MagQuest, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2019003889 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/714,185 12/13/2012 Patrick Allan McDevitt 20121121 5615
170055 7590 07/01/2020
VERIZON - HH
VERIZON PATENTING GROUP
1300 I STREET NW
SUITE 500 EAST
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
SNIDER, SCOTT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
VZPatent170055@verizon.com
ptomail@harrityllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PATRICK ALLAN MCDEVITT, G. DUANE GEARHART, and
JOHN PATRICK O’DWYER
____________

Appeal 2019-0038891
Application 13/714,185
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before, ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
BIBHU R. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 17, 19–24, 26, and 28–36. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Verizon Communications Inc. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We reverse and enter a new grounds of rejection under 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(b).
THE INVENTION
Appellant states “[t]he present disclosure relates generally to systems
and methods for advertising.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method, comprising:
querying, by a device, one or more databases to generate a set
of intersections on a map,
the set of intersections including information related to:
traffic volume data,
frequency of use, and
demographic information;
analyzing, by the device, at least one of:
the traffic volume data,
the frequency of use, or
the demographic information associated with the set of
intersections to identify a plurality of target intersections in the
set of intersections for a navigated route;
identifying, by the device and based on the plurality of
target intersections, a set of landmark locations;
detecting, by the device, at least one target intersection of
the plurality of target intersections in a route requested by a
user device of a user;
receiving, by the device, GPS signals from a GPS system
for determining a location of the user device;
determining, by the device, that the user device is within
a predetermined distance to the at least one target intersection
of the plurality of target intersections in the route requested by
the user device of the user;
auctioning, by the device, an advertisement space to a
plurality of advertisers for presenting an advertisement
associated with at least one landmark location, of the set of
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landmark locations, associated with the route that includes the
at least one target intersection;
receiving, by the device and based on detecting the at
least one target intersection, a request from at least one
advertiser of the plurality of advertisers to reference at least one
landmark location associated with the at least one advertiser, of
the set of landmark locations, in association with a particular
guidance maneuver of a plurality of guidance maneuvers,
the plurality of guidance maneuvers being associated with the
route requested by the user device of the user, the at least one
advertiser offering a highest bid for the advertisement space;
and
providing, by the device for display on the user device of
the user and responsive to receiving the request from the at least
one advertiser, the plurality of guidance maneuvers and the
advertisement, the advertisement being provided for display in
association only with the particular guidance maneuver, and
the advertisement being provided in relation to directions from
the particular guidance maneuver to the at least one landmark
location.

THE REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Weiland et al.
Grace
Jones et al.
Ramer et al.
US 2005/0004753 A1
US 2007/0078596 A1
US 2007/0143345 A1
US 2009/0234711 A1
Jan. 6, 2005
Apr. 5, 2007
June 21, 2007
Sept. 17, 2009

The following rejections are before us for review.
Claims 1, 3–8, 17, 19–24, 26, and 28–33 are rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Grace, Jones, and Ramer. Final
Act. 6–12.
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Claims 34–36 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Grace, Jones, Ramer, and Weiland. Final Act. 12.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION

Each of independent claims 1, 17, and 26 recites in pertinent part,

analyzing, by the device, at least one of:
the traffic volume data,
the frequency of use, or
the demographic information associated with the set of
intersections to identify a plurality of target intersections in the
set of intersections for a navigated route;
identifying, by the device and based on the plurality of
target intersections, a set of landmark locations.

Claim 1.

The Examiner found, concerning these limitations that Grace
discloses, the following:
Grace et al. teaches ranking “landmark locations” based on
“how frequently users in the class visit the landmark” in at least
[0035] while Jones et al. “teaches the ranking of ‘geo-spatial
entities’ for the purposes of determining and displaying
advertising in [0021] and [0022] wherein ‘geo-spatial entities’
includes road information as taught in [0023] and including
demographic data in at least [0038]”. Thus, applying the
techniques of Grace with respect to “landmark locations” to an
intersection would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art because Jones applies a similar technique to a variety of
“geospatial entities”.
(Ans. 3).
Appellant argues the following:
GRACE et al. makes no mention of analyzing intersections
(i.e., “analyzing the set of intersections to identify a plurality of
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target intersections in the set of intersections for a navigated
route”). Accordingly, cited sections in GRACE et al. does not
disclose to “ranking of intersections themselves,” as cited in
amended claim 1.

(Appeal Br. 34).
Appellant submits that “ranking geospatial entities for the
purposes of displaying the entities on a map according to rank”
as cited in paragraphs 0021 and 0023\2 of JONES et al. is not
the same as “identifying a plurality of intersections from a set
of intersections along a navigated route,” as recited in
independent claim 1. Rather, JONES et al. relates to
“displaying the entities according to rank” (paragraph 0021 of
JONES et al.). According, JONES et al. does not make up for
the foregoing deficiencies of GRACE et al.

(Appeal Br. 35).
We agree with Appellant that the disclosure in Grace of “the more
compensation the landmark owner is willing to pay, the higher the rank of
the landmark/promotion” (Grace ¶ 35), does not equate to “identifying, by
the device and based on the plurality of target intersections, a set of
landmark locations.” It is not apparent and the Examiner does not explain
how Grace discloses the claimed plurality of target intersections in the set of
intersections is used to determine a navigated route. Instead, Grace discloses
that “[t]he route determination component 220, uses the landmarks included
in the route and landmark database 204 to determine one or more landmarks
located at the direction point.” Grace ¶ 34. Thus, the routes in Grace are
determined directly based on landmarks which are ranked as opposed to
using targeted intersections. In other words, in Grace, ranking can result in a
landmark being missed by virtue of a low or no ranking which can effect
route determination without difference to intersections.
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We further disagree with the Examiner that Jones makes up for this
deficiency. The Examiner cites to paragraphs 21 and 22 (Final Act. 9)
which discloses inter alia, geospatial entities which are, like those in Grace,
also ranked by “potential origins, destinations, or waypoints in navigation
computations; and other uses where an estimation of a most popular or most
interesting subset of geospatial entities is desired.” Jones ¶ 22. Therefore, it
is not apparent and the Examiner does not explain how using the ranked
geospatial entities of Jones remedies the likewise ranking of landmarks
disclosed by Grace to result in the claimed, “identify[ing] a plurality of
target intersections in the set of intersections for a navigated route;
identifying, by the device and based on the plurality of target intersections, a
set of landmark locations.” Accordingly, the rejection of record of claim 1 is
not sustained.
Because claims 3–8, 19–24, and 28–36, depend from claims 1, 17, and
26 and we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 1, 17, and 26, the rejection
of claims 3–8, 19–24, and 28–36 likewise cannot be sustained.

NEW GROUNDS–35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We enter a new ground of rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 17, 19–24, 26,
and 28–33 under our authority in 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Claim 1 is
representative.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
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management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.

USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55.
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states: “The present disclosure relates generally to
systems and methods for advertising. More particularly, and without
limitation, the present disclosure relates to systems and methods for
location-based advertising . . . .” ¶ 2.
Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:
querying, . . . one or more databases to generate a set of
intersections on a map, the set of intersections including
information related to:
traffic volume data,
frequency of use, and
demographic information;
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analyzing, by the device, at least one of:
the traffic volume data,
the frequency of use, or
the demographic information associated with the set of
intersections to identify a plurality of target intersections in the
set of intersections for a navigated route;
identifying, . . . based on the plurality of target
intersections, a set of landmark locations;
detecting, . . . at least one target intersection of the
plurality of target intersections in a route requested by a user . .
.;
. . . determining a location of the user . . .;
determining, . . . that the user device is within a
predetermined distance to the at least one target intersection of
the plurality of target intersections in the route requested by the
user . . .;
auctioning, . . . an advertisement space to a plurality of
advertisers for presenting an advertisement associated with at
least one landmark location, of the set of landmark locations,
associated with the route that includes the at least one target
intersection;
receiving, . . . and based on detecting the at least one
target intersection, a request from at least one advertiser of the
plurality of advertisers to reference at least one landmark
location associated with the at least one advertiser, of the set of
landmark locations, in association with a particular guidance
maneuver of a plurality of guidance maneuvers, the plurality of
guidance maneuvers being associated with the route requested
by the user . . . , the at least one advertiser offering a highest bid
for the advertisement space; and
providing, . . . the user and responsive to receiving the
request from the at least one advertiser, the plurality of
guidance maneuvers and the advertisement, the advertisement
being provided for display in association only with the
particular guidance maneuver, and the advertisement being
provided in relation to directions from the particular guidance
maneuver to the at least one landmark location.

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Accordingly, we find that claim 1 sets forth a location based
advertising scheme referencing at least one landmark location associated
with the at least one advertiser using a plurality of target intersections for a
navigated route. This is an advertising, marketing or sales activity which are
part of fundamentantal economic practices and one of certain methods of
organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52; see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d
1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1596 (2017) (tailoring
content, such as targeted advertising, based on user information).
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “by a device,” and “a GPS system.” These components
are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec.
¶¶ 24, 27, 32, Figs. 1–3. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these
most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the
judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a certain
methods of organizing human activity that is not integrated into a practical
application.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to landmark based advertising does not make them any less abstract.
See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract.”).
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Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step we find claim 1 when considered as a whole in
an element or combination of elements consideration is insufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the ineligible concept itself. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims
here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to query, analyze, identify, detect, receive, and apply decision
criteria to data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—
one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer
functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . .
. those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without
special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not,
for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In
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addition, as we stated above, the claims do not affect an improvement in any
other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different
generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept
and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on
the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 24, 27, 32, Figs. 1–3.) Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (query,
analyze, identify, detect, receive, and apply decision criteria to data) and
storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract.
See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
Independent claims 17 and 26 contain similar language to that of
claim 1 and are rejected for the same reason set forth above.
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Claims 3–8, 19–24, and 28–33 depend from independent claims 1, 17,
and 26 and are directed to the same abstract idea as claim 1. See Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that when all claims are directed to
the same abstract idea, “addressing each claim of the asserted patents [is]
unnecessary.”). These dependent claims recite additional features related to
the advertising process, e.g., querying data, receiving payment. But, the
additional claim elements recited in these claims are insufficient, in our
view, to confer patent eligibility.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3–8, 17, 19–
24, 26, and 28–36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

CONCLUSION
In addition to reversing the Examiner’s rejection(s) of one or more
claims, this decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
This Decision contains a new rejection within the meaning of 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b) (2007).
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new rejection:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of
the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims
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so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the
Examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded
to the Examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard
under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .
Should the Appellant elect to prosecute further before the examiner
pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)(1), in order to preserve the right to seek
review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141 or 145 with respect to the affirmed rejection,
the effective date of the affirmance is deferred until conclusion of the
prosecution before the Examiner unless, as a mere incident to the limited
prosecution, the affirmed rejection is overcome.
If the Appellant elects prosecution before the Examiner and this does
not result in allowance of the application, abandonment or a second appeal,
this case should be returned to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
for final action on the affirmed rejection, including any timely request for
rehearing thereof.
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1, 3–8, 17,
19–24, 26,
28–33
103 Grace, Jones, Ramer 1, 3–8, 17,
19–24, 26,
28–33

34–36 103 Grace, Jones, Ramer,
Weiland
34–36
1, 3–8, 17,
19–24, 26,
28–33
101 Eligibility 1, 3–8,
17, 19–
24, 26,
28–33
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Overall
Outcome
1, 3–8, 17,
19–24, 26,
28–36
1, 3–8,
17, 19–
24, 26,
28–33

REVERSED; (37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b))