Lutnick, Howard W. et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 30, 202013584455 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/584,455 08/13/2012 Howard W. Lutnick 09-2308-C1 8275 63710 7590 03/30/2020 INNOVATION DIVISION CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P. 110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR) NEW YORK, NY 10022 EXAMINER WONG, ERIC TAK WAI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3692 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/30/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): lkorovich@cantor.com patentdocketing@cantor.com phowe@cantor.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte HOWARD W. LUTNICK, DEAN P. ALDERUCCI, MICHAEL SWEETING, and THOMAS D. BRADSHAW ____________ Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOHN A. EVANS, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38– 42, and 44. Appeal Br. 10. Claims 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19–32, 35–37, and 43 were cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant states the real party in interest is CFPH, LLC. Appeal Br. 3. 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed August 31, 2018, “Appeal Br.”), the Reply Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims relate to systems and methods for rating a likelihood of payment of one or more cash flows. See Abstract. Invention Claims 1, 33, 38, 41, and 44 are independent. Appeal Br. 10. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced in Table I. Rejection3 Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, and 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–8. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, and 44 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief. Any other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific arguments and findings primarily for Brief (filed January 25, 2019, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed November 27, 2018, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed March 21, 2018, “Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed August 13, 2012, “Spec.”) for their respective details. 3 The present application was examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions. Final Act. 2. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 3 emphasis. We consider Appellant’s arguments as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 10–20. CLAIMS 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, AND 44: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER Appellant designates Claim 1 as representative and argues the claims as a group in view of the recitations of Claim 1. Appeal Br. 12, 20. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 101 rejection on the basis of representative Claim 1 and refer to the rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Rejection and Appellant’s Contentions. The Examiner finds the claims are directed to determining debt instrument/portfolio cash flow ratings, which is a fundamental economic practice, certain method of organizing human activity, and a mathematical calculation and therefore an abstract idea. Final Act. 2. Appellant contends “the claims amount to an improvement to computer performance through generating electronic signals to generate a first window of a graphical user interface to allow a range of information to be selected and generate a second window to display cash flow based on the selected information.” Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis omitted). Appellant argues the claimed invention “may help control the number of commands and transactions being transmitted over the network and control computer workload including computer resources such as memory resources, processor resources, and network resources such as network bandwidth. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 4 This allows the computer to perform a function not previously performable by a computer.” Id. 13 (emphasis omitted). De novo review. We reviewed the record de novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”). Based upon our review of the record in light of recent policy guidance with respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101,4 we affirm the rejection of Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, and 44 for the specific reasons discussed below. Preemption. Appellant contends “the features of the instant claims, including the specificity and ordered combination of the claimed elements, do not preempt all ways of filtering content on the Internet because the claimed recitations are very specific and do not cover all possible approaches.” Appeal Br. 18 (emphasis omitted). While preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent- ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We conduct such an analysis below. 4 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 5 35 U.S.C. § 101 Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system aims to promote. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether Appellant’s claims recite: 1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human interactions such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes), and 2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the issue of whether the claim: Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 6 3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or 4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. A. Whether the claims recite a judicial exception. The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract-idea exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own): (a) mathematical concepts,5 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas, equations,6 and mathematical calculations7; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business 5 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . . reduced to a mathematical formula . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea.”). 6 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”). 7 SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on selected information” are directed to abstract ideas). Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 7 relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions)8; and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).9 The preamble of Claim 1 recites: “[a]n apparatus, comprising.” The limitations recited in the body of the claim are analyzed in Table I against the categories of abstract ideas as set forth in the Revised Guidance. Our de novo review renders moot any argument that the Examiner failed to follow any eligibility guidelines directed to Examiners. See Appeal Br. 11. TABLE I Claim 1 Revised Guidance, p. 52 [a]10 at least one processor of at least one computer in electronic communication with at least one other computer via an electronic communications network; and Generic computer component. [b] a memory that stores instructions which, when executed Generic computer component. 8 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract idea); see Revised Guidance, at 52 n.13 for a more extensive listing of “certain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be abstract ideas. 9 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“‘[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work’” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972))). 10 Step designators, e.g., “[a],” were added to facilitate discussion. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 8 by the at least one processor, directs the at least one processor to: [c] automatically generate electronic signals to cause time period and payment information entries about one or more debt instruments of a debt portfolio to be displayed in respective column structures at a first window of a graphical user interface of a computing device of a user; Insignificant extra-solution activity, displaying data. [d] automatically generate electronic signals to cause graphical interactive slider selection objects to be displayed to overlap the time period and payment information entries on the first window, the graphical slider selection objects to allow the user of the computing device to adjust the graphical interactive slider selection objects to select one or more time period and payment information entries; Insignificant extra-solution activity, displaying data. [e] in response to the selection from the first window, receive first electronic data comprising information about a debt instrument portfolio comprising one or more debt instruments, the information comprising, for each debt instrument, a price associated with the debt instrument in at least one database electronically coupled to Insignificant extra-solution activity, mere data-gathering. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 9 the at least one processor;11 [f] determine, based on information stored in the at least one database, a current value for each of the one or more debt instruments; Mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion. Revised Guidance, 52. [g] determine, based on information stored in the at least one database, a payment schedule for each of the one or more debt instruments, each payment schedule comprising one or more payments, each payment schedule correlating a series of payment amounts with respective scheduled times of payment; Mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion. Revised Guidance, 52. [h] determine a probability of payment for the one or more payments for each of the one or more debt instruments; Mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion. Revised Guidance, 52. [i] after determining a probability of payment for the one or more payments for each of the one or more debt instruments, determine a portfolio cash flow rating of the debt instrument portfolio based on: (1) the current value of each of the one or more debt instruments; and (2) the probability of payment for Mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion. Revised Guidance, 52. 11 The specific information that is received does not operate to confer patent- eligibility because information as such is an intangible. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007). Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 10 the one or more payments of each debt instrument; and [j] automatically generate electronic signals to cause information about the portfolio cash flow rating to be displayed at a second window of the graphical user interface of the computing device. Insignificant extra-solution activity, mere data-display. In view of Table I, we find limitations [f]–[i] of independent Claim 1 recite abstract ideas, i.e., mental processes. Our finding is supported by Appellant’s explicit disclosure: The term “determining” and grammatical variants thereof (e.g., to determine a price, determining a value, determine an object which meets a certain criterion) is used in an extremely broad sense. The term “determining” encompasses a wide variety of actions and therefore “determining” can include calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, looking up (e.g., looking up in a table, a database or another data structure), ascertaining and the like. Also, “determining” can include receiving (e.g., receiving information), accessing (e.g., accessing data in a memory) and the like. Also, “determining” can include resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing, and the like. Spec. ¶ 33. Appellant’s further disclosure confirms the claimed “determining” is a mental process: “[t]he term ‘determining’ does not imply that any particular device must be used. For example, a computer need not necessarily perform the determining.” Spec. ¶ 36. Independent Claims 33, 38, 41, and 44 contain commensurate recitations. Thus, we find the claims recite a judicial exception Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 11 Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. Rather the claimed invention “may help control the number of commands and transactions being transmitted over the network and control computer workload including computer resources such as memory resources, processor resources, and network resources such as network bandwidth. This allows the computer to perform a function not previously performable by a computer.” Appeal Br. 13. Under the Revised Guidance, Appellant’s “directed to” contention is addressed at Step 2A(ii). Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application? Because the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above, we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field.” “In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or “any other technology or technical field.” MPEP § 2106.05(a) (citation omitted). Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 12 With respect to technological improvements, Appellant contends the invention “contains a teaching in the specification about how the claimed invention improves a computer or other technology.” Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, Appellant argues: FIG[ure] 7 depicts an exemplary interface showing information associated with a selection of a time period for determining a cash flow rating according to at least one embodiment of the invention disclosed herein. In some embodiments, users 10 may interact with the interface of FIG. 7 to select one or more debt instruments (e.g., from a user’s portfolio or from the open market) and one or more time periods corresponding to the one or more debt instruments for purposes of determining information such as one or more probabilities of payment, a payment cash flow rating, and an aggregate cash flow rating for all of the selected payments and debt instruments. Id. (citing Appellant’s Specification published as US 2013/0166473, ¶¶ 229– 230 (emphasis omitted)). Appellant’s argument that the claimed interface “improves a computer or other technology” is not persuasive because Appellant also discloses the: “interfaces described in the present invention . . . may be presented at a display, such as a touch-sensitive display, at a webpage, or other interface described herein or known in the art.” Id. That which is “known in the art” cannot be understood as an advancement in a technology. Appellant further argues: “the claimed subject matter is directed to improvements in computer performance which may help control the number of commands and transactions being transmitted over the network and control computer workload including computer resources such as memory Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 13 resources, processor resources, and network resources such as network bandwidth.” Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis omitted). However, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because they are not supported by citations to the Specification or other evidence. Arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139–140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Attorney argument is not evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Nor can it take the place of evidence lacking in the record. Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977). Lawyer’s arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We find the claims collect data, recognize certain data within the collected data set, and present the data for display, which the courts have recognized as abstract. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine. The Bilski machine-or-transformation test is only applicable to method (process) claims. However, “[r]egardless of what statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, it is clear that the invention underlying “apparatus” Claims 1, 38, and 41, and “medium” Claim 44, is the method embodied in Claim 33. We therefore, analyze the machine prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 14 Appellant discloses generic computer devices: [i]t will be readily apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that the various processes described herein may be implemented by, e.g., appropriately programmed general purpose computers, special purpose computers and computing devices. Spec. ¶ 59. Thus a description of a process is likewise a description of an apparatus for performing the process. The apparatus that performs the process can include, e.g., a processor and those input devices and output devices that are appropriate to perform the process. Spec. ¶ 61. We find no indication, nor does Appellant direct our attention, that anything other than generic computer equipment is required by the claims. MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation. This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when determining whether a claim recites significantly more is whether the claim effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing.” “‘Transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). The claims select and analyze certain electronic data. The selection of electronic data is not “a transformation or reduction of an article into a different state or thing constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 15 2011) (“The mere manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation prong.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the transformation prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test. MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations. This section of the MPEP guides: Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. 450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding press. 450 U.S. at 177–78 . . . . The Court evaluated additional elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time, and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187 . . . . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . . In particular, the Court concluded that the additional elements such as the data processing system and communications controllers recited in the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional activity. MPEP § 2106.05(e). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 16 generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as in Alice, we find that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. (citation omitted). “In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Id. We find that Appellant’s claims do not add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions to Apply an Exception. Appellant discloses: Computers, processors, computing devices and like products are structures that can perform a wide variety of functions. Such products can be operable to perform a specified function by executing one or more programs, such as a program stored in a memory device of that product or in a memory device which that product accesses. Unless expressly specified otherwise, such a program need not be based on any particular algorithm, such as any particular algorithm that might be disclosed in the present application. It is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art that a specified function may be implemented via different algorithms, and any of a number of different algorithms would be a mere design choice for carrying out the specified function. Spec. ¶ 77. Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more than invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception. Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 17 MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity. The claims acquire and display data, which are classic examples of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment. [T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience, a category of use, field of use, or technological environment. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We find the claims “determine a portfolio cash flow rating of the debt instrument portfolio,” which is simply a field of use that attempts to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. We do not find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive because “[t]he courts have also identified examples in which a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. The claims fail to recite a practical application where the additional element does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use. Id. The mere application of an abstract idea in a particular field is not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See id. at 55 n.32. In view of the foregoing, we conclude the claims are “directed to” a judicial exception. B Well-understood, routine, conventional. Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 18 whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The written description describes the claimed computer system consistent with its being “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.” See e.g., Spec. ¶ 77, discussed above. C Specified at a high level of generality. It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor does Appellant cite any Specification disclosure for the required specificity. Indeed, no particular algorithm is required to perform the claims. See Spec. ¶ 77 (“Unless expressly specified otherwise, such a program need not be based on any particular algorithm, such as any particular algorithm that might be disclosed in the present application.”). We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Considering the claim limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing to the abstract idea that is not already present when the limitations are considered separately. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The ordered combination of limitations amounts to nothing more than certain mental processes implemented with generic computer components that operate “in a conventional way.” See also Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim Appeal 2019-002311 Application 13/584,455 19 limitations, viewed “both individually and as an ordered combination,” amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79). In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, and 44 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. CONCLUSION Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4–6, 8– 11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, 44. 101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–6, 8– 11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 38–42, 44. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation