01990001
04-25-2000
Louis Padin, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Louis Padin v. United States Postal Service
01990001
April 25, 2000
Louis Padin, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01990001
v. ) Agency No. 4H330164195
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the
basis of reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1>
Complainant alleges he was discriminated against when the agency did
not forward his CA-17 (medical form) to the Injury Compensation Office
for 10 days after he submitted the form on July 24, 1995. The appeal is
accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the FAD.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed
as a tractor trailer operator at the agency's Miami, Florida facility.
Complainant alleged that he submitted the form to management on July 24,
1995. On August 3, 1995 he inquired about the form. Neither management
nor the Injury Compensation Office knew where the CA-17 form was located.
The agency found the form on August 4, 1995, and the Injury Compensation
Office processed it accordingly.
Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling, and subsequently, he filed a complaint on October 6, 1995.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing
before an Administrative Judge (AJ) with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Prior to a hearing, complainant withdrew his request and
asked that the agency issue a FAD.
The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of reprisal discrimination because he presented no evidence that
similarly situated individuals not in his protected classes were treated
differently under similar circumstances. In addition, the FAD stated
that he failed to show a causal connection between the protected activity
and the allegedly discriminatory event.
Complainant does not make any additional arguments on appeal. The agency
requests that we affirm its FAD.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined
under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting
facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of
discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor
in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the
ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for a claim
of reprisal, complainant must show: (1) that he engaged in protected
activity; (2) that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the
protected activity; (3) that he was disadvantaged by an action of the
agency contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and
(4) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for
Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), aff'd, 545
F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80,
86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burris v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,
683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
A causal connection may be shown by evidence that the adverse action
followed the protected activity within such a period of time and in such
a manner that a reprisal motive is inferred. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 622 F.2d 43 (2nd Cir. 1980). "Generally, the Commission has held
that a nexus may be established if events occurred within one year of
each other." Patton v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950124
(June 27, 1996).
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Specifically, the
agency stated that management did submit the CA-17 form to the Injury
Compensation Office in eight days and that the office processed it.
Furthermore, the agency stated that management submitted other employees'
CA-17 forms to the Injury Compensation Office on the same day or up
to two months later depending on individual cases. According to the
comparison matrix provided by the agency, the Injury Compensation Office
did not receive the CA-17 forms of one employee (who did not participate
in prior EEO activity) until almost two months after his doctor signed
the form. When other employees (who had participated in prior EEO
activities) submitted their CA-17 forms, management sent the forms to
the Injury Compensation Office on the same day or up to two days later.
According to the Employee and Labor Relations Manual, Section 540,
the agency does not have specific time limits for processing CA-17 forms.
Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden
of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext
for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC
Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this
by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.
Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
We find that complainant has failed to meet this burden.
The Commission finds that complainant failed to present evidence that
more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its actions
were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note
that the agency does not have a specific time to process all employees'
CA-17 forms in the same fashion. As a result, some employees' forms are
submitted and processed more quickly than others. While the agency has
not explained specifically why complainant's form was not submitted to
the correct office for eight days, complainant has not shown that the
agency was motivated by a discriminatory animus.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
April 25, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.