Lou E. Woodward, Appellant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 21, 1999
01972467 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 21, 1999)

01972467

06-21-1999

Lou E. Woodward, Appellant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Lou E. Woodward, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01972467

v. ) Agency Nos. LAOJ95018

) LAOJ95038

F. Whitten Peters, ) LAOJ95057

Acting Secretary, ) Hearing Nos. 360-95-8315X

Department of the Air Force, ) 360-95-8316X

Agency. ) 360-95-8317X

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the bases of sex (female), reprisal

(prior EEO activity), and physical disability (Papillary Thyroid

Cancer), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq. Appellant alleges she was

discriminated against on the bases of sex and disability when: (1)

she was charged as absent without leave (AWOL) on November 21, 1994;

(2) her supervisor (S1) gave favorable job assignments and free time

for medical appointments to male co-workers; (3) she was harassed

for a six to eight week period prior to her surgery on December 2,

1994; (4) she was subjected to harassment based on sex when S1 made a

derogatory comment about her during a picnic on October 14, 1994; and

(5) S1 provided an investigator from the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) false information about her during a background investigation.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that appellant, a temporary GS-4 Grounds Inspection

Clerk in the 37th Engineering Housing Office at Lackland Air Force Base,

Lackland, Texas, filed three formal EEO complaints with the agency in

1995, alleging that she was discriminated against as referenced above.

At the conclusion of the investigations, appellant requested a hearing

before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative

Judge (AJ). The AJ consolidated the complaints, held a hearing, and

issued a Recommended Decision (RD) finding no discrimination.

Concerning issue (1), the record reveals that although appellant informed

a senior co-worker of her need for emergency leave on November 21,

1994, neither the individual serving as timekeeper nor S1 were aware

of the circumstances surrounding appellant's absence, and S1 directed

the timekeeper to mark appellant as AWOL. In January, 1995, after S1

learned why appellant was absent, appellant's time records were changed

to reflect sick leave, and she was reimbursed the four hours originally

charged as AWOL. Because S1 was unaware of appellant's medical diagnosis

in November, 1994, the AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case of disability discrimination.<1> The AJ also concluded

that appellant presented insufficient evidence to show that the agency's

articulated reason for charging her AWOL was pretextual.

Regarding issue (2), appellant alleged that S1 treated her male co-workers

more favorably by granting them time off for medical reasons, and by

favoring males when making job assignments. Appellant specifically

alleged that a male co-worker did not have to perform housing referral

updates, but S1 required her to perform such updates. The AJ found that

contrary to appellant's allegations, the male co-worker also performed

housing referral updates. Furthermore, S1 testified that he permitted

time off for medical reasons for both male and female employees, and

that appellant never requested such time off. Appellant admitted she

never asked, and thus was never denied, such time off. Accordingly,

the AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case

of sex discrimination.

Concerning issues (3) and (4), appellant alleged that S1 made two

derogatory remarks and harassed her about her work and her continual

use of sick leave. S1's first remark concerned an obscene comment

about appellant's sexual orientation during a picnic and outside

her presence. Appellant also alleged that S1 stated that a street

named �Lou street� probably was �an alley that led to a garbage dump.�

Concerning S1's first remark, the AJ found that the evidence did not

establish who made the remark, but S1 was disciplined for condoning it.

S1 admitted to making the second remark but stated it was meant as a joke.

Appellant's co-workers testified that S1 and appellant did not get along,

that S1 had an abrasive personality and that S1 treated everyone poorly.

Furthermore, although S1 questioned her use of leave, appellant admitted

she was never denied leave. The AJ concluded that S1's conduct was not

sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile environment on

the basis of sex.

In issue (5), appellant alleged that S1 deliberately provided false

information to an OPM investigator in retaliation for her prior EEO

activity, and that as a result, the OPM investigator issued an unfavorable

report which precluded her from obtaining an extension of her temporary

employment. According to the OPM investigator's report, both S1 and a

co-worker of appellant provided a less than favorable reference, noting

among other things, appellant's difficulty with S1. The AJ concluded

that appellant established a prima facie case of retaliation because

S1's statements to the investigator closely followed her EEO activity,

of which S1 was aware. The AJ found, however, that neither S1 or the

co-worker provided false information to the investigator, and it was

her poor employment history which, more likely than not, resulted

in the unfavorable report. The AJ concluded that appellant failed to

demonstrate that retaliatory animus more likely than not motivated S1's

unfavorable reference to an OPM investigator.

The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD. On appeal, appellant restates

arguments previously made at the hearing and offers various arguments in

support of her contention that the AJ erred in finding no discrimination

or harassment. The agency responded to appellant's appeal brief and

requests that we affirm its FAD.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws. We note that the agency's actions

were more likely than not the result of a personality conflict, and

not in retaliation for appellant's prior EEO activity or motivated by

discriminatory animus toward her sex. We also agree with the AJ's

conclusion that S1's remarks, either considered alone or together

with appellant's other allegations, do not constitute actionable

harassment. See Haley v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01950216 (August 29, 1996). We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's

findings of no discrimination which were based on a detailed assessment

of the record. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including appellant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 21, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1 The Commission

notes that the AJ also concluded that appellant

failed to demonstrate she was substantially

limited in any major life activities because

she was out a few weeks for surgery and returned

without restrictions. Thus, the AJ concluded that

appellant failed to establish she was disabled

within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.