M. R. & R. Trucking Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 1969

178 N.L.R.B. 167 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO. 167
M. R. & R. Trucking Company' and Truck Drivers,
Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 512
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America' and Harvey D. Boatright.
Cases 12-CA-4068, 12-CA-4167, and 12-CA-4098
August 21, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On July 25, 1968, Trial Examiner William J.
Brown issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in,
and was engaging in, certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The
Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and
recommended that such allegations of the complaint
be dismissed. Thereafter, General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in
answer to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. These rulings are
hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's
Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner only to the extent consistent with the
Decision and Order herein.
We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons
set forth in his Decision, that Respondent engaged
in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
during the period that the 1967 negotiations were in
progress by (1) advising its employees that although
management was engaged in negotiating with the
Union, the negotiations would not be productive
because management would shut down its operations
rather than let the company go union ; and (2)
coercively interrogating employees regarding their
Union sentiments. We do not agree, however, with
his analysis of the evidence bearing on the 8(a)(5)
d the independent 8(a)(3) and (1) violations
alleged in the complaint. Contrary to the Trial
Examiner and for the reasons discussed below, we
'Herein referred to as Respondent.
'Herein referred to as the Union.
are persuaded rather that these allegations of the
complaint are amply supported by the record.'
1. THE 8 (A)(5) ALLEGATIONS
The issue posed by the 8(a)(5) allegations of the
complaint is whether, in meeting with the Union for
the purposes of collective bargaining on and after
July 1967, Respondent engaged in mere surface
bargaining contrary to its obligation to meet and
discuss the bargainable issues in good faith and with
a sincere willingness to reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement. According to time-honored definitions of
the broad statutory standard of "good faith,"
resolution of this issue turns on a determination of
Respondent's state of mind and requires
consideration of the totality of Respondent's
conduct, rather than the appraisal of single events or
actions each in isolation." Application of these
standards always demands, at the outset, a difficult
judgment as to what are the significant or relevant
facts. But, clearly, the "previous relations of the
parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the
bargaining table, and the course of negotiations"' all
form part of the fabric of the evidence on which the
judgment must ultimately be based. Accordingly,
while 10(b) limitations preclude our finding unlawful
in the instant case any conduct by Respondent
occurring before July 2, 1967, we have taken into
account, as relevant background, the earlier aspects
of Respondent's relationship with the Union about
which evidence was adduced." Further, in seeking to
determine whether Respondent negotiated with the
Union in good faith on and after July 2, 1967, we
have examined not only the facts descriptive of its
behavior at the bargaining table in that period but
also those descriptive of its conduct towards the
Union and the unit employees away from the
bargaining table.
Our analysis of all this evidence has, as we have
indicated, led us to conclude that although
Respondent held extended discussions with the
Union for purposes of bargaining, it did not in fact
engage in these discussions with a sincere intent to
explore or to reach a meaningful agreement with the
Union. The considerations which have impelled our
conclusion are as follows:
'We have here taken into account certain facts in addition to those set
out by the Trial Examiner . In so doing , we have relied either on
documentory evidence of undisputed validity, or on the uncontradicted
testimony of the parties.
'See, for example, N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union.
AFL-CIO. (Prudential Insurance Company of America ). 361 U.S. 477,
485; Kohler Co., 148 NLRB 1434, 1444, enfd . 345 F.2d 748 (C.A.D.C.),
cert. deniedl, 382 U.S. 836; N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co.. Inc.,
275 F.2d 229 (C.A. 5).
'Quoted from Mr . Justice Frankfurter ' s opinion in N.L .R.B. v. Truitt
Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149,155.
'The alleged violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) is limited to Respondent 's dealings
with the Union during the Union 's second certification year. However, the
earlier negotiations were documented by the record as background evidence
both to give meaning to the antecedent negotiations and to aid in the
evaluation of Respondent 's state of mind during those later negotiations.
178 NLRB No. 35
168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A Respondent s Bargaining Strategy in the
1966 Negotiations
Respondent's conduct in its 1966 negotiations
with the Union disclose a number of classic indicia
that Respondent sought to avoid rather than to
reach agreement with the Union These indicia
appear, in the main, at all points of the negotiations
at which the critical issue of wages came up for
discussion and are fully described below
Although the parties commenced their meetings in
January 1966, the wage issue was not reached for
serious discussion until the March 21 meeting ' At
that meeting, Respondent offered the Union a
contract incorporating a 7-6-7-cent-per-hour increase
over the 3-year term on which the bargaining
discussions had theretofore been based ' Although
the Union then told Respondent that it did not
regard the offered increase as adequate, it
reconsidered the matter after the meeting had
adjourned and advised Respondent a few days later
that it was now willing to submit a contract
containing the 7-6-7-cent wage increase offer to a
vote of the employees By letter dated March 29,
Respondent advised the Union that as the Union
had failed to accept the wage proposal at the March
21 meeting, the offer had lapsed and that
Respondent was not willing to grant a contract on
that basis No economic justification for the
withdrawal of the wage proposal was offered to the
Union Nor was any asserted at the hearing' In
these circumstances, and in light of what follows, we
can only conclude that Respondent chose to renege
on the wage proposal solely because it believed that
it would be unable to avoid agreement on a contract
if it left its offer open
At a meeting held in April, the Union attempted
to elicit Respondent's revival of the 7-6-7-cent wage
offer, and, referring to the matter, voiced strong
objections to Respondent's having withdrawn that
offer In response , Respondent referred to the
Union's interim actions in filing with the Board a
number of unfair labor charges involving this unit,
and of a series of representation petitions for units
of employees at other of Respondent' s terminals 10
Respondent told the Union that it would not now
make any wage increase proposal unless and until
'The previous meetings of the parties had been devoted primarily to
discussion of noncost items According to the testimony of McKenzie and
Currie, Respondent' s chief negotiators the parties had by March 21
reached substantial agreement on most of the noncost items submitted to
negotiation
'The Trial Examiner incorrectly described this offer as being for 7-6 6
cents
When McKenzie Respondent ' s president was cross-examined at the
hearing as to why the wage offer was withdrawn he testified We were
still negotiating a contract and we made the offer at that time and it was
not accepted That s all I care to state about it When pressed further for
an explanation McKenzie replied I don t recall why There s no reason
for me telling you I do when I don't
Following Respondents unexplained withdrawal of the wage offer the
Union filed a refusal to bargain charge As noted below this charge was
subsequently withdrawn
(1) the Board disposed of the pending charges or the
Union withdrew them, and (2) the Union abandoned
its organizational efforts at the other terminals "
At subsequent meetings, Respondent continued to
explain in terms of the Union's other organizational
activities its unwillingness to agree to any contract
contemplating an increase in wage rates Thus, at a
meeting in June or July, Respondent told the Union
it would accept a contract similar to the one the
Union had negotiated with the Miller Tank
Company (an unrelated Employer) on condition that
the Union discontinue organizing at its other
terminals In rejecting that proposal, the Union
noted, i nter aha that the 5-year term of the Miller
Tank contract was longer than any term on which
the parties' negotiations had theretofore been based,
and that the Union did not want a contract for so
long a term
In September, the parties met under the auspices
of a mediator from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service By that time, the Board
elections at other terminals had been concluded As
these elections had resulted in the Union's victory at
only one of the several terminals the Union had
attempted to organize, the Union pressed
Respondent to reconsider its position on wages for
this unit of employees It offered to accept from
Respondent the 7-6-7-cent wage increase
Respondent had proposed in March, or a 1-year
contract limited to a 5-cent wage increase In
rejecting both of these proposals, Respondent
indicated that it would not now acquiesce in any
wage increase proposal because the Union's limited
success in organizing the other terminals had
strengthened Respondent's bargaining position and
had insured it of the Union's inability to exert
effective strike pressures
At the next meeting of the parties, held on
October 6, Respondent again refused to consider
any contract contemplating a wage increase This
time, however, Respondent grounded its refusal on
the fact that the Union's certification year was
about to expire And it suggested that the Union file
a new representation petition-this, though 2 months
still remained before the end of the certification year
and, as Respondent admitted at the hearing, there
"Previously filed unfair labor practice charges alleged violations of Sec
8(a)(5) (3 ) and (1) of the Act The 8(a)(3) charges (which alleged
discrimination against two employees ) were disposed of by formal
settlement procedures , and a decree based upon the same was entered on
or about March 28 1966 The Union withdrew its 8(a)(5) charges
sometime in the summer of 1966
The then pending representation petitions (some of which were filed by
sister locals and some by the Union ) culminated in the conduct of elections
by the Board at five terminals The Union succeeded in winning the
election at one of the terminals -that located in Quincy Florida A sister
local won the election at the Pensacola terminal But no union won the
elections conducted at the Atlanta Georgia or at the Marianna and
Tallahassee Florida terminals
"Under well settled precedents the imposition of such conditions as a
prerequisite to the negotiation of bargainable matters constitutes a clear
manifestation of bad faith See for example Greer Stop Nut Co 162
NLRB 626 630, and cases there cited
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO.,
was in fact no question in Respondent's mind that
the Union continued to enjoy the support of a
majority of the unit employees.12
The October meeting was the last one held for
purposes of bargaining during the first year of the
Union's incumbency as the Union thereafter chose
to follow Respondent's suggestion and seek a new
certification through the Board's election
procedures. Respondent then proceeded to use the
pre-election period to conduct a vigorous campaign
among its employees for the Union's ouster.
Significantly, in the course of this campaign, it
informed its employees that it had established fringe
benefits and increased wage rates for employees at
terminals where the Union had lost elections, and
had deliberately withheld these benefits from the
unit employees assertedly because it needed "to
cover the additional expenses brought about by the
presence of a union.""
Despite the foregoing, the Union won the second
election. But, as subsequent events were to prove,
Respondent remained determined that its employees
would not gain any substantial benefits by choosing
to remain committed to Union representation.
B. Respondent's Strategy During the 1967
Negotiations
Turning now to the period covered by complaint,
we find ample indicia that Respondent approached
the 1967 negotiations still determined to withhold
from the employees any economic fruits of
bargaining and to avoid the consummation of
agreement. We note particularly the following:
In the contract proposal which Respondent
prepared after the Union obtained its second
certification and which it submitted to the Union at
the July 21, 1967, meeting, Respondent offered
terms and conditions of employment less favorable
to the employees than those it had tentatively agreed
to grant in the course of the earlier negotiations.
Thus, by the conclusion of the 1966 negotiations
"Respondent ' s president , McKenzie, admitted at the hearing that
Respondent had no basis for questioning the Union's majority status, but
nonetheless suggested that the Union file a representation petition at the
end of the certification year so as to prove its majority status anew. The
Union thereafter decided that an election might afford it an advantageous
opportunity to demonstrate its bargaining strength to Respondent, and
accordingly filed the petition which ultimately resulted in the Union's
recertification.
"The letter stated, inter alia-
As you may or may not know, we are currently paying $3 20 an hour in
Tallahassee and Pensacola and $3.32 an hour in Atlanta This terminal
did not receive the increase given these other three terminals this year.
The law prohibits a unilateral pay increase . Also, a pension plan has
been put in and is in effect at all terminals not represented by a union
You have not been left out of the pension plan and you have not been
overlooked in the raise to either intimidate, punish or threaten you. The
presence of the union has cost your Company a large sum in legal fees,
travel expenses and other costs. If the Union had not been present these
sums could have been available for pay and fringe benefit increases By
not granting you a pay increase or including you under the pension plan,
we have just about been able to cover the additional expenses brought
about by the presence of a union.
169
Respondent had agreed, inter alia , to Union
requests for a 30-day probationary period for new
employees, Memorial Day as a paid holiday,
overtime pay after 48 hours, and the availability of
arbitration to dischargees. But Respondent's July 21
draft retracted these items although they were of
relatively little cost to it, by reverting to a 90-day
probationary period, the exclusion of Memorial Day
as a paid holiday, payment at overtime rates after
60 hours, and a prohibition against dischargees from
utilizing arbitration.
Respondent adhered to its "new" proposal on the
probationary period throughout the first and part of
the second of the three pre-strike negotiation
sessions held with the Union before it agreed to
modify the proposal in accord with its 1966
committments. It adhered to its less favorable
paid-holiday proposal until the third meeting before
it conceded that it had already granted Memorial
Day as a paid holiday and that the currently
proposed exclusion was in error. It never modified
its current definition of arbitrable grievances and it
does not appear that Respondent ever acceded to
the earlier 1966 tentative agreement regarding
overtime.
Respondent's current contract draft also expanded
upon the "management rights" clauses through
which Respondent sought to reserve to itself a
virtually complete and unreviewable right to change
the amount and character of unit work; to
determine at its discretion what constituted "just
cause" for discharge; and, under other of its broadly
defined managerial prerogatives and its restrictive
limitation of arbitrable grievances, to remove most
of the significant terms and conditions of
employment from the area of negotiation and
agreement."' Respondent refused to modify any of
these management right proposals. By contrast, it
adamantly insisted on a rigid no-strike clause.'s
"As described by Respondent in its brief, "Respondent's '67
management rights proposal differed from its '66 proposal in that the right
to sub-contract was broadened and a provision was added to the effect that
the rights of management could not be impaired by arbitration."
Respondent's definition of its "management rights" was contained in
article III, and read as follows:
The Company retains the sole right to manage its business, including but
not limited to the rights to decide the location of its terminal; the
method and processes to be employed at said terminal ; the number of
types of equipment , machinery , materials and supplies to be used,
operated , shipped or distributed ; the size and composition of the working
force, plus the rights to hire, assign, lay-off, recall , transfer and promote
employees , to maintain order and efficiency in its terminal operations, to
set job requirements and determine the individual qualifications of all
employees ; to determine the starting and quitting times and the number
of hours to be worked , to discontinue , transfer , subcontract or assign all
or any part of its business operations; to control, regulate , or discontinue
the use of supplies, machinery , equipment , vehicles and other property
owned , used , possessed or leased by the Company, and all other rights
and prerogatives including those exercised unilaterally in the past,
subject only to such regulations and restrictions governing the exercise of
these rights as are expressly provided in this Agreement "
"The no-strike clause proposed, inter alia , that any discharge of striking
employees would remain "final" irrespective of the ultimate determination
of any claims that the strike action was provoked by management action in
violation of contractual commitments or by contract in derogation of
170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In light of the knowledge Respondent had
acquired of the Union's objectives during the 1966
negotiations, and the efforts Respondent then had
made to frustrate agreement, we cannot view
Respondent's "new" proposals as just hard
bargaining We believe rather that Respondent
deliberately meant to frame a contract proposal it
could reasonably predict the Union would not
accept, and by compelling discussion of matters
seemingly settled in 1966, to prolong and to impede
the conduct of the new negotiations This conclusion
is buttressed by the peripheral acts of coercion
committed by Respondent's supervisors during the
period the current negotiations were going on We
note, for example, that employees were explicitly
told by supervisors that McKenzie "would close the
doors" and "let the grass grow under the trucks
before he would let [the Company] go union" and
that the employees would be earning $3 30 per hour
but for the presence of the Union
The attitude of predetermined intransigence with
which Respondent discussed its above-described
proposals on matters of known importance to the
Union was even more marked when the critical issue
of wages was reached The first and only offer on
wages which Respondent made in the 1967
negotiations [0-5-5 cents] contemplated less of a
wage increase than any other offer Respondent had
made in 1966 It was put on the bargaining table at
the second meeting of the parties held on August 11
and as later events reveal, Respondent advanced this
offer on a basis which in effect said "take it or leave
it " Thus, in describing the results of the August 11
meeting in a notice to its employees posted 6 days
later, Respondent quoted the terms of the offer,
characterized it as the Company's "best offer for a
3-year contract," and after noting the Union's
rejection, added "The Union has requested another
meeting with the Company, for what purpose we do
not know ' This hasty announcement that an
impasse had almost been reached after only two
bargaining sessions, can hardly be said to show that
Respondent was willing to negotiate further with a
view to narrowing the gaps to contractual accord 16
Indeed, as subsequent events proved, Respondent
had in fact made up its mind by then that the Union
would either have to take the contract as offered at
the August 11 meeting, or have no contract at all
These events establish that Respondent anticipated
the Union's rejection of this contract offer and the
Union's possible resort to strike action and
considered the latter alternative as proferring to
Respondent a means of ridding itself of any
obligation to deal with the Union
rights otherwise protected by the Act The Union was unwilling to yield to
the no strike provision unless in return either ( 1) the arbitration forum
was left open to it as a means of settling grievances arising from
Respondents exercise of its defined management rights in areas of
legitimate interest to the employees or (2) the proposed definition of
management rights was cut down Respondent flatly rejected all Union
contract proposals on these matters
"Cf Peter Satori Co Ltd 175 NLRB No 6
As above indicated, one more meeting was held
after the above "impasse" announcement This
meeting occurredon August 31 and was followed, 1
week later, by the announcement of a strike
At this August 31 meeting Respondent refused,
except in only two minor respects, to revise any part
of its contract offer " Although the Union presented
counterproposals framed with a view to offering
some settlement of the contract issues on a 1-year
contract basis, rather than the 3-year basis on which
the parties had previously been negotiating,
Respondent flatly rejected the Union's
counterproposals And, in our view, the attitude
with which Respondent received, considered, and
rejected the counterproposals plainly reflected its
bargaining frame of mind Respondent failed to give
any reason for its rejection other than that it was
"not interested" in a 1-year contract because it was
now in a "strong position" and therefore saw no
"reason to make any changes in position at this
time " These comments were scarely calculated to
provide a proper basis for discussion, such as a
good-faith bargaining requires is
But, apart from the foregoing, a number of
actions taken by Respondent immediately after the
September 6 strike began, exposed Respondent's
intent to deprive its employees of their right to
bargain collectively
First In offering and filling unit jobs after the
strike, Respondent unilaterally eliminated any
probationary requirement (theretofore established at
90 days) and increased the starting rate from $2 90
to $3 per hour As Respondent never offered the
Union a contract incorporating such conditions at
any time here relevant, its action necessarily had the
effect of discrediting the Union's status in the eyes
of the employees and plainly constituted the kind of
unilateral action independently supporting the
alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act i9
Respondent contends, however, that the above
changes were justifiable incidents of its economic
need to operate during the strike It argaes in this
respect that it could hardly be expected to attract
applicants willing to cross a picket line by offering
jobs conditioned on probationary service
requirements But, although this argument may be
plausible in another context, it is not supported by
the objective facts here For, by Respondent's own
admission, its advertisement for striker-replacements
"One of the two revisions included the establishment of Memorial Day
as a paid holiday Respondent admitted that as it had already given
employees this paid holiday it had been in error in faiiing to include this
item as part of the contract proposals
"As was stated by the Court in N L R B v George P Palling and Son
Co 119 F 2d 32 37 (C A 3) in explaining the operation of good faith
bargaining there must be common willingness among the parties to
discuss freely and fully their respective claims and demands and when
these are opposed to justify them on reason When the proffered support
fails to persuade or if for any cause resistance to the claim remains it is
then that compromise comes into play
"Cf N L R B v Crompton Highland Mills Inc 337 U S 217 and
Kohler Co 128 NLRB 1062 1082 83
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO.
attracted more than 100 applicants for the
approximately 25 full-time positions it had to fill.
No showing was made that it could not have
obtained all or any of the applicants it needed by
conditioning hire on the basis of the normal 90-day
probationary period or the theretofore prevailing
$2.90 starting rate.
In any event, Respondent does not explain away
its undisputed failure to advise the Union at any
time thereafter that it was willing to enter into a
contract which wholly eliminated any probationary
requirements and insured a permanent starting rate
for all those in the unit of 10 cents per hour more
than had been paid before the strike. Respondent's
failure to make this offer to the Union was
especially demonstrative of bad faith in light of the
facts that: (1) Respondent was offered an
opportunity to do so, when, pursuant to new efforts
made by the Union to settle the strike, the parties
met on November 22; and (2) Respondent was at all
times here relevant aware that shortening of the
probationary period had consistently been requested
by the Union as part of its bargaining proposals.
Second: On September 12, 1967, Respondent
invoked the severe sanction of discharge against
eight striking employees theretofore employed as
"casuals," by notifying all of them that their jobs
had been abolished and their employment
terminated. Despite the plain language of these
notices, Respondent would nonetheless have us
conclude that the notices did not in fact accomplish
discharges, but that they merely implemented
Respondent's "temporary" decision to reduce its
employee complement in the face of the strike. In
support of this position, Respondent's witnesses
testified that they had never in fact decided
I permanently to abolish the "casual" job
classifications, and had indeed filled these jobs with
new employees sometime after September 12 and
before any strikers applied for reinstatement.
However, as Respondent never retracted the notices
it issued to the striking "casuals" on September 12,
the above-described testimony of its witnesses serves
but to reinforce the conclusion that Respondent
meant effectively to discharge these employees,20 and
that it did so because they went on strike. Such
discharge action is plainly violative of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.21
Third: At a meeting of the parties called on
November 22 by a Federal mediator at the Union's
request, Respondent did not even pretend an interest
in settling the strike or in discussing the terms of a
contract. It not only advised the Union that it was
unwilling to consider any Union proposal which
"As was pointedly noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a
similarly postured situation , "[N]o set words are necessary to constitute a
discharge ; words or conduct, which would logically lead an employee to
believe his tenure had been terminated , are in themselves sufficient "
N L R B v Cement Masons Local No 555. etc (Anderson-Westphall
Co ). 225 F 2d 168, 172
"See Cincinnati Cordage and Paper Co, 141 NLRB 72, 76, and cases
there cited.
171
looked to the reinstatement of striking employees,
but, by its own admission, it flatly turned down the
Union's invitation to state the terms, if any, on
which Respondent was now prepared to contract
with the Union, assertedly because Respondent
believed it futile.22 Although the attitude Respondent
thus evinced at this meeting was calculated to insure
the meeting's futility and is sufficient to establish a
lack of any intent to bargain in good faith, it is also
illuminating to consider what seems to us to be the
real reason prompting Respondent's stand. Though
not expressly stated, the reason for Respondent's
present attitude is clearly apparent from the record:
Respondent felt that if a contract were avoided, the
end of the certification year would provide it with
the opportunity to rid itself of the Union once and
for all. Thus, Respondent's officials had made it
plain that they did not want the Union; that they
believed Respondent had succeeded in breaking the
strike;" and that as the strike replacements it had
hired were not likely to be Union adherents, the
time was ripe for a new election test. We note
particularly in this connection, that Respondent filed
a representation petition with the Board on
December 18, 1967, promptly upon the expiration of
the Union's second certification year but 4 weeks
after the November 22 meeting.
To conclude, the totality of the above conduct by
Respondent at and away from the bargaining table
plainly reveals a state of mind antithetical to the
concept of good-faith bargaining and committed to
the undermining of the Union and the
collective-bargaining process in the eyes of its
employees. Without giving conclusive weight to any
one element, we find, upon due consideration of all
relevant circumstances, that in conducting its
negotiations with the Union, Respondent at all
times here material was committed to, and utilized,
a purposeful strategy of only going through the
motions of bargaining without any bona fide intent
to strive for a mutually satisfactory agreement, and
thereby violated the duty to bargain in good faith as
required by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
We further find that the strike which began on
September 6, 1967, is attributable, at least in part,
to Respondent's failure to bargain in good faith and
its firm and fixed intent to frustrate the
collective-bargaining rights afforded its employees
"In describing Respondent ' s stand at this meeting , Currie admitted that
after Respondent rejected the Union's proposal , the Union asked if
Respondent had anything to offer by way of an agreement , but that
Respondent refused to make any offers assertedly because it had no
intention of firing any of the poststrike employees to whom it had
promised permanent jobs and felt it futile "to talk about" any economic
proposals , unless the Union were willing to concede the "situation as the
permanent replacements which I assumed that they weren't "
"Currie's testimony alone shows that he in effect informed the Union at
this meeting that Respondent believed that it had no ecomonic need to
settle the strike or to contract with the Union. He told the Union, that
although Respondent had incurred expenses related to the strike , "we had
secured additional rights, and we're doing well, in that we had a good deal
of business , although, of course, we lost some business because of the
strike "
172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the Act. "' We hold , accordingly , that the strike
was caused and prolonged by Respondent ' s unfair
labor practices.25
C. Respondent's Denial of its Striking
Employees' Reinstatement Requests
Respondent's refusal to honor reinstatement
requests made by, or on behalf of, its striking
employees some months after the strike's
commencement was specifically alleged as violative
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. This allegation
was based on the theory we have sustained above,
that the strike was at all times relevant an unfair
labor practice strike.
The complaint, as litigated at the hearing, alleged
that striker Harvey Boatright made a personal
request for reinstatement on or about January 8,
1968, which Respondent refused to honor on the
ground that it had permanently replaced Boatright;
that the Union made an unconditional request for
reinstatement on behalf of all strikers on March 5
or 11, 1968; that Respondent refused to honor the
latter request on the similar ground that it had hired
permanent replacements for each of the strikers'
jobs and had no vacancies; and that Respondent's
refusal of the reinstatement requests of these unfair
labor practice strikers therefore violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The relevant facts bearing on these 8(a)(3)
allegations are substantially undisputed. They are as
follows:
1. Boatright
Boatright, like the other employees, went on
strike on September 6, 1967. He returned to work
for 1 day on September 11, 1967, and then rejoined
the strike. On September 14, Respondent hired a
replacement for Boatright. According to the
testimony of Respondent's terminal manager,
Raulerson, Boatright called Raulerson several weeks
later and stated that he was returning to work,
Raulerson replied that he would have to check
whether Boatright could be rehired, and he then
called Currie. Currie advised Raulerson that as a
permanent replacement had been hired for Boatright
and as there were no vacancies at the terminal,
Respondent had no obligation to rehire him.
Raulerson called Boatright's home and left a
message with Boatright's wife that Boatright could
not be rehired. Raulerson did not hear from
Boatright again until the early part of January 1968,
"Where, as here , there is substantial evidence of a nexus between an
Employer ' s unfair labor practices and a strike, the fact that striking
employees may also have been motivated in part by economic interests in
supporting the strike does not preclude a finding that the strike was an
unfair labor practice strike in character . Cf Wittock Supply Company,
171 NLRB No. 33
"General Drivers and Helpers Union , Local 662 , International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (Rice Lake Creamery Co) v. N L R B, 302
F.2d 908, 911 (C.A D.C ).
when Boatright called and informed him that he was
filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board.
Boatright did thereafter file a charge with the
Board. This charge, dated January 23, 1968, alleged
that Respondent denied Boatright reinstatement in
violation of 8(a)(3). When Respondent received
notice of Boatright's charge, Currie wrote a letter to
a Board agent dated February 12, 1968, stating,
inter alia: "[T]he facts on the 8(a)(3) charge filed by
Mr. Boatright does not appear to be in any serious
conflict and the matter appears to be a question of
law. The question as I see it resolves itself to
whether or not an employer who has permanently
replaced an economic striker, who later indicates his
desire to return to work, has an obligation to keep
in touch with or notify said striker . . . when a job
becomes available [Emphasis supplied]." In the
same letter Currie further stated that Respondent
would be willing to consider Boatright for an
opening if he was "interested in applying again."
Based upon the foregoing, we find that although
the record does not establish the exact date in
January on which Boatright telephoned Raulerson
to request his immediate rehire, Boatright's
telephonic request was sufficient to establish
Respondent's obligation to reinstate him, and that
his request was made during the "early part" of
January 1968. As Respondent admittedly rejected
Boatright's application on the clearly unsupportable
legal ground that the job was occupied by a
permanent replacement, it follows that Respondent's
failure and refusal to rehire Boatright was in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.26
2. The remaining strikers
Following the termination of the November 22
meeting described above, the parties had no further
communication with each other until about March
1, 1968,27 when Union representative Carpenter
contacted Currie for the purpose of settling the
strike. Currie informed Carpenter that there was
some possibility of working out a settlement
regarding the reemployment of some of the strikers,
and asked Carpenter to find out how many strikers
wished to return to work . The next day Carpenter
called Currie and told him that between 22 and 25
men wished to resume employment . Both then
discussed the possibility of returning some strikers
to work and placing the remainder on a preferential
list if the strike were settled . Subsequently , by letter
dated March 5, Union President Turner informed
Respondent ; ". . . we are ready to resume
"The exact day on which Boatright applied for reinstatement is a matter
which can be established at the compliance stage of this proceeding and is
relevant to a determination as to the time when, in accord with our
remedial order herein, Respondent ' s backpay obligation to Boatright shall
have commenced to run in the circumstances of this case, we find,
however, that in no event shall backpay be established as running from a
date before January 8 , or subsequent to January 15, 1968.
"Meanwhile , on January 2, the Union filed the charges initiating this
proceeding
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO.
negotiations with you, and are hereby requesting
that all the people who are on strike be returned to
their jobs." Currie in turn asked that the Union
clarify its March 5, 1968, letter. In response, on
March 11, the Union wrote Respondent, that, inter
alia , it was "requesting unconditionally, the
reinstatement of the strikers . . . to their former or
equivalent jobs" and that it was discontinuing its
strike and picket line at 8 a.m.on Wednesday, March
13, 1968. Shortly after receiving this letter, Currie
spoke to Turner by telephone and told him that it
was impossible to settle the strike on the basis of the
previous discussion he had had with Carpenter.
In disclaiming that its refusal to reinstate the
strikers violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,
Respondent mainly relies on a contention we have
already rejected as untenable - namely that the
strikers were economic strikers who had been
permanently replaced. In addition, Respondent also
claims special justification for refusing the Union's
March 11 reinstatement request because: (1) it had
an established policy requiring that employment
applicants personally appear at its plant , for
interviews as a condition of employment; and (2) the
Union's blanket request was not a valid
"unconditional" request because it sought the
reinstatement of all strikers, some of whom
Respondent was not obligated to reinstate in view of
their strike misconduct. We consider each of these
contentions separately.
There is no evidence that the "personal interview"
policy on which Respondent would justify its refusal
to rehire the strikers was applicable, or had in fact
ever been applied, to any individual other than one
seeking initial employment with Respondent.28 Nor
is there any showing, in any event, that this policy
was communicated to the Union or its employees. It
appears, rather, that Respondent' s contention is an
afterthought. In these circumstances, and as the
Union was unquestionably the authorized
representative of the striking employees on whose
behalf it requested reinstatement,29 we find no merit
in that part of Respondent's defense based on its
personal interview policy.
We also find without merit Respondent's
contention that by making a blanket reinstatement
request the Union was in effect, making an "all or
none" request, viz one serving notice on Respondent
that in the event it chose to deny reinstatement to
strikers it deemed guilty of strike misconduct and to
offer work only to the remainder, the strike would
not be abandoned.30 There is nothing in the record
which supports Respondent's contention. On the
"Respondent' s striking employees did not , of course , lose their employee
status as a consequence of their engagement in the strike . See Sec 2(3) of
the Act
"It is well established that a union representing strikers may validly
make a blanket unconditional application on behalf of the strikers for
reinstatement to their jobs . See, for example , Elmira Machine and
Specialty Works. Inc. 148 NLRB 1695, 1702-03.
173
contrary, as the testimony of Respondent's own
witnesses reveals, the Union had responded
affirmatively to the tentative suggestion Respondent
made in early March that perhaps "something"
could be worked out by the parties so that some of
the strikers could come back at that time."
We conclude, accordingly, that Respondent
unjustifiably refused to honor the reinstatement
request made by the Union on behalf of its striking
employees and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.32
In framing a remedy for the Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) violations found above, we have given due
consideration to evidence of strike misconduct which
Respondent adduced with respect to 2 of the 26
strikers named in the complaint, namely, Sowell and
Huskey.
Respondent established that both Sowell and
Huskey were adjudged by the Circuit Court of
Duval County, Florida, to be in contempt of that
Court's previously issued injunction. More
specifically, the Court found that Sowell had
threatened nonstriker John Plummer at the latter's
house and also threatened striker-replacement
Edward Tukes at Respondent's terminal with
violence and physical harm. As to Huskey, the
Court found that he threatened striker-replacement
Clifford Strickland with violence and attempted to
cause a collision while Strickland was driving one of
Respondent's trucks.
The foregoing evidence establishes that (1)
Respondent had reasonable basis to believe Sowell
and Huskey committed the acts of strike misconduct
described by the Court's decision; and (2) these acts
of misconduct were of a serious enough nature to
excuse Respondent from any remedial duty to
reinstate Sowell and Huskey." Accordingly, as
General Counsel adduced no countervailing
evidence, we shall exclude Sowell and Huskey from
the provisions of our reinstatement and backpay
order.34
"Beaver Bros Baking Co ,Inc , 171 NLRB No. 98, a case Respondent
cites in support of its position , is wholly distinguishable There, the
employer responded to a striking union's blanket reinstatement letter by
offering to take back all strikers other than certain named strikers who
had been guilty of strike misconduct and on whom the employer thereafter
served termination notices The union thereupon told the employer that
none of the strikers would come back unless the employer agreed to take
all with no exception The Board held that in such circumstances the union
had attached to its reinstatement offer a condition which Respondent did
not have to honor
"Currie testified that, in the course of his preliminary discussions with
the Union on the matter of striker -reinstatement , he mentioned the names
of four strikers whom Respondent was unwilling to reinstate in any event
because of strike misconduct - namely, Mosely, Rice, Huskey, and Sowell
But Currie did not claim, and the record does not otherwise show, that the
Union insisted upon the reinstatement of any of these named strikers
"Having found that Respondent violated Section 8 (a)(3) by refusing to
reinstate unfair labor practice strikers , we find it unnecessary to pass upon
the applicability of the principles set forth in N L R B v Fleetwood
Trailer Co, 389 U S. 375, and The Laidlaw Corporation , 171 NLRB No
175, enfd 414 F.2d 99.
"Cf Davis Wholesale Co, Inc, 165 NLRB No 40
"Under the rule of proof enunciated in Rubin Bros Footwear , Inc, 99
NLRB 610, and approved by the Supreme Court in N.L R B v Burnup &
174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to
cease and desist from the unfair labor practices
found and to take the affirmative action as set forth
below which we find will effectuate the policies of
the Act.
As we have found that Respondent refused to
reinstate Harvey D. Boatright in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that
Respondent offer to Harvey D. Boatright immediate
reinstatement to his same or substantially equivalent
position with full restoration of seniority and other
benefits he would have enjoyed had he not been
discriminated against. Respondent shall also be
required to make Harvey D. Boatright whole for
any loss of income he may have suffered as a result
of the discrimination against him. As noted above at
footnote 26, such backpay shall in no event be
established as running from a date before January 8,
1968, or subsequent to January 15, 1968. As
Respondent has discriminated against the unfair
labor practice strikers named in the attached Notice
marked "Appendix" by discharging some of the
strikers and by refusing to reinstate the others upon
their application, we shall order Respondent to offer
them immediate reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions without prejudice
to seniority or other rights and privileges,
discharging if necessary any replacements.
Respondent shall also be required to make these
strikers whole for any losses in wages they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced
against them since March 11, 1968, the date of their
unconditional application for reinstatement."
Backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth
in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, plus
interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Having found that Respondent did not bargain in
good faith, we shall order it to bargain collectively
with the Union with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and embody in a signed
agreement any understanding reached.
Sims, 379 U.S. 21, the burden of proving that Sowell and Huskey did not
in fact commit the acts of misconduct described above rested with the
General Counsel once Respondent established , as we have found , that it
had reason to believe that they committed the acts in question. Member
Brown would find that the acts of misconduct attributed to Sowell and
Huskey are insufficient to support denial of their right to reinstatement
and backpay.
"In light of the fact that the "casuals " were on strike at the time of
their discharge and did not indicate a desire to return to work until March
11, 1968, when they applied for reinstatement , we shall, in accordance with
well-established Board principles , refuse to award them backpay while they
were withholding their services irrespective of the fact that they were
discharged . Cf. Sea- Way Distributing. Inc., 143 NLRB 460 Member
Brown , for reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Sea-Way
Distributing , would grant backpay from the date these strikers were
unlawfully discharged.
Because the violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
found herein are of the type that strike at the very
heart of the Act, we shall also order Respondent to
cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon
the exercise of employee rights. N.L . R.B. v.
Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4);
California Lingerie Inc., 129 NLRB 912, 915.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees regarding their
union membership and by threatening to shut down
operations rather than to recognize the Union,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discriminatorily discharging the "casual"
employees because of their activities on behalf of the
Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
5. By refusing to reinstate unfair labor practice
strikers upon their unconditional applications for
reinstatement, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
6. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent,
M.R. & R. Trucking Company, Jacksonville,
Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the following action:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by
interrogating them as to their union sentiments and
by threatening to shut down Company operations
rather than recognize the Union.
(b) Discouraging membership in the Union or any
other labor organization, by terminating the
employee status of unfair labor practice strikers or
by denying them reinstatement upon their
unconditional application to return to work, or by in
any other manner discriminating against an
employee in regard to his hire, tenure, or other
terms and conditions of employment.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO.
representative of all its employees in the following
appropriate unit:
All city pickup and delivery drivers, dockmen,
and helpers employed at Respondent's
Jacksonville, Florida, facility excluding office
clericals, over-the-road drivers, salesmen,
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in Section 2(1) of the Act.
(d) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist the Union or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the heretofore
described appropriate unit and embody any
understanding reached in a signed contract.
(b) Offer to the employees listed in the attached
notice marked "Appendix" immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority and other rights and privileges, and make
them whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced
against them in the manner set forth in the section
of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Notify the above employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of
their right to full reinstatement upon application in
.accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board and its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary in determining the
amount due as backpay.
(e) Post at its Jacksonville, Florida, terminal
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."36
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 12, shall, after being
duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this
175
Decision and Order, what steps Respondent has
taken to comply herewith.
"In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees as to their
membership in Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers Local Union No. 512, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
WE WILL NOT threaten to shut down Company
operations rather than recognize the above-named
Teamsters' local.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights under the Act.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
above-named Teamsters' local or any other labor
organization of employees, by discriminating in regard
to the hire and tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment because you engage in strikes
or other forms of concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT refuse^to bargain'in good faith with the
above-named Teamsters' local during the course of the
present collective-bargaining negotiations.
WE WILL offer Mather Anderson, Frederick Avery,
Edward Bell, Harvey D. Boatright, W. F. Boatright,
Leland Braswell, Henry Burnsed, James Burnsed, Clyde
Cothern, James Frederick, William Guess, Jack Harris,
James Holliman, J. W. Johns, Charles Lynch, George
Martin, Murray McDanial, Bobby Pringle, William
Ratliff, Jr., James Smith, Lovett Taylor, Jr., Robert
Thorton, Bobby Turner, and Richard Williams
reinstatement to their former positions with all the
rights and backpay due them.
WE WILL notify the above -named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in,good
faith with the above-named Teamsters' local as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the
bargaining unit described below and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understanding
in a signed agreement . The bargaining unit is:
All city pickup and delivery drivers, dockmen, and
helpers employed by the Employer at its terminal in
Jacksonville, Florida, excluding office clericals,
over- the-road drivers , salesmen, professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in Section 2(1) of the
Act.
All our employees are free to join or assist the
above-named or any other labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or
to refrain from any or all of such activities.
M. R. & R. TRUCKING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, Room 706
Federal Office Building 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida
33602, Telephone 813-228-7711.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
WILLIAM J. BROWN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, hereinafter referred to as the "Act," came on
to be heard at Jacksonville, Florida, on April 29-May 2,
1968. The charge in Case 12-CA-4068 was filed on
January 2, 1968, by the above-indicated labor
organization, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and
the consolidated complaint herein was issued April 4,
1968, by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, acting through the Board's Regional
Director for Region 12. It alleged, and Respondent's duly
filed answer denied, the commission of unfair labor
practices defined in Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the
Act.
At the hearing the parties appeared and participated as
noted above with full opportunity to present evidence and
argument on the issues . At the conclusion of the hearing
the General Counsel argued orally on the record of the
hearing; the Respondent has filed a written post-hearing
brief and the oral and written arguments have been fully
considered. On the entire record herein and on the basis of
my observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY
The pleadings and evidence establish that the Company
is a Florida corporation with its principal office and place
of business in Crestview, Florida, and engaged as an
interstate common carrier of freight by motor vehicle,
maintaining terminals at various locations in Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama including a terminal at
Jacksonville, Florida, which is involved in the instant
proceedings. In the conduct of its carrier operations the
Company annually receives gross revenue in excess of
$50,000 and is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings and evidence establish that the
above-indicated Union is a labor organization within the
purview of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction to the Issues
On October 29, 1965, the Union was certified' by the
Board as the statutory representative of employees of the
Company's Jacksonville terminal engaged as city pickup
and delivery drivers, dockmen and helpers, excluding
office clericals, over-the-road drivers, salesmen,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act. At material times the total number of
employees in the foregoing classifications was about 30
including a group of part-time workers known as
"casuals." The supervisory staff included W. Guy
McKenzie, president of the Company and in overall
charge of labor relations; Preston Raulerson, manager of
the Jacksonville terminal; James O'Quinn, dispatcher and
James Arnold, warehouse foreman.' Meetings between
Company and union representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining were held on various dates between
January 1966 and November 22, 1967.
The principal issue in the case is whether, in the period
July 2, 1967, until January 2, 1968, the Company refused
to bargain collectively in good faith and in a sincere
attempt to reach agreement with the Union or, as alleged
by the General Counsel, engaged in mere surface
bargaining with the intention of avoiding the execution of
any genuinely bargained agreement. The complaint also
alleges an unfair labor practice in the Company's action in
September 1967 by (1) unilaterally abolishing an
established 90-day probationary period for new employees
and increasing the starting rate from $2.90 to $3 per hour;
(2) unilaterally abolishing the classification of casual
employees, and (3) posting a notice to employees on
August 17, 1967, concerning the progress of the
bargaining.
The case also involves the allegation of the General
Counsel and the denial of the Company that a strike
which commenced September 6, 1967, was caused and
prolonged by the Company's unfair labor practices and
that the Company's refusal to reinstate employee Harvey
D. Boatright, a striker who unconditionally offered to
return to work on January 8, 1968, and 25 other named
strikers who unconditionally offered to return to work on
or about March 5 and it, 1968, constituted unfair labor
practices defined in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Finally it is alleged by the General Counsel and denied
by the Company that the latter engaged in acts of
interference, restraint and coercion within the scope of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1) interrogation and threats
on the part of O'Quinn in July 1967; (2) warning on the
part of Arnold in August 1967, and (3) threats and
interrogation on the part of Raulerson in August 1967.
B. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
1. James O'Quinn: interrogation and threats
Jack Harris, hired by the Company as a casual
warehouse employee about 6 weeks prior to the
September 6, 1967, strike in which he participated,
testified that some time shortly prior to the strike
O'Quinn, after praising his work, asked him if he
belonged to the Union and thereafter told him that he did
'The Union was recertified December 13, 1966.
'Arnold 's employment with the Company ran from February 1966 until
August 15, 1967.
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO.
not think the Union would succeed in organizing
employees of the Company. Harris further testified that
about 2 weeks prior to the strike he and employee Martin
met O'Quinn at a restaurant in Lake City and, after some
preliminary comment, O'Quinn said that McKenzie would
close the doors and let the grass grow under the trucks
before he would let the Company go union . O'Quinn
denied questioning Harris as to his union membership or
sympathies and with respect to the Lake City meeting
testified that in reply to a question he merely expressed
his personal opinion that McKenzie would not sign a
union contract.
I was impressed with the demeanor of Harris on the
witness stand and credit his account of the two
conversations.' In accord with this determination I find
that O'Quinn interrogated Harris concerning his union
membership and threatened him by, the statement that
McKenzie would close down before he would recognize
the Union. By these statements the Company engaged in
unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
2. James L. Arnold: threats
The complaint alleges that some time in August 1967,
the exact date being unknown, Arnold, whose supervisory
status is admitted, warned an employee that the Company
would close or sell its terminal before it would sign a
union contract. James W. Johns, a pickup and delivery
employee and a member of the Union's negotiating
committee in 1967, testified that some time in July or
August of that year Arnold brought up the subject of the
Union and when Johns stated that McKenzie had signed
with the Union at its Tampa terminal, Arnold denied this
and said that McKenzie would never sign a union contract
and would close the doors first. Arnold, whose
employment at the Company terminated August 15, 1967,
testified that some time early or mid-summer of 1967
Johns asked him if he thought McKenzie would sign a
contract with the Union and that he replied that, in his
opinion he did not think McKenzie would sign . I found
Arnold a credible witness and credit his account of the
conversation to the effect that Johns requested his opinion
and received it. I also agree with the Company that the
evidence fails to establish that this conversation occurred
on or after July 2, 1967, the limitation date imposed by
Section 10(b) of the Act and I shall recommend dismissal
of the allegations respecting threats through the agency of
Arnold.
3. Preston Raulerson: interrogation and "Notice"
As amended at the hearing, the complaint alleges in
paragraph 11(c) that Raulerson, about the last week in
August 1967, asked an employee if he belonged to the
Union and said that employees were trying to get a union
in the terminal. Section 11(d) of the complaint also
charges Raulerson with an unfair labor practice within the
scope of Section 8(a)(I) by posting a "Notice to All
Employees" on the terminal bulletin board on August 17,
1967, commenting on the course of the bargaining.'
'The Company asserts that a denial by Harris that he ever received a
registered letter sent him regarding return to work after the strike is a
basis for finding him not credible . Harris' testimony in this regard is only
that he did not believe that he received the letter in question which was
signed for by his sister-in-law. I see no necessary reason in this situation
for discrediting Harris.
'The posting of this notice is also alleged as an act of refusal to bargain.
177
Jack Harris testified that one afternoon, evidently
between the time of his hire in mid-July 1967 and the
strike of September 6, 1967, Raulerson asked where he
had worked previously and then asked how he felt about
the Union. Raulerson denied this and testified that he
followed instructions of counsel not to discuss the Union
with employees. I credit Harris' account of the matter and
find that Raulerson questioned as to how he felt about the
Union thereby engaging in an act of interference,
restraint, and coercion within the scope of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
With respect to the August 17, 1967, notice to
employees, the evidence indicates that, on advice of
counsel , Raulerson posted it on the bulletin board in the
terminal . Raulerson testified, and I credit him in this, that
the posting of the notice was prompted by his awareness
of employee discussions in the terminal which were
interfering with the progress of the work. The notice in
question reads as follows:
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
OUR LAST MEETING WITH THE UNION
WAS ON AUGUST 11, 1967. AT THAT TIME THE
COMPANY MADE ITS BEST OFFER FOR A
THREE YEAR CONTRACT. THE OFFER WAS
OF .00-.05 CENTS-.05 CENTS PER YEAR OVER
A THREE YEAR PERIOD.
THERE WERE NO MATERIAL. CHANGES IN
THE FRINGE BENEFITS OFFERED.
THERE WAS NO DEMAND OR OFFER TO
INCLUDE THE COMPANY PENSION PLAN IN
THE CONTRACT.
THE UNION HAS REQUESTED ANOTHER
MEETING WITH THE COMPANY, FOR WHAT
PURPOSE WE DO NOT KNOW.
WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.
YOURS VERY
TRULY,
(s)
PRESTON A.
RAULERSON
TERMINAL
MANAGER
It is not contended that the Notice misrepresented the
state of the bargaining nor is there any necessary
implication that the "best offer" was intended to preclude
further bargaining or intended to bypass the Union. In the
circumstances I agree with the Company that the posting
of the notice did not amount to an unfair labor practice
particularly in view of the provisions of Section 8(c) of the
Act.'
C. The Refusal To Bargain And The Answer Denies
The Complaint alleges and the Answer denies that from
and after May 31, 1967 the Company refused to bargain
collectively with the Union. While under the provisions of
Section 10(b) any unfair labor practice in this regard must
be shown to have been engaged in subsequent to July 2,
1967 it is established that Section 10(b) constitutes a
statute of limitations and not a rule of evidence.
Accordingly, it appears necessary to examine the entire
course of events relating to the bargaining for the purpose
'These same considerations would also require dismissal of the
allegations that the posting of the notice also constituted a refusal to
bargain within the purview of Sec. 8(aX5) of the Act.
178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of appraising the significance of events on and after July
2, 1967.
Following the Union's certification on October 29, 1965
there appears to have been at least one preliminary
meeting in 1965 between company and union
representatives but the first full fledged bargaining session
appears to have been that of January 1966 at which the
Company proposed a form of agreement (Resp. Exh. 2)
containing the Company's proposals on numerous matters
not including wage rates.` The evidence, particularly the
testimony of Attorney Currie, principal negotiator for the
Company, and of J. M. Floyd who represented the Union
in negotiations during the period from December 1965
until October 1966 indicates that some 15 negotiating
sessions were held in that period. There is no evidence
that the Union at any time requested more frequent c
more extended meetings in that or any subsequent period
than those actually held.
It appears that full fledged bargaining on wage rates
first occurred at a meeting held on March 21, 1966,
although the testimony of Currie, which I credit, indicates
that the Company had previously made a wage offer of an
increase of 6 cents per year for each year of a 3-year
agreement. Currie's testimony is that at the March 21,
1966, meeting the Company made a slight betterment in
its wage offer by increasing it to 7 cents-6 cents-6 cents
for a 3-year agreement. At that time the union
representatives, Parker and Mathis, rejected the
Company's offer and proposed an increase in wages of 10
cents per year for each year of a 3-year agreement.
Currie's testimony is to the effect that in discussing wages
during the course of this meeting the union representatives
pointed out that the Union had recently signed a contract
with a Jacksonville cartage company on the basis of 10
cents per year for a 3-year term and therefore could not
accept less from the Company. Soon after the March 21,
1966, meeting Currie encountered Parker in travel and
Parker indicated that he might be willing to reconsider the
7-6-6 proposal to which Currie stated that the Company
had not been fully satisfied with its own offer and since it
had been declined at the meeting it was no longer open for
acceptance. By letter of March 29, 1966, Currie confirmed
that the offer was not open. As a consequence of the
Company's position respecting the wage offer a charge of
refusal to bargain was filed by the Union but withdrawn
early in April 1966.
At an April 1966 meeting Parker, the principal union
representative in the early bargaining sessions, informed
Currie that since the Company would not agree to the
Union's demands the Union would organize all the other
terminals and shut the Company down by striking when it
would hurt. Representation petitions were subsequently
filed covering at least five other terminals and the
Company advised the Union that it would withhold any
new wage offer pending the termination of the multiple
representation and complaint proceedings in which the
Company became involved as a result of union petitions
or charges.'
At a meeting in June or July 1966 the Company
expressed a willingness to sign a contract known as the
"Miller Tank" contract which the Union had recently
negotiated with that concern and with a 5-year term with
`At a subsequent meeting on July 21, 1967, the Company submitted a
different draft agreement, and the bargaining thereafter appears to have
proceeded with that draft (G.C Exh 2) as a basis
'The Union filed representation petitions for five other terminals, a
number of charges filed by the Union were withdrawn after investigation
annual increases of 6 cents. There is some question as to
whether or not the Company's offer was conditioned on
the Union's ceasing organization at other Company
terminals and in finding that the Company did so
condition its offer to accept the Miller Tank contract with
annual increases for a 5-year term I credit the testimony
of J. M. Floyd who attended the meetings on behalf of the
Union. I also credit his testimony that in rejecting the
Company's offer, Parker, for the Union, indicated that
the Union's rejection was based not on the requirement it
cease organization but on dissatisfaction with the duration
clause and the size of the increases.
On September 6, 1966, the parties met in the offices of
the FMCS representative in Jacksonville, Mr. Nathan
Kazin. Present for the Union were Union Officials Parker
and Carpenter and employee William Guess; the
Company representatives were Attorney Currie, McKenzie
and Raulerson. Carpenter testified that his attendance was
merely that of an observer and he did not recall the
substance or details of the discussion; Parker and Guess
did not testify. Currie testified that agreement was
reached on the duration of the probationary period (30
days), premium pay for holiday work and several other
items. According to his testimony the Union indicated a
willingness to accept a 5-cent increase under a 1-year
agreement or alternatively increases of 7 6, and 6 cents
annually for a 3-year agreement. The Company expressed
disinterest in a 1-year agreement and asserted that it was
in a stronger position than previously when it had rejected
a comparable union wage proposal for a longer term
agreement. Parker then withdrew the Union's wage
proposals, and the parties agreed to meet again.
On October 6, 1966, the parties met again in the offices
of the FMCS. According to the testimony of Floyd, not
substantially disputed by Currie, the Company refused to
make any new offer on wages because the certification
year was due to expire and it suggested the filing of a
representation petition. An election was conducted on
December 5, 1966, and a new certification was issued
about December 13, 1966. At about this time, in
connection with an offer by Currie to resume negotiations,
Carpenter stated that the Union would not protest any
Company pay increase to unit employees. He made no
request for resumption of negotiations, however, until
May 31, 1967, when Carpenter wrote Currie asking a date
for resumption of the bargaining sessions. Currie replied,
suggesting July 20 or 21, in view of his long standing
vacation plans. The Union made no protest of the delay in
resumption of the bargaining.
The parties met for bargaining on July 21, 1967, at the
Thunderbird Motel in Jacksonville. The Union was
represented by Assistant Business Agent Carpenter and
employee J. W. Johns; Company representatives were
Attorney Currie, McKenzie and Raulerson.
It is undisputed that the July 21, 1967, meeting opened
with the proposal from Carpenter that the parties agree
on the recently negotiated Teamster National Master
Freight Agreement for a 3-year term with increases of 25
cents-15 cents-15 cents. Carpenter did not have available
copies of the National Master Agreement and the parties
negotiated on the basis of the Company's written
proposal, complete except for wage proposals. (G.C. Exh.
2) At the outset Carpenter asked for and was allowed an
hour to study the Company's proposal because of his
unfamiliarity with contract provisions and bargaining. The
meeting opened at 10 a.m., approximately 45 minutes was
taken by Carpenter's study and consultation, and
adjourned at about 1:30 or 2 p.m. In the relatively few
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO. 179
hours available the parties discussed numerous clauses and
reached agreement on a substantial number (some of
which were the fruit of prior bargaining ), the Union
passing however on a substantial number of provisions
contained in G.C. Exh. 2. Carpenter testified that
agreement was reached on article I and II of G.C. Exh. 2
as well as on articles V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII, XIV,
XVII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XXV, XXVI, XXVII,
XXIX (Currie accepting a union proposal for the Union's
benefit), XXXI (Currie accepting a union change), and
XXXII. It does not appear that Company made a wage
proposal at the July 21, 1967 meeting ; nor does it appear
that the union representatives voiced objection to the
absence of one.
The July 21, 1967 meeting ran from 10 a.m. until 2
p.m. at which time the parties agreed to recess until July
27, a date which later was changed by mutual agreement
to August It.
At the August 11, 1967, meeting the Union submitted
written proposals on a management rights clause and a
grievance procedure . Carpenter testified , and I credit him
in this regard , that the Union made a wage proposal of
25-15-15 for a 3-year agreement and that the Company's
counterproposal was for 0-5-5 for such an agreement.
There was extended discussion of the Company's proposed
agreement on noneconomic matters and agreement was
reached on several subjects. The Union protested the fact
that the Company ' s wage offer was below its previous
wage offer and Currie responded that the lower offer was
justified by Company costs incurred as a result of
Parker's activity in organization at other terminals of the
Company. Carpenter testified that in the course of the
August l 1 meeting the discussion proceeded mainly on the
basis of the Company proposed draft of an agreement,
(G.C. Exh. 2), there were one or two caucuses and the
parties were not too far apart on language . The meeting
adjourned sine die apparently after the Union's rejection
of the Company ' s wage offer
On August 18 Currie wrote Carpenter proposing
resumption of meetings on August 31 and the parties met
again on that date. McKenzie and Carpenter agree in
their testimony that the August 31 meeting was short,
lasting only a couple of hours with a caucus sandwiched
in. Again the basis of discussion was the Company's
proposed draft agreement and items therein not previously
settled were considered . Carpenter testified that in this
meeting he informed Currie that with the sole exception of
the items relating to grievances and management rights
the Company ' s agreement was acceptable to the Union on
the basis of a 1-year term with a 15 cents wage increase.
Currie rejected the idea of a 1-year agreement . Carpenter
conceded that he informed Currie that he would submit
the Company ' s proposal for a 3-year contract at 0-5-5 to
the employees . Nothing more was heard from the Union
however until the strike and picketing which occurred on
the morning of September 6. On that same date the
Company wrote the Union withdrawing its contract
proposal.
On September 7, 1967, the Company wrote striking
employees directing them to report for work on Monday,
September 11 at their usual reporting time, advising them
that if they failed to report permanent replacements would
be hired in their positions .' The Company advertised in
Jacksonville on Sunday , September 10 for permanent
replacements at a rate of $3 per hour . On September 11,
only two strikers (Plummer and H . D. Boatright) reported
for work , Boatright returning only for 1 day. The
Company then proceeded to hire replacements for the 21
strikers in the reverse order of seniority, and on
September 12 sent telegrams to each of the 21 strikers
notifying them of their permanent replacement. By
September 14 the last three senior employees had also
been replaced by permanent replacements and were so
notified by the Company on September 14, 1967.
At about this time the Company , anticipating a
slowdown of business as a consequence of the strike
determined that there would be no need for casual (part
time ) workers and each of the eight casual employees then
on the payroll were notified by the Company about
September 12 that their jobs had been abolished and their
employment terminated.
The complaint alleges that the strike was an unfair
labor practice strike and that the refusal to reinstate on
unconditional application the strikers listed in the
complaint constituted unfair labor practices defined in
Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act.
While it is true that 3 years of bargaining without
agreement may ordinarily create some doubt as to the
sincerity of purpose of one or both of the parties involved,
I cannot say that the evidence in this case preponderates
in favor of the conclusion that the responsibility for the
failure to reach agreement lies in a failure to meet and
negotiate in good faith and with a sincere purpose to
attempt to reach agreement on the part of the Company.
As the General Counsel emphasized in oral argument this
is a case involving an attempt to reach a first agreement
at the Jacksonville terminal , the result being that the
bargaining had literally to be "from scratch." The
processes of bargaining were hampered by changes in the
identity of union negotiators and by frequent and
protracted delays not attributable solely to the fault of the
Company. While it is true that some of the Company's
wage offers were relatively small, it is also true that some
of the Union ' s demands were relatively large. The
evidence indicates that the Company was subsequently
resistant to wage demands larger than 6 or 7 cents per
hour for a multiyear term but the Act plainly prohibits a
finding of refusal to bargain on the sole basis of failure to
make a concession . It does not appear that the Company
refused reasonable requests to meet or failed to devote
sufficient time to the actual negotiating sessions. The
evidence seems rather to suggest that if there is any single
cause of the failure of the bargaining process here it most
probably is the changes of identity of the union
negotiators and their failure to press for more frequent
and more extended discussions . Viewed in its totality the
evidence does not appear to me to indicate by a
preponderance that the Company refused to meet and
negotiate in good faith and in sincere effort to reach
agreement . I shall accordingly recommend dismissal of the
allegations of section 10 of the complaint relating to
refusal to bargain on the part of the Company
With respect to the allegations of refusal to bargain in
the nature of (1) unilateral abolition of the job
classification of casual employees and of the 90-day
probationary period for new employees and (2) unilateral
increase of starting rate for new employees from $2.90 to
$3, the evidence fails to establish that there was a duty to
bargain with the Union on these matters in the
circumstances . The Company as a licensed common
carrier was under Governmental requirements to furnish
carriage services as well as being under the economic
pressure of facing loss of business. Its action appears to be
'Between September 7 and I1 temporary replacements from other
Company terminals worked in place of the strikers.
180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nothing more than a response to the emergency conditions
surrounding it and in fact it does not, appear that a
classification was abolished but that the jobs were
eliminated temporarily in response to the emergency
conditions. As to the elimination of the 90-day
probationary period and increase in the starting rate from
$2.90 to $3 the Company's action appears to have been
reasonably directed to insure the continuance of
operations particularly in view of the Union's earlier
threats to shut the terminal down. In view of the absence
of other indications of bad faith in the bargaining it would
appear that the refusal to consult the Union on this
matter was in the circumstances at most a technical
refusal to bargain and not of a nature to require or justify
any bargaining order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the purview of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the purview
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating an employee as to his union
membership and by threatening to shut down operations
rather than recognizing the Union the Company has
engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Except as specifically found herein the Company has
not engaged in unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint.
D. Discrimination
The complaint alleges the commission of unfair labor
practices in the Company's refusal on January 8, 1968, to
reinstate on application Harvey D. Boatright and its
refusal on and after March 5, 1968, to reinstate on
application the 25 other striking employees named in the
complaint. With respect to the question as to the nature
and purpose of the strike employee witnesses called by the
General Counsel testified that picketing occurred but there
is no evidence as to whether or not picket signs were
carried or if they were what statements were contained
thereon. Strikers Anderson and Turner testified
respectively that the issue presented at the strike vote was
"better benefits, more money" and "economic reasons,"
and Union Business Agent Carpenter testified that the
strike was triggered by the "take it or leave it" attitude
Company which he felt was displayed at the preceding
bargaining session , although he conceded that the
Company's position was not presented as a final offer. On
the basis of all the evidence relating to the issue I find
that it does not support the view that the nature and
purpose of the strike was in protest against any unfair
labor practices of the Company. Since the evidence clearly
indicates that all strikers had been replaced by permanent
replacements, there is no obligation on the Company's
part to offer reinstatement to the strikers.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section III,
above, and there found to constitute unfair labor
practices, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Company as set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing such trade,
traffic, and commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
In view of the findings set forth above to the effect that
the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce I shall recommend that it be required
to cease and desist therefrom and from like or related
practices and take such affirmative action as appears
necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case , I make the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case,
it is recommended that the Company, its officers,
directors, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees as to their membership in
the Union.
(b) Threatening to shut down Company operations
rather than recognize the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action which appears
necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post at its terminal at Jacksonville, Florida, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Board's Regional
Director for Region 12, shall, after being duly signed by
the Company's authorized representative, be posted
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Company to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from receipt of this Decision, what steps have been
taken to comply with the terms hereof.10
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed as to
allegations of unfair labor practices not specifically herein
found to have been engaged in.
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 12, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
M. R. & R. TRUCKING CO. 181
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees as their
membership in Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers Local Union No. 512, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
WE WILL NOT threaten to shut down terminal
operations rather than recognize the aforesaid labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT by such interrogation or threats or in
any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under
the Act.
All our employees are free to join or assist the
above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or
to refrain from any or all of such activities.
Dated By
M. R. & R. TRUCKING
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office, Room 706,
Federal Office Building , 500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida
33602, Telephone 228-7257.