Luxaire, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 54 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Luxaire, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-4272.
May 31,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On December 29, 1966, Trial Examiner William
J. Brown issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in his attached
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the
Charging Party filed exceptions' to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Luxaire, Inc.,
Elyria, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
' On May 2, 1967, the Charging Party, upon notice to the other
parties, withdrew its cross-exception No 4 requesting that the
Board amend the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order to
include retroactive relief with respect to the violations of Section
8(a)(5) found by the Trial Examiner The request to withdraw said
exception is hereby granted
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J . BROWN, Trial Examiner : This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended , hereinafter referred to as the Act, was heard
before me at Elyria, Ohio, on September 29, 1966. The
underlying charge of unfair labor practices had been filed
on June 21, 1966 , by United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, Charging Party, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as the "Union," with due service thereof on
Luxaire, Inc., Respondent, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company." The complaint, issued August 1, 1966,
alleges, and the Company's answer denies, the
commission of unfair labor practices defined in Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.'
At the hearing the parties appeared and participated
with full opportunity to present evidence and argument on
the issues. Subsequent to the close of the hearing all
parties filed singularly cogent briefs which have been fully
considered. On the entire record herein and on the basis of
my observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The pleadings and evidence herein establish that the
Company is a corporation2 organized under the laws of the
State of Ohio, with its principal office and place of
business in Elyria, Ohio, where it is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of warm air heating and
cooling equipment in the course of which it annually ships
products valued in excess of $50,000 from its Elyria plant
directly to points located outside the State of Ohio. I find,
as the Company concedes, that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The pleadings and evidence establish and I find that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Summary of Events
The Company's maunfacturing operations at Elyria call
for* a normal employee complement of some 200-plus
employees. Prior to sometime in March 1966, these
operations were under the supervision of President
Richard W. Lindsay who was, sometime about March 20,
1966, succeeded by President E. S. Glines. At all material
times Bernard S. Becker and Delis Huddleston have been
supervisory employees having authority over certain
groups within the bargaining unit here concerned. The
pleadings as well as a prior representation case establish
the appropriateness of this unit, which is as follows:
All hourly rated production and maintenance
employees, including truckdrivers, but excluding all
office and shipping clerical employees, student
engineers, professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
' On September 22, 1966, the Union filed with the Regions,
Director a motion to amend complaint by adding allegations of
unfair labor practices previously considered by the Regional
Office but not included in the complaint The General Counsel by
written memorandum filed September 23 opposed the
amendment Renewed by the Union at the outset of the hearing,
the motion to amend was denied by the Trial Examiner on the
ground that the complaint could not be amended by adding
allegations over the objection of the General Counsel
2 Sometime prior to September 3, 1965, the Company's name
was changed from The C A. Olsen Manufacturing Company to
Luxaue,Inc
165 NLRB No. 19
LUXAIRE, INC.
On April 19, 1965, the Union filed a representation
petition seeking an election in the above-described unit
and on May 11, 1965, the Company and the Union
executed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent
Election. On May 28, 1965, a booklet (Handbook for
Hourly Employees) was issued by the Company to all
employees in the above-described bargaining unit; page 33
of the booklet, headed "Rules of Conduct," listed
numerous offenses as misconduct resulting in discipline
and possible discharge. The list included "Unauthorized
selling, soliciting or canvassing." The election, conducted
on June 4,1965, resulted in the following tally of ballots:
Approximate number of eligible voters 215
Votes cast for Union 110
Votes cast against Union 105
Challenged ballots 53
The Company filed timely objections to the election on
the basis of a union letter to employees mailed June 2,
1965, and allegedly misrepresenting rates at the
Company's Medina, Ohio, operation some 25 miles from
Elyria where the Union represents employees. Following a
hearing on the challenges and the Company's objections, a
Board Hearing Officer issued his report recommending
overruling of the five challenges; he also found the
Company's objections to union conduct affecting the
results of the election to be meritorious and concluded that
the challenged ballots should be counted and the election
set aside if the final tally showed a union victory and a
certification of results if it showed a union defeat. On
February 18, 1966, the Board adopted the Hearing
Officer's findings respecting the challenged ballots but
reversed his recommendation concerning the Company's
objection based on the preelection letter of the Union. On
February 5, 1966, a revised tally of ballots issued showing
114 votes for the Union and 106 against . The Union was
certified as representative of employees on March 2, 1966.
In the interim Company President Lindsay, as appears
from the uncontradicted testimony of General Counsel
witness Ray Bentley, an assembly department employee,
had announced certain improvements in employee
benefits at a company-employee banquet on February 5,
1966. These improvements were also announced by a
bulletin board posting on February 7, 1966, and, as
appears from Joint Exhibit 0, included added benefits by
way of pension and life insurance increases, jury pay,
added vacation benefits, and an additional paid holiday.
These additional benefits were also communicated to
employees by letters mailed to employees (Joint Exh. Q) on
March 8, 1966. About this time, on March 11, 1966, the
Company posted a bulletin board notice (Joint Exh. I)
referring to the existing rule against solicitation and
specifically prohibiting further solicitation of union
membership, dues, or funds during worktime while
reminding employees that the Company had no contract
with any union and that it was not necessary for employees
to loin any union. It concluded by stating that at the
Medina plant where there is a union contract many
employees were not members of the union.
As noted above, the stipulation entered into between the
Union and the Company preceding the election of June 4
recognized that a question of representation existing by
3 Both the Company and the Union challenged five voters at the
polls on the ground they were not listed on the eligibility list;
subsequently the Company withdrew its challenges.
4 The union petition of April 19, 1965 , reciteu that a request for
55
virtue of the union representation petition.4 In any event,
as appears from the parties' stipulation above referred to
and from Joint Exhibits J, K, L, and N, the Union
requested bargaining by letters to the Company on
March 15, 20, and 30, and the Company refused
recognition by letters dated March 21 and 31. The union
letters of March 20 and 30 threatened a strike in support of
the union recognition demand, and on March 31 Foremen
Becker and Huddleston called workplace meetings to
discuss the forthcoming strike and its consequences on all
parties. Their utterances on these occasions are alleged as
independent instances of interference, restraint, and
coercion within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The strike commenced on April 1, 1966, and a picket
line was maintained 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. On
May 2, 1966, a State court injunction limited the number of
pickets to 6-8 at any one period. On June 20, 1966, the
strike ended with all or substantially all employees
returning to work.
B. Interference , Restratnt , and Coercion
The complaint alleges and the answer denies that the
Company committed unfair labor practices defined within
the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the maintenance
and enforcement of the no-solicitation rules set forth in the
employee handbook of May 28 , 1965, and the bulletin
board posting of March 11, 1966 , by a March 21, 1966,
threat by Huddleston of reprisal for union activity and by
threats of reprisals in the course of the March 31, 1966,
workplace talks of Becker and Huddleston.
1. The no-solicitation rules
It appears from a stipulation of all parties and from Joint
Exhibits H and I that the Company on May 28, 1965,
promulgated a ban on unauthorized selling, soliciting, or
canvassing on company-owned or -controlled property
and, by bulletin board notice of March 11, 1966, referring
to the above-mentioned ban, specifically provided that
further solicitation of union membership, dues, or funds
during worktime would be subject to disciplinary action.
Employee Donald Alexander, a union supporter,
testified that in March 1966, prior to March 11, he passed
out about 20-25 union cards on company property around
the beginning of the shift and drove, around at noontime to
pick up the signed cards. He testified that, although no
foreman discussed the March 11 bulletin board notice with
him, he ceased passing out union cards when the notice
appeared.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that the May 1965 rule contained in the employee
handbook is an unlawful restraint upon employee rights to
self-organization inasmuch as it embraces both work and
nonwork time and that the May 11, 1966, bulletin board
rule is invalid because, though limited to worktime, it was
adopted for a discriminatory purpose; i.e., it prohibits only
union solicitation. The Company contends that the
handbook rule was a reasonable measure designed to
protect both employees from unwanted solicitations and
the employer from disruptions of production. It asserts
that the March 11, 1966, bulletin board rule was preceded
recognition had been made on April 17, 1965, and that no reply
had been made thereto by the Company but there is no
independent evidence of such request
56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by union solicitation on worktime and designed to prevent
continuation of that practice. In this regard the Company
points to the testimony of Alexander that he had been
passing out union cards around the beginning of the shift
and on posting of the notice quit such activity as
establishing that Alexander had been soliciting for the
Union on worktime. The Company further asserts that it
can be assumed that others were similarly engaged and
that multiplicity of worktime solicitations was the reason
for the promulgation of the March 11, 1966, prohibition.
With respect to the May 1965 handbook and the rules of
conduct relating to disciplinary action including possible
discharge for unauthorized soliciting on company-owned
or -controlled property, it is now clear that such a broad
prohibition against the exercise of employee rights under
the Act is presumptively invalid. Stoddard-Quirk
Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615. There is no showing in
the present case of operational necessities justifying the
prohibition against soliciting support for or opposition to
the union campaign in nonwork areas and on
nonworktime. Accordingly, I find that the Company by
maintaining5 in effect the unauthorized solicitation rule in
the employee handbook interfered with and restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the
Act within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Turning to the March 11, 1966, bulletin board notice
concerning the subject, it is clear that the notice was
directed specifically at solicitation of union membership,
dues, or funds during worktime. Contrary to the
Company's contention I can see no basis in the record for
concluding that there had been widespread or even thinly
spread solicitation on behalf of the Union during worktime.
The case is one in which, at a time while the Union was
still seeking the recognition to which it was entitled on the
basis of the Board's March 2 certification, the Company
singled out union solicitation for special treatment and
proclaimed the prohibition against solicitation on
worktime. It seems clear to me and I find that the
promulgation of the March 11, 1966 rule against worktime
solicitation was adopted and published with an antiunion
motivation and that thereby the Company engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the scope of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Ward Manufacturing, Inc., 152 NLRB 1270.
2. The March 21 occurrence
Alexander testified concerning an occurrence in the
plant on March 21 or 22, 1966, involving himself, fellow
employee Charles Scrivens, and Foreman Huddleston. It
appears that local union officers were elected about
March 19, 1966, and Scrivens was elected president. This
became known to the Company since Scrivens was one of
the signers of the March 20, 1966, letter requesting
recognition of the Union and threatening strike action in
the event of refusal thereof. Alexander's testimony is that
on the occasion in question he was sent by his foreman,
Becker, to get some motors from the cooling department
where Scrivens works and Huddleston is foreman. On
arriving at the cooling department, according to his
account, Alexander first met Scrivens and was asking him
where Huddleston was when Huddleston came up, asked
him what he was doing talking to Scrivens, and added that
Scrivens would get Alexander in trouble and that
Alexander should get the hell out and stay out. It was only
then that Alexander showed Huddleston the requests for
the motors.
Scrivens testified only that on the day in question he had
some talk with Alexander but did not hear any talk
between Huddleston and Alexander.
Huddleston's account of the episode is that he saw
Alexander and Scrivens talking and after observing them
for 2 or 3 minutes walked toward them, asked Alexander
what he wanted in his department, and told him not to be
bothering his employees. He denied saying anything
concerning the Union but was unable to recall whether he
used the word "trouble."
I credit Huddleston's account of this episode and I
believe in accordance with his account that in fact he
addressed his threatening remark to Alexander for
bothering employees of his department. At that time
Huddleston had no knowledge that Alexander was in the
cooling department on legitimate business. In my view of
the evidence it does not preponderate in favor of the
conclusion that the allegations of paragraph 8(a) of the
complaint are sustained and I recommend their dismissal.
3. Becker's threat of reprisals
Employee Harold Smith, an active union supporter,
testified that on two or three occasions in the period
March 20 to 29 he had conversations with his foreman,
Becker. On the last of these occasions he was with fellow
employee James Cross, when, according to his testimony,
Becker said to him that he hated to see a strike.
Thereupon Smith told Becker that the Union would go
ahead with the strike if the Company did not recognize it.
Then, according to Smith, Becker said if there were a
strike he would have to put four men in place of the two
presently on the job of assembling electric furnaces then
run by Smith and James Cross. Smith testified that such a
step would decrease his rate of pay which was on an
incentive basis. Becker did not testify concerning this
matter.
The General Counsel contends that Becker's statement
constituted a threat of reprisal for engaging in the strike.
The Company contends that the conversation does not in
fact make out a threat inasmuch as an increase in Smith's
incentive production would increase not decrease his pay;
further, the Company asserts, the General Counsel did not
establish that the addition of two men to the job would
decrease the amount or the hours of work for the men on
the job.
I agree with the contentions of the General Counsel
concerning the coercive nature of this conversation. There
is no doubt but that Becker related the occurrence of a
strike with a change in the nature of Smith' s earnings. It
seems to me that the only reasonable interpretation of the
threat is that placed on it by Smith, that the addition of
more men to the job would decrease the incentive earnings
of the two then performing the work. I find that Becker's
statement on this occasion constituted an instance of
interference with and restraint and coercion of employees
in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act
and was an unfair labor practice defined in Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. The March 31 meetings
It is clear from the record herein that, faced with the
Union's threat of a strike on April 1 unless recognition
5 There is no evidence of instances of enforcement of the rule.
LUXAIRE, INC.
were forthcoming, the Company instructed Foremen
Becker and Huddleston to hold meetings with groups of
employees on March 31. The foremen spoke to the
employees about 3 p.m. and referred to notes which they
had prepared at meetings with their superiors. Becker had
about 30 employees present at his meeting and
Huddleston had about 50 in attendance at his.
Employees Smith and Alexander testified concerning
Becker's talk. Smith testified that Becker stated that the
Company would not recognize the Union until proper court
action had been taken and that a strike could result in loss
of hospitalization and vacation pay and even in possible
replacement. According to Smith, Becker replied to an
employee's question on the matter by stating that the
strikers could be discharged. Alexander's testimony is that
Becker said that the Company would not recognize the
Union, that if the men struck they could be discharged and
would lose their hospitalization on May 7, and that a long
strike would mean replacement of the employees.
Becker testified that he told the group that a strike
could hurt the men and their families and that if it were
prolonged the Company would be forced to hire
replacements. He referred to the Company's policy of
requiring men to work the days before and after a holiday
to receive holiday pay unless legitimately excused, and
further said that the hospitalization was paid up to May 7.
Employees Bentley and Scrivens testified concerning
Huddleston's talk. Bentley's account is that Huddleston
told the men that he did not know if there would be jobs
after the strike and that the hospitalization was paid up to
May 7. Scrivens asserted that Huddleston told the group
that they would be subject to discharge if they were out
more than 48 hours and that he did not know if they would
have their jobs at the end of the strike.
Huddleston testified that he told the men that a strike
would benefit no one and that they should stay on the job
and let the court decide the matter of union recognition.
He made the same comments concerning holiday pay,
hospitalization, and possible replacement as Becker did,
according to his account.
It is quite apparent from the foregoing summary of the
evidence relating to the March 31 speeches of Becker and
Huddleston that they embraced a miscellany of varied
appeals to employees to consider the seriousness of the
step they were apparently about to take. Some of these
appeals are plainly legitimate appeals to employees
devoid of threats. I find, however, that both Becker and
Huddleston went beyond legitimate persuasion and
engaged in threats of reprisals as a consequence of strike
action in the following respects: (1) Becker's statement in
reply to an employee question that the strikers could be
discharged; and (2) Huddleston's statement that strikers
would be subject to discharge if they remained out for
more than 48 hours. In finding these statements to have
been in fact made, I rely on the testimony of Smith,
6 The Union's March 30 , 1966, letter requesting recognition,
without waiving its rights to recognition on the basis of the
Board's certification, requested the Company to make a count of
the number of striking employees on the following day to dispel
any doubt that the Union was the majority representative. The
Company rejected this challenge as an unreliable gauge of the
free choice of employees in the matter At the hearing the Union,
over the Company 's objection, was allowed to introduce in
evidence Charging Party's Exh. 1, identified by Smith as a list of
employees who actually performed picket duty during the strike.
It subsequently appeared that the list was actually prepared on
July 12, 1966, apparently on the basis of the memory of Smith,
57
Alexander, and Scrivens whose testimony on this I find
credible.
C. The Refusal to Bargain
It appears from the pleadings and from a written
stipulation of all parties (Joint Exh. 1) that the Union was
certified on March 2, 1966, as the bargaining
representative of employees in the concededly appropriate
above-mentioned unit . Following that certification the
Union, as appears from Joint Exhibits J, K, and M,
request .d bargaining on March 15, 20, and 30, 1966, and
the Company refused on March 21 and 31, 1966, as'
appears from Joint Exhibits L and N. The Company's
position was and is that the Board erred in refusing to
adopt the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the
election be set aside. The Board's Decision on this issue is
the law of the case insofar as the Examiner is concerned,
see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S.
146. Accordingly I find that at all times after March 2,
1966, the Union was entitled to recognition as the statutory
representative of employees and that the Company by
refusing to meet with and negotiate with it engaged in
unfair labor practices within the scope of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.6
The pleadings and evidence (the stipulation and
attached Exhs. P and Q) establish that following the
Union's certification the Company unilaterally and without
notice to or consultation with the Union announced and
effectuated changes in wage rates and terms and
conditions of employment. Incentive and nonincentive
base rates were increased and increased benefits were
announced in the existing programs relating to group life
insurance, pensions, jury duty pay, vacations, and
holidays. The Company's plea that the adjustments were
made pursuant to a practice of surveying adjustments of
other employers in the labor market area and making such
adjustments as are needed to retain and recruit employees
is not supported by evidence other than the self-serving
statements in the announcements themselves and in any
event does not justify its failure to notify the certified
representative and afford it the opportunity to bargain on
the matters.
On the basis of the foregoing I find that the Company
has, by refusing from and after March 21, 1966, to bargain
on request with the Union as the statutory representative
of employees in the unit for which it was certified and by
taking on March 8 and March 30, 1966, unilateral actions
to effectuate changes in wages and terms and conditions of
employment, engaged in unfair labor practices within the
scope of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Company's
Bentley, and Scrivens at Attorney Schwarzwald 's request . It also
appears that their memories were spurred by vouchers turned in
by men assigned to picket duty I am now persuaded that the list
was erroneously received in evidence It is neither a reliable
indication of those who actually picketed nor would it furnish a
basis for employer knowledge of the number and identity of the
pickets who apparently included a number of nonemployees. 1n
finding that the Company violated its duty to bargain I do not rely
on evidence as to the number of pickets , strikers , or nonworkers
but solely on the admitted refusal to bargain in the face of the
certification
58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
operations described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
In view of the findings set forth above to the effect that
the Company has engaged in certain unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it be required
to cease and desist therefrom and take such affirmative
action as appears necessary and appropriate to effectuate
the policies of the Act. Such affirmative action includes
recognition of and bargaining with the Union as exclusive
representative of employees in the appropriate unit and
the posting of notices.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the purview
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining in effect no-solicitation rules which
prohibit solicitation on behalf of labor organizations during
employee nonworktime or which are specifically and
discriminatorily directed against solicitation on behalf of
labor organizations, the Company has engaged in unfair
labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By threatening employees with reprisals in the event
of their participation in lawful strike activity, the Company
has engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By refusing to recognize and bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit; namely,
All hourly rated production and maintenance
employees including truckdrivers, but excluding all
office and shipping clerical employees, student
engineers, professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
and by unilaterally effectuating changes in wages and
terms and conditions of employment, the Company has
engaged in unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this, case, it is
recommended that the Respondent Company, Luxaire,
Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining in effect plant rules which prohibit
solicitation on behalf of the Union or any other labor
organization by employees on company-owned or
-controlled premises during nonworktime of employees in
nonwork areas.
(b) Threatening employees with reprisals in the event of
their exercise of their right to strike or engage in other
lawful concerted activities under the Act.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as
exclusive representative of employees in the above-
described appropriate unit.
(d) Unilaterally and without notice to or discussion with
the Union as exclusive representative of employees in the
appropriate unit effectuating changes in wages, benefits,
and terms and conditions of employment.
(e) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in exercise of their rights under the Act in any manner
similar to those referred to in paragraphs (a) through (d),
above.
2. Take the following affirmative action which appears
necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of employees in the unit
herein found appropriate, with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Rescind plant rules prohibiting solicitation on behalf
of the Union or other labor organizations on nonworktime
in nonwork areas of company-owned or -controlled
property.
(c) Post at its plant in Elyria, Ohio, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being duly signed by the Company's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Company
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Company to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the recei of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply here ith.8
7 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT maintain plant rules which prohibit
employees from soliciting on behalf of the United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, on any other
labor organization on nonworktime in nonwork areas.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of
benefits in reprisal for their participation in lawful
strikes or other concerted activity under the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization as exclusive
representative of employees in the following
appropriate unit:
LUXAIRE, INC.
All hourly rated production and maintenance
employees of the Elyria, Ohio, plant , including
truckdrivers, but excluding office and shipping
clerical employees, student engineers,
professional employees , guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT , by maintaining plant rules or by
threats as above or in any like or related manner,
interfere with , restrain , or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights under the Act to form, join, or
assist the above -named or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage
in other concerted activities for their mutual aid or
protection.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and,
59
if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
LUXAIRE, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 720 Bulkley
Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44115,
Telephone 621-4465, Extension 42.