Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 303 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69; Los Angeles
Web Pressmen's Union No. 18; Los Angeles Ster-
eotypers' Union No. 58; Los Angeles Typographical
Union No. 174; International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge
No. 94; General Warehousemen's Union Local 598;
Building Service and Maintenance Employees
Union No. 399; Los Angeles Mailers' Union No.
9; Los Angeles Paper Handlers' Union No. 3;
and Newspaper and Periodical Drivers' and Help-
ers' Union Local 921 and San Francisco Examiner,
Division of the Hearst Corporation; and Los Ange-
les Herald-Examiner , Division of the Hearst Cor-
poration
San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52
of the American Newspaper Guild and Los Angeles
Herald-Examiner Division of the Hearst
Corporation ; and San Francisco Examiner Division
of the Hearst Corporation . Cases 21-CC-1043 and
21-CC-1043-2
August 27, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN,
MCCULLOCH, AND JENKINS
On March 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Herman Marx
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that certain of the above Respondents had
engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action. He
also found that these Respondents did not engage
in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint,
and that Warehousemen's Union engaged in no unfair
labor practice. Thereafter the General Counsel, Charg-
ing Parties, and certain of the Respondents filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, together
with supporting briefs. The Charging Parties filed
a supplemental brief in support of their exceptions
and a brief in answer to the Respondent's exceptions,
and the Respondents filed a brief in opposition to
the General Counsel's and Charging Parties' excep-
tions.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case,' and hereby
The Respondents in the instant case and the respondent in Baltimore
News American Division, The Hearst Corporation, 185 NLRB No 26
issued this day, have filed a joint motion to consolidate these two cases
for purposes of Decision The Charging Parties and the General Counsel
303
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, with the following addi-
tions and modifications.'
At all times material herein, the Respondent Los
Angeles Unions' represented employees of The Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor-
poration in separate units at Los Angeles, California,
and were engaged in an economic strike in Los Angeles
against The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner. In further-
ance of this strike, all the Los Angeles Respondents,
except the Warehousemen's Union, formed and
became members of the Los Angeles Strike Council
and picketed various premises of The San Francisco
Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, The
San Francisco Chronicle Publishing Company, and
The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. The
Respondent San Francisco Unions are Newspaper
and Periodical Drivers' and Helpers' Union Local
921, which represented employees of the Printing
Company, and San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper
Guild, Local 52, of the American Newspaper Guild,
which represented employees of the Printing Compa-
ny, The San Francisco Examiner, and The San Fran-
cisco Chronicle in a multiemployer unit. During the
picketing by the Los Angeles Unions, the San Francis-
co Unions asked employees who were their members
at the Printing Company to honor the picket line.
That request was honored, causing a stoppage of
work by the Printing Company and the suspension
of publication of the San Francisco newspapers.
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
eight of the Respondent Los Angeles Unions' picketed,
or caused to be picketed, The San Francisco Examiner
Division of The Hearst Corporation, The San Francis-
co Chronicle Publishing Company, and The San Fran-
cisco Printing Company, Inc. in furtherance of their
dispute with the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner Divi-
sion of The Hearst Corporation, and thereby induced
and encouraged employees of, and coerced, the three
in both cases have filed oppositions thereto We hereby deny the Respond-
ents' joint motion, as the parties are different in each case, there are
some different issues in the instant case, and no useful purpose would
be served by consolidation at this stage of the proceedings
The building at 5th and Mission Streets, San Francisco, where,
among other places, picketing occurred, is owned by The San Francisco
Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation and The San Francisco
Chronicle Publishing Company, and not solely by The Chronicle Publishing
Company as the Trial Examiner stated
' Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, Los Angeles Web Pressmen's
Union No 18, Los Angeles Stereotypers Union No 58, Los Angeles
Typographical Union No 174, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No 94, General Warehousemen's
Union Local 598, Building Service and Maintenance Employees Union
No 399, Los Angeles Mailers' Union No 9, and Los Angeles Paper
Handlers' Union No 3
We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons stated in his
Decision, that the Warehousemen's Union was not responsible for the
picketing Accordingly, we adopt his recommendation that the complaint
be dismissed as to it
185 NLRB No. 25
304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
picketed companies, for the purpose of causing a
cessation of business between such companies and
their customers and suppliers, and each other, in
order to bring pressure to bear on The Los Angeles
Herald-Examiner to accede to the Union's demands.
1. We disagree, however, with the Trial Examiner's
conclusion that eight of the Los Angeles Respondents
did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by picketing The
San Francisco Division of The Hearst Corporation.
The Trial Examiner based that conclusion on the
ground that the San Francisco Division and the Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner Division are not separate
persons. We believe that this record, and our decisions
in similar cases, require the contrary conclusions.
Section 8(b)(4) forbids unions to (i) induce individ-
uals employed by any person to strike, or (ii) coerce
any person, with an object of (B) forcing any person
to cease doing business with any other person. Thus,
if each division is a person, the picketing was pro-
scribed by Section 8(b) (4)(B) as secondary. Section
2(1) provides that "the term `person' includes one
or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trus-
tees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."
The Board has held with court approval that sepa-
rate corporate subsidiaries are separate persons, each
entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4)(B) from
the labor disputes of the other, if neither the subsidiar-
ies nor the parent exercises actual or active, as opposed
to merely potential, control over the day-to-day opera-
tions or labor relations of the other.' It is clear
that no such active or actual control is exercised
here.
The Hearst Corporation is a Delaware corporation
engaged in a conglomerate of business activities con-
ducted through some 20 divisions, of which 7 are
newspapers, and through 31 separately incorporated
subsidiaries.' As to the two divisions here involved,
the president of the Corporation appoints their heads
and delegates to them the responsibility for the day-
to-day operation of the divisions, including the formu-
lation and implementation of labor relations policies.
' Knight Newspapers, 138 NLRB 1346, enfd 322 F 2d 405 (C A D C),
Poole's Warehousing, 158 NLRB 1281 Compare J G Roy and Sons
Company v NLRB, 251 F 2d 771 (C A 1), NLR B v Bachman
Machine Co , 266 F 2d 599 (C A 8)
The Hearst divisions are engaged in such diverse businesses as the
publication of newspapers and magazines , the manufacture of specialty
paper , the operation of ranches and timberlands , a newspaper syndicate,
a newsprint brokerage , and a purchasing service , a real estate investment
enterprise , and the collection and display of art objects and antiques
The corporate subsidiaries are engaged in such activities as advertising
representative , movie making , the acquisition and sale of musical composi-
tions, the distribution of publishing equipment and supplies , and the
processing of photographs
He may remove them for "an unsatisfactory job,"
meaning unfavorable earnings.
Each division manager determines the size and
salaries of his staff whom he hires, discharges, and
promotes. There is no transfer of employees among
divisions. Although the Corporation makes available
to the divisions certain insurance, pension, and salary-
continuation programs, each division may accept such
programs or not as it sees fit.
Each division manager has final authority to formu-
late and effectuate news, editorial, production, adver-
tising, and circulation policies. He decides whether
or not to use Corporation-owned services and features.
Thus, the Herald-Examiner purchases its newsprint
from the Hearst Enterprises Division, but the San
Francisco Examiner does not.
Each division maintains its own financial system,
subject to uniform reporting requirements for tax
purposes. The divisions retain "a comfortable cash
balance" as "operating profits" and remit the surplus
to the Corporation. Although corporate approval is
required for expenditures of more than $10,000, such
approval has never been withheld.
These facts establish that the authority exercised
by the Corporation over the divisions is limited to
certain financial matters inherent in common owner-
ship, and amounts only to potential control over
their operations. The Corporation does not exercise
actual, or active, control over these divisions which
operate independently of the Corporation and each
other as separate autonomous newspaper enterprises.
It is apparent, therefore, that if these two divisions
were corporate subsidiaries instead of divisions, they
would be entitled to the protection of Section
8(b)(4)(B) from each other's labor disputes. To deprive
them of the protection of the statute on the technical
ground that they are merely divisions of the Corpora-
tion would exalt from over-substance, a result which
we are convinced is not required by the statute.
Cf. Alexander Warehouse, 128 NLRB 916, where
the Board found that three geographically proximate
warehouses of the same corporation could not be
regarded as separate employers under a comparable
statutory provision because the day-to-day operations
of each warehouse, including their labor relations
policies, were subject to the corporation's actual con-
trol, and were operated in the same manner as allies.
By contrast, the divisions here involved are not subject
to actual control by The Hearst Corporation, serve
different newspaper advertisers and readers in widely
separated geographic areas, and thus, under the princi-
ple of that case, are neutral employers.
Section 2(1) on its face does not state that only
the entities specifically enumerated therein are to
be considered "persons" to the exclusion of all others.
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
It states, instead, that "person" includes those entities
enumerated. Therefore, where, as here, a virtually
autonomous division of a corporation has all the
relevant attributes of a person excepting only separate
incorporation, logic dictates that it too be considered
a person.'
Moreover, we believe this interpretation conforms
with the intent of Congress when in 1959 it amended
the Act by substituting the word "person" for
"employer" in Section 8(b)(4). Although we do not
find the legislative history particularly helpful in
resolving the issue before us, it is generally recognized
that this amendment was intended to reduce the
impact of labor disputes by expanding the protection
afforded by this Section.
As the Supreme Court stated in Local 1976 Carpen-
ters, (Sand, Door and Plywood Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 357
U.S. 94, 100, Congress' purpose in enacting the Taft-
Hartley Act amendments was "to restrict the area
of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved
by prohibiting the most obvious widespread and, as
Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of
unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral
employers, themselves not concerned with a primary
labor dispute, through the inducement of the employ-
ees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle
goods."
As observed, under the principles established in
Alexander Warehouse and Knight Newspapers, each
of these divisions would be treated as a separate
employer, both before and after the 1959 amendment.
Not to treat them as separate persons would result
in widening, instead of narrowing, labor disputes and
contracting instead of expanding the coverage of Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) contrary to the intent of Congress
and the mandate of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the General Counsel has issued and
the Board and courts have found merit in complaints
against divisions of corporations under Section 108,
' See Local Union 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al,
v New Y o r k , N e w Haven, and H a r t f o r d Railroad Co, 350 U S 155,
cited in the legislative history to the 1959 amendments, in which the
Supreme Court held the railroad was protected against secondary pressures
by virtue of the definition of "employer " The Court stated that since
"railroads are not excluded from the Act's definition of `person,' they
are entitled to Board protection from the kind of unfair labor practice
proscribed by Sec 8(b)(4)(A) See also Local No 24, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (A CE Transportation) v NLR B, 266 F 2d 675,
680 (C A D C) where the court stated that whether a violation of
8(b)(4)(A) and (B) has occurred "cannot be reached by the use of
any legalistic word or phrase."
' See, e g, NLR B v The Bendix Corporation (Research Laboratories
Division), 299 F 2d 308 (C A 6) cert denied 371 U S 827, NLR B
v Dan River Mills Incorporated, Alabama Division, 274 F 2d 38i(C A 5),
N.L.R.B. v General Electric Company, Specialty Control Department,
383 F 2d 152 (C A 4) International Union of Electric al Radio and Machine
Worbers AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801 [General Motors Corporation,
Frigiduire Division] v N L R B 307 F 2d 679 (C A D C) cert denied, 371
U S 936 N L R B v Insulating Fabricators, Inc Southern Division. 338
305
which provides under (a) that "the Board is empow-
ered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair laobr practice . . ." and
under (b) that "whenever it is charged that any person
has engaged in, or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, the Board . . shall have the power
to issue a complaint." Indeed Congress must have
recognized that such practice was extant when it
enacted the 1959 amendments
Accordingly, as the Los Angeles Unions' picketing
of the San Francisco Examiner had the effect of
coercing it and inducing its employees to strike, both
with an object of causing a cessation of business
between the Examiner and its customers and suppliers,
we find that such picketing violated Section
8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) of the Act.'
2. As we have found the San Francisco Examiner
to be a neutral person, we also find, in agreement
with the Trial Examiner, that the eight Los Angeles
Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)( ii)(B)
of the Act by picketing The Chronicle Publishing
Company and The San Francisco Printing Company,
Inc. in furtherance of their dispute with The Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor-
poration because these companies are also neutrals
to the dispute and separate persons within the meaning
of the Act.
3. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
the two Respondent San Francisco Unions violated
Section 8(b)(i)(B) of the Act by inducing employees
of The San Francisco Printing Co., Inc. to strike
in support of the Los Angeles Unions' dispute with
the Herald-Examiner. We also find that these two
Unions violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as their induce-
ment of employees of the Printing Company was
successful in causing them to refuse to continue to
work, thus coercing or restraining the Printing Compa-
ny. 10
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents, with the
exception of the Warehousemen's Union, have
engaged in additional unfair labor practices within
F 2d 1002 ( C A 4), international Uniim, United Automobi le Workers of
America U A W [Wooster Div of Borq - Warner Corp ] v N L R B 236
F 2d 898 ( C A 6), latertipe Conipani, a Division of Harris-Internpe
Corporation v V L R B , 371 F 2d 787 (C A 4) Los Angeles Mailers Union
y9 J T U 135 NLRB 1130 Hilhoro Newspaper Publishmq Printing
Compani Division of the Hearst Publishing Compani Fin , 127 NLRB
591 Divisions are considered to be employers in representation case
proceedings-Genera/ Motors Corp ( Detroit Diesel Eng Div ), 51 NLRB
457
' Accord , Penello v American Federation of Television and Radio Artists,
291 F Supp 409 (U S D C Md), and Kennedy v San Francisco-Oakland
Newspaper Guild (U S D C, N D Calif ), affd 412 F 2d 541 (C A 9)
"Interstate Employers Association, 139 NLRB 550 , 551, fn I
306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the meaning of the Act, we shall recommend that the
Respondents cease and desist therefrom and take
appropriate affirmative action.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The San Francisco Examiner Division of The
Hearst Corporation, and the Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation are
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The above Divisions, The San Francisco Chroni-
cle Publishing Company, and The San Francisco Print-
ing Company, Inc. are persons engaged in an industry
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. The Respondents are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4. By inducing individuals employed by The San
Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Corpora-
tion, The Chronicle Publishing Company and The
San Francisco Printing Company, Inc. to engage in
a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment
to perform services, with an object of forcing said
persons to cease doing business with each other and
with their customers and suppliers, the Los Angeles
Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. By threatening, coercing, and restraining the
above persons with an object of forcing said persons
to cease doing business with each other and with
their customers and suppliers, the Respondent Los
Angeles Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. By inducing individuals employed by The San
Francisco Printing Company, Inc., to engage in a
strike or refusal in the course of their employment
to perform services, with an object of forcing said
person to cease doing business with The San Francisco
Examiner Division of The Hearst Corporation, with
The Chronicle Publishing Company, and with its
customers and suppliers, the Respondent San Francis-
co Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(i)(B) and Section 2(6)(7) of the Act.
7. By coercing, and restraining The San Francisco
Printing Company, Inc., with an object of forcing
said person to cease doing business with the other
persons described above, the Respondent San Francis-
co Unions have engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that:
A. The Respondents Los Angeles Newspaper Guild,
Local 69; Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union No.
18; Los Angeles Stereotypers' Union No. 58; Los
Angeles Typographical Union No. 174; International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
District Lodge No. 94; Building Service and Mainte-
nance Employees' Union No. 399, Los Angeles Mail-
ers' Union No. 9; and Los Angeles Paper Handlers'
Union No. 3, their officers, agents, and representatives,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed
by The San Francisco Examiner Division of The
Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Publishing Com-
pany, and The San Francisco Printing Company,
Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce with whom they
have no primary labor dispute, to engage in a stnke
or refusal in the course of their employment to perform
services, where an object thereof is to force or require
the above-named persons to cease doing business with
each other or with their customers and suppliers,
under circumstances prohibited by Section
8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.
(b) Threatening, restraining, or coercing the above-
named persons or any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce with
whom they have no primary labor dispute, where
an object thereof is to force or require the above-
named persons to cease doing business with each
other or with their customers and suppliers, under
circumstances prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the Act.
2.Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at their business offices and meeting halls
in Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix A."'t Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
21, shall, after being duly signed by the above
Respondent Unions, be posted by them immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
" In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
taken by the Unions to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail to the Regional Director for
Region 21 sufficient copies of said notice, on forms
provided by him, for posting by the San Francisco
Examiner, the Chronicle, and the Printing Company,
if willing.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
B. Respondents Newspaper and Periodical Drivers'
and Helpers' Union, Local 921, and San Francisco-
Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52 of the American
Newspaper Guild, their officers, agents, and represent-
atives shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Inducing or encouraging individuals employed
by The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or
any other person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce with whom they have
no primary labor dispute to engage in a strike or
refusal in the course of their employment to perform
services, where an object thereof is to force or require
said person to cease doing business with The San
Francisco Examiner or Chronicle under circumstances
prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.
(b) Threatening, restraining , or coercing The San
Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other per-
sons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce with whom they have no primary labor
dispute, where an object thereof is to force or require
said persons to cease doing business with the San
Francisco Examiner or Chronicle under circumstances
prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at their business offices and meeting halls
in San Francisco, California, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix B.s12 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
21, shall, after being duly signed by the above
Respondent Unions be posted by them immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Unions to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail to the Regional Director for
Region 21 sufficient copies of said notice, on forms
" in the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
307
provided by him, for posting by The San Francisco
Printing Company, Inc., if willing.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER BROWN, concurring in part, dissenting in
part:
Contrary to the majority, I would affirm the Trial
Examiner's finding, for the reasons more fully stated
in his Decision, that Respondents' picketing and relat-
ed appeals to employees of the San Francisco Examin-
er constituted lawful primary activity outside the
ambit of Section 8(b)(4)(B).
The Unions' conduct with respect to the San Fran-
cisco Examiner, a separate operating division of the
Hearst Corporation, was merely designed to impose
economic sanctions upon the Hearst Corporation,
in support of basic contract demands during negotia-
tions with the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, another
operating division of the Hearst Corporation. Thus,
the question presented is whether a labor organization
is precluded, by virtue of Section 8(b)(4)(B), from
applying direct economic pressures to a single corpo-
rate enterprise in support of its dispute with a separate
operating segment of that enterprise? An affirmative
answer to this question is not supported by a literal
reading of the statute; for, separate operating divisions
of a single corporate enterprise, such as the San
Francisco Examiner and the Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner, are not within the definition of the term
"person" set forth in Section 2(1) of the Act. Further-
more, to extend, by interpretation, the secondary boy-
cott provisions to restrict the scope of the Union
activity involved here, not only insulates the
"offending employer" from the effects of what essen-
tially is its own dispute, but runs counter to a consist-
ent line of precedent cautioning against application
of Section 8(b)(4)(B) in a fashion which condemns
direct pressures in primary labor disputes." As stated
in N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341
U.S. 665, at 672-673:
. . . Congress did not seek to interfere with
the ordinary strike . . . . This is emphasized
in Section 13 as follows:
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically
provided herein shall be construed so as
to either interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike, or to affect
the limitations or qualifications on that right.
" See, e g Local 1976, Carpenters v N.L.R B (Sand Door & Plywood
Co), 357 U S 93, 99, Local 761 , International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Worbers [General Electric Co ] v N L R B 366 U S
667, 672. National Woodnorl ers Mfrs 4vsn v N L R B 386 U S 612,
625-627
308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
By Section 13, Congress has made it clear that
Section 8(b)(4), and all other parts of the Act
which otherwise might be read so as to interfere
with, impede or diminish the union's traditional
right to strike may be so read only if such
interference, impediment or dimunition is "specif-
ically provided for" in the Act. [Footnotes omit-
ted.]
In my opinion, the majority's position represents
a departure from traditional concepts of primary activ-
ity, and extends the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(4)(B)
to protect the very "person" made "fair game"
through enactment of Sections 13, 2(1) and 8(b)(4)(B)
of the Act. 14
14 I disagree with the Trial Examiner's failure to dismiss the allegation
based upon the direct appeals to employees of the San Francisco Printing
Co The Printing Co is half-owned by the San Francisco Examiner
and performs various services in the latter's behalf, including the printing
of the newspaper These activities are a vital step in the publication
and sale of the Examiner and are duties which, as a matter of practice,
are normally performed by employees of the newspaper In these circum-
stances, I deem immaterial the fact that the Printing Co is operated
by Hearst as a joint venture with the Chronicle and am of the opinion
that the lawful pressures directed at the Examiner were also lawfully
extended to employees of the Printing Co
APPENDIX A
NOTICE
TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER DIVISION OF THE HEARST
CORPORATION, THE CHRONICLE PUBLISH-
ING COMPANY AND THE SAN FRANCISCO
PRINTING COMPANY, INC.
TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOS ANGELES NEWS-
PAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69; LOS ANGELES
WEB PRESSMEN'S UNION NO. 18; LOS
ANGELES STEREOTYPERS' UNION No. 58;
LOS ANGELES TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION
NO. 174; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORK-
ERS, DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94; BUILDING
SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
UNION NO. 399; LOS ANGELES MAILERS'
UNION NO. 9; AND LOS ANGELES PAPER
HANDLERS' UNION NO. 3
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, an agency of the United States Government:
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encour-
age any individual employed by The San Francis-
co Examiner Division of the Hearst Corporation,
The Chronicle Publishing Company, The San
Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any other
person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or
refusal in the course of such individual's employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, arti-
cles, materials or commodities, or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is to force
or require The San Francisco Examiner Division
of The Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Pub-
lishing Company, The San Francisco Printing
Company, Inc., to cease doing business with
one another or with their customers or suppliers;
or to force or require any other person to cease
doing business with The San Francisco Division
of The Hearst Corporation, The Chronicle Pub-
lishing Company or The San Francisco Printing
Company, Inc.
WE WILL NOT coerce or restrain The San
Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst Cor-
poration, The Chronicle Publishing Company,
The San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or
any other person for such an object.
Dated By
Los ANGELES
NEWSPAPER GUILD,
LOCAL 69
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
Dated
Dated
By
By
Los ANGELES WEB
PRESSMEN 'S UNION No. 18
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
Los ANGELES
STEREOTYPERS' UNION
No. 58
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT LODGE No. 94
(Labor Organization)
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69 309
Dated By
Dated By
Dated
Dated
By
By
Dated By
(Representative)
(Title)
BUILDING SERVICE AND
MAINTENANCE
EMPLOYEES UNION No.
399
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
Los ANGELES MAILERS'
UNION No. 9
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
Los ANGELES PAPER
HANDLERS ' UNION No.3
(Labor Organization)
TO ALL MEMBERS OF NEWSPAPER AND
PERIODICAL DRIVERS' AND HELPERS'
UNION LOCAL 921 and SAN FRANCISCO-
OAKLAND NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL
52, OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER
GUILD
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board , an agency of the United States Government:
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encour-
age any individual employed by The San Francis-
co Pnnting Company , Inc., or any other person
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting
commerce , to engage in a strike or refusal in
the course of such individual' s employment to
use, manufacture , process, transport , or otherwise
handle or work on any goods , articles, materials
or commodities, or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is to force or require The
San Francisco Printing Company, Inc., or any
other person to cease doing business with The
San Francisco Examiner Division of The Hearst
Corporation or The Chronicle Publishing
Company; or to force or require any other person
to cease doing business with The San Francisco
Printing Company, Inc.
WE WILL NOT coerce The San Francisco Print-
ing Company for such an object.
(Representative)
(Title)
Los ANGELES
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION
No. 174
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative)
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered , defaced or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communi-
cate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 849
South Broadway , Los Angeles , California, Telephone
213-688-5200.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE
TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
PRINTING COMPANY, INC.
Dated By
NEWSPAPER AND
PERIODICAL DRIVERS'
AND HELPERS' UNION
LOCAL 921
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)'
(Title)
SAN FRANCISCO-
OAKLAND NEWSPAPER
GUILD , LOCAL 52 OF THE
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER
GUILD
(Labor Organization)
(Representative)
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered , defaced, or covered by any other matenal.
If members have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communi-
cate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 849
South Broadway , Los Angeles , California , Telephone
213-688-5200.
310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION OF THE TRIAL EXAMINER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HERMAN MARX , Trial Examiner : The complaint ' alleges,
in material substance , that The Hearst Corporation (herein
Hearst or the Corporation), an enterprise engaged in the
newspaper publishing business , "maintains" a number of
newspaper publishing divisions , including one known as
Los Angeles Herald -Examiner , Division of The Hearst Cor-
poration (herein the Herald-Examiner ), which publishes
a daily newspaper in Los Angeles, and another called
San Francisco Examiner , Division of The Hearst Corpora-
tion (herein the Examiner), which publishes a daily newspa-
per in San Francisco ; that a corporation called The Chronicle
Publishing Company (herein the Chronicle) similarly pub-
lishes a daily newspaper in San Francisco ; that a corporation
known as The San Francisco Newspaper Printing Company,
Inc (herein the Printing Company ) performs newspaper
printing and other services for the Examiner and the Chroni-
cle; that the Examiner and the Herald -Examiner , as well
as the Chronicle and the Printing Company, are "employers"
and "persons" within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended' (herein the Act); that eleven
labor organizations (herein the Respondents or Respondent
Unions) "in furtherance and support of a labor dispute"
between some of them and the Herald -Examiner have
induced and encouraged individuals employed by the Exam-
iner , the Chronicle , the Printing Company, and others,
"to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of
their employment to .. perform services , and have threat-
ened, coerced or restrained the Examiner , the Chronicle,
the Printing Company," and others, with objects of forcing
or requiring the said Examiner , the Chronicle , the Printing
Company, and others, severally , to cease doing business
with other persons , and such persons to cease doing business
with the Examiner , the Chronicle, the Printing Company,
and others ; and that by such conduct the Respondent
Unions have violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act '
' The complaint was issued on January 19, 1968, and is based on
a charge filed in Case 21 -CC-1043 on January 5, 1968, an amendment
thereof filed on January 6, 1968, and a charge filed in Case 21-CC-
1043-2 on January 10, 1968 The cases have been duly consolidated
for hearing Copies of both charges , the amendment of the first charge,
the complaint, the order of consolidation and a notice of hearing have
been duly served on all parties entitled thereto The hearing opened
on June 3 , 1968, in Los Angeles, California, continued there on various
dates thereafter , and closed on September 9, 1968, in San Francisco,
California
'29USC,Sec 151,etseq
' Sec 8(b)(4)(B) provides , in relevant part
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course
of his employment to use , manulacture process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials , or commodities
or to perform any services, or (u) to threaten , coerce, or restrain
any person engaged in commerce or in any object thereof is
forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling , handling,
transporting , or otherwise dealing in the products of any other produc-
er, processor, or manufacturer , or to cease doing business with any
other person , Provided , That nothing contained in this clause
Each of the Rest, 'ndent Unions has filed an answer
denying in material substance , that it has committed the
unfair labor practices attributed to it in the complaint.
All parties appeared , through counsel , at a hearing held
before me, as duly designated Trial Examiner , on the issues
in this proceeding , and have been afforded a full opportunity
to adduce evidence , examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and submit oral argument and briefs. Each party has submit-
ted a brief since the close of the hearing
Upon the entire record, from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and having read and considered
the briefs. I make the following findings of fact
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Chronicle is a Nevada corporation , maintains an
office and place of business in San Francisco , California,
where it is engaged in the business of publishing a daily
newspaper called the San Francisco Chronicle , employs
individuals in the operation of its business, is, and has
been at all material times, a "person " within the meaning
of Section 2(1) of the Act, and an "employer" within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act; in the course
and conduct of its business , subscribes to, and uses , "several
interstate news services and annually purchases and receives
goods, services, materials and supplies originating outside
the State of California valued at a substantial amount";
and is, and has been at all material times, engaged in
commerce , and in operations affecting such commerce, with-
in the meaning of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Hearst is a Delaware corporation , maintains its principal
office in New York, New York; and is engaged, among
other ventures in the business of publishing daily newspa-
pers, doing so through seven divisions , including the Herald-
Examiner and the Examiner . The Herald-Examiner, with
headquarters in Los Angeles, produces a newspaper there
called the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner , and the Examiner,
which is located in San Francisco , publishes a newspaper
in that city known as the San Francisco Examiner Hearst
and the Chronicle combine their respective San Francisco
publications in a Sunday edition which they publish jointly
under the name of San Francisco Sunday Examiner &
Chronicle
The Printing Company is a Nevada corporation; maintains
its principal office and place of business in San Francisco,
California, employs individuals in its business operations,
is, and has been at all material times, a "person" within
the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, and an "employer"
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act; in the
course and conduct of its business "purchases and receives
goods, materials, and supplies originating outside the State
of California valued at a substantial amount"; and is, and
has been at all material times, engaged in commerce, and
in operations affecting such commerce, within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
(B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful,
any primary strike or primary picketing
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
As the Chronicle and the Printing Company are "persons"
and "employers" engaged in operations in and affecting
interstate commerce, the Board no doubt has jurisdiction
of the subject matter of this proceeding as it pertains
to them, but, in addition, the General Counsel would have
the Board predicate jurisdiction over the subject matter,
as it relates to Hearst's Los Angeles and San Francisco
divisions, not on the basis of Hearst's status as a "person"
and "employer" engaged in activities in or affecting inter-
state commeice, but on the premise that each of the two
divisions is, as the complaint alleges in effect, a separate
"person" and "employer." As is evident, this approach
stems from the General Counsel's position that the divisions
are separate "persons" and "employers," apart from each
other and from Hearst, for the purposes of Section
8(b)(4)(B)
The position, reflecting a major problem in this proceed-
ing, is opposed by the Respondent Unions,and the conflict
perhaps accounts for some ambiguity in a written stipulation
of the parties (G.C. Exh. 3), upon which the General
Counsel relies, in the main, for commerce facts supporting
the Board's jurisdiction Paragraph 5 of the stipulation
states: "In connection with the publication of the San
Francisco Examiner, goods, materials and supplies valued
at in excess of $100,000 are annually purchased and shipped
directly to the San Francisco Examiner, Division of The
Hearst Corporation, from points and places located outside
the State of California; several interstate news services
are subscribed to; and gross volume of business in excess
of $1 million is had" Paragraph 4 is couched in the
same language, except that it relates to the Los Angeles
division and Hearst's Los Angeles newspaper, instead of
to the San Francisco division and the San Francisco Examin-
er. The stipulation does not tell us, in terms, who or
what entity purchases the commodities shipped to either
division, or subscribes to the "news services", nor who
or what entity receives the revenue from the business volume
that "is had." Judging by the commerce allegations of
the complaint, the thrust the General Counsel would give
the relevant provisions of the stipulation is that each division
has the gross business volume, and makes the purchases
and subscriptions to "interstate news services," set forth
in the stipulated paragraph applicable to it, but as each
division is, in effect, an operational device by which Hearst
does business, the end result of the reading the General
Counsel would give paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation
is that Hearst makes the purchases and subscriptions4 and
does the gross business volume mentioned in the stipulated
paragraphs.
In any case, finding the matters set forth in paragraphs
4 and 5 of the stipulation as facts in this proceeding,
I defer a disposition of the General Counsel's claim that
the two divisions are "persons" and "employers" for the
purposes of invoking the Board's jurisdiction until a determi-
nation, at a later point below, of the General Counsel's
parallel position that the divisions have that status for
the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. A decision
4 Hearst directly supplies some of the "interstate news services" through
one or another of its enterprises (C P Exhs 5 and 8)
311
on the latter position will, in my view, dispose of the
former 5
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The names of the Respondent Unions, and abbreviated
designations by which they will be respectively referred
to here, are set forth in the margin below.' Nine of them
(herein collectively called the Los Angeles Unions) are
located in Los Angeles or its vicinity, and the other two,
the San Francisco Drivers Union and the San Francisco
Guild, maintain their headquarters in San Francisco Each
of the Respondent Unions is, and has been at all material
times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory Statement
A description of various aspects of Hearst's business,
its corporate structure, and its relationship to its Los Angeles
Herald-Examiner and San Francisco Examiner Divisions,
the Chronicle, and the Printing Company is appropriate
to a resolution of the issues.
The Corporation's chief executive is its president, Richard
Berlin, whose functions include the appointment of all
divisional heads who, in the case of the newspapers, have
the title of "publisher." The chairman of the Corporation's
board of directors is William Randolph Hearst, Jr., who
is a son of the founder of the Hearst newspaper chain;
has the title of "Editor-in-Chief" of the Hearst newspapers
(or a closely similar variant of the title which appears
in differing forms in the record); heads an "Editorial Board"
centered in New York, which prepares editorials and feature
stories for the use of the newspapers, and writes or sponsors
the preparation of a column entitled "The Editor's Report"
which appears under his name and editorial title weekly,
usually on Sunday, in Hearst news publications.'
The Hearst Corporation is indubitably a "person" and "employer"
engaged in interstate commerce, within the purview of the Act, but
in view of the General Counsel's jurisdictional position, I see no need
to determine, and do not decide, whether that status may be used
here as a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction
The names of the Respondent Unions, each followed by a parenthetic
name by which it is on occasion referred to here, are Los Angeles
Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (Los Angeles Guild), Los Angeles Stereotypers'
Union No 58 (Stereotypers' Union), Los Angeles Web Pressmen's Union
No 18 (Pressmen's Union), Los Angeles Typographical Union No 174
(Typographical Union), International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No 94 (Machinists' Union), General
Warehousemen's Union Local 598 (Warehousemen's Union), Building
Service and Maintenance Employees Union No 399 (Building Service
Union); Los Angeles Mailers' Union No 9 (Mailers' Union), Los Angeles
Paper Handlers' Union No 3 (Paper Handlers' Union), Newspaper and
Periodical Drivers' and Helpers' Union Local 921 (San Francisco Drivers'
Union), and San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, Local 52 of the
American Newspaper Guild (San Francisco Guild)
I dispense with details of the ownership of the Corporation's capital
stock, which is governed by the will of the late William Randolph
Hearst, Sr , founder of the newspaper chain The titular and beneficial
interest in the stock, and the terms of the will, at least as developed
in this record, do not materially affect the results here
312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Punting Company is a joint venture of the Corpora-
tion and 'the Chronicle, having been formed in 1965 to
function as the "agent" of Hearst and the Chronicle for
the performance of a variety of operations required by
each principal for its newspaper enterprise in San Francisco
Hearst and the Chronicle supplied all of the Printing Compa-
ny's initial capital; own all of the latter's stock in equal
proportion; through equal contributions, provide funds for
the Printing Company, as it may require; and, in equal
proportion, own all of the plant and other facilities used
by the Printing Company for the performance of its func-
tions. Its board of directors consists of six persons, three
designated by, and "representing," Hearst, and three desig-
nated by, and "representing," the Chronicle. Upon its forma-
tion, the Printing Company's executives were chosen by
agreement between Hearst and the Chronicle from personnel
on the staff of one or the other of the principals.
The business of the Printing Company, in which it
employs some 2,600 persons, consists substantially of its
agency functions, which include the printing, mechanical,
distribution, accounting, revenue collection, advertising, and
subscription processing services required by the Chronicle
and Hearst for their respective San Francisco dailies and
their joint Sunday edition. With the exception of about
six clerks who prepare advertising layouts exclusively for
one or the other of the two newspapers, all of the Printing
Company's employees work in varying measure for both
publications, some doing so daily in the regular course
of their duties, and others interchangeably,working for given
shifts or periods for one publication, and then for the
other, as required. The agent performs no work for Hearst's
Los Angeles newspaper, and no editorial or reporting serv-
ices for the Hearst or Chronicle publications in San Francis-
co, each of which has an editorial staff (which includes
reporters).
The Printing Company hires and discharges employees
independently of Hearst and the Chronicle, and formulates
its labor relations policies and purchases its newsprint and
other materials it requires, without directions from either
of its principals. But it is dependent upon Hearst and
the Chronicle for funds for capital expenditures, drawing
upon them jointly, since its formation, for some millions
of dollars for the acquisition of building and equipment
facilities for use in its agency functions. Hearst's contribu-
tions came from its general corporate funds.
Collecting all advertising and circulation revenue due
the Chronicle and the Examiner, the Printing Company
deducts therefrom what it requires to defray its operating
expenses, retains 5 percent of the excess as compensation
for its agency services, paying dividends therefrom to its
two stockholders, Hearst and the Chronicle, and remits
the balance of its revenue to the Chronicle and the Examiner.
From its share of the revenue, that division defrays its
operating expenses , retains a portion "for emergency purpos-
es," and periodically remits the balance to Hearst's New
York office where the remittances become part of the
Corporation's general funds.
In addition to the seven newspaper divisions, The Hearst
Corporation has a variety of enterprises which it operates
under names it applies to them , some bearing the label
"Division," and others note Many of the enterprises are
unrelated to newspaper publishing, while others perform
services for Hearst newspapers, or supply features to them.
The latter include "King Features Syndicate Division,"
which supplies comics, columns and other features to all
Hearst newspapers, and many not published by Hearst;
"Hearst Enterprises Division," which, to effect economies
resulting from large purchasing volumes, buys newsprint,
as purchasing agent, for all Hearst newspapers, except
the San Francisco Examiner; "Puck, The Comic Weekly,"
which prints Sunday comics and sells advertising space
for Hearst and other newspapers, and performs printing
services for commercial enterprises unrelated to the Corpora-
tion; "Key Market Advertising Service," which sells adver-
tising space for Hearst and other newspapers; and "Hearst
Headline Service," "Hearst Wire Service," and Hearst's
"Washington Bureau ," which variously supply news or
news features or commentary to Hearst newspapers.
The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner carries William Ran-
dolph Hearst, Jr 's column, "The Editor's Report," and
uses services of King, Hearst Enterprises, Puck, Key Market
Advertising, Hearst Headline and Wire Services, and the
Washington Bureau The newspaper transmits no funds
in payment for any of these services, but like other Hearst
publications, is charged on the Corporation's books for
various of the services under centralized accounting proce-
dures to be described later. The Herald-Examiner also
utilizes a substantial volume of wire news services and
features provided by facilities other than Hearst's 9 Of a
total of approximately $22 million of operating expenses
in 1967 for "materials, supplies and services," the Herald-
Examiner spent about $14 million for newsprint which
was purchased for it by Hearst Enterprises, as its agent.10
The division paid nothing for the work of the purchasing
agency in conformity with the Corporation's policy of ren-
dering such services to its newspapers free of charge
The San Francisco Examiner does not use all the Hearst
facilities utilized by the Los Angeles publication. It purchas-
es no newsprint itself, for this is done by the Printing
Company as joint agent for Hearst and the Chronicle
as part of the agent's function of producing both San
Francisco newspapers. The San Francisco Examiner, like
the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, carries "The Editor's
Report," and uses services or features supplied by King
and Hearst Headline Services, and by enterprises other
than Hearst facilities. Most of the Examiner's comic strips
are supplied by a Hearst syndicate, but the greater protion
of its other features and its wire news service is furnished
by enterprises other than Hearst.
I In addition to its divisional and other operating segments , Hearst
has over 30 separately incorporated subsidiaries As these have no connec-
tion with the newspapers involved here, I dispense with further reference
to them
' C P Exh 5 reflects the comparative cost in 1967 or wire news
services and features supplied to the Herald-Examiner by Hearst and
"non-Hearst" sources It is enough to say here that the volume from
each source was substantial
10 An exhibit offered by the Charging Parties (C P Exh 5) shows
that the newsprint was purchased from "non-Hearst" sources, but does
not reflect the fact that a purchasing instrumentality of the Corporation
bought the product for the Herald-Examiner's account
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
The Herald-Examiner and Examiner maintain separate
payrolls and bank accounts. There is no interchange of
employees between them, nor does either perform any work
for the other, except on relatively infrequent occasions
such as when one secures assistance from the other in
covering facets of a news story in the other's locality.
The chief executive of each division chooses his staff
subordinates, and has the responsibility for direction of
the day-to-day operations of the newspaper he publishes.
He or divisional staff members under his direction decide
the advertising, circulation, personnel and labor relations
policies of the newspaper, its advertising and circulation
rates, with whom to do business and whether to use services
of any other Hearst enterprises; purchase equipment, sup-
plies, features and services from sources of their choice;
make capital expenditures within a limitation to be described
later; negotiate and enter into collective-bargaining agree-
ments without instructions from the home office; and deter-
mine the content and editorial positions of the newspaper,
except, as Charles Gould, publisher of the San Francisco
Examiner, testified, that in certain "specific areas" such
as editorial support of a Presidential candidate, the "final
decision" rests with the "Editorial Board," which consists
of William Randolph Hearst, Jr. and some of his aides,
after consideration of recommendations made by the chief
executives of the various Hearst newspapers.
The Herald-Examiner and Examiner are, moreover, sub-
ject to various policies and procedures of the Corporation
applicable to all its operating divisions, some explicitly
established by it, and some by customary practice or necessi-
ty.
Thus the Corporation, under the supervision of its treasur-
er, Frank Massi, who is its "senior financial officer," main-
tains a centralized accounting system for all its enterprises
at its "home office" in New York, and "procedures and
regulations" that require each division to submit to the
treasurer, on prescribed forms, monthly reports reflecting
such information as "cash report and cash forecast", and
"a financial statement which incorporates . . a profit
and loss section and a balance sheet section " The treasurer
periodically consolidates and submits the information to
the board of directors, so that they may be kept abreast
of the Corporation' s financial condition, and have sufficient
information for "the ultimate large decisions" that they
make for the Corporation's various enterprises.
Hearst enterprises that do business with each other
exchange no funds, but payment for whatever charge is
made by one such enterprise to another is effected through
a "clearance" system maintained by the home office. Under
the procedure, a division such as King Features Syndicate,
for example, that supplies features to the San Francisco
Examiner sends an "inter-company invoice" covering the
services to the latter, and a copy to the treasurer 's office
in New York, where the Corporation makes bookkeeping
entries debiting the newspaper, and crediting King, with
the puce of the services. The charges are also reflected
as liabilities or credits, as the case may be, in the "profit
and loss section" of the monthly report submitted by each
division involved.
Each operating division maintains "a comfortable cash
balance," treats surpluses beyond that as "operating profits,"
313
and periodically remits such surpluses to the home office.
They become part of the Corporation's general funds, and,
as such , available for use, and are used , by the Corporation
for investment, capital improvements for its various enter-
prises; its operating expenses, dividends; and payment of
balances due under the "clearance" procedure to a division
for services rendered to another. If a division's financial
situation, as reflected in its monthly reports, does not
permit a discharge of its "inter-company obligations", such
as for services rendered by another division, the indebtedness
is carried as an interest-free "loan" or "down-stream
advance" to the obligated division. Should such "deficien-
cies" take on "serious" proportions, they become "a matter
for the concern" of the board of directors.
The publishers of Hearst's Los Angeles and San Francisco
newspapers, like other division heads, may make capital
expenditures up to $10,000 without consultation with higher
corporate authority, but for capital outlays in excess of
that figure, they must secure approval of the board of
directors or its finance committee, depending on the amount
involved."
The reason for the requirement is of no large moment,
but it is worth noting that although_ there is testimony
that its purpose is to provide the home office with an
opportunity to induce division heads to make equipment
purchases in excess of the limitation from an inventory
of used equipment maintained by the Corporation, it is
evident that the policy is also rooted in necessity, particularly
in the light of evidence of capital expenditures by the
Corporation for divisional plant construction, as well as
for equipment. As Massi, the corporate treasurer, testified,
the "cash balance" maintained by any division does not
exceed $250,000, and if it lacks sufficient money for a
capital outlay, the division head "gets it from the Hearst
Corporation." There is no indication that any such executive
has standing authority from the Corporation to pledge
its credit for capital expenditures in excess of $250,000
(or, indeed, exceeding $10,000), and one may fairly conclude
from the relevant evidence as a whole, as I do, that there
is none. Thus at least in the case of capital outlays of
more than $250,000, a division head would have to look
to the Corporation for the required funds, quite apart
from any corporate preference that he purchase equipment
from the Corporation's inventory.
The necessity is by no means hypothetical, for the Corpo-
ration has in recent years made substantial capital expendi-
tures for facilities for its Los Angeles and San Francisco
newspapers, spending an unspecified, but obviously large,
" in his testimony, Publisher Gould refers to divisional requests for
such approval as a "practice," but the "practice" is clearly a corporate
requirement Thus Corporation President Berlin alludes to the corporate
policy as a restraint on "top executives" (the work "restrain" is erroneously
transcribed as "retrain" at the relevant place in the transcript), and
subsequently refers to it as "the best method of having a control" over
equipment expenditures in order to induce division heads to purchase
equipment they may need from an inventory of used equipment maintained
by the Corporation, rather than in the open market It may be noted,
too, that in a decision, dated January 27, 1969, in American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists (Baltimore News American Division), Case
5-CC-446, Trial Examiner Samuel M Singer found that capital expendi-
tures in excess of $10,000 by Hearst division heads require the Corpora-
tion's approval
314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sum for construction of a plant for the former, and in
excess of a million dollars for the San Francisco publication.
Moreover , as Gould testified , although he initiated discus-
sions with the Chronicle for the formation and functions
of the Printing Company, he deemed it necessary that
the then chairman of the Corporation 's board carry on
the talks because the arrangements "involved expenditures
. . . in the neighborhood of five to ten million dollars
. . (and) it was beyond my area of responsibility as
I saw it " The decision to join with the Chronicle to
form and finance the Printing Company was made for
Hearst by the latter 's board.
The Corporation provides a retirement program, free
of cost to the beneficiaries , and group life insurance for
all divisional and home office personnel for whom such
benefits are not provided by collective-bargaining arrange-
ments. There are no company -wide provisions , however,
for hospitalization and medical plans, each enterprise making
its own arrangements on "a local level" for such benefits
where they exist. In practice , at least , the seniority status
of "white collar" employees such as editorial personnel
is unaffected by transfer from one Hearst newspaper to
another.
B. The Strike and the Allegations
of Misconduct
At the times material to the issues here, each of the
Los Angeles Unions represented one or another category
of employees on the staff of the Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner , the San Francisco Drivers' Union had a contract
with the Printing Company affecting drivers employed by
that enterprise; and the San Francisco Guild had an agree-
ment with the Chronicle, the Printing Company and the
Examiner affecting individuals in the employ of one or
another of these enterprises. 1I
On December 15, 1967, the Los Angeles Unions, as
an outgrowth of a labor dispute between them and the
Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, commenced a strike against
the newspaper, which was still in progress at the time
of the hearing in this proceeding . Details of the dispute
which led to the strike are not material here.
Eight of the nine Los Angeles Unions formed a "unity
committee" prior to the strike "to consider common prob-
lems" relating to negotiations with the management of
the newspaper , and continued to function after the strike
began as a group under the name of "Herald -Examiner
Joint Strike-Lockout Council" (herein the Council). The
ninth , the Warehousemen 's Union , has not held membership
in either the "unity committee" or the Council at any
time material to the issues
" Pending a determination of the issue whether the Examiner and
Herald-Examiner are separate "persons" within the purview of the Act,
references to employees as those of either division or of the newspaper
with which it is identified are intended only as a means of convenient
description , and should not be taken as a determination of the relevant
issue Also , as the divisions filed the charges upon which the complaint
is based, I refer to them as the Charging Parties, without implying
that either is a "person" as that term is used in the Act
Although the Council functions without formal rules
of order, at least one of its underlying purposes is to
provide the participating unions with a vehicle for coordinat-
ing their strike activities Thus the Council holds meetings
of its members from time to time to discuss point strike
activites ; maintains standing committees to engage in
specified strike activities , and a "publicity department"
to publicize the Council members' strike positions; and
prepares and distributes literature such as leaflets and a
daily "official publication" of the Council called "On The
Line", dealing with the strike and related matters.
Toward the end of December 1967, the "strike director"
of the Los Angeles Guild, Robert Rupert, who is also
a representative of the American Newspaper Guild, of
which the Los Angeles and San Francisco Guilds are local
affiliates, telephoned Fred Fletcher , the executive secretary
of the San Francisco Guild, and told him that "officials"
of the striking unions were thinking of sending pickets
from Los Angeles to picket the Chronicle, Examiner, and
Printing Company in San Francisco Neither the San Fran-
cisco Guild nor the San Francisco Drivers' Union had
a dispute with either of the San Francisco newspapers
or the Printing Company at any time material to the
issues.
At a meeting held on or about Janaury 3, 1968, the
unions constituting the Council decided to engage in picket-
ing activities in San Francisco in support of the strike
in Los Angeles, leaving it to "each participating union
to decide how many people (pickets) it could afford" to
send."
On January 4, 1968, six of the Council members, the
Los Angeles Guild, and the Pressmen 's, Typographical,
Stereotypers', Mailers', and Machinists ' Unions, dispatched
individuals (herein the Los Angeles group or pickets) to
San Francisco for such picketing , each of the six separately
designating pickets and paying their traveling expenses.
On January 4, also, Jack Goldberger, president of the
San Francisco Drivers' Union , at a meeting in Los Angeles
attended by a Federal mediator and representatives of each
side in the Herald -Examiner dispute, stating that he had
come to the meeting because of concern that the dispute
would spread to San Francisco, and that he desired its
settlement , said that members of his organization would
observe "a picket line (in San Francisco) ... irrespective
of whose it was."
Upon their arrival in San Francisco on January 4, the
Los Angeles Guild's picketing representatives, under
Rupert's instructions , notified Fletcher of their presence.
Later in the day, at a meeting with Fletcher and other
San Francisco union functionaries connected with the news-
paper industry in that city, members of the Los Angeles
" Rupert's testimony is vague as to the dates of Council meetings
when the San Francisco picketing project was discussed, and as to the
identity of the unions represented at the meetings , but piecing together
various aspects of his testimony and other parts of the record, it is
fair to infer that all members of the Council agreed to the picketing
decision In that regard , it is noteworthy that the issue of the Council's
"official publication " for January 3, 1968, notes that "the Council recruited
pickets for informational duty in San Francisco "
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
group announced their intention to picket the San Francisco
"newspaper plants"; and at a subsequent meeting that ended
about 2 a in on January 5, the Los Angeles pickets
informed Fletcher and other local union representatives
that the picketing would begin at 6 a m that morning
Shortly before that hour, Fletcher assembled various
officers and members of his union at his office and informed
them of the picketing intention
Starting at about the scheduled hour, members of the
Los Angeles group picketed premises of the San Francisco
Chronicle, the San Francisco Examiner , and the Printing
Company, carrying or displaying signs and distributing
leaflets. The latter had been prepared by the Council's
"publicity department ," and approved by all Council mem-
bers, and the text of the signs had been prepared by
Rupert One set of leaflets (G C Exh 2) set forth alleged
grievances against the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, fol-
lowed them with the Council's name, and below that listed
abbreviated versions of the names of all nine Los Angeles
Unions, although one of them , the Warehousemen 's Union,
was not a member of the Council. Another set (G.C.
Exh. 8) similarly listed abbreviated variants of the names
of all nine unions.
The picketed sites were a Hearst-owned property (herein
the Hearst Building ) at 3rd and Market Streets, which
housed the Printing Company's classified advertisement
department , another Hearst building at 36 Annie Street
(located behind the 3rd and Market building), the work
place of several Examiner accounting employees and Print-
ing Company employees variously engaged in accounting
functions and production of sections of the Sunday Chronicle
& Examiner ; a Hearst property at 860 Howard Street,
where personnel of various Printing Company departments
normally worked; a Chronicle-owned building (herein the
Chronicle Building) at 5th and Mission Streets, which
housed physically separated editorial departments of both
newspapers , the Printing Company's headquarters, most
of its printing facilities , and a loading dock ; and a garage
at 200 Brannan Street used by the Printing Company's
newspaper delivery trucks. Picketing of the Chronicle Build-
ing and of the premises at 860 Howard Street, at least,
continued on January 5 as late as about midnight. The
duration of the picketing by the Los Angeles group at
any other site on that day or thereafter does not clearly
appear , but there is no claim that their picketing in San
Francisco continued beyond January 6.1'
" I find no materiality in evidence that a labor organization identified
in the record as the San Francisco Mailers ' Union began a strike against
the Printing Company, with which it had been having contract negotiations,
on the evening of January 5 and started to picket premises of the
Printing Company at some point that evening , its pickets mingling with
some from Los Angeles The material fact, established by undisputed
testimony of Joseph Kolder, the Printing Company's industrial relations
director , is that members of the Los Angeles group were picketing the
5th and Mission premises and the Howard Street building as late as
about midnight on January 5, and were then carrying signs similar to
those he saw them displaying before the local union 's pickets appeared
According to Kolder, too , at or about 8 30 a in on January 6, he saw
"a few of the same (Los Angeles) people" picketing with such signs,
and some with signs on which references to Los Angeles had been
"taped over ," but he does not clearly identify the location of such
picketing beyond a generalization that he visited the premises of the
315
With two exceptions , the picketing signs carried or dis-
played at any of the picketing sites contained slogans identi-
fying or alluding to a labor dispute between the Herald-
Examiner or Hearst in Los Angeles and one or more
unions in that city. Typical of these slogans were the
following. "Hearst Imports Strikebreakers in Los Angeles"
(carried in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building and 860
Howard Street); "Machinists On Strike Against Los Angeles
Herald - Examiner" (displayed at the Chronicle Building
site15); "Pressmen Locked Out By Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner" (displayed in the vicinity of the Chronicle and
Hearst Buildings ); and "Hearst Imports Professional Scabs
in Los Angeles" (near the Hearst Building) The signs in the
vicinity of 36 Annie Street were similar to those used at the
Hearst Building picketing site, all referring to a dispute in
Los Angeles The two exceptions noted above were a slogan
"All Scabs Must Go" (vicinity of the Chronicle Building
and 860 Howard Street) and "Teamsters Support Guild"
(near the Chronicle Building)
Most Chronicle , Examiner , and Printing Company
employees did not report for work on January 5 after
the picketing began , although scheduled to do so, and
the operations of both newspapers and the Printing Company
substantially shut down on the morning of that date and
remained that way for at least the balance of the day,
causing a cessation in the business of each newspaper
with its customers for a period of time 16
The absentees on January 5 included some 200 to 300
Printing Company drivers who were members of the San
Francisco Drivers' Union and subject to its contract with
the Printing Company, and had been scheduled to report
at the loading dock at the 5th and Mission premises between
9 and 10 a in . on January 5 preparatory to delivering
the San Francisco Examiner which is distribured during
daylight hours . (Several hundred drivers, assigned to delivery
of the San Francisco Chronicle , which is distributed during
the early morning hours, had reported before the picketing
began , and completed their shift on January 5.)
Clearly , these absentees , like others on the staff of each
newspaper, and of the Printing Company, failed to report
for work that day because of the picketing , but there
is also evidence that Goldberger had directed the members
of his union to respect the picket lines . He admitted as
much to the Printing Company 's circulation director, Ken-
neth Hobson , at or about 10 : 30 a.m . on January 5 while
the Howard Street premises , where about 75 drivers custom-
arily report for work , were being picketed . On that occasion,
Hobson , encountering Goldberger at the entrance to the
Printing Company's parking lot adjacent to the Howard
Printing Company , Examiner and Chronicle" and saw such picketing
in any event , his testimony as to picketing on the morning of January
6 adds nothing of substance to this case
" Other slogans used in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building were
"Stereos Locked Out by Los Angeles Herald -Examiner", and "Mailers
Locked Out By Los Angeles Herald-Examiner "
1' Operations at the two newspapers and the Printing Company were
suspended for some period after January 5 as a result of a labor dispute
between the Printing Company and the San Francisco Mailers' Union
That dispute and the related shutdowns are not material here
316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Street building, asked Goldberger "to allow his men (drivers
represented by the San Francisco Drivers Union) to go
to work," and Goldberger declined, stating that he had
"instructed (them) not to cross the picket line." He also
rejected a similar request that morning by another Punting
Company executive, Joseph Kolder. Goldberger had predict-
ed at the Los Angeles meeting he had attended on the
previous day that the drivers would observe the picket
lines, and I am persuaded that he helped fulfill his prediction
by instructing them to do so His conduct in that regard is
imputable to the San Francisco Drivers Union
Fletcher , too, gave similar instructions to two Printing
Company employees, both members of the San Francisco
Guild and subject to its contract with their employer
One such employee, Lola Sainsbury, a member of the
San Francisco Guild, arriving in the vicinity of the Chronicle
Building, her place of employment, shortly after the picket-
ing there began, asked Fletcher "what kind of picket line
it was," and he told her not to "cross it." As a result,
she did not report for work that day. The other employee,
Donald Mason, observing pickets in front of 860 Howard
Street upon his arrival for work there at about 8 o'clock
that morning, asked a Guild functionary, Dorothy Bedjani-
an, who was in the area, what employees "were supposed
to do." Bedjanian, who was then a member of a Guild
policy-making body called the "representative assembly,"
and had recently been elected vice-president of the union
(although not yet inducted), replied that "we are supposed
to respect the picket lines," stating , also, that "Guild offi-
cials" had decided earlier that morning (at the meeting
in Fletcher's office, as I infer) to request employees to
do so. Learning from Bedjanian that Fletcher was in the
5th and Mission area, Mason went there, and asked Fletcher,
who was in the midst of a group of employees, "what
we were supposed to do," and Fletcher replied: "We are
asking you to respect the picket lines. Go home. Report
back to your next tour of duty, and if the picket lines
are there, go home again. Then come back and report
when your next tour of duty is " As a result of Fletcher's
remarks, Mason went home and did not work that day
Fletcher's instructions to Mason and Sainsbury are imputa-
ble to the San Francisco Guild."
C Discussion of the Issues,-
Concluding Findings
Passing the issue of the legality of the picketing for
later disposition, a threshold question is whether all the
" I have based findings as to Mason 's conversations with Bedlanian
and Fletcher on Mason's testimony , and as to Sainsbury 's discussion
with Fletcher, on Sainsbury's testimony Fletcher testified that he has
no "present recollection" of having talked either to Mason or Sainsbury,
although also claiming that "it is not possible" that he made the remarks
Mason imputes to him Fletcher frequently professed an inability to
recall pertinent matters, including details of his meetings with members
of the Los Angeles group and representatives of San Francisco unions
on January 4 and the early morning hours of January 5 preceding
the picketing, and I formed the impression from his demeanor and
text that he knew more than he was willing to say in response to
pertinent interrogation In short , I am unable to accept his disclaimer
that he made the remarks Mason attributes to him , and, instead , credit
Mason , as well as Sainsbury
Respondent Unions may be held accountable for the activity,
as the General Counsel claims. Clearly, all eight members
of the Council are chargeable with it, although only six
actually dispatched pickets to San Francisco All eight
functioned as a group, through the instrumentality of the
Council, to coordinate their strike activities, and decided
at a Council meeting the facilities in San Francisco be
picketed; the Council's "publicity committee," plainly the
joint instrument of the Council members, prepared the
leaflets used in conjunction with the San Francisco picketing;
and all Council members approved their content. In short,
the San Francisco picketing activities were a joint venture
of all eight members of the Council, and all are thus
chargeable with them 1e
That is not the case, however, with the Warehousemen's
Union. That organization was not a member of the Council,
and there is no substantial evidence that it either participated
in the picketing decision or in the picketing itself. It is
not established that the term "Teamsters", as used in some
of the picketing signs, referred to the Warehousemen's
Union which is an affiliate of an international labor body
commonly known as the "Teamsters," for the reference
could as readily have been an allusion to the San Francisco
Drivers Union, which is also a local affiliate of the "Team-
sters " There is no evidence that the Warehousemen's Union
authorized the use of any of the picketing signs, or any
reference to it in any of the leaflets, and, indeed, there
is undisputed testimony that "neither [the Warehousemen's
Union] nor any of its officers became aware of the use
of its name on . . . Council . . . literature until [the
Warehousemen's Union] was served with certain papers
on January 12, 1968" in a proceeding involving the picketing,
brought under Section 10(1) of the Act." The fact that
the Warehousemen 's Union "has not (since) disavowed
the use of its name on said literature " does not make
it responsible for an activity which had ended prior to
its knowledge. The sum of the matter is that the record
does not establish that the Respondent Warehousemen's
Union participated in any of the activities alleged as miscon-
duct in the complaint, and for that reason, without regard
to the issue of the legality of such activities, I shall recom-
mend dismissal of the complaint as to that Respondent.
Nor is there sufficient warrant for a holding that the
San Francisco Drivers' Union and the San Francisco Guild
are chargeable with the picketing There is much ground
for suspicion that both San Francisco Respondents were
participants in the planning of the picketing enterprise,
taking into account the presence of Goldberger and Fletcher
at picketing sites on January 5; their respective instructions
to employees not to report for work while the picketing
" Local Freight Drivers, Local No 208 (Les Brockman), 150 NLRB
1016, 1022 , International Longshoremen 's Union v Juneau Spruce, 189
F 2d 177, 190 (C A 9), Smith Cabinet Mfg Co, 81 NLRB 886, 890,
Retail Fruit ClerAs v N L R B 249 F 2d 591, 597-598 (C A 9)
" A stipulation in the record that the "chief executive officer" of
the Warehousemen ' s Union, if called , would testify that the organization
did not "expressly authorize" the use of its name on Council literature
or the picket signs does not establish such an authorization by implication
There is simply no evidence of such authority , but, on the contrary,
affirmative proof that the Union was unaware of the use of its name
until some days after the picketing in question ended
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
was in progress ; Rupert's advance notification to Fletcher
(and to Goldberger also) of the possibility that picketing
would take place in San Francisco ; Goldberger 's prediction
at the Los Angeles meeting of January 4 that the members
of his union would respect the picket lines; and Fletcher's
testimony to the effect that he and other San Francisco
union functionaries met with members of the Los Angeles
group for some hours on the night of January 4 and
into the early morning of January 5 (although Fletcher
gives few details of what was said in all that time) But
the fact remains that there is no solid evidence that either
Goldberger or Fletcher or any other representative of either
of the San Francisco Respondents counselled or participated
in the picketing decision or activities 20 It is clear, however,
that both these Respondents , through the instructions given
by their respective agents, Goldberger and Fletcher, to
Printing Company employees to respect the picket lines,
induced and encouraged such employees not to perform
services for their employer Findings as to the legal propriety
of this conduct will be made at a later point.
There is no reason to doubt that Examiner and Printing
Company employees and operations were targets of the
picketing , but the Respondents maintain that picketing
of the Chronicle Building, which housed employees of
the Chronicle , as well as Printing Company and Examiner
personnel , did not constitute picketing of the Chronicle
because the activity "complied with the common situs picket-
ing requirements of Sailors ' Union of the Pacific (Moore
Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547," which include the condition
that "the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is
with the primary employer" (in this case, Hearst).
I disagree with the contention . The leaflets distributed
in the vicinity of the Chronicle Building and most of
the picketing signs in the area met that standard, but
one of the signs, bearing the slogan "Teamsters Support
Guild ," did not identify any dispute with Hearst , whether
in Los Angeles or San Francisco . Bearing in mind that
the Chronicle 's employees are members of the San Francisco
Guild and that Printing Company drivers, who use the
loading dock at the Chronicle building, are members of
the San Francisco Drivers' Union , which is affiliated with
the "Teamsters ," the sign could reasonably lead the Chroni-
cle employees to believe that their union or the San Francisco
Drivers Union , or both , were enmeshed in a labor dispute
with the Chronicle , or that the Los Angeles strike had
escalated to an involvement of the Chronicle in a dispute
with one or both of the San Francisco unions.
To cap the matter, the record warrants an inference,
and I find, that the picketing was intentionally directed
at the Chronicle , as well as the Examiner and the Printing
'° There is some warrant for the General Counsel's view that Goldber-
ger's prediction at the Los Angeles meeting, which had been called
to negotiate strike issues , was, in the context of events there , a threat
to force the Herald-Examiner's management to come to terms with
the striking unions , but it is conceivable that the prediction was intended
as no more than a forecast of the attitude of the drivers , and that
Goldberger ' s purpose was to avoid an escalation of the strike to San
Francisco rather than to implement the position of the striking unions
His conduct at the meeting , in other words , does not necessarily mean
that his union was either then or thereafter a member of the joint
venture that sponsored the picketing
317
Company. Rupert, director of strike activities for the Los
Angeles Guild, an active participant in Council affairs,
and admitted author of the slogans on the signs, notified
Fletcher, chief executive of the San Francisco Guild, a
few days before the picketing began that "the Los Angeles
union officials" were contemplating picketing the Examiner,
the Chronicle and the Printing Company Moreover, as
Fletcher testified, the Los Angeles pickets notified him
shortly before the picketing began that they were going to
picket "the newspaper plants " And a conclusion that the
reference to "plants" included the Chronicle, as well as the
Examiner and the Printing Company, is bolstered by the
fact that an edition of "On The Line," the Council's strike
organ, issued about two days after the picketing began,
referred to one of the Los Angeles pickets, who had been
dispatched by the Los Angeles Guild, as "[p]icketing the
old San Francisco Chronicle."
Passing the issue of the legality of the picketing for later
disposition, there is ample reason to conclude, and I find,
that the picketing induced and encouraged employees on
the staff of each of the three picketed enterprises not to
work on January 5, 1968, contrary to their scheduled duties,
and was a coercive measure aimed at bringing about a
cessation of business between each picketed newspaper and
its customers, between each such newspaper and the
Printing Company, and between the Printing Company and
its customers and suppliers, in order to bring pressure to
bear upon the management of the Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner to accede to terms sought by the striking Los
Angeles Unions 'i
The picketing of the San Francisco Examiner raises a
problem of construction of Section 8(b)(4)(B) not present
in the activity as it affected the Printing Company and
the Chronicle. The section forbids unions "( i) to . . . induce
or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce" to engage in a strike or refusal
to perform services , or "(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person engaged in commerce . . where in either
case an object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring
any person to cease . . . doing business with any other
person ." A proviso to these prohibitions expressly excludes
an otherwise lawful "primary strike or primary picketing"
from their reach. As is evident, a finding that the picketing
against Hearst 's Examiner in San Francisco in support
of a "primary" strike against the Corporation's Herald-
Examiner in Los Angeles was an unlawful one would
have to hold, as the complaint alleges, that the division
in San Francisco is a "person " within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), and that the picketing of its
operations was not "primary" and thus not protected by
the proviso
The only definition of "person" in the Act is contained
in Section 2(1) which provides: "The term `person' includes
one or more individuals , labor organizations , partnerships,
" i find no materiality in evidence that after the San Francisco picketing,
the Los Angeles group continued on to Seattle where "some of them
visited the premises of the Seattle Post-Intelligence ," a Hearst newspaper,
"in connection with the labor dispute" in Los Angeles There is no
evidence that the Seattle publication was picketed
318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
associations , corporations, legal representatives , trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy or receivers " Hearst's "divisions"
are unincorporated departments of its business enterprise;
are not within any of the express inclusions of the statutory
definition of the term "person," nor within any of the
dictionary usages of the term ; and it is thus evident that
what the General Counsel and the Charging Parties seek
is an expansion in the meaning of the term beyond any
given by the dictionary or the statutory inclusions.22
In that regard , I disagree with the interpretation the
Charging Parties place upon a comment by Senator Goldwa-
ter, a proponent of the amendment (effected in 1959 by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Land-
rum-Griffin) Act) by which the phrase "individual employed
by any person ," now in Section 8(b)(4)(i ), was substituted
for the words "employees of any employer" in what had
been Section 8(b)(4)(A) prior to the amendment . The Sena-
tor's comment, which , incidentally , was made after passage
of the Landrum-Griffin Act, was: ". . . by substituting
the term `person' for the term `employer,' it broadens
the scope of the latter term to its full dictionary meaning"
(11 Legis. His , L.M R & D A 1857) Harnessing this state-
ment to a dictionary definition of the term "employer,"
which includes such usages as "the owner of an enterprise
that employs personnel for wages ," "such an enterprise
itself," and "an agent acting for such an enterprise in
employing persons,"" the Charging Parties assert that a
Hearst newspaper division is an "employer ," and interpret
Senator Goldwater 's remark to mean that the term "person"
includes such a division as an "employer "
One would think that if a Hearst division is an "employer"
for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4), it surely had that
status before the replacement of the term "employer" by
"person," and the position of the Charging Parties that
the amendatory substitution of "person" for "employer"
had the effect of expanding the latter term "to its full
dictionary meaning" would appear to be superfluous, but
" Webster's Third International Dictionary , Unabridged ( 1963), includes
some archaic or theological meanings of the term "person " Omitting
these and illustrations of the various uses, Webster 's defines the term
as follows
1 a an individual human being c a human being as distinguished
from an animal or thing d an inferior human being
4 a an individual having a specified kind of bodily appearance
b the body of a human being as distinguished from the mind
c the body of a human being as presented to public view
5 a the individual personality of a human being b
bodily presence 6 a human being , a body of persons, or a
corporation, partnership , or other legal entity that is recognized
by law as the subject of rights and duties-see Juristic Person 7
any one of the three relations underlying discourse that are distin-
guished by certain pronouns and in many languages by inflected
forms of the verb-see First Person 8 a, a being characterized
by conscious apprehension , rationality , and a moral sense b a being
possessing or forming the subject of personality 9 a living individual
unit, specif a single zooid in a compound animal
I do not read the phrase "a body of persons" in Item 6 of the foregoing
usages as referring to a conception such as a Hearst "division " The
phrase is used in a "juristic " sense, that is, "a legal entity that is
recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties " A Hearst "division"
is not "a legal entity ," but, rather, a departmentalized method by which
the Corporation , which is "a legal entity ," does business
" Merriam-Webster New International Dictionary , 3rd ed 1961, cited
by the Charging Parties
in any case , it is unnecessary to deal at this point with
the question whether it is Hearst , rather than such a division,
that is the "employer" of the divisional personnel, for
it is enough for present purposes that the Charging Parties
read into the Senator 's remarks more than he meant. The
quoted comment is but a small portion of what he said
on the subject of the amendment , and reading the statement
it the context of remarks that immediately followed it,
it is clear that his meaning was that the substituted language
was designed to close what he termed "loopholes" in Section
8(b)(4), as it then stood , resulting from express exclusions
from the terms "employer" and "employee", as defined
in the Act, and that the substitution of "the term `person'
for the term "employer" would have the effect of bringing
the excluded categories within the reach of Section 8(b)(4).24
There is no indication in the Senator 's remarks that the
amendment was designed to give the term "person" any
meaning beyond that given to the word by the dictionary
or the express terms of Section 2(1) 25
The Board has had occasion in only one case, Alexander
Warehouse & Sales Co., 128 NLRB 916, to consider the
legality of picketing of an employer's premises where there
is no dispute in support of a strike by the picketing union
against the employer at another situs, but the opposing
sides on the comparable issue here are not in accord as
to the reach of the decision, each seeing in it support
for its position.
i' The following is the full paragraph of the Senator 's remarks in
which the statement cited by the Charging Parties appears
Secondly , by substituting the term "person" for the term "employer,"
it broadens the scope of the latter term to its full dictionary meaning
instead of the limited meaning which it has under the definition
of "employer"-in Taft-Hartley ' Employer' is defined in Taft-Hart-
ley to exclude employers subject to the Railway Labor Act, agricultural
employers , all governmental agencies , bodies or corporations , Federal
Reserve banks, and nonprofit hospitals "Employee" as defined does
not include employees of the above excluded employers ( II Legis
His,LMR & DA 1857)
The Charging Parties place emphasis on a remark by the Supreme
Court , made prior to the Landrum-Griffin amendment of the former
Sec 8 (b)(4)(A), that "since railroads are not excluded from the Act's
definition of 'person ' they are entitled to Board protection from the
kind of unfair labor practices proscribed by 8(b)(4)(A)"(Teannteri Local
25 v New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co, 350 U S 155,
160) As a "railroad" is a "person ," so the Charging Parties contend
in effect , so is a Hearst division The issues in the cited case, which
centered on a question of preemption arising under Sec 8 (b)(4) from
exclusion of rail carriers from the definition of "employer " contained
in Section 2(2) of the Act , are so clearly ungermane to any issue here
that I deem it unnecessary to comment on the case beyond noting
my view that the Court 's allusion to "railroads" in the particular context
was intended as a generic reference to the type of business in which
the New York , New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company , is engaged,
and not as a redefinition of the term "person" to include "railraods"
without regard to any corporate or other status that meets any meaning
of the term as' defined in the dictionary or Sec 2 ( 1) Nor do I see
any pertinency in Plumbers Union, Local 268 v County of Door, 359
U S 354, cited by the Charging Parties, involving a "political subdivision"
(a county) which , like a railroad , is expressly excluded from the Act's
definition of "employer " A political subdivision such as a county is
"a legal entity that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and
duties," and is thus a "person," in a "juristic " sense at least , as defined
in Webster 's Unabridged Dictionary For much the same reason, I find
no relevancy in Local Typographical Union No 6 (Gavrin Press), 141
NLRB 1209, 1212 , fn 2, cited by the General Counsel , holding that
a municipality , although not an "employer" within the statutory meaning
of that term i'.i person iiit hin the readh of ticL s(h)(4)(Hi
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
In the case , which arose under Section 8(b)(4)(A) prior
to its amendment in 1959, an employer , Alexander, operated
three warehouse'. respectively located in Joliet , Peoria,
and Urbana , Illinois . A union called an economic strike
of the Joliet employees , and in support of its strike demands,
sponsored picketing of all three warehouses by the Joliet
employees The union requested the employees of the Peoria
and Urbana warehouses to join the strike, but they refused
The picketing induced employees of customers and suppliers
of Alexander to refrain from making pickups and deliveries
at the three warehouses.
The picketing of the Joliet warehouse , the dispute situs,
was admittedly lawful , and the material question was wheth-
er the picketing of the two other warehouses was "sec-
ondary" and thus violated Section 8(b)(4)(A). Holding that
such picketing , like that of the Joliet establishment, "was
lawful pnmary activity ," the Board said (at 918-919, omit-
ting footnotes).
Though the economic dispute with Alexander direct-
ly involved only Alexander 's Joliet employees, Respond-
ents [the union and its agents ] had the right to bring
pressure upon Alexander at each and every one of
its warehouses . The Peoria and Urbana warehouses
are no more to be considered neutral premises for
purposes of applying the provisions of Section
8(b)(4)(A) than are the premises of an employer who
"allys" [sic] himself with a pnmary employer. Under
the "ally" doctrine a union may engage in picketing
at the operations of a pnmary employer and at all
operations of employers who "ally" themselves with
the primary employer, under the same conditions as
govern its picketing at the pnmary employer 's premises
. . A fortiori if an "ally" is not sufficiently neutral
to permit a distinction to be drawn between it and
the primary employer for purposes of applying the
secondary boycott provisions of the Act, Alexander's
Peoria and Urbana warehouses cannot be regarded
as premises of a neutral employer here . Those premises,
together with the Joliet warehouse , are operated under
common general supervision , their purchases are made
by a central purchasing office; they participate in pooled
shipments of supplies in order that Alexander my
[sic] receive the benefits of lower freight charges, and
there is some interchange of inventories between the
three warehouses Thus, the continued operation of
the Peoria and Urbana warehouses during Respondents'
strike at the Joliet warehouse constituted , because of
their proximity to, and integration with , the Joliet
warehouse , a factor which conceivably could have been
decisive in determining the outcome of the dispute,
and Respondents could legitimately extend their picket-
ing to those premises.
Stressing the Board's discussion of the warehouses' com-
mon supervision , their centralized purchases , pooled ship-
ments and interchange of inventories, the General Counsel
and the Charging Parties in effect read the decision as
meaning that but for the evidence of integration of the
warehouses , the Board would have held each to be a
separate "employer," and thus the picketing of the Peoria
and Urbana premises to be "secondary" and unlawful.
319
The Respondent Unions, in contrast , read the decision
as holding "that a single corporation should , as a matter
of law, be subject to picketing wherever it does business,"
and that the reference to the "ally" doctrine and operational
integration were "dicta ," aimed at demonstrating that if
an "ally" of a picketed primary employer could not be
considered "neutral ," then "a fortiori, " because of such
integration , the Peoria and Urbana warehouses could not
"be regarded as premises of a neutral employer "
Whether the Alexander decision requires clarification is,
of course, a matter for the Board , and it may wish to
make such a determination should it have occasion to
review the findings and conclusions made here. In any
event, the case is not dispositive of the relevant issue
It did not involve a construction of the term "person"
as used in Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), and needless to say,
that determination should be made against the background
of the economic and other facts of this case and not
of those in Alexander.
The General Counsel maintains in his brief that Hearst's
right to control the operation of its Los Angeles and
San Francisco newspaper divisions is immaterial to the
question whether each is a "person ," and that " the rule
is that for two separate business enterprises [the two divi-
sions] to constitute a single person so as to deprive the
alleged secondary person of the protection provided by
Section 8(b)(4)(B) for an, unoffending person there must
be actual , as distinguished from potential , common control
of both enterprises ." Applying this "rule"and his reading
of the Alexander case, the General Counsel casts each
division in the image of a "person" on the basis of the
autonomy exercised by the local head of each in determining
the content of the newspaper he manages , its labor relations,
news, editorial and advertising policies; its subscription
and other charges, and what services and supplies to pur-
chase for its day-to-day operations . The Examiner, so the
position runs, was the "secondary " and "unoffending per-
son," and thus the picketing of its premises was "secondary"
and unlawful."
The "rule" urged by the General Counsel does not
precisely encompass the relevant issue, for the question is
not whether the two divisions constitute "a single person,"
but whether each division is a "person " Moreover, the
"actual control" test for which the General Counsel
contends is more easily stated than applied If weight be
given to autonomy in the areas where it exists, why not to
those where it does not, as in editorial support of a
candidate for the Presidency; compliance with the
26 The Charging Parties take much the same view of the -ileiander
case as the General Counsel, but assert that the status of the Examiner
as a "person" is immaterial , and that what matters is the autonomy
of the Herald-Examiner , which, in the Charging Parties' view, makes
it a separate person It is unnecessary to deal here with the reason
why the Charging Parties view the Examiner 's status as immaterial,
for the fact is that the complaint alleges that each of the two divisions
in question is a "person " and "employer" and that in "furtherance
and support of the labor dispute with the Herald-Examiner" the
Respondents "induced and encouraged individuals employed by the Exam-
iner to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment
to perform services , and have threatened , coerced or restrained
the Examiner ," all for prohibited objects, and by such conduct have
violated Sec 8(b)(4)(B ) The complaint and the answers shape the issues
320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Corporation's "procedures and regulations" that subject
each division to a home office central accounting system,
governing the payment of Inter-divisional obligations, and
require each to make periodic reports used by Hearst's
board of directors as a basis for "large decisions" such as
significant expansions of divisional plant facilities or
changes in operational methods involved in the agency
functions of the Printing Company; the requirement that
division heads receive approval of the board or its
appropriate committee for outlays in excess of $10,000, and
the periodic transmission of "operating profits" to the
Corporation which uses them as it sees fitfl The ultimate
destination of divisional "profits" and the $10,000
limitation on capital outlays are plainly large restrictions
upon the local management of Hearst's Los Angeles and
San Francisco newspapers, particularly taking into account
the millions of dollars in capital outlays made by the
Corporation for both newspapers in recent years As is
evident from Gould's testimony, he was no free agent even
for completion of the talks with the Chronicle management
that led to formation and financing of the Printing
Company The amount involved was beyond his "area of
responsibility," and thus he deemed it necessary that the
then chairman of the Hearst board carry on discussions that
led to the board's decision in the matter
But the autonomy of local divisional management, or the
lack of it, is beside the point, for each division is not a
"person" for the purposes of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u), with
or without the evidence of autonomy That conclusion is
impelled not only by the dictionary and statutory
definitions of "person," previously mentioned, but by
legislative history of unquestioned weight, and the legally
permissible role of strike activity in collective bargaining.
Senator Taft, who sponsored the former Section
8(b)(4)(A), said of its purpose:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a
secondary boycott to injure the business of a third
person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement
between an employer and his employees [emphasis sup-
plied] 27
Judge Learned Hand took much the same view of the
legislative design, stating "The gravamen of a secondary
boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer
who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third
party who has no concern in It "28 And the Supreme Court,
speaking of the former Section 8(b)(4)(A), after citing
Senator Taft's statement and similar views of the legislative
purpose, has pointed out
. Congress likewise meant to protect the employer only
from union pressures designed to involve him in
disputes not his own [Footnote omitted ]
Judicial decisions interpreting the broad language of
Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act uniformly limited its
application to such 'secondary' situations. [Footnote
omitted ] This limitation was in "conformity with the
dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of
labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on
" 93 Cong Rec 4323, It Leg Hist L M R A 1106
° bit Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v NL R B, 181
F 2d 34 , 37 (C A 2)
offending employers in primary labor disputes and of
shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own " (National
Woodwork Mfrs Assn v NLRB , 386 U S 612,
625-627 )
The Court also noted that in the Landrum-Griffin
conversion of Section 8(b)(4)(A) into the present Section
8(b)(4)(B), Congress, by means of the proviso to the
amended section, "took pains to confirm the limited
application of the section to such `secondary' conduct" (id
632).
The two divisions are but segments of the same corporate
person, Hearst, or put another way, departmentalized
methods by which it does business, the employees on the
staff of each division are employees of the same employer,
Hearst, the labor dispute in Los Angeles is with Hearst
since the local management is its instrument, and, in the
face of these facts, to say that Hearst at its premises in San
Francisco is "a third person who is wholly unconcerned in
the disagreement" it has with its Los Angeles employees is
as much as to reject the clear meaning of Senator Taft's
statement, and of authoritative judicial expressions to the
same effect
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan has made clear, "the
use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is
not a grudging exception to some policy of completely
academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and
parcel of the process of collective bargaining" (N L R B v
Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U S. 477, 495) The
"operating profits" made by the Hearst divisions are fuel
for the total corporate body and, together with other
economic resources of the Corporation, are available at its
will to sustain any division in a contest of legitimate
economic pressures involved in a labor dispute between a
union and the management of the division or, in other
words. with Hearst. The right and power of the Corporation
to muster its economic resources to such an end,
irrespective of their divisional source, underscores the need
for recognition of a correlative right in the union to engage
in "otherwise" lawfui picketing of premises of the
Corporation other that the dispute situs Such recognition
gives balancing effect to 'ie "dual congressional
objectives," reflected in the harnessing of the proviso of
Section 8(b)(4)(B) to the prohibitions of the section, of
preserving the right of employees to bring economic
pressure to bear upon their em loyer in a dispute they have
with him, while shielding other employers "wholly
unconcerned" in the dispute from such a tactic
The Supreme Court has cautioned against blunting the
right in the absence of clear congressional warrant Noting
the organizational and bargaining guarantees in Section
7 of the Act, and the express preservation of the right
to strike in Section 13 "except as specifically provided
for" in the Act, the Court said that "[i]n the absence
of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary,
these provisions (Sections 7 and 13) caution against reading
statutory prohibitions as embracing employee activities to
pressure their own employers into improving the employees'
wages, hours and working conditions" (National Woodwork
Mfrs. Assn. v. N. L. R. B., supra at 643).
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUI! D, LOCAL 69
Heeding the caution , I find nothing in the Act to justify
a scaling down of the rights guaranteed Hearst's Los Angeles
employees in Sections 7 and 13 by prohibiting them from
bringing "economic pressure " to bear upon their employer,
Hearst , in the form of the picketing directed at it in
San Francisco.
That view is not negated by Miami Newspaper Printing
Pressmen 's Local No. 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138
NLRB 1346, enf. 322 F.2d 405 (C.A D.C.), upon which
the General Counsel and Charging parties place heavy
reliance The case arose from an economic strike by employ-
ees on the staff of a Miami newspaper , which is published
by a Florida corporation , Miami Herald Publishing Compa-
ny, the stock of which is wholly owned by an Ohio corpora-
tion , Knight Newspapers , Inc, which publishes a newspaper
in Detroit . In support of the strike against the Miami
newspaper , the union representing the striking employees
picketed the premises of the Detroit newspaper , with which
it had no dispute , and the ultimate issue in the case was
whether the picketing was "secondary " and in violation
of Section 8(b)(4)(B).
Finding that notwithstanding Knight's ownership of the
stock in Miami Herald "and the existence of some common
officers and directors of the two corporations ," both were
"operated in substance as separate and autonomous corpora-
tions," and that each publication had a separate managing
head who independently managed it and set its policies,
the Board concluded that "Knight Newspapers , Inc was
entitled to the protection of Section 8(b)(4) in connection
with Respondent 's (the union's) dispute with the Miami
Herald Publishing Company "29
The General Counsel and the Charging Parties claim
a compelling resemblance between the Miami Pressmen's
case and this one, in effect analogizing the Examiner and
the Herald-Examiner to the two corporations which the
Board described "as separate autonomous newspaper enter-
prises."
The cases are far apart . In the cited case, the purported
"secondary" employer , Knight Newspapers, Inc., was indu-
bitably a "person," by both dictionary and statutory stand-
ards, as was the Florida enterprise , the purported "primary"
employer. Knight was entitled to the protection of Section
8(b)(4)(B) unless it was so interwoven in common ownership
and operation with the other employer as to make them,
in practical effect , a single employer , thus precluding treat-
ment of Knight as a neutral in the Miami dispute. The
Board will inquire into the unitary status of two employers
in a variety of situations , 30 and the fact that Section
8(b)(4)(B) shields only "secondary" or neutral employers
was the underlying reason for the inquiry in the Miami
Pressmen 's case . Making such an inquiry the Board found
" The Board treated as inconsequential the fact that three employees
of Miami Herald formerly worked for a Knight newspaper , that Miami
Herald credits such service for its pension plan purposes , and that approxi-
mately two per cent of the supplies used by the Detroit and Miami
newspapers are purchased from a wholly owned subsidiary of Knight
'° See, among others , Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 639,
Teamsters (Poole's Warehousing, Inc), 158 NLRB 1281, NLRB v
Calcasieu Paper Co, 203 F 2d 12, 13 (CA 5), NLRB v National
Shoes, Inc, 208 F 2d 688, 691 (C A 2), and NL R B v Business Machines
and Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F 2d 553 (C A 2)
321
that Knight and Miami Herald were "operated in substance
as separate and autonomous corporations " and thus, by
evident implication , gave effect to each as a "person" as
that term is used in Section 8(b)(4)(f ) and (u)
Here the inquiry is not whether two "persons" should
be treated as one in the light of the underlying purpose
of Section 8(b) (4)(B), but whether there is any warrant
for treating two parts of a single "person ," Hearst, as
separate "persons" for the purpose of applying the section
On that score , unless one resorts to definitional invention,
the day-to -day operational autonomy exercised by the local
divisional management does not provide for each division
a status as a "person" that the dictionary and statutory
definitions withhold ; and to give the effect sought by the
General Counsel and Charging Parties to such autonomy
would be as much as to carve out of Hearst's status
as a single "person" and common employer of both division-
al labor forces an image of the Corporation as both a
"primary" disputant in Los Angeles and "a third person"
in San Francisco "wholly unconcerned in the disagreement"
it has with its Los Angeles employees . I find no warrant
for such a dual image either in the language of Section
8(b)(4)(b) or in its purpose , particularly when measured
by the proviso.
It will not do to say that this is a hypertechnical concentra-
tion on form at the expense of substance , and to undertake
to prove the point with a hypothesis that a different result
would follow , on the basis of the Miami Pressmen's case,
had Hearst chosen to publish each newspaper through
a subsidiary corporation . This is an idle assumption. The
economic facts of the relationship between the divisions
and Hearst differ substantially from those of the relationship
between the two corporations in the cited case . Without
passing on the legal effect of the differences , or attempting
to list them all, one may recall the $10,000 capital outlay
limitation on the local divisional management , an obvious
restriction on its power to make independent determinations
regarding divisional growth and the acquisition or expansion
of facilities , the pooled purchasing of newsprint through
a Hearst agency by all Hearst 'newspaper divisions, except
the Examiner for which the Printing Company purchases
newsprint as agent for both Hearst and the Chronicle;
the wire services , features , and news and editorial commen-
tary by the chairman of Hearst's board under the title
of Editor-in-Chief of the Hearst newspapers , made available
for use by the Corporation 's newspaper divisions , the central-
ized pension and insurance program made available by
the Corporation for all its nonunion employees , whether
employed in divisional work or at the home office, and
the centralized accounting system by which the Corporation
monitors the financial condition of its divisions , and oversees
the payment and collection of interdivisional obligations.
In short, it will be time enough to determine the applicability
of the Miami Pressmen 's case should the hypothesis, har-
nessed to the economic and other facts of the relationship
between Hearst and its divisions , become a reality.
I hold , for the reasons stated , that neither the Examiner
nor the Herald -Examiner is a "person " within the meaning
of Section 8(b)(4)(B); that the Corporation is the common
employer of the employees on the staff of each division;
322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and that the picketing to the extent that it was directed
at Hearst's enterprise, the Examiner, was in support of
a "primary" strike against Hearst , was "primary " within
the meaning of the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(b), and thus
did not violate the Act "
With respect to the picketing of the Chronicle, unlike
the Respondents , I see no significance in this proceeding
in the fact that that enterprise is joined with Hearst in
the agency relationship with the Printing Company. The
Chronicle is a separate "person" from Hearst, publishes
a newspaper that is wholly independent of Hearst, although
using the facilities of the common agent, and has no part
in the dispute between Hearst and the Los Angeles Unions.
Nor does it matter that the Chronicle does no business
with the Herald-Examiner. It is enough that disruption
of its business with others was an object of the picketing."
The sum of the matter is that by picketing the Chronicle,
each of the eight Respondent Unions identified above as
members of the Council violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of
the Act, and coerced and restrained the Chronicle in viola-
tion of Section 8(b) (4)(n)(B) of the statute.
The picketing directed at the Printing Company presents
problems stemming from its agency relationship to the
Chronicle and Hearst . One could argue with some reason
that at least as it affected Printing Company functions
for Hearst that were unrelated to any for the Chronicle
(for example, drivers' deliveries of the Hearst newspaper
only), the picketing activity was lawful, and, correlatively,
unlawful as it affected separable functions for the Chronicle.
The basis for such an argument is the elementary doctrine
of agency law that one who acts through another acts
for himself, or, in other words, Printing Company functions
performed by the agent for Hearst were those of Hearst
itself There is, moreover, some surface resemblance between
such agency functions and the performance of "struck
work" by an "ally" for a "primary" employer, but I think
the analogy strained ." In the "ally" situation , the "primary"
91 I have given consideration to the Court's decision in Penello v American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (D C Md Civil Action No
19942), a 10(1) proceeding, and to the subsequent decision of my colleague,
Trial Examiner Samuel M Singer, in American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (Baltimore News American Division, The Hearst
Corporation), Case 5-CC-446 Both proceedings involved the legality of
picketing of a Hearst newspaper division in Baltimore in support of a strike
against a Hearst television and radio division in that city The Court,
although not required by Sec 10 to make definitive determination whether
the Baltimore divisions are "persons" intimated the view that they have that
status, and Trial Examiner Singer concluded that each is a "person" within
the meaning of Sec 2(2), and for the purposes of Sec 8(6)(4)(6) For the
reasons I have given, I respectfully disagree with that holding and the similar
view intimated by the Court to the extent that they are contrary to the
conclusion reached here on the relevant issue I note, also, that the picketing
involved here has been the subject of a 10 injunction pendente hie in Kennedy
v San Francisco Oakland Newspaper Guild, 69 LRRM 2301 (D C , Calif)
The Court did not pass on the question of the status of the Examiner and
Herald-Examiner as "persons", and had no occasion to do so in view of the
limited nature of the 10 proceeding
" Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local No 46 v NLRB, 322 F 2d
405,410 (C A D C), and The Kroger Co , 119 NLRB 469,479
33 See Alexander Warehouse and Sales Co, supra at 919, and fns
3, 4, and 5 for a discussion of the "ally" doctrine and its legislative
and judicial history
dispute follows the "struck work," causing a loss of separate
personality for the "ally" for the purposes of Section
8(b)(4)(B), but there is no transfer of "struck work" involved
here, and what is more the image of independence of
the Printing Company goes much beyond that of a mere
instrument of Hearst
Its situation is closer, it seems to me, to a "secondary"
employer's enterprise, which has business dealings (not
involving "struck work") with a "primary" employer's
enterprise, which is owned in common with that of the
"secondary" employer, but not actually under common
control, although potentially subject to it. In a number of
.cases involving such related employers, the courts, either
because of the absence of "actual" common control, or its
insufficiency, held picketing of the "secondary" employer
to be unlawful 34
Here, the picketing of the Printing Company was a
fortiori unlawful. In addition to the fact that the chief
executive of the enterprise independently manages its day-
to-day affairs, including its labor relations, one principal,
the Chronicle, is a neutral in Hearst's Los Angeles dispute,
and the other, Hearst, sharing the capital stock of the
Printing Company with the Chronicle in equal measure
is not in a position, by force of its proprietory interest
alone, to control the Printing Company's affairs. The fact
that three members of the Printing Company's board "repre-
sent" Hearst does not alter the matter, for the other three
members "represent" the Chronicle, and are in a position
to prevent any actions of the board, including those pertain-
ing to labor relations, whether these relate to employees
performing functions for Hearst's newspaper or that of
the Chronicle
The Printing Company in short, has a sufficient "sec-
ondary" status to place it beyond the boundaries of the
dispute between Hearst and its employees, and beyond
the reach of the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B). Thus by
picketing the Printing Company, each of the eight Respond-
ent Unions identified above as members of the Council
violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, and coerced and
restrained the Printing Company in violation of Section
8(b)(4) (ii)(B) of the statute."
Finally, the conduct of the San Francisco Drivers' Union
and San Francisco Guild in inducing and encouraging
employees of the Punting Company to absent themselves
from work was unlawful . Both San Francisco Respondents
31 JIG Roy & Sons Co v N.L R B, 251 F 2d 771 (C A 1), reversing
a Board order (118 NLRB 286), and NLRB v Bachman Machine
Co, 266 F 2d 599 (C A 8), also reversing a Board order (121 NLRB
1229) The Board has since applied the "actual control" test See Drivers,
Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local No 639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc), 158
NLRB 1281
"There is testimony that construction work on a property jointly
owned by the Chronicle and Hearst, located about a half block from
the Chronicle Building, stopped while the picketing was in progress
The building under construction was to be used by the Printing Company
upon completion The record does not identify the employer of the
construction workers, and it may be something of a guess to say that
the picketing caused cessation of the work In any case, even if the
picketing was directed at the construction employees and caused the
stoppage, a finding to that effect would add nothing to the remedy
to be recommended below
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPER GUILD, LOCAL 69
were under contract to the Printing Company and had
no dispute with its, and it is evident that an object of
their conduct was to bring about a cessation of the Printing
Company's business with Hearst, the Chronicle, and others
such as customers of each newspaper enterprise , in order
to bring pressure to bear upon Hearst in support of the
striking Los Angeles Unions By such inducement and
encouragement of employees, the San Francisco Drivers'
Union and San Francisco Guild violated Section 8(b)
(4)(i)(B) of the Act.36
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent Unions, except the Ware-
housemen 's Union, set forth in section III, above , occurring
in connection with the operations of the Chronicle and
the Printing Company, described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Unions, with the
exception of the Warehousemen's Union, have engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act,
I shall recommend that each Respondent so found cease
"' Service Trade Chau llears ca/es men and Helpers Local 145 (Hon land
Dri Goods Compant) 85 NLRB 1037 1038 remanded on other ,rounds
191 F 2d 65 (C 1 2) and later enld 199 F 2d 709 (C \ 2) Sea/area bmun
(Hanrmermrll Paper Compass ) 10(1 NLRB 1176 1177-8
323
and desist from such practices , and take certain affirmative
actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the
following conclusions of law:
1. The Chronicle and the Printing Company have at
all times material here employed individuals , and are, and
have been at all such times , persons engaged in commerce
and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u) of the Act.
2 Neither the Examiner nor the Herald-Examiner is
a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(ii) of the Act.
3. Each of the Respondent Unions is, and has been
at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
4. Each of the Respondent Unions found above to have
induced and encouraged employees of the Chronicle and
the Printing Company to cease work for an object proscribed
by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act has, by such conduct,
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act
5. Each of the Respondent Unions found above to have
coerced and restrained the Chronicle and the Printing Com-
pany for such an object has, by such conduct, engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act
6 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
7 The record does not establish the commission of any
unfair labor practices except those found above.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]