Mack Anderson

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 19, 2021

2020001896 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/341,170 07/25/2014 Mack Anderson SK10491 3155
44088 7590 01/19/2021
KAUFHOLD DIX PATENT LAW
P. O. BOX 89626
SIOUX FALLS, SD 57109
EXAMINER
SHARIEF, MOHAMMED JAMEEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/19/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jason@kaufholdlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MACK ANDERSON
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Appeal 2020-001896
Application 14/341,170
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, MERRELL C. CASHION, JR.,
and JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–8, 10, and 11. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the inventor/applicant, Mack
Anderson, as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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The invention “relates to charging devices and, more particularly,
pertains to a new charging device for charging an external electrical device
in a remote location.” Spec. 1. Claim 1 illustrates the invention:
1. A portable charging assembly comprising:
a housing;
a lever movably coupled to said housing such that said
lever is configured to be depressed;
a generator coupled to said housing;
a drive gear movably coupled to said housing, said drive
gear being movably coupled to said generator, said lever
engaging said drive gear when said lever is depressed such that
said drive gear moves said generator, said generator producing
an electrical current when said lever is depressed;
a battery coupled to said housing, said battery being
operationally coupled to said generator such that said battery is
charged by said generator;
a pair of power ports coupled to said housing, said power
ports being operationally coupled to said battery, said power
ports being selectively operationally coupled to an external
electronic device such that said battery charges the external
electronic device; and
a photovoltaic skin wrapped around an outer wall of said
housing such that said photovoltaic skin is configured to absorb
solar energy.
Independent claim 11 also recites a portable charging assembly
similar to the one recited in claim 1 but includes additional features.
Appellant requests review of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–8,
10, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dai
(US 2009/0033100 A1, published February 5, 2009), Noguchi
(US 2007/0285053 A1, published December 13, 2007), and Myer
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(US 2011/0085322 A1, published April 14, 2011). Appeal Br. 5; Non-Final
Act. 2.
Appellant designates claim 1 as representative of the subject matter
claimed and directs the arguments presented to this claim. Appeal Br. 6.
Accordingly, we limit our discussion to claim 1, and claims 2–8, 10, and 11
stand or fall with this claim.
OPINION
After review of the positions the Appellant provides in the Appeal
Brief and the Examiner provides in the Non-Final Action and the Answer,
we AFFIRM the Examiner’s prior art rejection of claims 1–8, 10, and 11
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons the Examiner presents. We add the
following for emphasis.
Claim 1
Independent claim 1 recites a portable charging assembly comprising
a photovoltaic skin wrapped around an outer wall of the portable charging
assembly housing such that said photovoltaic skin is configured to absorb
solar energy to charge a battery located within the portable charging
assembly.
The Examiner finds that Dai teaches a portable charging assembly that
differs from the claimed invention in that Dai does not disclose the portable
charging assembly as comprising (1) a battery operationally coupled to said
housing, (2) a pair of power ports coupled to said housing, said power ports
operationally coupled to said battery to facilitate charging of an external
electronic device, and (3) a photovoltaic skin wrapped around an outer wall
of the housing to absorb solar energy. Non-Final Act. 2–4. Regarding
differences (1) and (2), the Examiner finds that Noguchi teaches a portable
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charging assembly for powering devices that comprises a rechargeable
battery and output power ports. Non-Final Act. 3–4; see Noguchi ¶¶ 4, 6, 7,
38. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to modify Dai’s portable charging assembly
to include a battery and power outlet ports to provide power to different
types of devices as needed. Non-Final Act. 4; see Noguchi ¶ 36.
Regarding difference (3), the Examiner finds that Myer discloses
using a thin-film photovoltaic material as a flexible sheet to charge a battery
or energy storage device by absorbing solar energy for later use as needed.
Non-Final Act. 4; see Myer ¶¶ 7, 34, 35. The Examiner finds that Myer
teaches the photovoltaic flexible sheet as capable of taking the form of the
surface of the object it is attached to (i.e., as a skin) and that it is used to
absorb solar energy to charge a battery or energy storage device. Non-Final
Act. 4; see Myer ¶ 35. The Examiner determines that it would have been
obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to include a solar panel
skin on the housing of the portable charging assembly from the combined
teachings of Dai and Noguchi to provide an additional source of energy to
charge the battery. Non-Final Act 4.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s motivation for combining the
cited art does not address a problem that was known in the art at the time of
the invention. Appeal Br. 6. According to Appellant, the problem being
solved is to be able to lessen the physical requirements of a manual
recharging device. Id. at 7. Thus, Appellant contends that the Examiner
benefitted from impermissible hindsight because the Examiner does not
provide a reason to combine the teachings of the cited art “based on common
sense when viewing the teachings of the prior art references, in a box, and
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without using the applicant’s specification as a roadmap to the obviousness
finding.” Id.
Appellant’s arguments do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s determination of obviousness.
After careful review of the Specification, we find no mention of the
stated problem being addressed by Appellant’s invention. Nor does
Appellant point to any portion of the Specification that identifies this
problem. To the extent that Appellant in this case argues that the claimed
invention addresses a newly discovered problem, the prior art need not
suggest a combination that addresses the same problem that the claim
addresses. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In
considering motivation in the obviousness analysis, the problem examined is
not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that
confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). Therefore, we
agree with the Examiner that the arguments do not address the rejection the
Examiner presents. Ans. 5 (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981)).
Appellant argues that Dai and Noguchi do not address easing the
requirement of a manual power generator by incorporation of a solar array.
Appeal Br. 8. Appellant further argues that Myer proves only that such
technology exists, but does not bridge the gap from use in a fixed structure
to a hand cranked (or more accurately, lever depressed) generator
incorporating a photovoltaic skin as claimed. Id. Thus, Appellant contends
that the Examiner again relies on impermissible hindsight to combine the
teachings of the cited art to arrive at the claimed invention. Id.
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Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. As the
Examiner explains, Myer teaches the use of photovoltaic substances for the
purpose of collecting energy to charge a battery and that one skilled in the
art would have reasonably expected these substances to perform the same
function regardless of whether the substances are applied to a fixed object or
portable object. Ans. 3. Thus, the Examiner provides a reasonable basis
why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings
of the cited art to arrive at the claimed invention. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“For obviousness under § 103, all that is required
is a reasonable expectation of success.”). Appellant fails to explain
adequately why one of ordinary skill in the art, using no more than ordinary
creativity, would not have been capable of modifying the portable charging
assembly from the combined teachings of Dai and Noguchi by incorporating
Myer’s photovoltaic skin onto the portable charging assembly to provide an
alternate source of power to recharge a battery within the portable charging
assembly and still reasonably expect the portable charging assembly to
charge other devices. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421
(2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity,
not an automaton.”); In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(presuming skill on the part of one of ordinary skill in the art). Further, as
the Examiner states, Appellant also fails to provide evidence that using
Myer’s solar skin would have been unsuitable for the purposes of charging a
battery located in a portable charging assembly. Ans. 4.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s prior art rejection of claims 1–
8, 10, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons the Examiner presents
and those we provide above.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 10, 11 103 Dai, Noguchi,
Myer
1–8, 10, 11

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED