Lolita F. Abille, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 28, 1999
01993295 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 28, 1999)

01993295

10-28-1999

Lolita F. Abille, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Lolita F. Abille v. Department of the Navy

01993295

October 28, 1999

Lolita F. Abille, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01993295

) Agency No. DON-99-00406-003

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

The Commission finds that the agency's February 10, 1999 decision

dismissing two of three allegations raised in appellant's complaint on the

grounds of failure to state a claim and mootness is not proper pursuant

to the provisions of EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. ��1614.107(a) and (e).

The record shows that appellant filed a formal complaint of discrimination

alleging that she had been discriminated against on the bases of race

(Asian Pacific American), sex (female), and reprisal when:

(1) on November 11, 1998, she was placed on a 10-calendar day suspension

for being AWOL from August 20, 1998 through September 29, 1998;

(2) on November 23, 1998, appellant was denied keycard security access

to her work area; and

(3) on December 12, 1998, she was severely admonished by her supervisor

for calling 911 to report a broken steam pipe that was flooding the

work area.

The agency issued a final decision accepting allegation (1) for

investigation. Allegation (2) was dismissed on the grounds of failure

to state a claim and mootness after the agency found that appellant "and

her coworkers had their access restored ... and the problem was repaired

on December 3, 1998". Allegation (3) was also dismissed for failure to

state a claim and mootness after the agency found that "the call to 911

was completed. No adverse action was taken against the complainant".

On appeal, appellant argues that allegations (2) and (3) are reflective of

the on-going harassment and hostility against her. Regarding allegation

(2), appellant argues that, contrary to the agency's statements, there was

no malfunction of the system and that she was the only employee who had a

problem with her keycard access. Appellant argues that while access to

her workstation was denied to her, her coworkers entered and departed the

building with no limitations; and that she was forced to ask coworkers to

open the door for her every time she went to lunch and to the bathroom.

Appellant claims that these actions resulted in additional harassment

because she was then asked by her supervisor why she had taken so long

to go to the cafeteria or to the bathroom. Appellant further argues

that she was the only employee subjected to this harassment.

Concerning allegation (3), appellant argues that as the "the designated

Safety and Fire Warden, she received training to call 911 in instances

of danger to people or the facility." Appellant also contends that

when she followed the requirements of her collateral duty as Safety

and Fire Warden, she was humiliated and yelled at in front of her

coworkers. Appellant further argues that she is the only employee who

"over-supervised, her every move and every piece of work scrutinized".

Finally, appellant argues that the harassment is still taking place.

In her complaint appellant claims that she has been and is currently being

subjected to discriminatory harassment. To support her claim she raises

two incidents which she claims are examples of the harassment against her:

being denied access to her workstation and being yelled at and humiliated

for following her safety training (call to 911). The agency dismissed

both issues for failure to state a claim and mootness. We disagree.

An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or

applicant who believes that he or she has been discriminated against by

that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or

disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103; �1614.106(a). The Commission

has held that while the regulations do not define the term "aggrieved

employee," the United States Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean

an employee who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term,

condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy.

Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (Apr. 21,

1994). "To state a claim under our regulations, an employee must allege

and show an injury in fact." Id. (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445

F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1971)). "Specifically, an employee must allege and

show a `direct, personal deprivation at the hands of the employer,' that

is, a present and unresolved harm or loss affecting a term, condition

or privilege of his/her employment." Id. (citing Hammonds v. United

States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900863 (Oct. 31, 1990); Taylor

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900367 (June 2, 1990)).

We find that the agency should have investigated allegations (2) and (3)

and not dismissed them. The only questions for the agency to consider

are whether the complaint alleges employment discrimination on a basis

covered by EEO statutes and if appellant is aggrieved. If the answer is

yes, then the agency must accept the complaint for processing, regardless

of what it thought of the merits. Odoski v. U.S. Department of Energy,

EEOC Appeal No. 01901496 (April 16, 1990). Appellant claims that she,

an Asian Pacific American female with prior EEO activity, was continuously

harassed by being denied access to her workstation and being yelled at and

humiliated after following her training requirements. Appellant further

alleged that no other employee was treated in this manner and that

after being denied access to her workstation she sought the assistance

of other coworkers to enter and exit the building, which she claims,

resulted in additional harassment. We find that these allegations are

sufficient under Odoski.

Moreover, a review of allegations (2) and (3) persuades the Commission

that the incidents in question are sufficient to support a claim

of harassment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e) provides for the dismissal

of a complaint, or portion thereof, when the issues raised therein

are moot. To determine whether allegations (2) and (3) are moot, it

must be ascertained (1) if it can be said with assurance that there

is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur,

and (2) if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See County of Los

Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). When such circumstances exist,

no relief is available and no need for a determination of the rights of

the parties is presented.

A determination of whether a case is moot often turns on the second

element of the Davis test, that is, whether interim relief or events

have completely eradicated the effects of the alleged discrimination.

In this case, the agency dismissed allegations (2) and (3) as moot

after finding that appellant was provided access to her workstation on

December 3, 1998,<1> and because the 911 call was completed and no adverse

action was taken against appellant. However, appellant claims that:

(a) the incidents raised in the dismissed allegations are examples of the

harassment against her; (b) no other employee is treated as she is; and,

(c) the harassment and hostility against her are currently taking place.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the agency has failed to show that

there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violations will

recur.

Accordingly, the dismissal of allegations (2) and (3) for failure

to state a claim and mootness was not proper and is hereby REVERSED.

Allegations (2) and (3) are REMANDED for further processing in accordance

with this decision and applicable regulations.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

10/28/1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 The record shows that she was denied access since November 23, 1998.