Lucian Cristache

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 18, 2019

13921976 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/921,976 06/19/2013 Lucian Cristache LUCM-1-1006 1595
25315 7590 10/18/2019
LOWE GRAHAM JONES, PLLC
701 FIFTH AVENUE
SUITE 4800
SEATTLE, WA 98104
EXAMINER
KHAN, OMER S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing-patent@lowegrahamjones.com
patentdocketing@lowegrahamjones.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte LUCIAN CRISTACHE
____________________

Appeal 2018-007246
Application 13/921,976
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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Application 13/921,976
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of
claims 1–5 and 7–10. Claims 6 and 11–13 are canceled and claims 14–21
are withdrawn from consideration due to the constructive election by
original presentation. (See Final Act. 2.) We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b.)
We reverse.

The claims are directed to systems and methods for object localization
and path identification based on RFID tag sensing. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A radio frequency identification (RFID) system for
localizing an RFID tag, the system comprising:

a plurality of radio frequency identification (RFID) tag
readers;

a computer system communicatively coupled with the
plurality of RFID tag readers over a network;

a memory associated with the computer system, the
memory storing a network semantic model having a plurality of
endpoints and oriented links between the endpoints, wherein the
endpoints are associated with physical locations in space, each of
the endpoints having associated with it one or more radio
frequency identification (RFID) tag readers, the network
semantic model further comprising at least one semantic attribute
associated with at least one of the oriented links;

at least one sensor;

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies that Lucomm Technologies,
Inc. is the real party in interest. (Appeal Br. 1.)
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the computer system being configured to localize the
RFID tag based on data received from the RFID tag readers;

the computer system further being configured to associate
an RFID tag rating with the RFID tag;

the computer system further being configured to adjust the
network semantic model as a function of a measured parameter
from the sensor;

the computer system further being configured to determine
that the RFID tag has traversed the oriented link and further to
adjust the RFID tag rating associated with the RFID tag based on
the determination that the RFID tag has traversed the oriented
link, the adjusted RFID tag rating further being a function of the
semantic attribute associated with the oriented link.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Hines et al. US 2001/0040512 A1 Nov. 15, 2001
Krishna et al. US 2006/0022800 A1 Feb. 2, 2006
Kantrowitz et al. US 2007/0236339 A1 Oct. 11, 2007
Kuhl US 2008/0231428 A1 Sept. 25, 2008
Warner et al. US 8,344,853 B1 Jan. 1, 2013

REJECTIONS2
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Krishna and Hines in view of Warner.

2 The Examiner should consider to consider whether, in light of the recent
Office Guidance, the claims pass muster under § 101 or are instead directed
to tracking RFID tags along an oriented link between two endpoints, i.e., a
mental process (e.g., an observation or evaluation) and, therefore, an abstract
idea?
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Claims 3 and 10 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Krishna and Hines in view of Warner and further in
view of Kantrowitz.
Claims 7 and 9 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Krishna and Hines in view of Warner and further in
view of Kuhl.

ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly and confusingly
interprets the “network semantic model” to invoke § 112, sixth paragraph.
(Appeal Br. 15.) Appellant contends that the written description makes it
clear that semantics are language components, structures, or constructs that
have particular meanings, and a network semantic model is a computer
model of a physical space, in which semantics are associated with the
network model of the physical space. (Appeal Br. 15.) Appellant further
contends that “it is a model of endpoints and oriented links associated with
physical locations, and in which ‘semantic attributes’ are associated with the
oriented links.” (Appeal Br. 15.)
The Federal Circuit has established that use of the term “means” is
central to the analysis of whether a claim limitation should be interpreted in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph: use of the word “means”
creates a rebuttable presumption that the inventor intended to invoke § 112,
sixth paragraph, whereas failure to use the word “means” creates a
rebuttable presumption that the inventor did not intend the claims to be
governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. Personalized Media Commc’ns., LLC
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However,
the presumption that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not subject to
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§ 112, sixth paragraph, may be rebutted if the claim fails to recite sufficient
structure. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2015). As the Williamson Court explained:
The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood
by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently
definite meaning as the name for structure. When a claim term
lacks the word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and §
112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the
claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or else
recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (internal citations omitted).
As an initial matter, we note the claims (e.g., claim 1) do not recite a
“means for” or a “step for” performing a function. Thus, there is a
presumption that Appellant did not intend the claims to be governed by
§112, sixth paragraph. See Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 703–04. In
addition, the Examiner has not explained that the term “network semantic
model” would not be understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan to have a
sufficiently definite meaning for structure. (See Final Act. 7–8; see also
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349) Moreover, the Examiner does not confine the
interpretation of a “network semantic model” to a corresponding structure in
the Specification, but rather applies a “plain meaning” to the term. (Final
Act. 8.)
We agree with Appellant that, in light of the Specification, one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the “network semantic model” to
be “a computer model of a physical space, in which semantics are associated
with the network model of the physical space.” (See Appeal Br. 15.)
.)The Examiner further interprets the claimed “endpoint” as “physical
location” based upon paragraph 32 of the Specification. (Appeal Br. 16.)
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Appellant contends the Examiner provides an erroneous interpretation
of the claim term “endpoint” where the Specification discloses that the
endpoint is not itself a physical location, but rather is an endpoint in a
computer network model of the physical space. (Appeal Br. 16 (citing ¶ 32)
(“Each network model includes one or more endpoints. Each endpoint has
an associated physical location or area in space and is represented in the
network model as a graph node.”).)
Appellant further contends that the Examiner’s interpretation of the
claim term “oriented link” as a “direction of travel” is unreasonably broad
and is not consistent with the term as used in the description. (Appeal Br.
17.)
Appellant clarifies that an oriented link must “link” two endpoints, and must
do so in an “oriented” way, with a sequence of travel between them, and the
oriented link must be part of the network semantic model. (Appeal Br. 17.)
We agree with Appellant.
With this proper claim interpretation, we evaluate the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection.
Appellant argues that the prior art does not teach the network
semantic model with endpoints and oriented links as claimed. (Appeal Br.
17.)
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant and maintains that
paragraphs 116 and 416 of the Krishna reference evidence the use of tag
information and movement to determine direction of movement of tagged
items or individuals. (Ans. 6.) Additionally, the Examiner relies upon the
Hines reference for determining the location of a body/user as well as a path
of travel. (Ans. 6 (citing Hines ¶ 12).) The Examiner concludes that it
would have been obvious to modify the invention of the Krishna reference
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and validate the data only if the tag has traveled the predetermined path
based on the lay of the premises; therefore, making the overall system more
accurate by rejecting invalid communication reads from the tag. (Ans. 6–7.)
Appellant argues that the prior art does not teach the network
semantic model with semantic attributes as claimed. (Appeal Br. 18.)
With respect to “semantic attributes” in the “network semantic
model,” the Examiner maintains that the Krishna reference teaches
determining a direction of travel, i.e. claimed oriented links, for each tag
associated with a related interrogation response, i.e. claimed at least one
semantic attribute, using a power profiling technique, and in determining the
direction of movement of the tags within a site. (Ans. 7 (citing Krishna
¶¶ 280–281).) The Examiner further maintains that the Hines reference
receives data and the collection of such data forms a historical record for the
body unit and its wearer, and provides a record of the proximity of the
individual to RFID tags and thus a finite history of the travel of the body unit
and its wearer throughout the monitored premises (Ans. 8 (citing Hines
¶ 24).) The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to the
skilled artisan at the time of invention “to modify the invention of Krishna
and validate the dat[a] only if the tag has travel[ed] the predetermined path
based on the lay of the premises; therefore, making the overall system more
accurate by rejecting invalid communication reads from the tag.” (Ans. 8.)
Appellant contends that “[t]hroughout the specification, the
description consistently refers to the semantic attributes as being associated
with the oriented links and a part of the network semantic model.” (Appeal
Br. 19 (citing ¶¶ 32, 36, 71, 72, 132–134).) Appellant further contends that
“given the structure of the claim itself and the supporting description, it is
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important to understand that the semantic attribute is a part of the network
semantic model.” (Appeal Br. 19.)
Appellant also argues that the Examiner “does not identify any
teaching in the prior art for a defined ‘network semantic model’ stored in the
memory, in which the stored network semantic model includes semantic
attributes associated with oriented links as claimed.” (Appeal Br. 19.)
Appellant argues that neither the Krishna reference nor the Hines reference
teaches semantic attributes associated with oriented links within a network
model as claimed. (Appeal Br. 20–21.)
Finally, Appellant argues that the cited references do not refer to “tag
ratings,” as incorporated into the system as claimed, and the references do
not “adjust the network semantic model as a function of a measured
parameter from the sensor.” (Appeal Br. 21–23.)
With respect to the claimed “RFID tag rating,” the Examiner
identifies paragraphs 11, 12, and 37 of the Hines reference and relies upon
the storage of tag information and rejecting RFID tags which would not
logically correspond to a path of travel which is in fact rating stray RFID
tags. (Ans. 8–10.)
We disagree with the Examiner and find that because the system of
the Hines reference is opposite to the data acquisition and monitoring in the
claimed invention, the proffered rejection of the RFID tag is not similar to
the claimed RFID tag rating because the RFID tag in the claimed invention
is the system that is moving and the RFID tag in the Hines reference is not
moving.
With respect to the claimed “adjusting,” the Examiner identifies
paragraphs 99 and 281 of the Krishna reference and column 5 of the Warner
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reference for teaching storage of tag locations and direction of movement
and updating of the stored data. (Ans. 10–11.)
The allocation of burdens requires that the USPTO produce the factual
basis for its rejection of an application under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.
In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Warner,
379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA 1967)). The one who bears the initial burden
of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability is the Examiner.
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A prima facie case is
established when the party with the burden of proof points to evidence that is
sufficient, if uncontroverted, to entitle it to prevail as a matter of law.
See Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. U. S., 434 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
In particular, regarding the Patent Examiner’s burden of production:
[A]ll that is required of the office to meet its prima facie
burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the
rejection and the reference or references relied upon in a
sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132. As the statute itself
instructs, the examiner must “notify the applicant,” “stating the
reasons for such rejection,” “together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging the propriety of
continuing prosecution of his application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132.

In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The Examiner’s obviousness rejection is not well supported by the
express disclosure of the Krishna and Hines references. Accordingly, we
agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s determination that the claimed
invention is obvious is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Examiner’s burden
of proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence); see also
In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (“The Patent Office has
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the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not,
because it may doubt that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation,
unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in
its factual basis.”) We will not resort to such speculation or assumptions to
cure the deficiencies in the factual basis in order to support the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection.
Although the Examiner provides citations and argument, we find the
Examiner’s reliance upon the Krishna and Hines references does not teach
the use of a “network semantic model” and “semantic attributes,” but merely
the recordation of data. As a result, we find the Examiner’s evidence
lacking to support the Examiner’s ultimate conclusion of obviousness.
Additionally, the Examiner relies upon the Warner reference for adjusting
the rating, and the Examiner does not identify how the Warner reference
teaches the “network semantic model” and “semantic attributes” found
lacking in the prior art combination above.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4, 5, and 8 based on
obviousness over the combination of Krishna, Hines, and Warner.
Moreover, the Examiner does not identify how the additional prior art
references remedy the deficiencies noted above. Therefore, we cannot
sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 3, 7, 9, and 10 for the same
reasons.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–5 and 7–10 based upon
obviousness.
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DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claims 1–5 and 7–10.

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 5, 8 103 Krishna, Hines,
Warner
1, 2, 4, 5, 8
3, 10 103

Krishna, Hines,
Warner,
Kantrowitz
3, 10
7, 9 103

Krishna, Hines,
Warner, Kuhl
7, 9
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–10

REVERSED