on the referral list of candidates for the Commissary

Management Specialist position and that he had not expressed an interest

in the position. According to the Human Resources Specialist, complainant

was not on the referral list because he was not registered for GS-05 or

GS-07 level positions, only GS-09 through GS-12 vacancies. With regard to

the Meatcutter Supervisor position, the agency stated that complainant did

not apply for the position and that the selectee was the only candidate

who applied for the position. As for complainant's leave request being

denied, the agency stated that the request was denied because one of

the other two Computer Assisted Orderers had already requested leave

for that time period and it was necessary to have two Computer Assisted

Orderers on duty. As for the individual at issue becoming the Store

Manager and complainant's supervisor, the agency stated that the Deputy

Director issued a memorandum regarding leadership items stating that all

Computer Assisted Orderer positions, in all stores, were to be realigned

under the Store Director. With respect to complainant's schedule change,

the agency stated that complainant had been frequently absent and that

the absences caused scheduling difficulties because there was inadequate

Computer Assisted Orderer coverage. The agency stated that the schedule

changes were made to ensure that there would always be two Computer

Assisted Orderers available to work everyday. We find that the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged actions.

Complainant claimed that the Store Director was aware of his interest in

the Commissary Management Specialist position. We find that complainant

has not refuted the agency's position that he was not on the referral

list because he was registered for GS-09 through GS-12 positions and not

GS-05 or GS-07 positions. As for the Meatcutter Supervisor position,

complainant argued that he had meatcutting experience and that the

position had been taken out of the 1144 series in order to avoid selecting

him. Complainant's argument does not negate the fact that he did not

apply for the relevant position and therefore we find that he has not

established that the agency's reason for not selecting him was pretext.

With respect to being denied a leave request, complainant contended that

it was not essential to always have two Computer Assisted Operators on

duty since there were occasions where he had been on duty by himself.

We find that the fact that complainant has performed at times by himself

in this position is not sufficient to refute the agency's explanation that

two Computer Assisted Orderers were needed and that a coworker had already

been granted leave for the relevant time period. Complainant argues

that the individual who became the Store Director and his supervisor was

appointed to these positions in reprisal for his previous EEO activity.

This argument does not refute the agency's position that the appointment

was made in response to a decision that all Computer Assisted Orderer

positions, in all stores, were to be realigned under the Store Director.

Complainant has not shown that this agency policy was effected with the

intent of discriminating against him. As for complainant's schedule

being changed, complainant has not refuted the agency's position that he

had numerous absences that caused scheduling difficulties and inadequate

staff coverage. We find that complainant has not established that the

agency's stated reasons were pretext intended to mask discriminatory

motivation.

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final

order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 9, 2006

__________________

Date