Lucia, Deborah et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 26, 2019

14745375 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/745,375 06/19/2015 Deborah Lucia 14-2424 7388
63710 7590 12/26/2019
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
SHAIKH, MOHAMMAD Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DEBORAH LUCIA, JEFFREY GIUDICI, DAMON KHOURI,
HOANG NGUYEN, MICHAEL SCHROEDER, and STACI TELSEY
____________________

Appeal 2019-001673
Application 14/745,3751
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC B. CHEN, HUNG H. BUI, and MELISSA A. HAAPALA,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–20, which are all the claims pending
in the application. Appeal Br. 21–29 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).2
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicants” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is Berkeley Point Capital LLC.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed July
30, 2018; Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed October 19, 2018; Reply
Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed December 18, 2018; Final Office Action (“Final
Act.”) mailed March 2, 2018; and original Specification (“Spec.”) filed June
19, 2015.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “electronic systems and methods for
managing risk, such as insurance risk.” Spec. ¶ 2. According to Appellant,
the “electronic data management system” (1) “tracks and displays [e.g., to
users], for a plurality of different loans or other financial instruments,
information related to the loans, such as information about the status of the
loan or other financial instrument (e.g., whether a particular loan is in
effect), availability and status of documentation related to the loan, payment
information, and other information” and (2) “generate[s] communications
such as auto-generated letters for communicating information (such as action
items, status reports, deficiency notices, etc.) to various relevant parties such
as a borrower, lender, insurance provider, mortgage holder or servicer, title
holder, title company, bank, or other entity.” Spec. ¶¶ 4, 24–25; Abstract.
Claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics:
1. A method comprising:
for each of a plurality of properties that each comprise
collateral for one or more loans each having insurance policy
requirements, receiving, by at least one processor in electronic
communication with at least one memory having at least one
database, insurance information concerning each of one or more
insurance policies associated with the respective property, in
which the insurance information comprises compliance
information indicative of whether one or more predetermined
insurance policy requirements applicable to the respective one or
more insurance policies associated with the respective property
have been satisfied, the one or more predetermined insurance
policy requirements comprising a first policy requirement
applicable to a first insurance policy and a second policy
requirement applicable to a second insurance policy;
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based on the received compliance information,
determining, by the at least one processor, for each of the one or
more loans on each of the plurality of properties, whether each
of the respective one or more predetermined insurance policy
requirements have been satisfied, in which the act of determining
whether each of the respective one or more predetermined
insurance policy requirements have been satisfied comprises (1)
determining that the first policy requirement associated with the
first insurance policy has been satisfied and (2) determining that
the second policy requirement associated with the second policy
has not been satisfied;
populating, by the at least one processor, the at least one
database based on the received insurance information, in which
the act of populating the at least one database comprises (1)
storing, in a first database entry associated with the first
insurance policy, information indicating that the first policy
requirement has been satisfied and (2) storing, in a second
database entry associated with the second insurance policy,
information indicating that the second policy requirement has not
been satisfied;
[1] receiving, by the at least one processor, from a first
workstation a first request for information about whether the first
policy requirement has been satisfied;
responsive to the first request, querying, by the at least one
processor, the first database entry;
responsive to querying the first database entry, causing, by
the at least one processor, first indicia indicating that the first
policy requirement has been satisfied to be displayed at a
graphical user interface;
[2] receiving, by the at least one processor, a second
request for information about whether the second policy
requirement has been satisfied;
responsive to the second request, querying, by the at least
one processor, the second database entry;
responsive to querying the second database entry, causing,
by the at least one processor, second indicia indicating that the
second policy requirement has not been satisfied to be displayed
at a graphical user interface;
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after causing the second indicia to be displayed, receiving,
by the at least one processor, updated compliance information;
determining, by the at least one processor, that the second
policy requirement has been satisfied based on the updated
compliance information;
[3] receiving, by the at least one processor, a third request
for information about whether the second policy requirement has
been satisfied; and
responsive to the third request, causing, by the at least one
processor, third indicia indicating that the second policy
requirement has been satisfied to be displayed at a graphical
user interface.

Appeal Br. 21–22 (Claims App.) (bracketing added).

EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS & REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act.
14–45.
(2) Claims 1–9, 11–17, 19, and20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Dillard (US 2007/0233527 A1; published
Oct. 4, 2007). Final Act. 46–62.
(3) Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over Dillard. Final Act. 63–64.
(4) Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over Dillard and Dillard (US 2005/0086084 A1; published Apr. 21,
2005; “Dillard II”). Final Act. 62–63.

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DISCUSSION
35 U.S.C. § 101: Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
In support of the § 101 rejection of claims 1–20, the Examiner
determines that representative claim 1 recites “managing compliance for a
plurality of insurance policies,” which is considered “a fundamental
economic practice” as a certain “method of organizing human activity”
because all steps recited relate to insurance services rendered to homeowners
and/or a series of “mental processes” that can be performed in the human
mind or by using pen and paper. Final Act. 14–17; Ans. 5–6.
The Examiner then determines additional elements (i.e., “processor,”
“database” and “graphical user interface”), when analyzed individually and
as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea because these additional elements are (1) “[g]eneric computers
performing generic computer functions,” (2) “do not provide improvements
to another technology or technical field,” or “improvements to the
functioning of the computer itself,” and (3) “do not provide meaningful
limitations beyond general linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment.” Final Act. 21–22.
Legal Framework
To determine whether claims are patent eligible under § 101, we apply
the Supreme Court’s two-step framework articulated in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). First, we determine whether the claims are
directed to a patent-ineligible concept: laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas. Id. at 216. If so, we then proceed to the second step to
consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that
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“‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at
217. In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 218 (alteration in original,
internal quotation marks omitted).
The Federal Circuit has described the Alice step-one inquiry as
looking at the “focus” of the claims, their “character as a whole,” and the
Alice step-two inquiry as looking more precisely at what the claim elements
add—whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the
ineligible matter to which the claim is directed. See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (the “Office”) applies the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework, the Office has published revised guidance interpreting governing
case law and establishing a framework for all patent-eligibility analysis
under Alice and § 101 effective as of January 7, 2019. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”) and October 2019 Patent Eligibility
Guidance Update (October 2019 Update), as currently reflected in the
Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (MPEP) §§ 2103, 2104, 2105,
2106 and 2106.03 through 2106.07(c).
2019 Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look under Alice step 1 or
“Step 2A” to whether the claim recites:
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(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., [i] mathematical concepts,
[ii] mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion), or [iii] certain methods of organizing human activity
such as a fundamental economic practice or managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people); and

(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55, Revised Step 2A,
Prong One (Abstract Idea) and Prong Two (Integration into A Practical
Application). Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does
not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 or
“Step 2B.” See 2019 Revised Guidance at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
1) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

2) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2A—Prong 1
Turning now to the first step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant does not
dispute the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites “managing
compliance for a plurality of insurance policies” that are considered as (1)
“mental processes” and/or (2) “a fundamental economic practice” as a
certain “method of organizing human activity.” See Final Act. 14–17; Ans.
5–6. Instead, Appellant argues claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea
because (1) the Examiner “oversimplifies the claims by looking at them
generally and failing to account for the specific requirements recited in the
claims”; and (2) the Examiner fails to cite (i) “‘an appropriate court decision
that supports the identification of the subject matter recited in the claim
language as an abstract idea’” and (ii) “a court decision that is ‘reasonably
tied to the facts of the case.” Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
asserts the Examiner instead relies “upon language taken out of context.’”
Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note
Appellant’s Specification and claims describe “electronic systems and
methods for managing risk, such as insurance risk.” Spec. ¶ 2. According to
Appellant, the “electronic data management system” is used to (1) “track[]
and display[] [e.g., to users], for a plurality of different loans or other
financial instruments, information related to the loans, such as information
about the status of the loan or other financial instrument (e.g., whether a
particular loan is in effect), availability and status of documentation related
to the loan, payment information, and other information” and (2) “generate
communications such as auto-generated letters for communicating
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information (such as action items, status reports, deficiency notices, etc.) to
various relevant parties such as a borrower, lender, insurance provider,
mortgage holder or servicer, title holder, title company, bank, or other
entity.” Spec. ¶¶ 4, 24–25; Abstract.
For example, Appellant’s claim 1 recites a method comprising:
[1] . . . receiving . . . insurance information concerning each
of one or more insurance policies associated with the respective
property, in which the insurance information comprises
compliance information indicative of whether one or more
predetermined insurance policy requirements applicable to the
respective one or more insurance policies associated with the
respective property have been satisfied, the one or more
predetermined insurance policy requirements comprising a first
policy requirement applicable to a first insurance policy and a
second policy requirement applicable to a second insurance
policy;

[2] based on the received compliance information,
determining . . . whether each of the respective one or more
predetermined insurance policy requirements have been
satisfied, in which the act of determining whether each of the
respective one or more predetermined insurance policy
requirements have been satisfied comprises (1) determining that
the first policy requirement associated with the first insurance
policy has been satisfied and (2) determining that the second
policy requirement associated with the second policy has not
been satisfied;

[3] populating . . . the at least one database based on the
received insurance information, in which the act of populating
the at least one database comprises (1) storing, in a first database
entry associated with the first insurance policy, information
indicating that the first policy requirement has been satisfied and
(2) storing, in a second database entry associated with the second
insurance policy, information indicating that the second policy
requirement has not been satisfied;
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[4] receiving . . . a first request for information about whether
the first policy requirement has been satisfied;

[5] responsive to the first request, querying . . . the first
database entry;

[6] responsive to querying the first database entry, causing . .
. first indicia indicating that the first policy requirement has been
satisfied to be displayed at a graphical user interface;

[7] receiving . . . a second request for information about
whether the second policy requirement has been satisfied;

[8] responsive to the second request, querying . . . the second
database entry;

[9] responsive to querying the second database entry, causing
. . . second indicia indicating that the second policy requirement
has not been satisfied to be displayed at a graphical user
interface;

[10] after causing the second indicia to be displayed, receiving
. . . updated compliance information;

[11] determining . . . that the second policy requirement has
been satisfied based on the updated compliance information;

[12] receiving . . . a third request for information about whether
the second policy requirement has been satisfied; and

[13] responsive to the third request, causing . . . third indicia
indicating that the second policy requirement has been satisfied
to be displayed at a graphical user interface.

Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.) (bracketing added).

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As correctly recognized by the Examiner, the limitations of
Appellant’s claim 1, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite all
the steps necessary for “managing compliance for a plurality of insurance
policies [on real properties or other collaterals],” including “receiving . . .
insurance information concerning each of one or more insurance policies
associated with the respective property” and “determining . . . whether each
of the respective one or more predetermined insurance policy requirements
have been satisfied”—which are known business activities and a
fundamental economic practice in our system of commerce, especially in the
context of tracking, managing, and selling proper insurance policies to those
companies that collateralize loans—one of the certain methods of organizing
human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and therefore an abstract
idea. See Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 (describing an abstract idea category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing
human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices . . .
commercial or legal interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or
sales activities or behaviors; business relations)”), 54. Final Act. 15–16
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 25–27).
Such activities are squarely within the realm of abstract ideas, like
(1) the risk hedging in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); (2) the
intermediated settlement in Alice, 573 U.S. at 220; (3) verifying credit card
transactions in CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370; (4) guaranteeing transactions
in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
(5) distributing products over the Internet in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) determining a price of a product offered
to a purchasing organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,
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793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); (7) pricing a product for sale in OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and (8) delivering
user-selected media content (i.e., targeted advertisement) to a portable
device in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, 838 F.3d 1266, 1269,
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Managing compliance for a plurality of insurance
policies on real properties or other collaterals is also a building block of
commerce and stock market and, like risk hedging and intermediated
settlement, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 220.
Alternatively, these limitations of Appellant’s claim 1, under their
broadest reasonable interpretation, recite nothing more than a series of steps
of “managing compliance for a plurality of insurance policies [on real
properties or other collaterals]” which are a series of “mental processes” that
could also be performed in the human mind or by a human using a pen and
paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion), and
therefore an abstract idea. Final Act. 5–6; see CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method that
can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is
not patent-eligible under § 101.”); see also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,
979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental processes—or processes of human
thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical
application.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena
of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”
(Emphasis added)). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable
even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could
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have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, were precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson.”).
For example, limitations (1)–(3) in claim 1 describe several steps
performed by an insurance administrator (person) who is tasked to “receiv[e]
. . . insurance information concerning each of one or more insurance policies
associated with the respective property” and “determin[e] . . . whether each
of the respective one or more predetermined insurance policy requirements
have been satisfied” and then store the same in a bookcase (database). See
Spec. ¶¶ 25–27, 45–46.
Limitations (4)–(13) in claim 1 describe a series of steps performed by
the same insurance administrator (person) who is tasked to review and
observe various policy requirements, and provide a visual indication that
these policy requirements have been satisfied using a pen and paper.
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong One, we agree with the Examiner that
limitations (1)–(13) in Appellant’s claim 1 recite “managing compliance for
a plurality of insurance policies [on real properties or other collaterals],” that
are nothing more than a fundamental economic practice and/or a series of
“mental processes” as identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus, an
abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84
Fed. Reg. at 52, 54.
Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Revised Step 2A, Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we must
determine if the claim (i.e., additional limitations beyond the judicial
exception) integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. We
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discern no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in
Appellant’s claim 1 that integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
For example, the additional elements (i.e., “processor,” “database”
and “graphical user interface”) recited in claim 1 do not (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for generic computer components), (3) do not
effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are
not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues, like the claims in Core Wireless S.A.R.L. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), “the claims recite specific
ways of rendering data on an improved graphical user interface” and, as
such, provide “an improvement to the functioning of the computer.” Appeal
Br. 11 (original emphasis omitted). According to Appellant,
the claims of the instant case [] recite an improved user interface
with precise language delimiting the type of data to be displayed
(e.g., “responsive to querying the first database entry, causing ...
first indicia indicating that the first policy requirement has been
satisfied to be displayed at a graphical user interface . . . receiving
. . . a second request for information about whether the second
policy requirement has been satisfied . . . responsive to querying
the second database entry, causing . . . second indicia indicating
that the second policy requirement has not been satisfied to be
displayed at a graphical user interface").

Appeal Br. 13 (original emphasis omitted).

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Appellant also argues, like the claims in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “the claims recite
rules that improve the technological process through a specific
implementation of content via graphical user interafces [sic, interfaces].”
Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. As correctly recognized by
the Examiner, “[t]here is no improvement to the technology of the GUI (the
graphical user interface) it is operating in exactly the same way it was
designed to function, (functions of inputting and displaying insurance data).”
Ans. 14. Core Wireless is not applicable because the claims in Core
Wireless are directed to an improved user interface for computing devices, in
which “an application summary that can be reached directly from the menu,”
specify a particular manner by which the summary window must be
accessed and a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to
the user, resulting in “an improved user interface for electronic devices,”
whereas Appellant’s claims only use a generic user interface, as shown in
Figure 2, to display various types of information (e.g., insurance, load, and
compliance information) to allow an administrator to track, manage, and
display (e.g., to users) information related to a plurality of different loans.
Spec. ¶¶ 3–4, 24–25, Figures 10–54.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, neither the “first indicia indicating
that the first policy requirement has been satisfied” nor the “second indicia
indicating that the second policy requirement has not been satisfied”
improve the functionality or configuration of a graphical user interface
(GUI) as recited in claim 1.

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Appellant’s reliance on McRO is also misplaced. See Appeal Br. 14.
For example, McRO’s ’576 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576) describes
computer software for matching audio to a 3D animated mouth movement to
provide lip-synched animation. McRO’s claims contain (i) specific
limitations regarding a set of rules that “define[] a morph weight set stream
as a function of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme
sequence” to enable computers to produce “accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters” (McRO, 837
F.3d at 1313) and, when viewed as a whole, are directed to (ii) a
“technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D animation
techniques” that uses “limited rules in a process specifically designed to
achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice.”
Id. at 1316.
In contrast to McRO, Appellant’s Specification and claims do not
describe “an improvement to the functioning of a computer.” Ans. 12.
Rather, Appellant’s Specification and claims describe an “electronic data
management system” used to (1) “track[] and display[] [e.g., to users], for a
plurality of different loans or other financial instruments, information related
to the loans, such as information about the status of the loan or other
financial instrument (e.g., whether a particular loan is in effect), availability
and status of documentation related to the loan, payment information, and
other information” and (2) “generate communications such as auto-
generated letters for communicating information (such as action items, status
reports, deficiency notices, etc.) to various relevant parties such as a
borrower, lender, insurance provider, mortgage holder or servicer, title
holder, title company, bank, or other entity.” Spec. ¶¶ 4, 24–25; Abstract.
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For business-centric inventions such as Appellant’s invention
involving “managing compliance for a plurality of insurance policies [on
real properties or other collaterals],” including tracking, managing, and
selling proper insurance policies to those companies that collateralize loans,
the “integration into a practical application” prong requires consideration of
whether the claims purport to provide “a technical solution to a technical
problem” as required by the Federal Circuit’s precedential decisions in (1)
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2014) and (2) Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288
(Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
For example, the Federal Circuit found DDR’s claims are patent-
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because DDR’s claims: (1) do not merely
recite “the performance of some business practice known from the pre-
Internet world” previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2)
provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet,
i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Likewise, the Federal Circuit also found Amdocs’
claims patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because like DDR, Amdocs’
claims “entail[] an unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in
a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows
which previously required massive databases)” and “improve the
performance of the system itself.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302.
In contrast, Appellant’s invention—involving “managing compliance
for a plurality of insurance policies [on real properties or other
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collaterals]”—does not provide any “technical solution to a technical
problem.” See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
The focus of Appellant’s invention is not to improve the performance
of computers or any underlying technology. Instead, there is no support
from Appellant’s Specification for any feature that would improve any
existing computer technology or would overcome any problem arising in the
realm of computer networks. Instead, Appellant’s claims seek to utilize a
generic computer as a tool to perform the recited abstract idea, i.e., to solve a
business problem for identifying risks. Spec. ¶¶ 3–4, 25–27.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, using generic computer
components does not provide any “technical solution to a technical problem”
as contemplated by the Federal Circuit in DDR (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)),
and is insufficient to show “integration into a practical application.” See
MPEP § 2106.05(f). Instead, these generic computer components are simply
the “automation of the fundamental economic concept.” OIP Techs., 788
F.3d at 1362–63. “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation,”
“does not move into [§] 101 eligibility territory.” buySAFE, 765 F.3d at
1354 (second alteration in original).
A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “No
matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims recite, the
advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged
innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” See SAP America, Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s “additional
elements” recited in claims 1–20 integrate the abstract idea into a practical
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application. As such, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are
“directed to” an abstract idea.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. However, we find no
element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claim 1 that
contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to
transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573
U.S. 208 at 221.
Appellant does not identify any specific limitation of claim 1 beyond
the judicial exception that is not ‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ in
the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). As previously discussed, utilizing
generic computer components (i.e., “processor,” “database” and “graphical
user interface”) does not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter. As our reviewing court has observed, “after
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR, 773
F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222).
Pre-emption
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Lastly, Appellant argues “the claims do not pre-empt all processes
for achieving the intended result” because “the claimed recitations are
very specific and do not cover all possible approaches.” Appeal Br. 14
(citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1299). We disagree. The lack of preemption is a
necessary clue for patent eligibility, but it is not sufficient for patent
eligibility. As the McRO court explicitly recognized, “the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Ans. 7–8. Furthermore,
“[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter” under the Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Because Appellant’s claim 1 is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract
concept and does not recite an “inventive concept” or provides a solution to
a technical problem under the second step of the Alice analysis, we sustain
the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of Appellant’s claim 1, and similarly,
independent claims 19 and 20, and their respective dependent claims 2–18
not separately argued.

35 U.S.C. § 102((a)(1): Claims 1–9, 11–17, and 19–20

Claim 1 recites, inter alia:
[1] receiving, by the at least one processor, from a first
workstation a first request for information about whether the first
policy requirement has been satisfied;
. . .
[2] receiving, by the at least one processor, a second
request for information about whether the second policy
requirement has been satisfied;
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. . .
[3] receiving, by the at least one processor, a third request
for information about whether the second policy requirement has
been satisfied.

Appeal Br. 21–22 (Claims App.) (bracketing added).
Appellant argues Dillard does not disclose these features, i.e.,
receiving (1) “a first request for information about whether the first
policy requirement has been satisfied,” (2) “a second request for
information about whether the second policy requirement has been
satisfied,” and (3) “a third request for information about whether the
second policy requirement has been satisfied,” as recited in claim 1.
Appeal Br. 15. According to Appellant,
Dillard is limited to merely a “request to initiate the builder's risk
policy” and “request for a builder’s risk policy,” where the
builder's risk policy is later converted to a homeowner’s policy.
However, this request is different from the request in claim 1,
which recites: “a request for information about whether the first
policy requirement has been Satisfied” . . . a “request to initiate”
or a “request for a builder’s risk policy” is not one in the same as
a “request for information about whether the first policy
requirement has been satisfied,” recited in claim 1. That is,
requesting a policy itself is very different from requesting
information about whether policy requirements have been
satisfied . . . . communicating, by the insurance department, an
approved insurance application without receiving any requests is
very different from receiving, by the at least one processor, a
second request for information about whether the second policy
requirement has been satisfied before displaying the second
indicia . . . . [and likewise] the insurance department
communicates the approved application without receiving any
requests [is different from] a third request for information about
whether the third policy requirement has been satisfied before
displaying the third indicia . . .

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Appeal Br. 16–17 (original emphasis omitted) (citing Dillard ¶¶ 9, 11, 33,
50).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Instead, we find the
Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellant’s arguments,
supported by evidence. Ans. 18–23. As such, we adopt the Examiner’s
findings and explanations provided therein, as discussed below. Id. For
additional emphasis, we note claim terms are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning,
as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of
the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
The disputed limitations: (1) “first request for information about
whether the first policy requirement has been satisfied,” (2) “second request
for information about whether the second policy requirement has been
satisfied;” and (3) “third request for information about whether the second
policy requirement has been satisfied” recited in Appellant’s claim 1 are not
defined or even described in Appellant’s Specification. However, the policy
requirements are described in Appellant’s Specification in the context of (1)
“[s]upporting documents associated with compliance requirements [that]
may be stored and displayed to users to facilitate compliance tracking and
management” (Spec. ¶ 25) and (2) “compliance information indicative of
whether one or more predetermined insurance requirements applicable to the
respective one or more insurance policies associated with the respective
property have been satisfied” (Spec. ¶ 26).
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For example, Figure 45 shows a graphical user interface (GUI) of a
policy checklist tab, as reproduced below:

Figure 45 shows a graphical user interface (GUI) of a policy checklist tab
displaying various insurance requirements.

As shown in Figure 45, the “[p]olicy [c]hecklist tab may display
information such as a comprehensive list of policy and coverage level data
points to be reviewed for compliance against applicable insurance
requirements” and “[i]n some embodiments, a policy checklist may be
manually (or automatically) completed in the IRMA system.” Spec. ¶ 170.
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Based on Appellant’s Specification, we agree with the Examiner that
the disputed limitations of claim 1 can be broadly, but reasonably interpreted
to encompass Dillard’s risk system 10, shown in Figure 1, for converting a
builder’s risk insurance policy to a homeowner’s insurance policy,
including: (1) a “request [] received from the builder [or insurer and 3rd
party] along with relevant information . . . . if the additional payment is
needed (the policy requirement is satisfied), the policy is issued” (Ans. 19
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 34–35)); 2) a “second request,” shown in Figure 3A, 306, to
initiate conversion of the builder’s risk insurance policy (Ans. 23 (citing
Spec. ¶ 45, Figure 3A); and (3) if “the underwriting information is
requested, then in Fig 3:312 (if all of the underwriting documents are
received), the underwriting is completed (the second policy requirement) is
satisfied” (Ans. 23 (citing Figure 3A, step 307)).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of
independent claim 1 and similarly, independent claims 19 and 20 and its
respective dependent claims 2–9, 11–17, which Appellant does not argue
separately.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claim 10

Claim 10 depends from claim 1, and further recites “a third policy
requirement” and “causing . . . information about the third insurance policy
to be displayed” and “responsive to receiving the information indicating that
the third policy requirement has been satisfied, causing . . . the third
insurance policy to be updated to reflect that the third policy requirement has
been satisfied.”
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The Examiner finds the “third insurance policy and third requirement
[of the third insurance policy]” are “mere redundancy, duplicity, or
repetition of existing structure or steps” that are “deemed obvious under
§ 103 analysis.” Final Act. 64 (citing MPEP § 2144.05 and In re Harza, 274
F.2d 669 (CCPA 1960) (holding that “mere duplication of parts has no
patentable significance unless a new and unexpected result is produced”)).
Appellant argues the “third insurance policy and third requirement [of
the third insurance policy]” as recited in claim 10 are not “duplication of
parts and each claim feature is distinctive” but without explaining why these
claim features are distinctive. Appeal Br. 18.
Although we agree with Appellant that the features recited in claim 10
are not “duplication of parts” within the meaning of In re Harza, we
determine the limitations in claim 10are rather repetitive steps that are within
the knowledge level of those skilled in the art (i.e., an artisan could review
as many different insurance policies and their requirements as needed) and,
as such, are deemed obvious, as correctly recognized by the Examiner. See
Final Act. 64.
For this reason, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 10
and similarly, claim 18, which Appellant does not argue separately. Appeal
Br. 18.

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,
102(a)(1), and 103(a).
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DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(1), and 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.§ Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 non-statutory 1–20
1–9, 11–17, 19–20 102(a)(1) anticipation 1–9, 11–17,
19–20

10, 18 103 obviousness 10, 18
Overall Outcome 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED