Lutnick, Howard W. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 4, 2019

13887486 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/887,486 05/06/2013 Howard W. Lutnick 05-1113-C1 8778
63710 7590 10/04/2019
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte HOWARD W. LUTNICK, KEVIN M. FOLEY,
JOSEPH NOVIELLO, and MICHAEL SWEETING
____________

Appeal 2017-0048351
Application 13/887,4862
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) claims 1–23 and 43–66.3
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 Our decision references the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
August 12, 2016), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed February 2, 2017), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 5, 2017) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed May 28, 2015).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies “BGC Partners, Inc.,” as the real party in
interest (Appeal Br. 2).
3 With respect to claim 67, the Examiner states “[a]n After-Final
Amendment cancelling claim 67 is being submitted herewith. (The listing of
claims herein reflects the cancellation, though technically the After-Final
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims relate generally “to electronic trading systems” and
more particularly “to order types for use in electronic trading systems”
(Spec. ¶ 2).
Claims 1, 10, 19, 43, 52, 61, and 66 are the independent claims on
appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of trading items on an electronic trading system
comprising a processor, the method comprising:
[a] receiving by the processor over a network a good-until-
bettered bid comprising a bid price;
[b] receiving by the processor instructions that specify a
good-until-bettered increment value comprising an amount of
standard trading increments for the bid;
[c] after maintaining the good-until-bettered bid in the
electronic trading system, determining that another bid received
by the electronic trading system tops the good-until-bettered bid
by the specified amount of standard trading increments; and
[d] responsive to determining that another bid received by
the electronic trading system tops the good-until-bettered bid by
the specified amount of standard trading increments, canceling
by the processor the good-until-bettered bid.

Amendment has not yet been entered.) No other amendments have been
submitted since the Final Office Action dated May 28, 2015” (Ans. 3; cf.
Appeal Br. 2). For purposes of this appeal, we consider claim 67 to be
cancelled.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–23 and 43–66 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–23 and 43–66 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Fisher (US 5,835,896, iss. Nov. 10, 1998) and Lupien (US
5,689,652, iss. Nov. 18, 1997).
Claims 1–23 and 43–66 are rejected on the ground of non-statutory
obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1–18, 24–36, and 41–51 of
U.S. Patent No. 8,438,097.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application, i.e., that “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Appellant argues claims 1–23 and 43–66 as a group (see Appeal Br. 7;
see also Reply Br. 3). We select independent claim 1 as representative.
Claims 2–23 and 43–66 stand or fall with independent claim 1. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the
Examiner states that the claims broadly recite:
receiving over a network a good-until bettered bid comprising a
bid price and after maintaining the good-until-bettered bid in the
electronic trading system, determining that another bid received
by the electronic trading system tops the good-until-bettered bid
by the specified amount of standard trading increments; and
responsive to determining that another bid received by the
electronic trading system tops the good-until-bettered bid by the
specified amount of standard trading increments, canceling by
the processor the good-until-bettered bid.
(Final Act. 3–4). After considering the language of the claims, the Examiner
determined that the claims recite an abstract idea which the Examiner
considers to be “a method of a fundamental economic practice” (id. at 6; see
also Ans. 4–12). .
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In response, Appellant first argues that the Examiner’s rejection is
improper because the Examiner “merely provides conclusory assertions of
these findings, without any supportive evidence or reasoning” (Appeal Br.
7–8; Reply Br. 3–4). We cannot agree.
Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
first determine if the claims recite an abstract idea. In this regard, the
Specification is titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR MAINTAINING
THE VIABILITY OF A GOOD-UNTIL-BETTERED ORDER TYPE IN
ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS,” and “relates to order types for use
in electronic trading systems” (Spec. ¶ 2). The Specification informs us that
“[b]ids that are bettered are commonly referred to as ‘topped’ and offers that
are bettered are commonly referred to as ‘cut’” (id. ¶ 4). The Specification
describes that “a bid or offer that is removed from the trading system on
occurrence of it being topped or cut may be referred to as a ‘good-until-
bettered’ order” (id.). In contrast, “a ‘limit’ order that remains listed and
available for trading in a trading system until traded or cancelled” (id.).
According to the Specification, one drawback with limit orders is that
participants “are forced to remain constantly aware of their existence”
because “[a] limit order may be set to remain good until traded or cancelled
for a trading session, multiple trading sessions or any other suitable period”
(id.).
However, the Specification describes that a good-until-bettered order
does not share this drawback because this order type enables participants “to
bid or offer for a short time span” (id. ¶ 5). Additionally the Specification
discloses that “a good-until-bettered order type may become preferable to a
limit or other order type, especially in fast moving markets where a
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participant’s thought processes, or a computer’s processing speed, are at a
premium” (id. ¶ 6). The Specification also informs us of a drawback with
the good-until-bettered order type that “occurs when there is a gap in the
inside market” (id. ¶ 7). During this scenario,
[i]f a first participant is working a “good-until-bettered” bid
order in such a situation, a subsequent “topping participant”
taking advantage of a gap in the market may knock the first
participant’s order out of the trading system either unnecessarily,
or for the topping participant’s trading advantage. This may be
contrary to what the first participant intended, and often serves
to unnecessarily remove liquidity from the trading system by
knocking out good-until-bettered orders, even when the market
price of the instrument is not moving away from them.
(id. ¶ 7). To address this drawback, the present invention provides “systems
and methods for maintaining the viability of a good-until-bettered order in
electronic trading systems” (id. ¶ 9). More particularly, the present
invention discloses that it providing “a new order type” which “is a
modification of a conventional good-until-bettered order type” (id. ¶ 10).
Taking independent claim 1 as representative, the claimed subject
matter recites “[a] method of trading items on an electronic trading system”
including steps for “receiving . . . a good-until-bettered bid comprising a bid
price,” “receiving . . . a good-until-bettered increment value comprising an
amount of standard trading increments for the bid,” “after maintaining the
good-until-bettered bid in the electronic trading system, determining that
another bid received by the electronic trading system tops the good-until-
bettered bid by the specified amount of standard trading increments,” and if
the another bid “tops the good-until-bettered bid by the specified amount of
standard trading increments, canceling . . . the good-until-bettered bid.”
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Understood in light of the Specification, we agree with the Examiner
that independent claim 1 broadly recites “a method of a fundamental
economic practice” (id. at 6; see also Ans. 4–12). In this regard, exemplary
independent claim 1 includes steps for receiving a bid, receiving increments
for the bid, and determining if the bid has been topped, which we find akin
to placing an order on an electronic trading system. Therefore, when viewed
through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner’s analysis
depicts the claimed subject matter as being directed to ineligible subject
matter which may be categorized as one of the ineligible “methods of
organizing human activity” that include “fundamental economic principles
or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk)” and
“commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations),” and thus an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claims recite a practical application of
the recited judicial exception. Here we look to see if, for example, (i) any
additional elements of the claims reflects an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an application of the
judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, (iii) a
transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing,
or (iv) a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
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technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55;
See also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues that the present claims are similar to the patent-
eligible claims in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245
(Fed. Cir. 2014), and patent-eligible because the “present claims solve a
problem rooted in computer technology to improve functionality of trading
systems by automatically canceling orders when certain conditions are met”
(Appeal Br. 12). However, we find no indication in the Specification that
this purported improvement to the computer, i.e., automatic cancellation of
orders, invokes any assertedly inventive programming, requires any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components (cf.
Spec. ¶¶ 26–39), i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is
implemented using other than generic computer components to perform
generic computer functions (see Ans. 12–14). See also DDR, 773 F.3d at
1256 (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”). Instead, we find that the “improvement” to which the Appellant
refer is a business improvement rather than an improvement to a
technological or technical field (see OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform
routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a
claim patent eligible.”).
Appellant further argues “that the combination of elements recited in
the amended claims perform functions that are not generic computer
functions” (Reply Br. 5 (emphases omitted)). However, independent claim
1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer
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technology to send bid data, receive bid data, and analyze global bid data
(see Spec. ¶¶ 26–39), and does not recite an improvement to a particular
computer technology. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because
they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”).
Thus, we do not find anything of record that persuasively attributes any
improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
Appellant also argues that the present claims are not directed to the
alleged abstract idea because the Examiner “fails to make any analysis or
showing of any kind concerning preemption” (Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6).
However, Appellant’s preemption argument does not alter our § 101
analysis. Preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot where a
patent’s claims are deemed to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under
the two-part framework described in Mayo and Alice. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “While
preemption may signal patent ineligible matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Turning to Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the additional elements (1) add a specific limitation or combination
of limitations that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional activity
in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present or
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(2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not
be present. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Addressing the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the
Examiner states:
[t]he claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more that the judicial exception
because steps for routine data gathering in order for delivering
content to consumers do not add a meaningful limitation to the
method as they would be routinely used by those of ordinary skill
in the art in order to deliver data content.
(Final Act. 4; see also id. at 6). The Examiner also notes the “[i]n the instant
application, the data processing platform, including a processor is no more
than conventional hardware and as such, does not amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea” (Ans. 12). More particularly, the Examiner
finds that the Specification “requires no more than a generic computing
device (server), a client (generic computer) interface, and a network
(connected generic computers) to perform generic functions that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in the
industry” (id. at 13−14 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 6, 27, 31)).
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements taken alone
or in combination do not result in anything more than conventional computer
implementation. And, considered as an ordered combination, the “electronic
trading system comprising a processor” recited by independent claim 1 adds
nothing that is not already present when the limitations are considered
separately. Viewed as a whole, independent claim 1 simply recites “a
method of a fundamental economic practice” (Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 4–
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12) or more particularly, a series of steps for placing an order on an
electronic trading system. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claimed sequence of steps comprises only
‘conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,’ which is
insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’”) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2357). The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning
of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field, as discussed above with respect to prong two
of step 2A. Instead, independent claim 1 amounts to nothing significantly
more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using “an electronic
trading system comprising a processor,” which under our precedents, is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and claims 2–23
and 43–66, which fall with independent claim 1.
Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1–23 and 43–66 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
because the combination of Fisher and Lupien fails to disclose or suggest
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“responsive to determining that another bid received by the electronic
trading system tops the good-until-bettered bid by the specified amount of
standard trading increments, canceling by the processor the good-until-
bettered bid,” as recited by independent claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 16–19; see
also Reply Br. 8–9). Each of independent claims 10, 19, 43, 52, 61, and 66
include a similar limitation, and are argued based on similar argument (see
Appeal Br. 23–28; see also Reply Br. 10–12).
The Examiner maintains the rejection is proper, and cites Lupien, at
column 9, lines 30–50, as disclosing the argued limitation (see Final Act. 8–
9). However, we agree with the Appellant that there is nothing in the cited
portion that discloses or suggests the argued limitation.
In making this determination, we agree with the Appellant that “the
cited passages of Fisher and Lupien do not disclose or suggest any logical
connection between cancelling a good-until-bettered bid/offer/order, on the
one hand, and determining that another bid/offer/order is better than the
good-until-bettered bid/offer/order by a specified amount of standard trading
price increments” (Appeal Br. 16). Although Lupien describes cancelling an
order (see, e.g., Lupien, col. 9:41–45), we fail to see, and the Examiner does
not adequately explain how Lupien’s ability to cancel or modify an order
discloses or suggest “canceling an order based on (or responsive to) the
recited determining action (namely, determining that another bid/offer/order
is better than the good-until-bettered bid/offer/order by the specified amount
of standard trading price increments)” (Appeal Br. 17). Instead, the cited
portion of Lupien simply discloses that “whenever a new order is entered or
an existing order canceled or modified” (Lupien, col. 9:47–50). We also
agree with the Appellant that the “Time-in-Force would disclose an order
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ceasing to be in force solely as a result of a time expiration, and not ‘based
on (or responsive to) the act of determining that another bid/offer/order is
better than the good-until-bettered bid/offer/order by the specified amount of
standard trading price increments’” (Appeal Br. 19).
In the Answer, the Examiner additionally relies upon Lupien, at
column 6, lines 56–61, as disclosing the argued limitation (see Ans. 18–19).
However, we agree with the Appellant that even if the time-in-force feature
does cancel an order, the Examiner has not shown that the time-in-force
feature “would disclose an order ceasing to be in force solely as a result of a
time expiration, and not ‘based on (or responsive to) the act of determining
that another bid/offer/order is better than the good-until-bettered
bid/offer/order by the specified amount of standard trading price
increments’” (Appeal Br. 19 (emphases omitted)). The Examiner does not
rely on Fisher to address this deficiency.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1, 10, 19, 43, 52, 61, and 66, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a). For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 2–9, 11–18, 20–23, 44–51, 53–60, and 62–65, which
depend therefrom.
Non-statutory Obvious-type Double Patenting
The Examiner rejected claims 1–23 and 43–66 on the ground of non-
statutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1–18, 24–36, and
41–51 of U.S. Patent No. 8,438,097 (Final Act. 15–16).
In response, the Appellant argues that “this rejection can be overcome
by filing a proper Terminal Disclaimer” and “[a]s the claims of the present
application are subject to change during prosecution, Appellants have
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requested that these rejections be held in abeyance until the application is
otherwise in condition for allowance” (Appeal Br. 29).
Therefore, the double patenting rejection is summarily sustained.

DECISION
Claims Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23, 43−66 § 101 1−23, 43−66
1–23, 43−66 § 103 Fisher, Lupien 1−23, 43−66
1−23, 43−66 Obviousness-Type Double
Patenting
1−23, 43−66
Overall Outcome 1−23, 43−66

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED