Luvenia S.,1 Complainant,v.Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jan 22, 2020

0120182791 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 22, 2020)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Luvenia S.,1 Complainant, v. Ryan D. McCarthy, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 0120182791 Hearing Nos. 480-2015-00017X 480-2016-0355X Agency Nos. ARCEJAPAN13MAR01508 ARCEFE15JAN00106 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 10, 2018, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Supervisory Program Analyst at the Agency’s Korea Program Relocation Office (KPRO) in Camp Humphreys, South Korea. In October 2012, Complainant obtained a new first line supervisor (S1). Complainant’s second line supervisor (S2) acted as her first line supervisor until S1 arrived. Report of Investigation (ROI) at 794,599. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120182791 2 On July 2, 2013, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint (Agency No. ARCEJAPAN13MAR01508) alleging that the Agency discriminated against, and harassed her, on the bases of race (Asian), sex (female), national origin (Korean), age (59), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. in mid-October 2012, S2 undermined Complainant’s supervisory authority when he awarded her subordinate a Commander’s Coin, without notifying Complainant in advance; 2. in late October 2012, S2, acting as Complainant's first line supervisor, ignored three of the four pages of Complainant's performance input, despite being significant accomplishments, and their absence decidedly marginalized the significance of Complainant's accomplishments throughout her total and exceptional accumulated performance during this reporting period; 3. in late October 2012, S2 lowered Complainant’s cash award to below 1%, only later to claim it was a “mistake,” before correcting the error; 4. in late October 2012, S2 told Complainant that he had never seen a GS-13 functioning as a supervisory program analyst, marginalizing, disparaging, and casting doubt on Complainant’s abilities and accomplishments; 5. on November 20, 2012, S1 responded to Complainant’s query about extending her tour of duty in order to care for her elderly Korean mother by stating, “I don’t care about who’s who and cats and dogs . . . the reason [for an extension] has to be written mission oriented,” thus implicitly insulting Complainant and her mother; 6. on February 8, 2013, S1 directed Complainant to lower the cash award for a subordinate employee (E1), despite the fact that E1’s performance was equal to, or better than, her two co-workers, thus undermining Complainant’s supervisory authority, forcing Complainant to engage in discrimination, and further causing Complainant to pit her employees against one another; 7. in response to Complainant’s protest of this discriminatory directive, S1 sent Complainant an email later on February 8, 2013, directing Complainant to formally counsel E1 regarding her allegedly irregular arrival and departure times, despite the fact that E1 had Complainant’s express permission for the alternative schedule, was an accomplished, highly functioning employee, and despite the fact that many other KPRO employees had erratic attendance, thus undermining Complainant’s supervisory authority and further making Complainant unwillingly complicit in singling out E1 for discriminatory scrutiny; 8. during a February 8, 2013 meeting in which Complainant questioned the purpose and intent of the direction to counsel E1, and raised specific concerns to S1 that the directive was discriminatory and unfairly singled out E1, and may have been the continuation of discriminatory actions against E1, S1 abruptly stood up from her chair, raised her fist at 0120182791 3 Complainant, and screamed at Complainant, “that’s it, I’m going to give you counseling. . .;” 9. on February 8, 2013, after S1 called Complainant into her office for the counseling, S1 had the Deputy Military Director witness the counseling, thus further humiliating Complainant and harming her reputation; 10. during the February 8, 2013 counseling, S1 imitated Complainant’s voice and Korean accent in a mocking and disparaging manner when Complainant was expressing her concern on work-related issues; 11. on February 14, 2013, only two hours after Complainant sent S1 an email indicating that she had visited the EEO office regarding her concerns, S1 issued Complainant a second letter of counseling directing her to attend Korean National supervisory training on an annual basis, despite the fact that Complainant previously attended the training. S1 did not, however, direct Complainant’s male peers to update their Korean National supervisory training; 12. on February 14, 2013, during a counseling meeting, S1 again invited a third-party witness, an Area Engineer (AE), further humiliating Complainant and harming her reputation, thus causing further distress; 13. during the February 14, 2013 meeting, after Complainant stated her request for EEO intervention, S1 said at least three times that Complainant had “mental problems” and asked AE whether S1 could order Complainant to be physically removed from the premises, further humiliating and disparaging Complainant and harming her reputation; 14. on February 15, 2013, Complainant met with S2 and S1, who refused to allow Complainant to speak or address her concerns, and S2 ordered Complainant to “stop” and further threatened that he would reprimand her if she didn’t stop providing her input; 15. during the February 15, 2013 meeting, S1 also admitted that she had based her prior discipline of Complainant on mere hearsay, and S1 renewed her threat to counsel Complainant again if she voiced another protest of S1’s discriminatory actions; 16. On March 8, 2013, the Branch Chief (BC) screamed exceedingly loudly (at the top of his lungs) at Complainant, even more loudly than S1 during the February 8, 2013 counseling, in setting the tone for the office and creating a hostile environment against Complainant. Complainant stated that she has never been treated like this by anyone in her 28 years of dedicated public service to the Corps; 17. On March 9, 2013, BC repeated his screaming torrent at Complainant, and this incident became so loudly abusive that one of KPRO's project managers, who happened to also be 0120182791 4 in the office (but in an enclosed cubicle), called both S1 and S2 at their homes on this Saturday morning to report BC's verbal abusive behavior toward Complainant; 18. on May 30, 2013, S1 gave Complainant another counseling via DA Form 4856, instead of using the required DA Form 7222-1, and instead of following the structured process required in a Midterm Review. In addition, although Complainant had all her objectives ready and present for review, S1 refused to review them with Complainant; 19. S1 continued to harass, marginalize, and disparage Complainant in front of her staff, peers, and other stakeholders (in an increasingly pointed manner), including: a) on June 28, 2013, via an "extended rant" in front of one of Complainant's staff employees, stating, "no one's going to be extended (and specifically those who were recently extended)," clearly referring to Complainant's future extensions; b) during a July 2, 2013 meeting, in response to Complainant expert advice to S1, she snapped, stating, "you're giving me bad advice," even though Complainant’s advice incorporated normally accepted budgetary practice throughout the Corps, and; c) again on July 2, 2013, during a staff meeting, when Complainant asked S1 her planned furlough date, S1 again snapped at Complainant, replying in a demeaning and sarcastic manner, without addressing Complainant's input, "do you want to see the written document?" in front of all KPRO members in attendance, including branch chiefs and others, even though this was the primary theme of a casual conversation among all members in attendance; 20. S1 discussed and processed all of Complainant’s performance appraisal actions in an intentionally rude and calculated manner, to include a delay in providing her appraisal in a timely manner, refusing to review Complainant’s performance accomplishment documents, refusing to provide the performance appraisal documents and changing Complainant’s performance requirements without her knowledge, which created a hostile work environment. A human resources representative, whose physical presence was considered intimidating by Complainant, made rude, hostile and accusatory remarks regarding Complainant’s employment status which constituted and created a hostile work environment; 21. on March 6, 2014, S1 and S2 conducted a fifth counseling session based on false accusations/statements, that resulted in an adverse action against Complainant; 22. on March 19, 2014, Complainant was screamed at and threatened by S2, that he was going to take disciplinary action against Complainant regarding an email incident; 23. in March and April 2014, S1 and S2 provided Complainant with her performance appraisal several months late, and ordered her to sign the performance appraisal without first being 0120182791 5 provided with the opportunity to review it; counseled and insulted her on various occasions; and 24. between June and July 2014, a coworker misled Complainant, and S1 left the Agency without rating her for the year.2 On February 19, 2014, Complainant filed another EEO complaint (Agency No. ARCEFE15JAN00106) alleging that the Agency discriminated against her based on age, national origin, race, sex, and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when on November 24, 2014, Complainant was falsely accused of working improper overtime and charged with a security violation for using her Common Access Card (CAC) on Veterans Day, November 11, 2014, while working overtime (without pay). At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided copies of the investigative files, and she requested hearings before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On April 10, 2017, and April 20, 2018, the Agency filed Motions for Summary Judgment. On June 11, 2018, the AJ issued a consolidated decision, without a hearing, finding no discrimination. The AJ determined that the record was adequately developed and made all reasonable inferences in favor of Complainant with respect to any disputed facts. For example, the AJ found that in February 2013, after Complainant made an oral complaint of discrimination, S1 twice counseled Complainant, and once threatened to counsel her again. In addition, the AJ noted that S1 also imitated and mocked Complainant’s voice, and she again counseled Complainant and refused to review her performance objectives. The AJ found that Complainant did not point to sufficient evidence to show that forced training, performance objectives, ratings delays, forged signatures, extension denials, false accusations, inadequate feedback, undermining of authority, and the CAC issues resulted in any concrete harm. Regarding Complainant’s harassment claim, the AJ determined that Complainant did not provide evidence to connect the bulk of the conduct to her protected status, and she did not provide comparator evidence sufficient to connect her protected status to her allegation of harassment. The AJ noted that even if the one-time imitation of Complainant’s voice was evidence of race or national origin-based animus, this was an isolated event that was insufficiently connected to the other harassment allegation. 2 Complainant amended her complaint multiple times, both with the Agency and the AJ. We note that the AJ’s descriptions of claims 1-22 in his decision differ from the acceptance notices issued by the Agency. For the purposes of this decision, claims 1-22 are presented in line with the Agency’s notices of acceptance and dismissal, while claims 23-24 are presented in line with the AJ’s descriptions. 0120182791 6 The AJ also found that the events in February 2013, which were the only harassment allegations potentially linked to an unlawful motive, were insufficient to “buoy” Complainant’s harassment claim. The AJ found that the allegations, which spanned years, were more akin to the types of perceived slights and annoying personnel matters that the Commission has found to be insufficient to prove an objectively hostile work environment. The AJ concluded by granting the Agency’s Motions for Summary Judgment and entering judgment in favor of the Agency. The Agency’s final order implemented the AJ’s decision. Through her attorney, Complainant argues on appeal that the AJ erred in issuing a decision without a hearing because he improperly conducted credibility determinations and improperly weighed the evidence. For example, when the AJ concluded that the repeated mocking of Complainant’s voice and accent were not based on her race. Complainant also argues that the AJ erred when he found that her allegations did not rise to the level of ongoing retaliation because the named actions did not result in concrete harm. Complainant asserts that the AJ used the wrong legal standard, and there does not need to be “concrete harm” in a retaliation claim. In addition, Complainant argues that she suffered at least 26 discrete independent adverse personnel or employment actions, which taken collectively, show an ongoing pattern and practice of hostile work environment. Complainant states that when the AJ concluded that the actions were “more likely occurred because of something other than” Complainant’s protected bases, he weighed the evidence to make a determination on the motives of the Agency’s management officials. Regarding the causal relationship between Complainant’s protected activity and the Agency’s actions, Complainant asserts that a retaliatory motive can be inferred based on the proximity of a few hours between her protected activity and the initiation of hostile treatment by S1. Complainant also states that she has shown per se retaliation because S1’s actions were to discourage participation in the EEO process. Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the Agency’s final order and deem her the prevailing party, or to grant a hearing on the merits of her claims. The Agency argues that the AJ reached his conclusions without making credibility determinations, and that his decision is supported by the record and should be affirmed. The Agency asserts that the undisputed evidence shows that there was no illegal discriminatory animus behind any of the complained of events. The Agency also argues that there is insufficient evidence of a severe and pervasive hostile work environment based upon a protected status. Regarding Complainant’s retaliation claim, the Agency asserts that S1 learned of Complainant’s EEO activity on February 14, 2013, and any acts of alleged retaliation occurring more than three months after February 14, 2013 are too remote in time to establish the required nexus to show retaliation. Further, the Agency argues that all the allegations were not likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC. The Agency states that the AJ correctly entered judgment as a matter of law in its favor and requests that the Commission affirm the AJ’s decision without a hearing. 0120182791 7 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and the Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). As an initial matter, we note Complainant states that the issues on appeal are whether the Agency and AJ erred when: (1) finding no discrimination on the basis of reprisal for prior protected activity; (2) finding no hostile work environment on the bases of race, national origin, sex, age, and in reprisal for prior protected activity; and (3) making determinations which are not ripe for summary judgment, including making credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence, resulting in an improper analysis and decision which actions are in contrast to established case law. Complainant has not challenged the AJ’s procedural dismissal of claims 1, 2, 3, and 5, as untimely discrete claims of disparate treatment. The Commission has the discretion to review only those issues specifically raised in an appeal. See id. at Chap. 9, § IV.A.3. Accordingly, this decision will only focus on the issues that Complainant raised on appeal. We will consider the dismissed discrete claims as background evidence regarding the claim of hostile work environment. Decision without a hearing We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. 0120182791 8 At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant argues that the AJ erred when he improperly conducted credibility determinations and improperly weighed the evidence. However, Complainant does not identify any specific evidence that shows a dispute, and she only makes general assertions that the AJ improperly made credibility determinations and improperly weighed the evidence. Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not presented any evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material facts, and that the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing. Disparate Treatment Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. Once Complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts back to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s reason(s) for its action was a pretext for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983). On appeal, Complainant states that she suffered at least 26 discrete, independent adverse personnel or employment actions, which collectively show an ongoing pattern of a hostile work environment. However, we note that most of the actions were not discrete employment actions; for example, Complainant alleged “public disparagement with respect to her accounting advice.” In reviewing Complainant’s allegations, we find the following to be discrete claims: (9) counseling issued on February 8, 2013; (11) counseling issued on February 14, 2013; (18) counseling issued on May 30, 2013; and (21) counseling issued on March 6, 2014. 0120182791 9 We note that Complainant also alleged in her appeal a claim regarding a “lowered rating of one of her performance objectives.” However, it appears that this claim is being raised for the first time on appeal and the Commission has held that it is not appropriate for a complainant to raise new claims for the first time on appeal. See Hubbard v. Dep't of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 01A40449 (Apr. 22, 2004). As such, we will not consider Complainant’s allegation that she was retaliated against when she received a lowered rating in one of her performance objectives. Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination for claims 9,11,18, and 21, we find that S1 proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her actions. For claims 9 and 11, S1 stated that she issued the counselings because Complainant needed to meet her supervisory responsibility of counseling a subordinate and that she needed to complete supervisory training within one year of becoming a supervisor. ROI 1 at 843. For claim 18, S1 stated that she issued Complainant a DA 4856 Developmental Counseling form to address “key points” and provided a plan of action to address the concerns. ROI at 848. For claim 21, S1 stated that she counseled Complainant because another employee complained that Complainant questioned her about her salary and disclosed her personally identifiable information. ROI at 856. Complainant has not shown that the proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. We find that Complainant has not established that the Agency discriminated against her for claims 9,11,18, and 21. Harassment Complainant also alleged that she was subjected to unlawful harassment. A harassment claim is examined under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). See also Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). To establish this claim, a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/ or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. The Supreme Court in Harris explained that an “objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive” and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. at 23. A hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the complainant's employment. See Harris, supra; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). 0120182791 10 Even when crediting Complainant’s version of events and her claim that the complained of conduct was due to her protected classes, we find that the conduct did not rise to the level of an unlawful discriminatory hostile work environment. Here, Complainant complains of 26 incidents of harassment, from October 2012, through July 2014, which was a span of over a year and a half. In looking at the circumstances, we do not find that the alleged incidents of harassment were frequent, nor severe. Further, Complainant has not shown that the conduct unreasonably interfered with her work performance. As such, we find that Complainant did not establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her race, national origin, sex, age, or in reprisal for prior protected activity. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. 0120182791 11 Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 22, 2020 Date