Mahbubul Hassan, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 20, 2000
01997222 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 20, 2000)

01997222

12-20-2000

Mahbubul Hassan, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


Mahbubul Hassan v. USPS

01997222

December 20, 2000

.

Mahbubul Hassan,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01997222

Agency No. 4F-913-0138-98

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD), concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that was he was discriminated

against based on race (Asian), color (brown), religion (Muslim), sex

(male), age (over 40 years of age), national origin (Bangladesh), and

retaliation (prior EEO activity) when on August 5, 1998, he was issued

a notice of removal and subsequently removed.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant, born May

19, 1954, was employed as a letter carrier at the agency's North Hollywood

Post Office facility in North Hollywood, CA. Believing he was a victim

of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on October 7, 1998. At the conclusion of the

investigation, complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final

decision by the agency. Complainant requested that the agency issue

a final decision, which was issued August 18, 1999.

In February 1998, complainant complained about an on-the-job injury

and filed a CA-1 Form related to the accident.<2> The District Injury

Compensation Office made an inquiry into complainant's prior injuries.

The inquiry disclosed that complainant made errors in his initial job

application, involving PS Form 2485, Medical Examination and Assessment

(dated November 5, 1993), and also, as part of his reinstatement with

the Postal Service (completed and signed July 14, 1997, and discussed in

more detail, infra); PS Form 4583, Physical Fitness Inquiry for Motor

Vehicle Operators (completed and signed July 14, 1997, as part of his

reinstatement); and PS Form 2591, Application for Employment (completed

and signed September 21, 1993).

Prior to his removal, complainant had engaged in protected activity.

More specifically, in a complaint dated March 24, 1994, complainant,

then a former flexible city carrier (part time) alleged that the agency

discriminated against him on the bases of race (Asian), color (brown),

national origin (Bangladesh), and religion (Muslim), when he was removed

from employment during his probationary period. The Commission found

that complainant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he

was discriminated against because of race, color, and national origin,

as alleged. Complainant was ordered reinstated, inter alia, to his

position retroactive to February 15, 1994. EEOC Appeal No. 01955052,

Hassan v. USPS (May 5, 1997).

It appears that PS Form 2485 (signed July 14, 1997), supra, was required

by the agency before his reinstatement, and that the agency considered

this to be relating to a job application.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant was justifiably removed

for falsification of the records, relating to his job application(s).

The agency found that complainant failed to honestly disclose the correct

information on his job application(s), and thus that the agency was

prohibited from making a sound decision when hiring him. Accordingly,

the agency concluded that it did not discriminate against complainant

based on any of the complainant's alleged grounds.

On appeal, complainant contends that he was removed based on retaliation

for his prior EEO activity, refers to an incident of complainant's alleged

misconduct not relied upon by the agency for the removal, and points out

that he knew from another employee that having won his reinstatement case

that the agency would retaliate. The agency requests that we affirm its

FAD, emphasizing that complainant had falsified his job application.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

In general, claims alleging disparate treatment under Title VII are

examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell

Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Prewitt v. USPS, 662

F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)

(requiring a showing that age was a determinative factor, in the sense

that "but for" age, complainant would not have been subject to the adverse

action at issue); and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental

Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st

Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal cases). A complainant

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited reason was a factor in the

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action(s).

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

After the agency has offered the reason for its action, the burden returns

to the complainant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's reason was pretextual, that is, it was not the true

reason or the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, complainant

may show that he is a member of a protected group and that he was

treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside

his protected group. See Potter v. Goodwill Industries of Cleveland,

518 F.2d 864, 865 (6th Cir. 1975). Complainant may also set forth

evidence of acts from which, if otherwise unexplained, an inference of

discrimination can be drawn. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576.

The Commission agrees with the agency that complainant failed to establish

that his removal was discriminatory. Assuming arguendo that complainant

established a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not)

that the agency's articulated nondiscriminatory explanation for its

action was a pretext for discrimination.

As previously indicated, the agency submits that complainant's removal

resulted from a determination that complainant had falsified his job

application(s) in numerous areas, and that the complainant's failure to

honestly disclose information on his job application(s) prevented the

agency from making a sound hiring decision. In evaluating the merits of

the agency's articulated nondiscriminatory explanation, complainant does

not dispute that numerous errors were made. Indeed, the agency prepared

a lengthy and detailed Notice of Removal Memorandum, dated August 3,

1998, delineating the many errors made by complainant in PS Forms

2485, 4583, and 2591.<3> Complainant appears to essentially accept

the Notice of Removal Memorandum's findings, at least with respect to

his reporting of inaccurate information. Complainant, however, argued

before the agency that the mistakes were not intentional, but does not

otherwise adequately explain much of the inaccurate information.<4>

Given the number of errors, their significance, and complainant's lack

of additional adequate explanation, we are unpersuaded by the credibility

of complainant's argument.<5>

The agency has also indicated that it has removed numerous other employees

for falsification of records. An affidavit from complainant's Postmaster

identified six individuals who had been removed for falsification of

records. Complainant does not dispute this. Nor has complainant suggested

that the agency has treated some employee or employees, who falsified

records, more favorably in terms of discipline. In addition, falsification

goes to questions of honesty and integrity, and the agency's vigorous and

consistent enforcement of such values cannot be questioned. Furthermore,

the agency explained that after on-the-job injuries are reported, it is

common practice in the district to review the person's prior injuries.

Finally, it is complainant's burden to establish by a preponderance

of the evidence (more likely than not) that the agency's articulated

nondiscriminatory explanation for its action was a pretext for

discrimination. In the Commission's view, complainant has failed to

meet his burden to show that the agency's articulated nondiscriminatory

explanation was a pretext. See also Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (April 12, 1994).

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 20, 2000

__________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The record indicates that the injury involved one of his fingers (nail

avulsion and contusion), in addition to one of his hands (contusion)

and knees (abrasion and contusion). His physician released complainant

to modified duty, recommending that the complainant not use the injured

finger. The treating physician noted the injury occurred on February 21,

1998.

Complainant seems to make much of the fact that the Postmaster thought

the injury occurred on February 2, 1998. Any confusion may have

occurred due to the fact, that there is a certification from another

of complainant's physicians dated February 2, 1998, indicating that

complainant would be unable to return to work because of �injury/illness�

from February 2, 1998, through February 8, 1998. Indeed, it appears,

as of February 2, 1998, complainant had not reported for work since

January 27, 1998.

3 For example, complainant responded in PS Form 2485, Medical Examination

and Assessment (July 14, 1997), that he had never been treated for any

medical condition other than minor illness, or had any operations.

To the contrary, the agency found that complainant had numerous

extended medical-related absences from work, as well as numerous

periods of temporary disability, in addition to numerous significant

injuries and medical problems of both a physical and mental nature.

Complainant also responded in PS Form 4583, Physical Fitness Inquiry

for Motor Vehicle Operators, that he had never had any nervous or mental

trouble of any kind. The agency pointed out that complainant's medical

records reflected a history of significant mental health problems and

symptoms. Complainant further responded in PS Form 2591, Application for

Employment, that he had never been fired from any job for any reason.

The agency found that complainant had been terminated from a private

sector position in January of 1993. The agency pointed out that an

Unemployment Appeals Board decision of an Administrative Judge upheld

complainant's subsequent disqualification of benefits based on a finding

of misconduct by the complainant.

4 Before issuing the Notice of Removal Memorandum, the agency gave

complainant an opportunity to respond to all of the instances of

the allegedly incorrect information. In many instances, complainant

essentially responded that it was a long time ago, maybe he forgot,

he could not recall, or that he could not remember at the time.

5 It appears, however, that some of the questions in PS Forms 2485

and 4583 were disability-related inquiries. Prior to an offer of

employment, an employer may not ask any disability-related questions or

require any medical examinations, even if they are related to the job.

Nevertheless, after an applicant is given a conditional job offer, but

before he or she starts work, an employer may ask disability-related

questions and conduct medical examinations, regardless of whether they

are related to the job, as long as it does so for all entering employees

in the same job category. After employment begins, an employer may

make disability-related inquiries and require medical examinations

only if they are job-related and consistent with business necessity.

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical

Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) (July 26, 2000). Generally, a disability-related inquiry or

medical examination of an employee will be regarded as �job-related and

consistent with business necessity� when an employer �has [a] reasonable

belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee's ability to

perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition;

or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.�

Id. at 15-16. Complainant does not argue in his complaint or on appeal,

that the agency submitted improper disability-related inquiries, and

therefore we do not address this matter.