Luvenia Nix, Complainant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 10, 2000
01a00367 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 10, 2000)

01a00367

04-10-2000

Luvenia Nix, Complainant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Luvenia Nix, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00367

v. ) Agency No. DOT-1-98-1053

) Hearing No. 160-99-8416X

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency action

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was an

employee relations specialist at the agency's facility JFK International

Airport, Jamaica, New York. Complainant alleges she was discriminated

against on the basis of reprisal for her prior EEO complaint. On November

10, 1997, complainant's Team Leader (TL) presented complainant with

a notice that complainant had been promoted which had been an issue

in a prior EEO complaint. Complainant became angry and made a remark

regarding the delay in the promotion. According to the TL, complainant

made threatening remarks over the phone which complainant contends

were unrelated to anyone at the office. The TL contacted complainant's

Manager (Manager) about the incident. The next working day, November

12, 1997, the Manager called complainant into her office to discuss the

situation and placed complainant on administrative leave for that day

so that the agency's Civil Aviation Security Office could investigate

the matter. Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant

sought EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on

February 5, 1998. The agency's security investigation concluded that

complainant had never made any threatening remarks nor was her conduct

considered violent toward any of her co-workers. The agency, however,

still issued complainant a Letter of Warning (LOW) dated March 31, 1998,

for disorderly and inappropriate behavior referring to statements that

co-workers considered to be threatening. The LOW claim was included in

complainant's EEO complaint and accepted by the agency for investigation.

At the conclusion of the EEO investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, noting that complainant filed an EEO complaint

in June 1997, however, the event at issue occurred after she became

angry due to a delay in her promotion. The AJ further noted that had

complainant established a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination,

she failed in showing the ultimate burden that the agency's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the disciplinary action, namely that

complainant's actions were threatening, was pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to demonstrate

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were in

retaliation for her prior EEO activity.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that the statements

she made on November 10, 1997, were not threatening in nature to anyone.

She further contends that the co-workers and management involved in this

complaint are the same individuals named in her prior EEO complaint.

Complainant also states that the co-workers and management individuals

were contacted by an EEO investigator about questions regarding her prior

EEO complaint the week complainant allegedly made threatening remarks.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure

set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United

States Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is appropriate

where the trier of fact determines that, given applicable substantive

law, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the

evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the

non-moving party. Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st

Cir. 1988). In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title

VII, summary judgment is appropriate if, after adequate investigation,

complainant has failed to establish the essential elements of his or

her case. Spangle v. Valley Forge Sewer Authority, 839 F.2d 171, 173

(3d Cir. 1988). In determining whether to grant summary judgment,

the trier of fact's function is not to weigh the evidence and render a

determination as to the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether

there exists a genuine factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he

concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.

In finding no discrimination, the AJ relied on the representations of

management officials as provided in their affidavits. Upon review of the

record, the Commission finds that complainant clearly has established a

prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. The allegations against

complainant were raised when co-workers and managers named in a prior

EEO complaint were contacted by the EEO office to set up interviews

regarding the complaint. Further, TL was delivering a notice of

promotion which had also been the issue of a prior EEO complaint

filed by complainant. In addition, the Commission finds that Manager's

decision to issue complainant a LOW for making threatening remarks toward

co-workers and managers suspect especially in light of the agency's

security investigation which exonerated complainant of those charges.

The Commission also finds that the record is unclear as to the content

and intent of the remarks allegedly made by complainant as well as the

effect the remarks had on the co-workers.

We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the

investigative process, designed to �ensur[e] that the parties have a

fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and

to examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive

(MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also 64

Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,657 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred to

as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(c) and (d)). �Truncation of this process, while

material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is

still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full and

fair investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October

31, 1996); Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995). In summary, there are simply too many

unresolved issues which require an assessment as to the credibility of

the various management officials, co-workers, and complainant, himself.

Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the agency should not have

been granted.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

arguments on appeal, and the agency's response, the Commission REVERSES

the agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the agency in

accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER

The complaint is remanded to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC

field office for scheduling of a hearing in an expeditious manner.

The agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the

EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this

decision becomes final. The agency shall provide written notification

to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the

complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter,

the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the complaint in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final

action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R1199)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal

with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 10, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

MEMORANDUM

TO: Hearings Unit, New York District Office

FROM: Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

DATE: 03/30/00

RE: Luvenia Nix v. DOT, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00367

Enclosed is a DECISION requiring the above referenced complaint

be assigned to an Administrative Judge. We request that the

Administrative Judge notify the Compliance Division at the Office of

Federal Operations after a decision has been issued. If there are

any questions concerning the further processing of this complaint,

please contact Robert Barnhart, Acting Director of Compliance and

Control, at (202) 663-4525.1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations

governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect.

These regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at

any stage in the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission

will apply the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999),

where applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as

amended, may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.