M. K. Morse Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1991

302 N.L.R.B. 924 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

924
302 NLRB No. 147
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Respondent filed a motion to strike the General Counsel’s exceptions
and brief in support of its exceptions and to strike the Charging Party’s brief
because neither party served these papers on representatives of the Employees
for Self–Representation (ESR). The motion is denied because no representative
of the ESR made an appearance at the hearing despite being served with the
fourth consolidated complaint; nor has the Respondent offered any evidence
to show that the failure to make service on the ESR prejudiced any party in
this case. See Terpening Truck Co., 271 NLRB 96 fn. 1 (1984).
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings.
The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s
credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evi-
dence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully ex-
amined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
Additionally, our review of the record reveals no evidence that the judge
prejudged the case, made prejudicial rulings, or demonstrated any bias. Con-
trary to the Respondent’s contention, we find that the Respondent was ac-
corded due process, including a fair hearing, in all respects.
3 The judge relied on the authorization card of Roy P. Eberhardt, which was
misplaced by the Union and not produced at the hearing. We find it unneces-
sary to rely on this card because the Union has demonstrated its majority sta-
tus without it.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to hire John Sparrow and Ervin Potts, we rely solely
on Chancellor Transportation Co., 282 NLRB 887 (1987).
Member Cracraft would not find that the oral warning issued to union sup-
porter Edward Lashua on October 20, 1987, was unlawful. She finds the cases
relied on by the judge to find a violation to be factually inapposite and legally
distinguishable. Assuming that a prima facie case has been established to war-
rant the inference that Lashua’s union activities were a motivating factor for
the warning, she finds, particularly in the absence of a definitive credibility
resolution by the judge, that the Respondent has demonstrated that it would
have orally admonished Lashua for what it reasonably perceived to be a threat
of physical harm uttered by Lashua to the complainant contract foreman even
in the absence of Lashua’s union activity.
In addition, apart from the two unlawful threats of discharge found herein,
Member Cracraft finds it unnecessary to pass on the remainder of the General
Counsel’s exceptions to the judge’s failure to find additional violations of Sec.
8(a)(1) and (2) concerning alleged promises of benefits, assistance to ESR, co-
ercive threats and statements, creation of the impression of surveillance and
futility of union activities, and disparagement of union supporters, because any
violations found would be cumulative in this case and would not materially
affect the remedy.
Regarding Lashua’s warning, the judge found that Lashua and the construc-
tion worker were ‘‘well-known’’ to each other. The judge then characterized
the incident which resulted in Lashua’s reprimand as an exchange of ‘‘humor-
ous wholly innocuous banter in a friendly and playful manner.’’ This charac-
terization parallels Lashua’s testimony. Significantly, the judge did not men-
tion, or allude to, the construction worker’s somewhat different version of the
incident. Accordingly, Chairman Stephens and Member Devaney find, contrary
to Member Cracraft, that the judge implicitly credited Lashua’s testimony.
M. K. Morse Co. and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL–CIO–CLC and Employees for Self-
Representation, Party in Interest. Cases 8–CA–
19631, 8–CA–19891, 8–CA–19954, 8–CA–20152,
8–CA–20457, 8–CA–20487, and 8–RC–13523
May 14, 1991
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On March 31, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Har-
old Bernard Jr. issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions,
supporting briefs, and answering briefs; the Respond-
ent filed cross–exceptions; and the Charging Party
filed a brief in support of the administrative law
judge’s decision.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three–member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and con-
clusions3 only to the extent consistent with this Deci-
sion and Order and to adopt the Order as modified.
1. We agree with the judge’s conclusion that Brian
Smithberger, Robert Dean, and Lawrence Kovats are
guards within the meaning of Section 9(b)(3) of the
Act. Their principal duties involve protecting the Re-
spondent’s property by making periodic rounds of the
plant, punching security clocks at various stations, and
opening plant offices and gates with keys which they
possess. See Blue Grass Industries, 287 NLRB 274,
300 (1987). These employees also perform some
nonguard duties, including putting materials into the
furnaces, checking supplies, and performing janitorial
work. The amount of time spent in each function, how-
ever, is unclear and we therefore do not rely on the
judge’s finding that they ‘‘spend only minimal time in
other tasks.’’
2. We also agree with the judge that John Vesalo,
an employee of the Myers Agency, the employment
agency used by the Respondent to screen many of its
applicants, was the Respondent’s agent. The Respond-
ent argues that Westward Ho Hotel, 251 NLRB 1199
(1980), compels the Board to find otherwise. We dis-
agree, and find Westward Ho Hotel distinguishable.
The employer in Westward Ho filled job vacancies
through in–house hiring, newspaper ads, and the serv-
ices of several employment agencies. It hired only
about 1 percent of its employees through the particular
employment agency alleged to be its agent. The Board
found the lack of continuity in service dispositive in
concluding that the employment agency was not an
agent. Here, the Respondent and the Myers Agency
have had a close business relationship for about 10
years, and Myers screens a large percentage of the em-
ployees who are hired by Morse. Thus, we agree with
the judge that Vesalo and the Myers Agency are the
Respondent’s agent. Gourmet Foods, 270 NLRB 578,
610–611 (1984). See also Alliance Rubber Co., 286
NLRB 645, 645–646 (1987). We also rely on a tele-
phone conversation which occurred in Vesalo’s office
between the Respondent’s vice president, John
Comune, and Vesalo in the presence of applicant
James Monroe. Vesalo said to Comune, ‘‘What about
the guy I sent down earlier today? Oh, he has union
ties, huh?’’ Vesalo then turned to Monroe and told him
that if he had union ties like that, he would not be
hired. We infer from the testimony of Comune and
Vesalo that the subject of the telephone conversation
was applicant John Sparrow. Accordingly, we find this
is additional evidence establishing that the Respond-
925M. K. MORSE CO.
4 With respect to Plant Superintendent Roeser’s profanities uttered to em-
ployee Edward Lashua on February 6, 1987, we agree that they are unlawful
insofar as they were coupled with the reference to Lashua’s charge filing and
the order to clock out, but we find them covered by provisions of the Order
concerning unlawful threats and discipline.
ent’s articulated reason for failing to hire Sparrow (that
he held too many jobs in the recent past) was
pretextual and designed to mask its suspicion that he
shared the prounion views of friend, neighbor, job ref-
erence, and vocal union activist Hobert Starcher. We
further find that this conversation shows that the Re-
spondent’s union animus was specifically conveyed to
Vesalo and that the Respondent and Vesalo were co-
ordinating their efforts to keep potential union sympa-
thizers from gaining employment with the Respondent.
3. During the campaign, the Respondent employed a
labor consultant, Kevin Smyth, who spent lengthy peri-
ods of time in discussions with employees. On Novem-
ber 5, 1986, 2 days before the election, Smyth ap-
proached employee Cathy Henceroth and asked her
opinion of the Union. He told her that she might be
able to get back a $1-an-hour salary loss she had sus-
tained after an injury if she voted against the Union.
Smyth then told her that another employee, Robert
Baugus, was going to be discharged because he sup-
ported the Union and was constantly out of his seat
discussing union business. The judge credited
Henceroth’s testimony concerning this conversation
and found that Smyth’s comment regarding
Henceroth’s salary constituted an unlawful promise of
benefit. The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s
failure to make a finding on Smyth’s statement that
Baugus was to be discharged because of his union ac-
tivity. We find merit in the exception. Telling one em-
ployee that another employee is going to be discharged
because of his union activity is coercive and violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Evans St. Clair, Inc., 278
NLRB 459 (1986).
4. Employee James Monroe began work on January
19, 1987. Monroe told fellow employees that he under-
stood that after his probationary period he would re-
ceive a wage increase to $7 or $8 per hour. Two days
later, Vice President John Comune told Monroe that he
found out everything that was said or done in the
plant, and he denied promising Monroe such a raise.
Monroe told Comune he would drop the matter.
Comune noted a ‘‘bad attitude’’ comment in Monroe’s
file. Monroe began attending union meetings after his
conversation with Comune and mentioned this to his
supervisor on February 2. Two days later Monroe was
discharged by Comune, who told him it was because
his work was inadequate. Monroe protested and
Comune told Monroe that he was ‘‘still uncomfortable
about the argument concerning money, in light of all
the problems the Company was having with the
Union.’’ We agree with the judge that Monroe’s dis-
charge violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). The General
Counsel excepts to the judge’s, perhaps inadvertent,
failure to find Comune’s statement coercive and a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We agree. Telling
an employee that remarks he has made have caused
him to be discharged because there is union activity in
the plant sends a message to all employees that their
jobs are in jeopardy merely because others are engag-
ing in protected activity. It accordingly coerces em-
ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The judge found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) when Vice President Comune told
some employees that ‘‘You don’t know what a good
screwing is.’’ He concluded that this statement was an
unspecified threat of reprisal if the Union won the
election. We disagree. When Comune happened upon
the employees they were engaged in jocular, bawdy
conversation and antics—one employee was panto-
miming a sex act. Comune’s crude remark was made
in a laughing manner and contains no allusion to union
activity. Thus, when viewed in context we conclude
that his remark was made in reference to what he was
observing and was not a threat of reprisal.
The judge additionally found a violation when Su-
pervisor Schaufele referred to two union supporters as
liars and used profanities to describe them. We dis-
agree and find that the language used, while offensive,
was not sufficiently threatening or disparaging to con-
stitute a violation of the Act.4
6. In adopting the judge’s bargaining order analysis,
we note that the judge set aside the election and dis-
missed the petition in Case 8–RC–13523 without any
discussion of the merit of election objections filed by
the Petitioner Union in that case. The record reveals
that the Regional Director issued an order directing
hearing on objections, order consolidating cases and
notice of hearing in Cases 8–RC–13523 and 8–CA–
19631 on January 29, 1987. The Regional Director
found that certain evidence offered in support of enu-
merated objections concerning the Employer’s alleged
unlawful assistance to ESR, interrogation of employ-
ees, promises of benefits, disparaging union supporters,
threatening employees with wage reductions and lay-
offs, and discriminatorily disciplining union supporters,
and that certain evidence offered in support of a catch-
all objection alleging numerous independent violations
of Section 8(a)(1), was coextensive with certain evi-
dence in support of unfair labor practice allegations in
Case 8–CA–19631 and should be consolidated for
hearing with the unfair labor practice case. We find
merit to these election objections, which generally par-
allel the unfair labor practices found, and set aside the
election in Case 8–RC–13523.
926 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, M. K.
Morse Co., Canton, Ohio, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(c) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Insert the following as paragraphs 1(m) and (n)
and reletter the last paragraph (o).
‘‘(m) Telling employees that other employees are
going to be discharged because of their union activ-
ity.’’
‘‘(n) Telling employees they are being discharged
because of union activity at the plant.’’
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
concerning their feelings about United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO–CLC, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that employees’
union activities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with specific or
undefined reprisals including layoffs and that employ-
ees will be hurt if they support the Union.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances and promise em-
ployees benefits, including promotion to a supervisory
position and correction of grievances if they withdraw
support from the Union.
WE WILL NOT blame the Union for lost or frozen
employee benefits.
WE WILL NOT withdraw benefits from employees
because of their support for the Union or indicate to
them that activities in support of the Union are futile.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully support or assist Employ-
ees for Self–Representation.
WE WILL NOT administer any solicitation rule or
policy in a discriminatory manner favoring Employees
for Self–Representation and against United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC.
WE WILL NOT seek to induce any employee to inflict
bodily harm against any employee leading union sup-
port in order to discourage employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge, refuse to hire, suspend,
withdraw benefits from, falsely discipline, warn, or
reprimand any employee in order to discourage em-
ployee support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that the cost of the
Company’s defending against charges filed with the
National Labor Relations Board against us is coming
out of their wages, future earnings, or pocketbooks.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily screen applicants for
employment with us to discourage employee support
for the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that other employees
are going to be discharged because of their union ac-
tivity.
WE WILL NOT tell employees they are being dis-
charged because of union activity at the plant.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by the Act.
WE WILL reinstate, hire, and make whole with inter-
est, as applicable to the named employees James Mon-
roe, Dan Hetrick, Ervin Potts, and John Sparrow for
their resulting losses from discrimination against them,
restore Doug Glantzer’s paid lunch, rescind the suspen-
sions against Edward Lashua and Robert Baugus while
further making them whole for any loss suffered by
them as a result of the discrimination against them,
with interest, and further
WE WILL expunge from their records, as well as
from the records of Steve Kortis, John Caplinger, and
Steve Fowler, all unlawful discriminatory and false
warnings, reprimands, or discipline, including last–
chance agreements found to have been designed to dis-
courage employee support for the Union.
WE WILL further notify these employees in writing
that this has been done and that the above–described
actions will not be used as a basis for any future dis-
ciplinary action against them.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collec-
tively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO–CLC, as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the Respondent in the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees at the
Employer’s Canton, Ohio plant excluding all of-
927M. K. MORSE CO.
1 The election results: 35 votes cast against and 30 votes cast in favor of
representation.
fice clerical employees, professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
M. K. MORSE CO.
Allen Binstock, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Terrance Ryan, Esq., of Toledo, Ohio, for the Respondent.
James S. Gwin, Esq., Canton, Ohio, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HAROLD BERNARD, JR., Administrative Law Judge. These
cases were tried in January and February 1988 in Canton,
Ohio, following charges filed November 13, 1986, and com-
plaint issued January 28, 1987, with later amendments con-
solidated for hearing with objections to election in the rep-
resentation case (8–RC–13523).1 Respondent filed answers
denying allegations contained in the consolidated complaints.
The parties were accorded full opportunity to examine wit-
nesses, introduce evidence, argue orally, and file briefs.
Issues
The issues are whether Respondent unlawfully interrogated
employees, created the impression of surveillance of em-
ployee union activities, derided the Union and its employee
supporters, threatened employees with reprisals, promised
benefits, blamed the Union for lost benefits, created the im-
pression that union activities were futile, withdrew benefits,
discriminatorily disciplined, discharged, coercively warned,
and refused to hire employees, unlawfully enforced a solici-
tation rule, encouraged assault of a union adherent, and ren-
dered unlawful support to Employees for Self-Representation,
thereby violating, in turn, Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the
Act and warranting, as sought by counsel for the General
Counsel herein, a bargaining order remedy. Subordinate mat-
ters concerning agency and supervisory status, the Union’s
majority, and the bargaining unit are also addressed.
On the entire record in this proceeding, including my ob-
servation of the witnesses during their examination and the
parties’ briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent makes hacksaws, bandsaws, and abrasives to-
gether with related products at its plant in Canton, Ohio,
from which it annually sells and ships products valued in ex-
cess of S50,000 directly to customers outside Ohio. I find,
as admitted, that Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Admittedly, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO–CLC is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act, and I so find. Respondent in its answer
denies that Employees for Self-Representation (ESR) is a
labor organization. The uncontroverted testimony by several
witnesses, as well as numerous exhibits received into evi-
dence, establish by a clear preponderance of the proof that
at all relevant times ESR, an employee group open to hourly
paid plant employees, was formed for the main purpose of
representing Respondent’s employees in bargaining with Re-
spondent over wages, hours, benefits, and other conditions of
employment, that it published numerous pamphlets explicitly
concerning such matters which were regularly distributed
among plant employees, held well-attended employee meet-
ings to formulate action in such regard, including the han-
dling of employee grievances, sent out notices regarding the
selection of officers, and that such officers were elected and
appointed to lead in helping to achieve its representation
goals. I find that ESR, which continued to play an active role
as a rival during the organizational campaign by the United
Steelworkers through the election and thereafter, is, notwith-
standing the lack of a totally formal structure, a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Betances Health Unit, 283 NLRB 369 (1987); Edward A.
Utlant Memorial Hosital, 249 NLRB 1153, 1160 (1980);
Armco, Inc., 271 NLRB 350 (1984); and Sahara Datsun, Inc.
v. NLRB, 811 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
Appropriate Unit
I find the appropriate unit herein, as stipulated by the par-
ties in Case 8–RC–13523 to be:
All production and maintenance employees at the Em-
ployer’s Canton, Ohio plant excluding all office clerical
employees, professional employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
The parties also agree that the employees named on the
voting list for eligibility used in the election conducted on
November 7, 1986 (GC–2), some 69 in number, constitute all
employees properly included in the unit except for disagree-
ment as to four employees on said list, Brian Smithberger,
Robert Dean, and Lawrence Kovats alleged to be guards, and
Marsha Humes, daughter of Respondent’s plant super-
intendent.
Smithberger, Dean, and Kovats, at times material herein,
admittedly served in the capacity of ‘‘security’’ at Respond-
ent’s plant, where, Robert Dean testified, they were told to
‘‘check everything in the plant,’’ and made hourly tours,
punching security clocks at various stations. The three were
entrusted with keys to the plant office and plant gates which
they opened for operations. Although they performed brief
duties putting prescribed materials in a heat furnace occa-
sionally, as well as some janitorial duties cleaning and
checking supplies, their compensation was lower than plant
employees received and they did not share in a January 1988
general wage increase. Dean testified that when he asked
Plant Superintendent Roeser what his primary job at the
plant was, that Roeser replied ‘‘security,’’ and that he, Dean,
would ‘‘go after’’ anyone trying to break into the plant, that
he was definitely there to protect the Company’s property.
As it is clear that the three employees regularly tour the plant
for fire protection purposes, to safeguard the premises from
intruders, and otherwise protect plant property from damage,
are classified as ‘‘security’’ at the plant and spend only mini-
mal time in other tasks, I find that their principal duties are
to serve as guards, and that they are therefore excluded from
928 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 All dates refer to 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
the unit. Blue Grass Industries, 287 NLRB 274 (1987); and
Midwestern Mining & Reclamation, 277 NLRB 221 (1985).
Marsha Humes is the daughter of overall Plant Super-
intendent (for over 10 years) Charles Roeser, who is partly
responsible for hiring employees, reports to a vice president
just below Respondent’s owner in the chain of hierarchy, and
who himself is a company shareholder. Humes has been em-
ployed by Respondent for 8 years as a press operator at
$6.45 per hour. Humes works part time, sets her own
hours—during one period she worked 4:30 a.m. to 1 p.m.
without supervision—on a shift not worked by others, so that
she was alone in plant 2 during the early hours. Humes de-
cides her own break periods, receives no paid holidays or
other fringe benefits as do other employees, and is not re-
quired to follow the usual reporting or lunchtimes at the
plant; in fact, she has authority to change her working hours
to suit herself and has done so. There is record evidence
tending to show, as well, that she can move between depart-
ments such as press operation and packaging bandsaws.
There is no question that Humes’ working conditions are sig-
nificantly different from those of other employees and that
she occupies a special status as a result of her family rela-
tionship to one of Respondent’s highest level supervisors,
setting her apart from all other employees in the unit from
which, I find, Humes is properly excluded. Honeycomb Plas-
tics Corp., 288 NLRB 431 (1988); and Holthouse Furniture
Corp., 242 NLRB 414, 416 (1979).
The Union’s Majority Status
For the unit of employees thereby reduced—by the above
4 exclusions—from 69 to 65, counsel for General Counsel
introduced and by probative evidence authenticated cards ex-
ecuted by 20 bargaining unit employees unequivocally desig-
nating the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC
as their collective-bargaining representative, 37 of which
cards were given to the Union by September 11, 1986. (GC–
33–75.)
Respondent’s questioning of the validity of some cards be-
cause not authenticated by the card signer, or because there
was no showing of a subjective intent by the card signer to
authorize the Union as representative, or further, that an elec-
tion purpose was mentioned by the card solicitor, an em-
ployee was told the signing was for his protection by the
Union and the NLRB, or the year was incorrectly shown on
one card, is without merit. There was no evidence that any
card signer was told that the only purpose for signing a card
was to secure an election, or that any card signer relied on
any misrepresentation when signing a card; moreover, the
single instance where a card showed the incorrect year was
credibly corrected by testimony offered by the card signer
himself. Numerous card signers, moreover, testified to au-
thenticate that they had read, signed, and dated their cards,
which specifically contained an explanation for the card’s
purpose over their signature. Moreover, in those instances
when the cards’ solicitors authenticated the cards, there was
credible testimony concerning the relevant circumstances, the
date, place, and in several instances, that employees were
also informed orally concerning the nature of the cards’ pur-
pose as being to authorize the Union as bargaining represent-
ative. Board and Court decisions settled such questions
against the Respondent’s objections herein long ago, includ-
ing the propriety and probative value of card solicitor testi-
mony for authentication purposes. I find a clear preponder-
ance in the evidence established the Union’s majority status
by September 11, 1986. Jeffrey Mfg., 248 NLRB 33, 36
(1980); Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969); Don
the Beachcomber, 163 NLRB 275 (1967); Clothing Workers,
419 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 988;
and Martin Electronics, 183 NLRB 66 (1970). I have, more-
over, decided on balance to count the authorization card
signed by Roy P. Eberhardt, which was lost, in totaling said
majority. It is well established that, ‘‘testimony of an em-
ployee is itself probative of a union’s majority status in cir-
cumstances where the card has been misplaced.’’ J. P. Ste-
vens & Co., 247 NLRB 420, 486 (1980), citing Hedstrom
Co., 223 NLRB 1409, 1411 (1076), enfd. in relevant part
558 F.2d 1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1977). Eberhardt testified he
read and signed a union card such as the one shown him at
the hearing identical to other cards introduced herein in Sep-
tember or October 1986 at the union hall, where he turned
it in. A staff representative testified to conducting a search
for the card in the office files there to no avail. There is not
in this case an issue as to the exact date his card was signed,
for reasons noted below; more importantly, there is not the
slightest suggestion of bad faith in any of the circumstance’s
surrounding the card’s loss. Given the further fact that the
Union’s majority is more than sufficient without the card,
which militates in favor of its validity—there hence being
less basis to suspect its proffer as other than in good faith,
as well as the proof of its validity by appropriately advanced
secondary evidence, it has been counted. Rayner v. NLRB,
665 F.2d 970 (1982), and cases cited supra; Fed.R.Evid.
1004 (1); and Section 10(b) of the Act providing that Board
‘‘proceeding[s] shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in
accordance with the [Federal] rules of evidence . . . .’’
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Employees began efforts to secure collective-bargaining
representation in August 1986, and from then on through the
November election and its aftermath the testimony at this
hearing reports a widespread, hostile reaction by Respondent
to those efforts.
It is noteworthy just how many employees among the
modestly sized plant force of 65 employees the Respondent
contacted in person through its supervisory staff—the com-
plaint alone alleges some 70 or more illegal acts, many
against prounion employees generally as a group, and numer-
ous actions towards individual members of the group by the
supervisor or higher company officials in personal confronta-
tions.
Interrogation and Threats
Nine employees testified to being interrogated by Re-
spondent concerning their prounion sentiments, including
some whom Respondent confronted with threats of reprisals.
Maintenance employee John Caplinger credibly described an
encounter with Plant Superintendent Chuck Roeser on Au-
gust 19, 1986,2 prior to Caplinger’s open demonstration of
union support, in a plant restroom otherwise unoccupied
when Roeser wanted to know ‘‘what’s this about a union,’’
indicating he heard Caplinger wanted to get a union in and
be its president. Roeser admitted under examination that he
929M. K. MORSE CO.
3 The mere fact that Chief Engineer Borkwin—not Fohl’s regular super-
visor—questioned Fohl sometime after Fohl wore a union hat does not estab-
lish Borkwin ever saw Fohl on the occasion when Fohl wore the hat or that
Borkwin had any knowledge whatever whether Fohl was an open union sup-
porter when he questioned him under the coercive circumstances described by
Fohl including an implied promise of benefit and other unlawful threats then
extant at the plant, and undenied by Respondent. Borkwin did not testify.
Max’s City Deli, 282 NLRB 742 (1987).
may have asked an employee ‘‘what is this about this Union
crap?’’ Respondent’s president, M. K. Morse, also ques-
tioned Caplinger alone on August 29 in the maintenance
shanty or shop, where Morse was a not-too-frequent visitor,
asking him ‘‘what’s this about a union?’’, and proposing that
they talk about it, pointing out ‘‘if we put a union in here
we’re going to hurt a lot [of] people.’’ Employee Stephen
Kortis, welder for 7 years, described questioning by Execu-
tive Vice President Jack Comune on September 18 at his
welder, before Kortis openly advocated union support, when
Comune questioned what Kortis believed the problems were
in the shop, declaring he knew Kortis was one of the ‘‘top
dogs’’ getting all the union stuff started and stating that if
employees did get a union some employees might have to
take a wage cut. Press operator Catherine Henceroth recalls
questioning by a labor relations consultant, Kevin Smyth, on
November 5, 2 days before the election—in the pressroom—
when Smyth, an admitted agent for Respondent, wanted to
know her opinion about the Union and conducted discussions
with her totaling 1-1/2 hours. Henceroth, without denial by
Smyth, said that he told her if she voted against the Union
there was a good possibility of getting her $1 an hour back—
a reference to the employee’s reduction in pay after an acci-
dent left Henceroth unable to do heavy lifting and an unlaw-
ful promise of benefit. Smyth also told her that a fellow em-
ployee, Bob Bougus, was going to be fired, ‘‘because he was
a union supporter always out of his seat talking union busi-
ness.’’
The Respondent questioned alleged discriminatee James R.
Monroe during his prehire interview, early January 1987,
when Vice President Comune told Monroe he was going to
ask him some illegal questions, inquiring whether Monroe
was previously involved in a union shop and how he felt
about a union; and the record further reflects Respondent su-
pervisors, including Comune, Plant Superintendent Roeser,
Chief Engineer Jerry Borkwin, and Pat Chidester, packaging
supervisor, individually interrogated employees Stephen
Fowler, Robert Bougus, Edward Glen Fohl,3 Daniel Hetrick,
and Barbara Caplinger concerning their feelings about the
Union during the election campaign period under similar cir-
cumstances credibly described by them and either completely
undenied or unpersuasively addressed by Respondent wit-
nesses such that I do not credit their accounts. Thus, I found
Respondent officials’ overly guarded, nonresponsive, fre-
quently led leading questions, inconsistent, and argumen-
tatively defensive in that they dodged questions and avoided
direct answers. I find therefore, that Respondent’s above de-
scribed conduct constitutes impermissible coercive interroga-
tion into employee union sentiments in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Professional Eye Care, 289 NLRB 1376
(1988) (prehire interview questioning of employee Knutson);
Christopher Street Owners Corp., 286 NLRB 253 (1987),
citing Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), and refer-
ring to questioning occurring in connection with other unlaw-
ful statements; and Angelica Healthcare Services Groups,
284 NLRB 844 (1987). Given the realities in the workplace,
and the further Respondent conduct at this plant, I do not ac-
cept the Respondent’s contention on brief that its conduct
was innocent. See Garman Construction Co., 287 NLRB 88
(1987), citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
617 (1969).
The reported wrongdoing went further. Maintenance la-
borer Gary Gooding credibly reported that then maintenance
supervisor Dave Schaufele, referring to a letter he handed
Gooding on September 25, told him if the Union came into
the shop it would cost the Company 25 percent of earnings
and would come from employees like him being laid off as
he was a younger employee. Schaufele, while offering his
version, which may or may not have been a complete ac-
count, did not deny Gooding’s account, which was left intact.
Similarly, when employees Arley and Bobby Burns testified
that Schaufele on September 25 told Arley Burns there
would be a pay cut if the Union came in, attributing the cut
to President Morse’s expenses in fighting the Union,
Schaufele gave an account of the words he used but did not
specifically address or deny the Burns’ accounts. Cross-ex-
amination of Arley Burns left the accounts undamaged in
view of Schaufele’s failure to deny them. Arley Burns testi-
fied further that Vice President Comune, in January 1987, re-
sponded to Burns’ question why recently evaluated employ-
ees’ wage increases were so low during a conversation with
Burns, at his machine, that it was because of the Union, the
money spent on the Union, and John Caplinger—the most
prominent employee union activist as known by Comune. In
addition to attributing lower wage increases to union activi-
ties and John Caplinger in particular, when Burns asked,
‘‘when is this [expletive] going to stop; then?’’ Comune re-
plied that all Burns had to do was get a couple of guys to-
gether, get Caplinger off to the side, and do whatever he had
to do to stop it and that will stop—that if they could stop
him then ‘‘we’ll stop the whole thing’’ meaning, plainly
enough, the employees efforts towards union representation.
Burns interpreted, he said, Comune’s suggestion as a sugges-
tion to use physical force to stop Caplinger’s efforts. Since
Burns, a weight-lifting practitioner over the years, had dem-
onstrated strong disappointment over the low level in wage
increases to Comune, who blamed the union campaign for
the employee losses, Burns’ view is not unreasonable; viz.
That Comune’s advice was to pressure Caplinger including
by the use of physical force. Comune’s own words regarding
the use of a ‘‘couple of guys’’ along with Burns, getting
Caplinger ‘‘to one side’’ and ‘‘do whatever [he] had to do
to stop it,’’ that if they could stop him [Caplinger] ‘‘we’ll
stop the whole thing’’ supports the finding. Comune did not
testify to either deny the testimony of Burns or the induce-
ment of Burns in the latter’s view to do whatever had to be
done, including physical force to stop Caplinger’s union ac-
tivities. Clear violations of the Act are established in the
threatening impact on Burns that Respondent would resort to
physical violence on an employee to stop union activities.
Workroom for Designers, 274 NLRB 840 (1985); Lord
Jim’s, 259 NLRB 1162, 1165 (1982); and Jax Mold & Ma-
chine, 255 NLRB 942 (1981).
Burns decided to support the union efforts given the above
incident and wore a union T-shirt to an evaluation meeting.
After losing some $3 an hour due to decreased orders for his
machine, Burns talked to Comune who seemed disinterested.
930 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A couple days after evaluations, Comune told Burns and
other employees, ‘‘you don’t know what a good screwing
is.’’ Burns saw abrasive supervisor Jim Betts shortly there-
after, when Betts approached him and said, ‘‘Well I’m glad
to see you wised up and took your [union] tee shirt off.’’
Betts himself testified he told Burns he wasn’t in favor of
any union. Then Burns told Betts what Comune had said
about a screwing, Betts replied, ‘‘Well, if you get that union
here, I’ll bet you’ll find out.’’ Comune acknowledged his
comment, Betts offered no denial. I find the supervisory
comments constitute both an unlawful attribution of em-
ployee income loss to wearing a union shirt, and threats of
unspecified but serious reprisals if the Union were to become
the employees’ bargaining representative. K & M Elec-
tronics, 283 NLRB 279 (1987) (see Jones Plumbing Co., 277
NLRB 437, 441 (1985)).
The Respondent’s attribution of severe employee wage
losses to their drive for representation continued on other oc-
casions as well. Welder Stephen Kortis recalled an employee
meeting in mid-February 1987 when Vice President Comune
told employees that the cost of employees filing charges with
the NLRB didn’t come out of Morse’s pocket (the company
owner); rather, he said, ‘‘it comes out of your raises and
your future income.’’ Welder Stephen Fowler testified that in
December, during a warning by Manufacturing Vice Presi-
dent Mueller over an alleged production problem, Mueller
told him that Superintendent Roeser had come down several
times to try and discuss it and ‘‘all you did was turn around
and file a charge on us and we didn’t appreciate it,’’ refer-
ring to a charge filed by Fowler alleging harassment by
Roeser. Fowler recalls Comune’s statement at a company
meeting that the filing of charges was hurting our (employ-
ees’) pocketbook. For his part, Comune admitted he told
Fowler, though characteristically unsure when, that Fowler’s
‘‘filing charges [with the NLRB] caused expenses so that the
percentage of [sic] wages was going to decrease—that the
money to pay for these charges was coming out of all our
pockets—including employees’. For his part, Manufacturing
Vice President Mueller testified that he didn’t know if he
mentioned or referred to Fowler’s charge filing during the
encounter and ‘‘couldn’t be specific’’ concerning the con-
versation, leaving Fowler’s credibly rendered testimony in-
tact, and evincing further indications of Respondent wit-
nesses’ selective power of recall not demonstrated when tes-
tifying in friendlier waters. The above conduct is no more
nor no less both an unlawful attribution of employee losses
imposed by Respondent tied to their exercise of lawful rights
under the Act and the threat, as sweepingly phrased in Vice
President Comune’s own admission of further such losses if
‘‘this issue’’—union problems—was going to continue, made
during his talk with Fowler as described by Comune himself.
The threat of adverse employer action against employees be-
cause of charges filed with the National Labor Relations
Board against the employer is clearly unlawful. Delta Faucet
Co., 251 NLRB 394 (1980).
Barbara Caplinger, packaging employee, testified that dur-
ing the last week in August Supervisor Pat Chidester came
into the band room where several employees were working
(Caplinger was 5 feet away) and told employee Pat
Brumbough that she had talked to all of her girls and that
none would be for the Union or they’d pay for it. Caplinger’s
account was straightforward and given under the danger of
substantial possible contradiction by the numerous employees
she identified by name as being present—no such contradic-
tion occurred. Chidester was not specific or complete in her
denials of the account rendered by Caplinger and was gen-
erally contradictory during her examination so that the in-
complete denial she offered left me unconvinced as to the
value in her accout. I find this threat of retaliation a violation
of the Act. Max’s City Deli, supra. I further find the state-
ment by Plant Superintendent Roeser to prospective em-
ployee James Monroe, as described by the latter as occurring
on January 14 (or 15), 1987, during a plant tour, that the job
didn’t pay a lot but was secure because the Company didn’t
have a union was inferentially a threat of lessened employ-
ment security if Monroe were to engage in union activities—
this conclusion arising from Respondent antiunion directed
comments treated below—and therefore a further violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. L & J Equipment Co., 272 NLRB
652 (1984); and Brookfield Dairy, 266 NLRB 698 (1983).
Further Promises of Benefit
During the unlawful interrogation of press operator Cath-
erine Henceroth noted further above on November 5, where
Respondent’s consultant Smyth probed into the employee’s
opinion concerning the Union, and made a specific promise
concerning her regaining a lost wage rate, Smyth also told
Henceroth what the Company was prepared to do if the
Union didn’t win the election—first telling her a fellow em-
ployee, Bob Burns, had changed his vote for the Union after
Smyth had talked to him. Smyth told her the bonus was
going to be changed if the Union didn’t come in, and that
wages would be reevaluated. He also said that all kinds of
changes would be made whether it came in or not. That
same day Smyth, circulating around the plant, told employee
Edward G. Fohl, paint line laborer, at his work station that
if Company President Morse was given another chance (the
election was 2 days away) he’d solve the problems of work-
ers’ wages and incentives and he would better working con-
ditions—that the union activity was like having a gun point-
ing at his head and he (Morse) would be a fool not to ad-
dress problems in the shop. These mainly undenied accounts
are credited.
Employee Barbara Caplinger described a September talk
with Vice President Comune, treated partly above, when he
interrogated her at work—a second time—why she was for
the Union. When the employee explained she was tired of
supervisory harassment and threats, and wanted job protec-
tion, Comune told her, ‘‘the supervisors would be taken care
of if the union didn’t come in’’ that ‘‘we had put a pretty
big scare in Morse and he is willing to negotiate with em-
ployees if the Union doesn’t come in.’’
On August 5, Smyth met leading employee union adherent
John Caplinger in a parking lot in Canton, Ohio, pursuant to
a meeting arranged when Supervisor Jim Betts asked
Caplinger to call Smyth. Smyth had been introduced as a
company consultant during an earlier plant meeting attended
by Caplinger and spent 40 days addressing the union cam-
paign at the plant in the preelection period. Smyth, whom the
record shows played a hands-on role, directly confronting
and interrogating employees and unlawfully promising em-
ployees benefits if the Union didn’t come in, told Caplinger
he’d rather be working with him than against him, that he’d
make a good supervisor—that there was a possibility of
931M. K. MORSE CO.
being appointed a supervisor by the Company. Smyth as-
sured Caplinger he could convince Morse that Caplinger
would make a good one, and that three other company offi-
cials knew he was talking to him that day, saying later in
testimony that either Comune or Morse were advised regard-
ing his tactics. Smyth testified he merely thought from an
earlier action by Caplinger in securing an injured employee
first aid that he and Caplinger could come up with answers
and solutions to problems at the plant prompting their, as he
himself described it, highly confidential meeting. He testified
he told Caplinger he had leadership skills that can be more
positively used than as a front man for an untruthful union,
admitting, he repeated the ‘‘leadership quality’’ remark five
more times in their discussion. On cross-examination he did
not deny directly Caplinger’s account of the suggestion of an
offer of a supervisory position, instead limiting himself to
saying he told Caplinger he had no authority to make the
offer. Caplinger turned down the offer, noting to Smyth he
had already declined such a position earlier. None of the cir-
cumstances alleged by Smyth to have prompted the meeting
with Caplinger ring at all true; and his examination by coun-
sel for Respondent skirted the opportunity to have him deny
head on Caplinger’s testimony most of which was left
undenied; besides, the emphasis by Smyth—again
undenied—on Caplinger’s leadership qualities five times in
their talk lends considerable credence to Caplinger’s account
in such regard that Smyth was encouraging him to drop his
union support, and work with Smyth against the Union as a
company supervisor and at the very least that this was a via-
ble option tendered to Caplinger if he would work with
Smyth against the Union.
I find by the above-described conduct involving all the
named employees that Respondent made unlawful promises
of benefits to coerce employees into withdrawing their sup-
port for the Union, thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Keystone Lamp Mfg. Corp., 284 NLRB 626
(1987).
Further Threats and Disparagement of Employee Union
Adherents’ Activities
Respondent’s representatives disparaged employee union
adherents to other employees in the plant, castigating them
and portraying activities pointless on behalf of a scorned or-
ganization. Thus, on September 25, Maintenance Department
Supervisor Schaufele told employee Gary Gooding he
(Gooding) couldn’t trust employee John Caplinger and
Chuck Casler, to well-known employee union supporters be-
cause they were liars. The same day, employee James
Shuman testified that Schaufele told him John Caplinger was
‘‘a son of a bitch and a couple of union representative [sic]
assholes.’’ Shuman stated that Schaufele said he could talk
for himself ‘‘you didn’t need those other assholes’’ to think
for you, that they were lying to you naming known union
supporters Caplinger, Bob Burns, and Jac Seabolt. Welder
Edward Lashua testified that Plant Superintendent Roeser an-
grily reacted to his wearing a brightly colored union T-shirt
on February 6, 1987, telling him he didn’t care how many
charges ‘‘you file against me’’ telling him ‘‘f—k your
union.’’ Respondent’s efforts on brief to lessen or avoid the
coercion practiced against employee rights under the Act by
either painting a more gentle context or by unpersuasive de-
nial are rejected. I find by such conduct further violations of
the Act. Bonanza Sirloin Pit, 275 NLRB 310 (1985); and
Southern Illinois Petrol, 277 NLRB 160 (1985).
Respondent further attempted to link its failure to grant
wage reviews and increases promised beforehand to the
Union’s filing of charges and objections to the election, by
a letter to employees dated November 18 (GC–7), in which
Respondent stated ‘‘the conditions under which you work are
frozen’’ and attributed such to the Union, in a clear further
effort to thereby further disparage it and interfere with em-
ployee organizational rights under the Act in violation of
Section 8(a)(1). National Micronetics, 277 NLRB 993
(1985); J & G Wall Bakinq Co., 272 NLRB 1002, 1012
(1984); and Trover Clinic, 280 NLRB 6 (1986). I agree with
counsel for the General Counsel that the letter left the mes-
sage with employees that an earlier promised and scheduled
salary raise review was withdrawn by the letter’s reference
to frozen conditions, and further violated the Act. Gerkin
Co., 279 NLRB 1012 (1986); and, United Artists, 277 NLRB
115, 124 (1985).
In a further effort to weaken the desires of employees to
select a union, consultant Smyth told employee Henceroth
and Burns on November 5 that, as Burns put it, ‘‘we’re only
going to get what Morse wants to give us with or without
the union?’’ I find that this message from Smyth to the em-
ployees during more than an hour’s discussion with them
during working hours in the presence of their supervisor was
designed to plant and fortify the idea that union efforts were
futile, conduct violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Hilty
Tank Corp., 273 NLRB 979, 982 (1984).
Impression of Surveillance, Withdrawal of Benefit, and
Other Forms of Interference
The Respondent’s supervisors and agents made comments
to employees such as that they knew who one of the top
dogs in the union effort was, that there was union activity
going on, that it knew the employees had decided to go
ahead and pursue or backup union-filed charges and objec-
tions to the election, and even the identity of the employee,
John Caplinger, who wanted to get the Union in and become
its president. Were these comments viewed in isolation they
might reasonably be viewed in a less serious light, but such
is not the case when viewed in context for in each instance,
in its conversations with the employees involved, John
Caplinger by Roeser on August 19, employee Rudolph
Skropits by Comune who told him he understood employees
were no longer interested in a meeting with Morse, discussed
below, because of their union activity, and employee Steven
Kortis, by Comune on September 18, before Kortis had ex-
pressed support for the Union and Comune interrogated him
as described above, bluntly telling him he knew Kortis was
one of the top dogs in getting the union activity started—in
each instance the comments arose in a context of pervasive
unlawful acts by Respondent which would reasonably fuel
the perception in employees’ minds that Respondent had a
powerful motive for, and in fact was, maintaining close sur-
veillance on the union activities of its employees, such was
its animosity towards those activities. I find Respondent’s
conduct created the impression of such surveillance among
its employees and that it thereby violated the Act. Haynes
Motor Lines, 273 NLRB 1851, 1855 (1985); Cardivan Co.,
271 NLRB 563 (1984); and see Dutch Boy, Inc., 262 NLRB
4 (1962).
932 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The record shows further that Respondent withdrew an
earlier granted benefit consisting of a new procedure by
which employees could present grievances directly to Re-
spondent, as described by a written memorandum to employ-
ees dated August 26, 1986. (GC–15.) The memo outlined the
opportunity for employee representatives to present all
‘‘complaints, grievances, ideas, etc.’’ pursuant to the plan at
a meeting scheduled for September 2. It is undenied that the
promised new benefit was withdrawn by Respondent’s vice
president Comune a week or so later when he informed
Skropits the letter was rescinded, or no longer effective, be-
cause there was union activity occurring in the plant and Re-
spondent had learned about it since issuing the letter. By as-
cribing the loss of a clearly contemplated and promised sub-
stantial improvement in employment conditions—a means for
the first time by which employees could present grievances
through employee representatives to management for resolu-
tion to employees’ union activities, Respondent clearly vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. General Electric
Co., 255 NLRB 673 (1981).
There is no doubt on this record that Respondent unlaw-
fully screened applicants for employment for their union
sympathies, so as to possibly prevent any increase in support
for the Union among its plant force members. By company
officials, and its longtime, 9- or 10-year close, daily associa-
tion with the lawyer’s firm representative John Vesalo, fully
an agent with either express, implied, de facto, or construc-
tive authority to do Respondent’s bidding and the record is
ample in such regard Respondent carried out a hiring proce-
dure after the election in a studiedly administered antiunion
manner.
Thus, Respondent’s agent Vesalo told James Monroe dur-
ing his interview January 9, 1987, for a welder’s position
that the Company just had a union campaign and was con-
cerned about hiring prounion employees—that if Monroe
asked, he was to say he was against the Union or they
wouldn’t hire him, and that Vesalo referred to a phone con-
versation with Comune during Monroe’s presence as involv-
ing a ‘‘guy’’ with union ties who wasn’t hired and that if
Monroe had such ties, he wouldn’t be hired. Vesalo repeated
the Company was looking for hard-working mature nonunion
individuals. When Monroe later met with Comune, the latter
openly announced he was going to ask him some questions
which were probably illegal, proceeding to ask if Monroe
was involved in any union shops as described earlier in the
finding of unlawful interrogation. During an interview by
Vesalo of John Sparrow, Vesalo told him that Sparrow
should just go down and talk to Jack Comune and say you
have nothing to do with a union. When Sparrow met with
Comune, further along in the hiring interview process, the
latter took pains—as Respondent had instructed Vesalo to do
with all the applicants—to describe the ‘‘situation’’ with the
Union, and when Sparrow mentioned the name of a 10-year
long friend and union supporter who had described the situa-
tion to him, Comune’s attitude seemed to Sparrow to go
from pleasant to angry—as discussed more fully below.
Sparrow didn’t get a job offer let alone a tour of the plant.
Vesalo and Comune also individually interviewed employee
applicant Linda Hodges, both inquiring into how she felt to-
ward a Union during the hiring interview, Comune explain-
ing the ‘‘Union situation’’ to her, that there had been an
election which the Company won and asking whether
Hodges specifically liked the Union or whether she did not
like the Union. Comune also interviewed applicant Donald
Fortney on December 15, 1987, inquiring into whether
Fortney’s prior place of employment was union or not.
Vesalo was not asked to deny the specific employee testi-
mony and admitted he ‘‘may’’ have told applicants that Re-
spondent had ‘‘always been non-union.’’ Crediting employee
accounts Vesalo clearly had apparent authority to act for Re-
spondent, conveying information to prospective employees
regarding Respondent’s attitude toward the Union and thus
constituting its agent. Lapeer Foundry & Machine, 289
NLRB 952 (1988).
Respondent never attempted to disaffirm or escape from
the view that it had ratified the actions of Vesalo, portrayed
credibly by the employee accounts, and the finding of agency
relationship is therefore even further borne out. I find Re-
spondent unlawfully screened employee applicants, some of
whom are subjects of discussion below as alleged
discriminatees, coercively interfering with their rights in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, such screening conduct
sometimes occurring in the form of illegal interrogation de-
scribed in further detail above, or in the guise of admonish-
ments not to disclose union-supporting views, or as pointed
references to the Respondent’s decided preferences for non-
union types, or to the failure of a ‘‘union-involved’’ appli-
cant to be hired because of such involvement. In short, the
screening process went beyond unlawful interrogation and
more broadly interfered with employee candidates’ rights
under the Act. Minnesota Boxed Meat, 282 NLRB 1208
(1987); and Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 NLRB 1194
(1986). In the same vein, during an interview of Ervin Potts,
discussed more fully below, Respondent told Potts that
wages would be, for some jobs, 20 to 30 cents more per hour
if it wasn’t for the union-filed charges against Respondent.
By laying blame for lower wages on pending union charges,
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Na-
tional Micronetics, 277 NLRB 993 (1985), and Southern Illi-
nois Petrol, 277 NLRB 160 (1985).
Respondent’s Unlawful Assistance to ESR
Midnight shift employee Gary Kunkle testified that 2
weeks before the November 7 election, Executive Vice Presi-
dent Jack Comune made it his practice to appear on the mid-
night shift—not Comune’s regular schedule—about 3 a.m.
and starting at one end of the shop work down to where
Kunkle was, talking to each employee individually about the
Union and the ESR, telling Kunkle he thought the ESR
‘‘would be better for us . . . [than the Union,] that we could
settle problems ourselves with Mr. Morse without a union.’’
After Kunkle mentioned he hadn’t received ESR ‘‘stuff’’
Comune left and returned shortly afterward, winked, and
smiled at Kunkle saying, ‘‘I’m going to leave this [ESR lit-
erature] sit here just in case somebody wants to read it’’ and
departed. Comune didn’t deny Kinkle’s account, merely testi-
fying he never gave Kunkle any literature. Labor Relations
Consultant Smyth, an admitted Respondent agent, told em-
ployee Catherine Henceroth at her work station on November
5 that the ESR could do more for her than the Union could,
and her account of this, which was undenied by Smyth’s
vague testimony, occurred in the context of an unlawful
promise of benefit described earlier. Further evidence of Re-
spondent assistance to ESR occurred on October 28 when
933M. K. MORSE CO.
employee Bobby Burns saw ESR supporters handing out
ESR literature and heard Superintendent Roeser advising one
of them, John Held, not to pass out all the leaflets ‘‘to make
sure he saved some and put them in by the time clock on
[the] table so the night shift could get them.’’ Burns also tes-
tified that Supervisor Jim Betts intruded into a conversation
between Burns and ESR founder, Dave Hallam, telling Burns
how the Union cost the Company 15 to 40 percent of its
profits, holding a copy of the Laymen’s Guide to N.L.R.B.
and that Burns’ best bet was to go along with ESR as they
would do a better job of representing him than the Steel-
workers. Betts was unsure and couldn’t recall much when
testifying. Employee James Monroe met efforts by Respond-
ent to assist ESR in late January or early February 1987,
when admitted Supervisor Steve Scibetta, in the context of
a discussion over whether Monroe would get a raise, told
him benefits of ESR were a lot better than what the Steel-
workers Union could offer because you could work things
out directly with a supervisor, promoting ESR to Monroe.
Scibetta told Monroe he was doing real well and when leav-
ing asked him to reconsider the idea of the in-house union.
The record further shows that an employee leader in the
ESR, Rudy Skropits, was in regular telephone contact with
Vice President John Comune at Comune’s home during the
election campaign period—making between 10 and 20 such
calls during which he transmitted information about the
Steelworkers campaign. Comune also testified he received
calls to his home from another ESR leader Debbie Vendetti.
Given Comune’s unusually energetic devotion to assisting
ESR even to the extent of making 3 a.m. visits to shop em-
ployees where he solicited the support of individual employ-
ees on behalf of ESR, and gave out ESR literature, coupled
with his pervasive other anti-Steelworkers Union conduct, I
find it beyond reasonable dispute that those phone calls as-
sisted, in both a narrow and broader sense, whether by infor-
mation gathering or advising strategy, the ESR efforts to de-
feat the Steelworkers campaign by such plainly collaborative-
in-nature contacts. All the foregoing occurred in the midst of
fusillade-like disparagements of the Union, the leading em-
ployee union supporter, and other employee union leaders—
personally scurrilous attacks and sustained disparagements of
the unwanted labor union alleged responsible for employee
losses, while ESR was held out to employees as the better
way to go. Based upon the above, I find there is a clear pre-
ponderance of proof establishi‘ng that Respondent unlawfully
assisted the ESR in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
Midwestern Mining, 277 NLRB 221 (1985); Ralco Sewing
Industries, 243 NLRB 438, 442 (1979); Palmas Del Mar
Co., 277 NLRB 71, 82 (1985); see also World Wide Press,
242 NLRB 346, 362 (1979).
Further Unlawful Assistance to ESR By Discriminatory
Enforcement of Respondent’s No-Solicitation Rule
In September Respondent adopted a rule forbidding em-
ployees ‘‘to leave their work station or work area to discuss
the union question with other employees.’’ Respondent in-
formed employees in writing they could discuss union cam-
paign matters barring interference with work, before or after
work or during breaks, according to uncontradicted employee
testimony, in the early stages of the union campaign. But this
rule as amplified in the company flyer was openly ignored
by Respondent as to ESR employee activities in numerous
instances and tightened beyond its letter and spirit against
prounion employees.
Maintenance Supervisor David Schaufele in mid-Sep-
tember ordered maintenance department employees—all of
whom had signed union authorization cards including the
leading union activist John Caplinger, ‘‘not to talk to any-
body about nothing except company business and our job
and he didn’t want to see or hear of us talking to anybody
at anytime while we were working about the union activity.’’
Employees Gooding and Caplinger similarly decribed the
meeting. On September 20, Plant Superintendent Roeser
found Stephen Kortis, an early known leading union advo-
cate, talking to fellow employee Ed Lashua and
unprecedently issued a warning into his personnel file, Vice
President Comune explaining inscrutably in response to
Kortis later inquiring why with a smile only that, ‘‘we felt
justified’’ and walking away from him. The two employees
had been discussing Lashua’s machine’s performance. Em-
ployee Hobert Starcher, a member on the Union’s organizing
committee, described how, for the first time, after the elec-
tion campaign started he was instructed to stay in his depart-
ment, that he had to secure permission from a newly sta-
tioned supervisor before leaving for any reason and being
told by supervision on two occasions to return to his depart-
ment—the latter occasion involving Superintendent Roeser,
who told the employee he disbelieved what Starcher, who
was wearing a union hat and a Vote for the Union button,
told him he was talking about with another employee without
explanation. Yet by contrast employee Gooding, ordered to
avoid such conduct by Schaufele, noted that he saw ESR
supporters passing out literature in the campaign period, spe-
cifically John Held walking through a work area passing out
ESR material to employees most of whom were working—
including himself, in the cone room, machine shop—that
there was ESR literature on the bulletin board, and by the
timeclock. Held testified only that once Roeser had told him
and a co-employee not to pass out literature while employees
were working. Bobby Burns described how leading ESR
members Marsha Humes, John Held, and others including
Dave Hallam and Rudy Skropits were ‘‘almost constantly
campaigning’’ around in the presence of supervisors, that
Marsha Humes, an ESR leader, would clock out from plant
1 and come over to plant 2 and group together with John
Held, Dave Hallum, and Rudy Skropits for up to an hour on
the day of their ESR meetings, and that two supervisors were
present on those occasions. ESR supporter Peggy Brumbaugh
testified that she talked with employees regarding the union
efforts to organize fellow employees as she went through the
plant without being stopped or disciplined. Debbie Vendetti,
another ESR supporter, did not deny passing out literature to
employees stating only that she had only done so when she
wasn’t on the clock after being told she couldn’t do so—
leaving intact employee testimony that ESR supporters had
solicited employees under the circumstances described. Thus,
Robert Bougus in the preelection period saw Peggy
Brumbagh, Marsha Humes, and three others named by him,
in his area on working time talking in a small group 10 or
15 minutes, three of whom worked in his area, while the
other two were in the bands department, so that the former
worked the same hours as Bougus and got the same breaks.
He testified that Supervisor Pat Chidester was in the area.
Humes, who helped form ESR and, as the daughter of Super-
934 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
intendent Roeser made her own hours, testified she believed
the rules allowed free talk so long as you didn’t leave your
work area.
Rudy Skropits recalled that ESR supporter Dave Hallum
passed out ESR literature to employees still on working
time—possibly with approval of his supervisor. Catherine
Henceroth saw Brumbaugh and Humes—leading ESR mem-
bers in the same period talking to other employees in work-
ing hours at bandsaws and packaging—that they were out of
their area—bandsaws—two or three times. Barbara Caplinger
testified she observed ESR campaigning by them as well, in-
cluding in addition, Karen McFadden and Rita Kennedy—
that the ESR representatives would stand around and talk 15,
20, or 30 minutes, out of their work area and that
Brumbaugh and Humes left their work areas the most.
Caplinger placed Comune and Roeser at the scene but her
complaints over the ESR activities to Comune were ineffec-
tive. There was further testimony of a like genre by employ-
ees John Caplinger, Douglas Glantzer—who specifically
identified ESR supporters Karen McFadden out of her de-
partment stopping and talking to people all through the
shop—including him on ESR’s behalf—Kortis—beyond his
earlier testimony—and Michael Lombard and Edward Lashua
were mutually corroborative on the matter. I find a settled
attitude and range of conduct by Respondent in assistance
and support to ESR documented earlier above was fortified
further by Respondent’s just-described clearly disparate en-
forcement of its no-solicitation rule in favor of ESR in fur-
ther violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act and that by dis-
criminating against prounion employees in terms of their
conditions of employment—viz. the harsher application of
said rule—Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. SMI Steel Inc., 286 NLRB 274 (1987); Castaways Man-
agement, 285 NLRB 954 (1987); and Midwestern Mining &
Reclamation, 277 NLRB 221 (1985).
Respondent’s Unlawful Discipline of Employees
On February 6, 1987, Plant Superintendent Roeser saw
employee union supporter Edward Lashua leaving another
employee’s department and asked him why he was outside
his own department. After Lashua responded he had been on
break, Roeser told him he was being warned and then angrily
said, ‘‘I don’t care how many charges you file against me.
. . . F—k your union. Punch out and go home,’’ whereupon
Lashua departed, losing several hours’ pay. The record is
clear that Roeser’s actions were precipitous, ignored discipli-
nary procedures, and were totally unfounded; in fact, at the
hearing Roeser changed reasons for the action to overstaying
the lunch period in an obvious, yet unfounded effort to retro-
actively justify the unwarranted harsh discipline by shifting
its rational. Respondent’s actions against Lashua on October
are further evidence of the unusual paranoia-like antiunion
attitudes manifested by Respondent, when it again targeted
Lashua for disciplinary warnings in an effort so obviously
trumped up a to be pitiful though instructive of its deep ani-
mus. Lashua and a construction worker, who was well-
known to him, had exchanged humorous wholly innocuous
banter in a friendly and playful manner on October 20; that
afternoon Roeser summoned Lashua to Roeser’s office where
Respondent accused Lashua of threatening the construction
worker, who testified it was not his idea to file any com-
plaint; and warned Lashua if there was a delay on the con-
struction job or injuries, that Lashua would be punished, rep-
rimanded, suspended or discharged, and could be brought up
on criminal charges. The warning was entered in Lashua’s
file. Respondent’s animus-fueled actions against Lashua are
most decidedly proven to be illegal actions based on falsely
exaggerated circumstances for the purpose of harassment in
clear violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Woodcliff Lake Hilton Inn, 279 NLRB 1064, 1070 (1986);
Power-Seal Corp., 276 NLRB 357 (1985); and American
Model & Pattern Co., 277 NLRB 176, 182 (1985).
Shortly after Vice President Comune accused Steve Kortis
of being one of the top dogs in the employees’ organization
for the Union on September 18, described above during a co-
ercive confrontation, Superintendent Roeser found Kortis
talking to Lashua on September 20 at 6:30 a.m. when Kortis
had approached Lashua to discuss whether better caps for
Kortis’ welding work were available or whether there was a
problem with the tapmatic machine. Roeser asked if they
were on company time, told them to get back to work, and
left. The two immediately complied. On September 22, with-
out explanation, Roeser gave Kortis a written reprimand for
the ‘‘incident’’ on September 20 and left. Then Kortis later
protested to Comune on October 6, Comune told him he
could have written up three or four others stating with a
smile that they felt justified in writing him up. This was
Kortis’ first reprimand in 6 years, and came within days of
his leading involvement with the Union became admittedly
known to Respondent; moreover, Kortis had never before
been required to seek permission to leave his area to pursue
a production-related problem. As a senior experienced welder
with a spotless record, it would have Kortis’ conduct, leaving
as a proper inference, that Roeser was more interested in pe-
nalizing one of the Union’s leading employee supporters than
in evaluating the circumstances properly before deciding on
any discipline at all—and this, by the way, in stark contrast
to the freedom accorded the heavily assisted ESR supporting
employees documented above. The Kortis’ reprimand was
patently discriminatory. United Merchants & Mfrs., 284
NLRB 135 (1987); and Wayne W. Sell Corp., 281 NLRB
529 (1986).
The Reprimands and Suspension of Robert Baugus
Baugus, an early union supporter as admittedly known by
Comune and Roeser, wore union hats, T-shirts, and buttons.
Consultant Smyth, as detailed above, told employee
Henceroth that Baugus was going to be discharged on No-
vember 5 for campaigning for the Union. He had a good pro-
duction record but was twice disciplined for the petty offense
of not starting at the stroke of 7 a.m., even though he was
in the department just a few feet from his machine and an-
other employee was regularly not at his work station without
penalty. Contrary to Respondent, there was no record in the
other employee’s file of any discipline. The discrimination
towards Baugus increased on May 21, 1987, when he was
disciplined for alleged gross insubordination which turned
out to be based on Baugus merely jokingly telling another
employee, known by him to work overtime often, that she
soon would be working 16 hours. Respondent failed to ex-
plain why such was ‘‘gross insubordination.’’ In another in-
cident, Baugus, just outside the restroom enroute inside, was
met by Roeser who scolded him for using the facility then,
rather than on lunchbreak, took him to his office, told him
935M. K. MORSE CO.
he was a pain in the butt, and should have been fired before
and angrily told him to punch out and go home, referring to
Baugus being seen talking to another employee away from
his machine on another occasion. Respondent later allowed
Baugus to return on condition he sign a last-chance letter ac-
knowledging clearly erroneous alleged prior misconduct by
Baugus, the petty infractions involving minutes at most, the
alleged ‘‘gross insubordination,’’ and other unsubstantiated
entries dealing with production which were shot through with
nonrepresentative periods, vacation time, failure to account
for varying piece sizes—Mueller acknowledging himself that
the record could have been better if the period reviewed had
been longer—and a warning on the heels of one of Baugus’
best production efforts wherein he had actually earned a
bonus of $161. (CP–17; GC–22.) Moreover, Mueller himself
admitted Baugus didn’t have a production problem, that Re-
spondent had not reviewed the record prior to the suspension,
and the action was not in accord with its progressively staged
disciplinary system. There was clear evidence of much more
tolerant treatment being accorded by Respondent to a decid-
edly more misbehaving employee working under Baugus’ su-
pervisor—Chidester—in the same timeframe in stark con-
trast, as well as to the other employee noted earlier who was
consistently not at his work place on time without discipli-
nary warnings being recorded against him. I find a clear pre-
ponderance of proof in the record supports the unmistakable
view that Respondent’s above-discriminatory actions against
Baugus are violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Magnesium Casting Co., 250 NLRB 692, 711 (1980); and
Production Plated Plastics, 247 NLRB 595, 605 (1980).
Warnings for Absenteeism and Productivity
Respondent issued reprimands and warnings against open
union advocate welder Stephen Fowler shortly after the elec-
tion, on November 24, for alleged excessive absenteeism,
and again on December 11, 1987, for allegedly insufficient
production. The evidence convincingly shows that neither
reprimand was justified and that the actions were unlawful.
Regarding the warning over productivity, it is readily ap-
parent that Respondent’s basis for action is wholly unsup-
ported as painstakingly and thoroughly detailed in the brief-
ing by counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging
Party. In sum, there was no clear rule regarding what Re-
spondent considered satisfactory production, Fowler’s re-
ported record looked much worse—but only part of the time
at that—for fully explained and undeniable reasons than it
actually was, and in many instances Respondent’s own
records or its interpretation of them were erroneous. Re-
spondent ignored the strongly mitigating factors as well as
the satisfactory performances demonstrated by Fowler and
undenied in the record, compared production numbers of an-
other welder on Fowler’s machines without taking into ac-
count the undenied poor quality of his work compared to
Fowler, whose rating for quality was above average while
productivity was average, ignored the undenied wretchedly
poor condition of Fowler’s continuously unrepaired machine,
ignored the sizes of the pieces left to Fowler to produce after
more senior employees got their choice of the easier to
produce smaller pieces, ignored Fowler’s achieving a triple
bonus such was his productivity, and Fowler’s overall rating
of ‘‘above average’’ in Respondent’s own rating system.
(GC–81.) Respondent’s omissions of these details and its
failure to render a fair evaluation are explained by the Re-
spondent’s meeting with Fowler on December 11 shortly
after Fowler had filed charges against Respondent protesting
its harassment and Respondent called him in with Mueller
and Roeser during which the warning, unprecedented since
it rejected the need for any lesser discipline, as called for
normally in Respondent’s system for discipline, threatened
summary discharge against Fowler. Mueller told Fowler,
‘‘Evidently, I have a problem here with your production,
Chuck (Roeser) has come down several times and tried to
discuss it and all you did was turn around a [sic] file a
charge on us and we didn’t appreciate that.’’
The warning against Fowler for alleged excessive absen-
teeism is equally unfounded since Respondent’s implementa-
tion policy on the record was so ambiguous as to approach
invisibility, 6 days being considered ‘‘ecessive,’’ Fowler’s
absences were documentedly excusable under plant practice
for medical reasons in five or six instances, other employees
compiled much ‘‘worse’’ records without encountering dis-
cipline, indicating discriminatory application of whatever the
rule was in Fowler’s case, Respondent thereafter required
Fowler unlike others to submit medical excuses upon each
absence, rather than for those in excess of 3 days, and clearly
failed to adjust Fowler’s record based on the medical excuses
offered by him preceding the discipline. I find that both
warnings have been demonstrated to arise from Respondent’s
animus toward a known union adherent such is the provenly
unreliable asserted basis for the discipline and the strong
basis for inferring the presence of an unlawful discriminatory
motive arising from the circumtances noted herein. Lancer
Corp., 271 NLRB 1426 (1984); and Delta Faucet Co., 251
NLRB 394, 400–404 (1980).
Respondent also issued a warning for allegedly excessive
absenteeism against chief employee union supporter and
election observer for the Union John Caplinger on January
9, 1987. Respondent, as described above, had targeted
Caplinger for physical assault, deprecatory slurs, and other
forms of coercive interference. Caplinger’s attendance record
was free of any warnings or discipline prior to January 9, but
Respondent issued a disciplinary warning then, using
Caplinger’s return to home after 4 hours work; on the night
shift due to illness, as the reason. Respondent claims that it
believed Caplinger had gone home early from work, albeit
with permission from his supervisor first being properly ob-
tained, for the purpose of being able to go deer hunting, and
that’s why the discipline was issued. The Respondent failed
to establish by any probative evidence, however, and this is
admitted that Caplinger wasn’t genuinely ill when his super-
visor gave him permission to go home without pay, or that
Caplinger went hunting the next day either during his normal
shift hours or at anytime. In my view, there wasn’t even rea-
sonable cause for Respondent to believe he had done so
given the incredibly, contradictory testimony of Respondent
witness describing the surrounding circumstances in over-
whelming yet totally unproductive detail; acccordingly, I do
not see any reason whatsoever which would reasonably trig-
ger the imposition of a disciplinary warning founded on an
employee’s otherwise entirely valid, medically based, and
specifically excused absence from the second part of his
work shift. The record is so replete with evidence concerning
nonunion and other employee records for absenteeism includ-
ing an employee election observer for the Company of a far
936 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
worst nature, that the action against Caplinger sticks out even
further like a sore thumb, especially since illnesses were not,
on this record, considered unexcused absences in all cases.
Bristling with animus, Supervisor Schaufele told Caplinger
when he reported for work on his next tour of duty, ‘‘We
know you went home early to go hunting and if we could
prove it, we would have grounds to dismiss you.’’ In the
normal scheme of things, there would be no valid reason for
Respondent to raise the intimidating spectre of discharge
against an employee who had been authorized to excuse him-
self from work due to illness, especially when, as here, the
Respondent admittedly had no proof of employee wrong-
doing unless some other motive fueled Respondent’s action,
which is demonstrated amply above including by Respond-
ent’s failed efforts to support the discipline. I find by its con-
duct that Respondent discriminatively disciplined Caplinger
because of his union activity in further violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. Confort & Co., 275 NLRB 560 (1985);
Ohio New & Rebuilt Parts, 267 NLRB 420, 433–434 (1983);
Superior Warehouse Grocers, 277 NLRB 18, 25 (1985); and
Hedaya Bros., 277 NLRB 942, 945 (1985).
Doug Glantzer’s Paid Lunch Period
The record shows that Respondent singled out Doug
Glantzer for punishment due to his active, vocal support for
the Union on April 22, 1987, when it eliminated Glantzer’s
paid lunch period while maintaining the benefit for others in
the same department and, indeed, for another employee who
operated the very same machine as Glantzer. This conclusion
is based on a clear, strong preponderance in the evidence. At
the hearing Respondent offered three different reasons for its
action, none of which hold up to analysis. The alleged rea-
son, that Glantzer’s machine could be shut down so that
there was no need to keep it running during the lunch period,
was proven false as other employee machines in Glantzer’s
department could also be shut down and anyway what about
the undenied fact that when other employees in the same de-
partment, as well as a new hire who operated the same ma-
chine, did the same work as Glantzer, they were paid for
their lunch period but Glantzer was not? The next alleged
reason for admittedly cutting the benefit for Glantzer was
due to the fact that his machine was moved to another area
but this was not shown to be any justification whatever,
since others who worked on the machine continued to have
the benefit and why would that matter anyway? Finally, in
its poor defense, Respondent alleged it removed Glantzer’s
paid lunch because of other employee complaints, an
unproven and unprecedented action for Respondent, indeed.
The disparate treatment accorded the only open advocate for
the Union in his department is thus left unexplained by Re-
spondent’s woefully weak parade of shifting reasons, and the
absence of any shred of justification for Respondent’s con-
duct, coupled with Glantzer’s known activity, and Respond-
ent’s steadily continuing animus-fueled discrimination against
employees, including deep into the postelection period leads
to the inescapable conclusion that its conduct was motivated
by discriminatory reasons and that it thereby violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Hendrickson Bros., 272 NLRB
438, 457 (1984); Scotch & Sirloin Restaurant, 269 NLRB
436, 443 (1984); and Teamsters Local 164, 267 NLRB 8, 12,
17 (1983).
The Refusals to Hire John Sparrow and Ervin Potts
The complaint alleges that Respondent refused to hire
John Sparrow and Ervin Potts for discriminatory reasons,
namely, out of Respondent’s heavily documented determina-
tion not to employ union-supporting individuals or those who
even might become so inclined, which intentions were be-
hind Respondent’s unlawful screening of job applicants dem-
onstrated above.
The record shows that Respondent’s agent Vesalo ap-
proved Sparrow’s employment application readily on January
9, 1987, Vesalo informing Sparrow there was a job opening
at Morse and ‘‘you should have a job.’’ Sparrow was experi-
enced and qualified by past employment, which was termi-
nated when prior companies experienced operational changes
outside Sparrow’s control, for openings badly needing filling
at Morse. Vice President Comune told Sparrow at his inter-
view later about benefits and work shifts, including that there
was an opening on the first shift which Sparrow could have.
As the discussion continued an objective view is that things
were going quite well for Sparrow’s efforts to secure em-
ployment until, during further conversation about Sparrow’s
past employment, Comune—an established ritual for him—
brought up the union problems being experienced by Re-
spondent and Sparrow told him he knew all about them from
Morse employee Hobie Starcher, a 10-year-long pretty good
friend and former coworker with Sparrow at Timken Steel.
Starcher was known to Comune as one of the original seven
employees initiating the employees’ organizational efforts for
a union. Sparrow, in a possible natural gesture to save his
employment prospects when he heard Comune’s tone of
voice go from friendly to angry in an instant, told Comune
he didn’t share Archer’s views on unions, but the effort by
Sparrow was to no avail as Comune ended the interview
minutes later. After Sparrow left, he (Sparrow) called Vesalo
who expressed shock that Respondent had not hired Sparrow.
Respondent claimed it refused to hire Sparrow for the sole
reason that he had held too many positions in the past, yet
the record clearly shows that Respondent knew the reasons
for such four job changes—save for one as a dishwasher—
ended for economic reasons at those companies, not due to
Sparrow’s conduct. There is no doubt Respondent admittedly
needed the job filled, and knew very well that Sparrow was
well-qualified. Further, the record shows that Respondent
hired other applicants who possessed no relevant prior skills
or experience, and other applicants who had over three em-
ployers in 3 years. I am convinced by Respondent’s failure
to explain by any rational means why the well-qualified ap-
plicant Sparrow was, at the time he disclosed a friendship
with a known union adherent, rejected in a summary and
angry manner for employment, that the only reason was that
relationship. By applying different standards and by acting
on antiunion animus in rejecting Sparrow for hire, Respond-
ent further violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Jones Plumb-
ing Co., 277 NLRB 437 (19885); Food & Commercial
Workers Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1985), Chancellor Transportation Co., 282 NLRB 887
(1987); and Rogers Cleaning Contractors, 277 NLRB 482
(1985).
Ervin Potts worked for Dyneer Company as an experi-
enced welder, press operator, and furnace operator for many
years until the company closed down and moved away. On
January 14, 1987, Potts applied for employment at Respond-
937M. K. MORSE CO.
ent’s plant, armed with a glowing recommendation from
Dyneer, stating that Potts’ ‘‘dependability, conscientiousness,
ability to work unsupervised, attitude toward his fellow em-
ployees and supervisors, and qetting the job done whatever
the task, has made Ervin an outstanding employee.’’ CP–4
(emphasis added). Adding further to Potts’ prospects for
being well-received were recommendations or references by
two former coworkers at Dyneer by then employed by Re-
spondent, whose supervision knew them to be good employ-
ees and not to be supporters of the Union.
At the interview on January 17, Vice President Comune—
in charge of the ‘‘whole ball of wax,’’ including hiring, ac-
cording to President Morse—told Potts Respondent was
thinking of adding a third shift. He also told Potts there were
three or four openings and it is unquestioned that Potts was
qualified and that this was readily apparent to Comune, to
fill an opening; in fact, Comune, after reviewing Potts’ appli-
cation, background, and recommendation, made the deter-
mination that he was qualified for the position of utility oper-
ator. Comune then asked Potts how soon he could start and,
I find, whether Potts had to give any notice at a current posi-
tion and Potts said no. Comune tried to dodge, on examina-
tion, but I find he in fact indicated to Potts that he would
be placed in the utilityman classification, did not express the
need specifically for a further interview and undeniably
asked Potts for his shift preference, telling him his rate of
pay would be around $5 an hour and when his insurance
coverage would begin. Comune testified he believed Potts
was a good prospect for employment; in fact Comune admits
he was actually enthusiastic about him. Comune told Potts he
wanted Superintendent Roeser to give Potts a tour of the
plant the following Monday, January 19, and gave Potts one
of his business cards, Comune himself testifying ‘‘he [Potts]
may have perceived by my conversation that he most likely
would be hired.’’
Potts, who testified he believed he had been hired, was
strongly encouraged even further to hold such belief when he
arrived for the plant tour on Monday and was greeted by
Vice President Comune, who shook his hand and, in re-
sponse to Potts’ question whether he still had a choice of
shift, told Potts ‘‘no, you’re going to be on night shift.’’
Potts then went to Roeser’s office for his tour, a mere for-
mality in Respondent’s orientation procedure rather than, on
this record, any kind of hurdle or test for further evaluating
candidates for employment because by far the overwhelming
majority of candidates for employment who reached the plant
tour stage were hired by Respondent. In short, at this point,
from all that appears, including Comune’s preeminent role in
screening and hiring and his favorable determination, Potts
was assured of a job.
After a few minutes long walk through the plant—a pleas-
ant one in Potts’ view—during which Roeser described its
area dimensions, Roeser showed Potts one of the tasks of the
utilityman’s position which Potts expected to fill and de-
scribed the paperwork entailed. Then it happened. Roeser
and Potts approached John Caplinger, the leading union sup-
porter in the plant, while he was working on a machine, and
Caplinger, an outdoor sports-connected acquaintance of Potts,
greeted Potts asking him how he was doing and Potts ex-
changed polite similar comments, within sight and hearing of
Roeser. Revealingly, in my view, Roeser at first in examina-
tion denied even that Caplinger’s name ever came up during
the tour but further examination led to his admission that
Potts did mention that Caplinger was a customer at a bait
store where the two often met. In any event, the two, Roeser
and Potts, walked a short distance when Roeser asked, ‘‘Do
you know that guy?’’, and Potts admitted he, Caplinger, was
one of the guys that comes in to our (bait) shop. Potts testi-
fied that Roeser didn’t say ‘‘hardly anything after that’’ the
two returning to Roeser’s office and Roeser telling Potts the
surprising news that he (Roeser) would now have to see
which job was best qualified for each guy, a puzzling com-
ment given Comune’s reference to the utilityman position.
Potts never got the job or a call back; eventually being told
by Comune things had gotten slow as the reason—an asser-
tion flatly belied by significant hirings of less qualified can-
didates for employment during the same time period or short-
ly after Respondent’s suddenly executed about-face rejection
of Potts. At the hearing, Respondent’s purported reason for
not hiring Potts, who had diligently tried to discover the rea-
son for Respondent’s abrupt switch in plans to hire him, was
because, Roeser testified, Potts had ‘‘lagged’’ behind Roeser
during the tour, which indeed was news to Potts who denied
any such conduct. It is undenied that Roeser never advised,
or cautioned or gestured to Potts to catch up, or that he
would prefer it if Potts were to show a little more interest
or hustle. No witness is able to corroborate Roeser; in fact,
those able to testify within the confines of their ability to ob-
serve the two deny that Potts was lagging behind. Of course,
it defies logic in the circumstances, wherein Potts is trying
his best to find work, is recommended by two former co-
workers, goes through a carefully detailed interview with the
company vice president which he comes through with flying
colors, is early for the tour inquiring whether he can have
his choice of shift, and otherwise is presenting himself as
best he can and doing a good job of it that he would then
hang back during a tour evincing lack of interest and place
all his efforts at risk by alienating the plant superintendent.
Potts didn’t lag behind and didn’t fail to show interest in em-
ployment at Respondent’s plant at any time, and I do not ac-
cept a word of Roeser’s inconsistent, argumentative, guarded,
patchy recollection. Both asserted reasons being totally un-
worthy of belief, I find Respondent in an action consistent
with its settled antagonism towards employee organizational
efforts and paranoia-like suspicions so amply evident in this
case went so far as to deny Ervin Potts his chance at a job
because he manifested acquaintanceship—possibly even a
sports-based friendship—with the most active employee
union supporter in the plant, Respondent perceiving possible
union sympathies thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. Well-Bred Loaf, 280 NLRB 306 (1986); Airport Dis-
tributors, 280 NLRB 1144 (1986); NLRB v. Health Care Lo-
gistics, 784 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1986); and Chancellor
Transportation Co., supra.
The Discharges of James Monroe and Dan Hetrick
After subjecting James Monroe to unlawful acts during its
screening procedures, as detailed above, Respondent hired
Monroe on January 19, 1987, as a welder. The record sup-
ports a fair inference that Monroe had passed the Respond-
ent’s litmus test by not appearing to be union-oriented. Mon-
roe quickly established himself to be a fine employee, Roeser
himself testifying Monroe’s attendance record was extremely
good, and Vice President Comune admitting Monroe’s piece-
938 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rate production was ‘‘better than other guys.’’ A coworker,
Steve Fowler, testified that Monroe’s performance on the
welding maching was ‘‘exceptionally good for a short time
on the job’’ and Respondent admitted further, through
Comune, that it had no complaints about the quality of
Monroe’s work, there were no performance problems and he
wasn’t insubordinate.
After arranging to pay Vesalo a referral fee of $1248,
Monroe began work at the plant and during the course of the
day happened to mention to other employees his under-
standing that he would receive a wage increase to $7 or $8
per hour after 90 days. The employees indicated no one re-
ceived those wages and he must be mistaken.
Later, on January 21, Comune pointedly advised Monroe
that—everything gets back to him and denied promising
Monroe such a raise. Monroe, after first offering his beliefs
as to the matter, told Comune he desparately needed the job
and would live without the increase—at no time implying he
would quit and informing Comune he, Monroe, would drop
the matter. Comune nevertheless noted a bad-attitude com-
ment into Monroe’s personnel file, based solely on Monroe
telling other employees he was going to be paid $9 an hour.
Monroe also made clear to Vesalo in a later phone call that
he would accept the situation and Vesalo told Comune Mon-
roe wouldn’t be complaining. Comune several days later ap-
proached Monroe and told him he felt bad about the earlier
conversation and that Monroe would probably get a 50-cent
raise on evaluation after the 30-day period; and that Monroe
would be entitled to incentive pay, around $1.50 an hour.
Monroe began to attend union meetings following the above,
and in a conversation with Supervisor Scibetta on February
2, who approached Monroe and promoted ESR unlawfully,
as described above, Monroe mentioned he had been attending
Steelworkers Union meetings.
On February 3 Monroe agreed with John Caplinger’s re-
quest that he tape a meeting the Company had scheduled for
new employees and his assent to do so was commented on
by at least a dozen other employees, including one known
to speak freely around the plant. Monroe never taped the
meeting because on February, only the day after he had
agreed to do the taping and 2 days after informing Scibetta
he had attended union meetings, Respondent’s vice president
Comune, the one who earlier claimed to Monroe that every-
thing gets back to him, called Monroe at home at 4:30 p.m.,
in the middle of the pay period and before the probationary
period usually accorded new employees had expired, dis-
charging Monroe, telling him the reason for during so was
because—a first expression—Monroe’s work was ‘‘inad-
equate.’’ Comune later in the conversation, after Monroe
protested that his work was good, told Monroe the reason
was that ‘‘he [Comune] was still uncomfortable about the
argument concerning money, in light of all the problems that
the Company was having with the union.’’ The fact that Re-
spondent in the days before Monroe’s disclosure of prounion
activities had termed his work ‘‘great,’’ that he was doing
a ‘‘good job,’’ and was a ‘‘good worker’’ render the first as-
signed reason a palpably false one. The second assigned rea-
son—repeated at the hearing—is totally self-indicting for it
attributes discharge to concerted activity by Monroe in mere-
ly discussing his wages with other employees and is thus un-
lawful, and further attributes as a contributory cause union
problems, a still further damaging admission of an unlaw-
fully discriminatory motive. The further undenied fact that
Respondent presented shifting reasons for its conduct, failed
to explain the rushed timing for its action in mid pay period,
abruptly before the start of Monroe’s scheduled shift, and
prior to completion of his probationary period—all for non-
work-related reasons—especially true since Monroe had ac-
cepted Respondent’s position on the wage matter and quickly
established a ‘‘great’’ work record—militate strongly to sup-
port the conclusion that it was Monroe’s protected and cor-
rected activities including conduct in support of the Union,
as known to a company harboring a great deal of antiunion
animus that led to Monroe’s discharge. I make the conclu-
sion without hesitation that Respondent thereby violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Lemon Drop Inn, 269 NLRB
1007, 1018 (1984); David’s, 271 NLRB 536, 562 (1984);
Kranco, Inc., 228 NLRB 319 (1977); Yaohan of California,
Inc., 280 NLRB 268 (1986); H & G Wall Baking Co., 272
NLRB 100, 1016 (1984); and D & D Distribution Co., 277
NLRB 909 (1985).
The unlawful discharge of Dan Hetrick on March 20,
1987, is strongly established by the record, for once again
Respondent’s asserted reason for its action is on its face un-
worthy of any belief. The briefing by counsel for General
Counsel and Charging Party, in an exemplary, wholly per-
suasive and thoroughgoing manner, fully supports the com-
plaint allegation based on a virtual catalogue of painstakingly
arranged details and legal analysis supported by the record
and by law, which I find unnecessary to wholly duplicate
herein, such is the clarity of violation.
Suffice it to note that Hetrick was a machine operator for
9-1/2 years who compiled an extraordinary record of produc-
tion during his tenure, coupled with a superb attendance
record and an unparalleled work ethic among his coworkers.
He held two or three jobs, was considered by Respondent to
be extremely conscientious and productive and earned the
highest bonus in the plant. He worked 60 hours a week in-
cluding 10 hours daily and 8 to 10 hours on Saturday.
Hetrick openly supported the Union, wearing union buttons,
union hat, and a union shirt seen by Chuck Roeser on the
day of the election, as well as by Supervisors Schaufele,
Borkwin, and Jim English, Hetrick’s immediate supervisor.
In the previous October, Vice President Comune interrogated
Hetrick as to his feelings toward the Union, Hetrick explain-
ing he thought it was necessary for the employees. Hetrick
openly associated with the leading employee supporters at
the plant, the Caplingers, Lashua, Cosler, and Bob Burns and
company consultant Smyth testified Hetrick was identified to
him by management as a union supporter. The extraordinary
antiunion animus of Respondent has already been amply
noted, but not before Hetrick’s discharge was it so clear just
how far Respondent would go to find a reason for dis-
charging an employee such as Hetrick to discourage employ-
ees’ organizational efforts.
Hetrick and a co-employee on his machine the shift prior
to Hetrick’s agreed—I find with management knowledge and
approval—to their shift times. One day, March 19, 1987, in
an honest mixup, I find between the two employees, Hetrick
appeared 1-hour early for work. After a brief discussion, the
other employee opted to leave early by 1 hour, without, I
find, any hint of pressure by Hetrick. The employee testified
he was tired anyway and he made up the hour the next day
or so; in all, a totally innocent, production-loss-free incident
939M. K. MORSE CO.
with neither involved employee causing each other any loss,
or causing any problem whatsoever. Respondent promptly
fired Hetrick the next day and took no action against the
other employee nor did it even bother to get Hetrick’s
version of the nonevent; alleging he had changed the 30
hours of work. To buttress its trivial transparently false al-
leged reliance on this wholly unsupported interpretation of
events, Respondent dredged up stale, trivial, and innocuous
past comments it had covertly entered into Hetrick’s file and
pointed to them, especially a last-chance agreement dated
November 5, 1985, which Hetrick had signed arising from an
incident between Hetrick and a supervisor between whom
there was preexisting personal enmity. In addition, there was
an earlier incident when Hetrick refused for a time to operate
a machine where the dead stop first needed testing for safety
reasons, and Hetrick believed he was not to do maintenance
work, but kept working another machine throughout resolu-
tion of the problem. Upon careful evaluation, it is clear to
me that Respondent blew the innocuous events on March 19
way out of proportion in order to trump up a false charge
against Hetrick—no other interpretation is possible—in order
to discharge him and discourage union activity by its em-
ployees. Such was the incredible pettiness of Respondent’s
claimed misconduct of Hetrick, such was its sinister and se-
cret procurement of a statement from the other employee
who had no complaint whatsoever, and such was the harm-
less nature in the innocent mixup that Respondent—not even
bothering to get Hetrick’s version—clearly tortured the facts
to manufacture a phony pretext. The action, moreover, was
nearly an unprecedented form of discipline at this plant,
against, moreover an employee who would ordinarily be con-
sidered to be worth his weight in gold such was his produc-
tion, attendance, and work record. Counsel for General
Counsel established, by a clear preponderance of proof, a
prima facie case for finding that Respondent discharged
Hetrick because of his support for the Union, the only pos-
sible interpretation of these events, while the earlier election
results were under consideration in the objections case and
there was the prospect of a rerun election being conducted.
Respondent failed to raise a scintilla of proof tending to even
suggest it would have discharged Hetrick even aside from his
support for the Union. I find Respondent’s action completely
discriminatory in nature and in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980);
Fox Art Theaters, 278 NLRB 812, 816 (1986); Autoglass &
Upholstery Co., 264 NLRB 149 (1982); and American
Thread Co., 242 NLRB 27 (1979).
IV. THE REMEDY
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law detailed in section II, above, wherein it is clear, and I
find, that Respondent’s unlawful conduct affects commerce
within the meaning of the Act, the following remedy is in
order.
Having found that Respondent has engaged in widespread
unfair labor practices, Respondent shall be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. With respect
to the discharges of Monroe and Hetrick, I shall recommend
Respondent be ordered to offer them unconditional reinstate-
ment, and that Respondent offer employment to Potts and
Sparrow; that Respondent reinstate Glantzer’s paid lunch,
and refund Lashua for his unlawful suspension, and as to
each such employee make them whole for all wages lost by
them as a result of Respondent’s unlawful discrimination
against them, such amounts to be computed on a quarterly
basis with interest thereon on and after January 1, 1987,
being computed at the ‘‘short-term Federal rate’’ for the un-
derpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26
U S.C. § 6621, in accordance with the Board’s decision in
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). In-
terest on amounts accrued prior to January 1, 1987 (the ef-
fective date of the 1986 Amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621),
shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corp.,
231 NLRB 651 (1977). Since the widespread misconduct en-
gaged in by the Respondent clearly ‘‘demonstrates a general
disregard for [its] employees’ fundamental statutory rights,’’
I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order. See
Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
It is readily apparent, moreover, that Respondent’s perva-
sive, serious, and continuing widespread unfair labor prac-
tices prompted by the Union’s organizing campaign and the
election petition impacted heavily on the relatively modest-
sized work force from August 1986 deep into the post-
election period up to the time of the hearing, when Respond-
ent continued to unlawfully screen job applicants weeding
out those seeming to hold prounion sympathies while hiring
a substantial number of new employees who passed through
the unlawful procedure. The sheer volume of its illegal acts
against the small work force, concentrated in a short period
of time—August until the election early November—(and
thereafter) committed by Respondent’s highest officers and
representatives—as well as to a lesser extent first-line super-
vision—is a most telling circumstance supporting my view
that Respondent’s conduct, designed to discourage support
for the Union, had a marked tendency to undermine the
Union’s established majority status and prevented any possi-
bility of holding a fair election on November 7, 1986. Re-
spondent coerced its plant force members, inter alia, by inter-
rogation, creating the impression of surveillance, attributing
employee losses and frozen benefits to the Union deriding
the Union and its employee supporters scathingly, threatening
reprisals against employee union supporters, unlawfully
promising benefits, strongly asserting the futility in employee
self-representation efforts, soliciting grievances, withdrawing
benefits, discriminatorily screening job applicants, warning,
disciplining, suspending, refusing to hire, and discharging
employees; encouraging assault on a leading employee union
adherent, discriminatorily enforcing a no-solicitation rule,
and rendering unlawful assistance to a rival labor organiza-
tion; in most instances Respondent committed several acts
within each of the categories cited. Given the hallmark viola-
tions herein, the discharge of union supporters, and threats
thereof, the numerous acts of discriminatory discipline, the
discriminatory suspension of an employee union supporter,
and the unlawful take-away of an employee’s paid lunch; the
discriminatory refusal to hire employee job applicant’s per-
ceived to be possibly sympathetic to the Union; and the dis-
criminatory application of its solicitation rule, Respondent
has by these and other acts described mostly destroyed any
semblance of hope that traditional remedies can sufficiently
erase the continuing impact of such unlawful conduct on the
electorate so as to make a fair election possible. Whether one
concludes that the Respondent’s conduct is in the ‘‘out-
940 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
rageous and pervasive’’ category, or is in the second cat-
egory involving, ‘‘less extraordinary cases marked by less
pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency
to undermine strength and impede the election processes’’ as
described by the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), it is clear that a bar-
gaining order remedy is warranted for such conduct is at
least in the second category. Respondent’s antiunion cam-
paign included a barrage of violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) against employees, committed by its top officials,
and included company literature broadcasting unlawful con-
tents to voters, including Respondent’s message, as well, that
employment benefits were frozen given the Union’s prob-
lems. I note further, as has the Board, that, ‘‘Given the swift-
ness with which the Respondent reacted to the organizing ef-
fort, the likelihood of the Respondent engaging in further il-
legal conduct is clearly present,’’ in reaching this conclusion,
and ‘‘to withhold a bargaining order here would reward the
Respondent for its own wrongdoing.’’ 299 Lincoln Street,
Inc., 292 NLRB 172 (1988). There is every reason to believe
that the employee force, which continued to be barraged by
Respondent’s egregiously unlawful conduct well into the
postelection period as Respondent continued to unlawfully
screen out union adherents in its hiring process, broadcasting
its ‘‘union speech’’ to all job applicants, a substantial num-
ber being involved, will long remember all too clearly the
Respondent’s interference with their rights so as to render a
fair election a most improbable prospect. Granco, Inc., 276
NLRB 1450 (1985); Horizon Air Services, 272 NLRB 243
(1994); Long-Airdox, 277 NLRB 1157 (1986); Laird Printing
Co., 264 NLRB 369 (1982); and Downtown Toyota, 276
NLRB 999 (1985). Further, contrary to Respondents’ conten-
tion on brief that a bargaining order is not warranted absent
a union demand for recognition, I find it entirely appropriate
that such an order issue and that Respondent’s duty to recog-
nize and bargain be dated from September 11, 1986, forward,
at which time the Union had established its majority status
and Respondent had already engaged in numerous violations
of employees’ rights under the Act. Lapeer Foundry, supra.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, M. K. Morse Co., Canton, Ohio, its
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
feelings about the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO–CLC, or any other union.
(b) Creating the impression that employees’ union activi-
ties are under surveillance.
(c) Deriding the Union or its employee supporters as liars
or by the use of profane descriptions.
(d) Threatening employees with specific or undefined re-
prisals including layoff and hurting of employees if they sup-
port the Union.
(e) Soliciting grievances and promising employees benefits
including a supervisory position or correction of grievances
if they withdraw support from the Union.
(f) Blaming the Union for lost or frozen levels of em-
ployee benefits.
(g) Withdrawing benefits from employees because of their
support for the Union and indicating employee union efforts
are futile.
(h) Assisting Employees for Self-Representation.
(i) Discriminatorily enforcing a no-solicitation rule in a
manner favorable to Employees for Self-Representation and
against the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC,
or any other labor organization.
(j) Seeking to induce any employee to inflict bodily harm
on any employee because of said employee’s support for the
Union.
(k) Discouraging employees from support of, or member-
ship in, the Union, or any other labor organization by dis-
criminatory discharge, refusal to hire, suspension, withdrawal
of benefit, pretextual disciplinary warnings and reprimands,
or last-chance agreements because of said employee’s union
activities.
(l) Telling employees the cost of Respondent’s defending
against charges filed with the National Labor Relations
Board comes out of their wage increases, future income, or
pocketbooks.
(m) Discriminatorily screening job applicants in order to
discourage support for the Union.
(n) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer to James Monroe and Dan Hetrick immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason
of Respondent’s unfair labor practices in the manner set forth
in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Offer immediate employment to Ervin Potts and John
Sparrow and make them whole with interest for lost earnings
in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(c) Reinstate employee Doug Glantzer’s paid lunch benefit
and make him whole with interest as aforesaid.
(d) Rescind the suspensions imposed on Edward Lashua
and Robert Baugus and make them whole with interest for
lost earnings in the manner set forth in the remedy section
of this decision.
(e) Expunge from the records of all above-named employ-
ees, as well as from the records of all other employees here-
inabove found to have been issued unlawful warnings, rep-
rimands, or discipline, in this decision, Steve Kortis, John
Caplinger, and Steve Fowler any reference, where applicable
to said employee as described hereinabove to their discharge,
warning, reprimand, suspension, failure to be hired, or last-
chance agreement, and notify them in writing that this has
been done and that the evidence of the unlawful action taken
against them as identified herein, will not be used as a basis
for any future disciplinary action against them.
941M. K. MORSE CO.
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals,
the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(f) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll recods,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this order.
(g) Recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC, as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees
of Respondent in the appropriate bargaining unit described
above.
(h) Post at its Canton, Ohio facility copies of the attached
notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’5 Copies of the notices on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 8 after being
signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma-
terial.
(i) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any complaint allegations not
herein specifically found to be a violation be dismissed.
IT IS ALSO FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case 8–
RC–13523 be set aside, and that the petition in Case 8–RC–
13523 be dismissed.