Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1407 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1407
Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems and Alma
Paulette Beveridge

Office and Professional Employees International Un-
ion, Local 277, AFL–CIO and Alma Paulette
Beveridge. Cases 16–CA–17464, 16-CA–17588,
16–CB–4764, and 16–CB–4805
August 25, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On September 23, 1996, Administrative Law Judge
Albert A. Metz issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent and the Union filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief
to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings,1 findings,2 and conclusions to
the extent consistent with this Decision and Order and to
adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.
Reclassification of P&A Employees
The judge found that the Respondent Employer vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and that the Respon-
dent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act
by, inter alia, entering into an unlawful agreement to
accrete previously unrepresented salaried professional
and administrative employees (P&A) in Department 17-4
(Graphic Arts) into the existing bargaining unit at a time
when the Union did not represent a majority of these
previously unrepresented P&A employees and by apply-
ing the terms of the Respondent’s collective-bargaining
agreement to them.
The Respondents except to the judge’s findings, con-
tending that this case involves only the lawful return of
bargaining unit work which had seeped out over time
from the bargaining unit. We find merit in the Respon-
dents’ exceptions and, for the following reasons, we re-
verse the judge’s findings in this respect.
The basic facts are not in dispute. The judge found that
the Respondents have had a collective-bargaining rela-
tionship since 1951 and have signed successive collec-
tive-bargaining agreements over the years covering a unit
of all office and clerical employees. It is also undisputed
that the P&A employees have been historically excluded.

1 The Respondent Employer has renewed its motion to reopen the
record to submit transcript testimony from a 10(j) hearing which was
previously denied by the judge. For the reasons stated by the judge and
in light of our decision in this matter, we deny the motion.
The Respondent Employer has also requested oral argument. The re-
quest is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present
the issues and the positions of the parties.
2 The Respondent Employer has also excepted to some of the judge’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are in-
correct. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
In 1993, at the time of the negotiations surrounding the
collective-bargaining agreement effective from Decem-
ber 13, 1993, to May 4, 1997, the Respondents discussed
the growing number of grievances filed by unit employ-
ees alleging that nonunit employees were performing
bargaining unit work.3 In an effort to resolve these dis-
putes, the parties agreed to perform audits of jobs and
their tasks, particularly those in departments that were
involved in the grievances. Pursuant to that agreement,
in the summer of 1994, the Respondents formed an audit
committee that consisted of representatives from Lock-
heed’s management and the Union. As the judge found,
their mission was to examine the jobs/tasks that were the
subject of the grievances, interview the nonunit employ-
ees who were performing those tasks, and make recom-
mendations as to whether the disputed tasks were bar-
gaining unit work. This resulted in audits being per-
formed in several departments, including department 17-
4, whose work involved editing and the development of
graphics for brochures, sales proposals, posters, and in-
ternal newspapers. By March 1995, the audits were com-
pleted. In department 17-4, 76 jobs were audited, and 26
were determined to comprise primarily bargaining unit
work. These jobs were then reclassified as bargaining
unit positions with new job titles of document editor and
computer graphics technician. The Respondents agreed
that since there were no unit employees on layoff status
with recall rights, the nonunit P&A employees who had
been performing this work would be offered transfers to
these new unit positions.
The judge found, in agreement with the General Coun-
sel, that the P&A employees who transferred into the unit
were unlawfully accreted to the unit because they had
been historically excluded from the unit and they had
never designated the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative. The Respondents except, contending,
inter alia, that the judge erred in applying the Board’s
accretion analysis to the events in this case. Contrary to
our dissenting colleague, we find merit in this exception.
The Respondents in this case were faced with a prob-
lem of a growing number of grievances alleging that
nonunit employees were performing unit work. They
decided through collective bargaining to resolve the
problem through a job audit of the departments involved
in these grievances, including department 17-4. The audit
revealed that of the 76 nonunit P&A jobs in department
17-4, 26 consisted of bargaining unit work. In other
words, through the course of time, bargaining unit
3 Because of defense spending cutbacks, the Union was also losing
members who were either being laid off or retired. In 1990, the Union’s
bargaining unit was about 2000 members, but by 1993 the bargaining
unit had shrunk to approximately 1095 members.
331 NLRB No. 190
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1408
worked had “seeped out” of the unit, and the Respon-
dents agreed that the work performed by these 26 non-
unit employees should be returned to the bargaining unit.
The Respondents then negotiated a procedure for the
return of this work to the bargaining unit. Since there
were no bargaining unit employees on layoff status with
recall rights, the Respondents agreed that the nonunit
P&A employees who had been performing this bargain-
ing unit work would be allowed to “follow the work” and
would therefore be offered transfers to the unit. If they
chose not to accept the transfers, they could bid on any
existing vacancies in jobs for which they were qualified
or they could risk being laid off.
Under these circumstances, we do not find that the
P&A employees who accepted transfers to the bargaining
unit constituted an accretion to the bargaining unit. Sig-
nificantly, the General Counsel did not allege that the
Respondents’ agreement to conduct a job audit was in
any way unlawful or that the audit process was in any
way tainted. Thus, the General Counsel is not contesting
the finding of the audit that the work of 26 nonunit P&A
positions in department 17-4 was bargaining unit work.4
Further, the General Counsel did not allege that the Re-
spondents were attempting to expand the unit description
to include the historically excluded classification of P&A
employees.
In sum, the General Counsel is not contesting the right
of the Respondents to return work to the bargaining unit.
Rather, his argument seems to be that even if P&A em-
ployees have been assigned what is concededly bargain-
ing unit work, they cannot be treated as bargaining unit
employees and covered by the collective-bargaining
agreement because at the time the unit was established,
the P&A employees did not perform bargaining unit
work and were therefore not included in the bargaining
unit.
The fallacy of the General Counsel’s theory can be
easily demonstrated. Had there been bargaining unit em-
ployees on layoff status and had they been recalled to do
the returned unit work, there could be no contention that
the recalled unit employees constituted an accretion to
the unit. Similarly, had the Respondents agreed to hire 26
new employees to do the bargaining unit work that had
been returned to the unit, there could be no contention
that the new hires constituted an accretion. Yet, the op-
erative facts in these scenarios are the same as in the sce-
nario agreed to by the Respondents whereby nonunit
employees were allowed to transfer into the unit. In each
case, work that belongs in the bargaining unit is being
returned to the unit and thus the unit is being increased

4 Our dissenting colleague repeatedly suggests that the work in ques-
tion was not in fact bargaining unit work, but was really “nonunit”
work by some sort of “sleight of hand.” The dissent cites no evidence
in support of this contention, as there is none.
by 26 positions.5 That the Respondents agreed to offer
nonunit employees transfers to the bargaining unit rather
than laying them off and hiring new employees should
not and does not require a different analysis.6 Indeed,
because they were offered transfers, these employees are
actually better off than they would have been had the
Employer followed the entirely lawful alternative course
of simply laying them off and hiring new employees to
perform the bargaining unit work.
Accordingly, we find that the transfer of nonunit em-
ployees into the unit did not constitute an accretion and
that the Respondents did not violate the Act in this re-
gard, as alleged. We therefore dismiss these complaint
allegations.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that
A. Respondent Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Sys-
tems, Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with discharge if they did
not agree to join the Union or sign a union dues-checkoff
authorization card.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Fort Worth, Texas, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix A.” 7 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16,
5 Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we are not “ignoring” the
Sec. 7 rights of the P&A employees. Under Sec. 7 and Sec. 8(a)(3) of
the Act, an employee hired into an appropriate bargaining unit repre-
sented by a union does not have a right to choose to perform unit work
but be unrepresented by the union or exempt from the obligations im-
posed by a lawful union-security agreement covering that unit. The
choice the P&A employees did have, consistent with their Sec. 7 right
to remain unrepresented, was to refuse a transfer into the unit. Cf. The
Sun, 329 NLRB 854, 856 (1999) (new employees who perform job
functions similar to those performed by unit employees, as defined by
unit description, presumed to be part of that unit unless the unit func-
tions they perform are incidental to their primary work function or are
otherwise an insignificant part of their work).
6 The accretion cases, relied on by the judge and our dissenting col-
league, are simply not applicable in this case. The Respondent and the
Union did not attempt to expand the unit by adding the P&A job classi-
fication to the unit. Rather, they sought to adhere to the scope of the
bargaining unit to which they had agreed by returning unit work to the
unit to be performed by employees in the job classification that, by
their agreement, should have been performing the work all along.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1409
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since July 3, 1995.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
B. Respondent Office and Professional Employees In-
ternational Union, Local 277, AFL–CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees that the Union would seek
their discharges if they refused to sign a union member-
ship application and dues-checkoff authorization card.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union office copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix B.”8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed its office involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent Union shall duplicate and mail, at its own ex-
pense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent Lock-
heed at any time since July 3, 1995.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

8 See fn. 7, above.

MEMBER BRAME, dissenting in part.
The primary issue here is whether Lockheed (the Em-
ployer) and the Union (collectively, the Respondents)
violated the Act by compelling unrepresented nonunit
employees to join the bargaining unit.1 The judge found
that they did. Concentrating their analysis on the work
performed rather than on the Section 7 rights of the em-
ployees who performed it, my colleagues find that the
Respondents’ conduct of forcing unrepresented nonunit
employees into the bargaining unit was lawful because
the Respondents, they assert, were merely reabsorbing
into the bargaining unit work that had “seeped out” from
it. For the reasons set out below, I find my colleagues’
reasons for reversing the judge unconvincing, their
“analysis” without legal significance, and their result
contrary to the Board’s longstanding and well-
established policy of protecting the Section 7 rights of
employees in matters of unit placement. I therefore dis-
sent.
The facts are straightforward. Lockheed operates a
military aircraft manufacturing facility in Fort Worth,
Texas. Lockheed and the Union have had a collective-
bargaining relationship at the Fort Worth facility since
1951. Since about 1966, the Union has represented the
following unit of employees at the Fort Worth facility:
Included: All office and clerical employees in the Em-
ployer’s Fort Worth, Texas Division and all employees
of the Employer employed at its Fort Worth, Texas
plant in the classification of Photographer A and B, and
Photographic Laboratory Man A and B. Excluded: All
other employees, including confidential employees,
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility is considered a Federal
enclave and at all material times the Respondents’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement has contained a union-security
provision. The Respondents’ most recent collective-
bargaining agreement was effective from December 13,
1993, to May 4, 1997. During the negotiations for that
agreement, the Respondents discussed the increasing
number of grievances alleging that nonunit employees
were performing unit work. The impetus for the griev-
ances was, in part, the number of unit employee layoffs
caused by a reduction in national defense spending. In
fact, there were about 2000 employees in the bargaining
unit in 1990, but this number had shrunk to approxi-
mately 1095 by 1993. In summer 1994, the Respondents
formed audit committees consisting of Lockheed em-
1 A secondary issue here is whether Lockheed and the Union vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (2), and Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), respectively, by unlaw-
fully threatening certain employees that they would have to join the
Union and sign dues-authorization cards or be terminated. I join my
colleagues in adopting the judge’s findings of these violations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1410
ployees and union representatives to examine the tasks
that were the subject of the grievances.
Unrepresented professional and administrative (P&A)
employees in Lockheed’s department 17-4 performed
some of the contested work which was the subject of the
audit. Based on an audit of 76 of the P&A jobs in de-
partment 17-4, it was concluded that 26 of the employees
in that department performed unit work and that there-
fore their jobs should be reclassified as unit positions.
Two new unit titles were created for the reclassified em-
ployees, document editor and computer graphics techni-
cian. Since there were no unit employees on layoff
status with recall rights, the Respondents agreed to offer
the 26 nonunit P&A employees transfers to these newly
classified unit positions.
On March 10, 1995, the Respondents told the affected
employees that they were being reclassified as repre-
sented unit employees although none of these employees
had designated the Union as his bargaining representa-
tive prior to the March 10 meeting.2 The change offi-
cially took place on March 13. Several of the P&A em-
ployees testified that they had been performing their jobs
prior to the 1993 negotiations and that these jobs had
remained the same after they were reclassified as bar-
gaining unit positions.
As relevant here, the General Counsel alleged that the
Respondents, by reclassifying the unrepresented P&A
employees as bargaining unit employees and then ex-
tending the Union’s recognition to them, interfered with,
and/or restrained and coerced those employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights. Specifically, the com-
plaint alleged that Lockheed violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by reclassifying “a group of previously unrepre-
sented employees in Department 17-4 and similarly situ-
ated employees” from salaried positions to hourly bar-
gaining unit positions; that it violated Section 8(a)(2) by
granting recognition to the Union as the exclusive repre-
sentative of those employees at a time when the Union
did not represent a majority of those employees; and that
it violated Section 8(a)(3) by applying the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement to these previously
unrrepresented employees. The complaint further al-
leged that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
by accepting recognition as the representative “of a
group of previously unrepresented employees in Depart-
ment 17-4 and similarly situated employees” at a time

2 Also at the March 10 meeting, Union Representative J. B. Moss
stated that if a P&A employee did not sign his union membership and
dues-authorization cards within 30 days, the employee would be termi-
nated. On March 20, Supervisor Mickey Winchester told P&A em-
ployee Monte Richardson, who was on vacation at the time of the re-
classification, that he would have to join the Union or be discharged,
and on April 8, Supervisor Larry Crook told P&A employee Stacy Jobe
that if she did not sign the dues authorization card, Lockheed would
have to initiate the process of discharging her. These events form the
factual predicate for the judge’s findings of the 8(a)(1) and (2) and
8(b)(1)(A) violations discussed above at fn. 1.
when the Union had not been designated as the exclusive
representative by a majority of those employees and by
applying the terms of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment to these previously unrepresented employees.
Since the complaint alleged, in effect, that the Respon-
dents unlawfully added nonunit employees to the bar-
gaining unit, the judge applied an accretion analysis to
determine the legality of the Respondents’ conduct.3 It
being undisputed that the P&A employees had been his-
torically excluded from the bargaining unit, the judge
found that under the Board’s Laconia Shoe doctrine,4
which forbids the accretion to a bargaining unit of em-
ployees who have been historically excluded from it, the
Respondents’ accretion of the P&A employees into the
bargaining unit was unlawful. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the judge considered and rejected as “a distinction
without substance” the Respondents’ sophistic gambit
that the reclassification applied only to the audited work
and not to the nonunit employees who performed that
work. This should be the end of the matter.
Unfortunately, however, my colleagues seize on the
Respondents’ gambit as their own to proclaim that the
judge erred by finding a “distinction without substance”
the Respondents’ characterization of the reclassification
as one of work rather than employees. My colleagues
then use this gambit as an analytical springboard from
which first to detach the work performed from the em-
ployees who perform it, and then those employees from
their Section 7 rights. For the reasons set out below, my
colleagues’ decision cannot stand because they can nei-
ther justify their result nor explain why such a departure
from Board precedent is warranted.
The fallacy of my colleagues’ “analysis” that leads to
their wrongheaded result is easily revealed. Simply put,
my colleagues vest with legal significance that which has
no legal significance, i.e., the Respondents’ agreement
between themselves to reclassify the audited work as
bargaining unit work. Relying on negative inferences,
including, inter alia, that “the General Counsel did not
allege that the Respondents’ agreement to conduct a job
audit was in any way unlawful or that the audit process
was in any way tainted,” and that the General Counsel
did not “contest” the results of the audit, my colleagues
finesse a finding that the Respondents’ agreement to re-
classify the nonunit work as bargaining unit work had the
legal effect of actually transforming that work into bar-
gaining unit work. Based on this sleight of hand, my
colleagues can then assert positively that the transferred
employees were merely assigned what is “concededly”
bargaining unit work, and that therefore under the “sce-
nario” agreed to by the Respondents, the nonunit em-
3 As explained in Gould, Inc., 263 NLRB 442, 445 (1982) (footnote
omitted): “An accretion, as the term has been employed by the Board
and the courts, is merely the addition of new employees to an already
existing group or unit of employees.”
4 Laconia Shoe Co., 215 NLRB 573 (1974).
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1411
ployees allowed to transfer into the bargaining unit to
perform this new work were analytically no different
from employees recalled from layoff to perform the
work, or from new employees hired to perform it. Hav-
ing thus stripped the unrepresented P&A employees of
their Section 7 rights,5 my colleagues conclude that the
mere fact that these employees were transferred into the
unit from nonunit positions rather than recalled from
layoff or hired as new employees neither changes the
analysis nor constitutes an accretion.
By thus shifting the analysis from the issue presented,
i.e., whether the unrepresented P&A employees’ Section
7 rights were violated when they were forced into the
bargaining unit, to an issue of no legal significance, the
Respondents’ agreement to reclassify the audited work as
bargaining unit work, and then feigning that this issue is
actually dispositive of the issue presented, my colleagues
avoid any discussion of the Section 7 rights of the unrep-
resented P&A employees. By ignoring these Section 7
rights, my colleagues find that the Respondents did not
violate them. Such is the thrust of the Respondents’
gambit and their agreed-on “scenario.” Such is the result
of my colleagues’ “analysis.”
However, contrary to my colleagues’ findings, the fact
that the Respondents fixed on, as my colleagues put it, a
“scenario” whereby they could agree that the audited
work was bargaining unit work, does not resolve the is-
sue of whether they could lawfully compel the unrepre-
sented P&A employees to join the bargaining unit. For
the fact that the Respondents agreed between themselves
to reclassify the audited work as bargaining unit work
has no legal significance and, indeed, is totally irrelevant
to the issue presented, which is, after all, an issue of unit
placement. Thus, whether the unrepresented P&A em-
ployees can be added to the bargaining unit by agreement
of the parties is, as the judge correctly found, fundamen-
tally an issue of accretion. And, as explained in Honey-
well, Inc.6:
Issues of accretion are representational issues for
the Board to determine. . . . Although unions and
employers are not precluded from initially attempt-
ing to resolve such issues through contractual griev-
ance and arbitration machinery, the Board’s deter-
mination takes precedence.
But in resolving representational issues involving the
placement of employees in a bargaining unit, including is-
sues of accretion as we have here, the Board has assigned

5 As relevant here, Sec. 7 states (emphasis added):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities[.]
6 307 NLRB 278, 283 (1992), reconsideration granted in part 310
NLRB 517 (1993).
primary importance to the very issue which my colleagues
have ignored here, the vindication of the employees’ Sec-
tion 7 rights, “which rights, of course, include both joining a
labor organization or refraining from doing so[.]”7 As the
Board explained in Melbet Jewelry, 180 NLRB 107, 109
(1969) (footnote omitted; emphasis added):
The Board . . . must examine fundamentals and
put the Section 7 rights guaranteed the employees
and the appropriate unit concept of Section 9(b) into
proper perspective.[8] Excessive preoccupation with
“appropriate unit” . . . leads to the abrogation of
those rights. Section 7 of the Act is not subordinate
to Section 9(b). As the Board indicated in Haag
Drug [169 NLRB 877], quite the opposite is true.
Section 9(b) directs the Board to select units to “as-
sure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by this Act . . .”—which rights,
of course, are those set out in Section 7.
Since the Board has given preeminence in unit placement
issues to the Section 7 right of employees to “assure to em-
ployees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaran-
teed by [the] Act,” it naturally follows, as explained by the
judge, that “[t]he Board has followed a restrictive policy in
finding accretion because it forecloses the employees’ basic
right to select their bargaining representative.” Towne Ford
Sales, 270 NLRB 311, 311 (1984), affd. sub nom. Machin-
ists v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1985).
A corollary to the Board’s application of a restrictive
policy in finding accretion is set out in Laconia Shoe,
supra, 215 NLRB at 576 (footnote omitted), where the
Board explained that
[t]he single most crucial factor in any “accretion case”
under settled Board law is whether the group sought to
be accreted has been in existence at the time of recogni-
tion or certification, yet not covered in an ensuing con-
tract, or, having come into existence, has not been part
of the larger unit to which their accretion is sought or
granted. . . . When a group has in fact been excluded
for a significant period of time from an existing produc-
tion and maintenance unit, the Board will not permit
their accretion without an election or a showing of ma-
jority among them even if no other union could attain
representative status for them.
In other words, when employees have been historically ex-
cluded from a bargaining unit, that “‘historical exclusion . . .
is determinative’ against their later accretion absent evi-
dence of the majority’s preference.” Teamsters National
UPS Negotiating Committee v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 1518, 1521
7 Haag Drug Co., 169 NLRB 877, 877 (1968).
8 As relevant here, Sec. 9(b) provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to em-
ployees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof[.]
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1412
(D.C. Cir. 1994).9 In approving the Board’s application of
Laconia Shoe, the court explained that “[b]oth the Board
and the courts recognize that the Laconia Shoe doctrine is
critical to the protection of employees’ Section 7 right to
choose whether to belong to a union and if so to which
one.” Id.
In the present case, where the fact of the P&A employ-
ees’ historical exclusion from the bargaining unit is un-
contested, the judge correctly applied the Board’s Laco-
nia Shoe doctrine to find that their historical exclusion
precluded their accretion into the bargaining unit. In so
doing, the judge vindicated the Section 7 right of these
employees “to choose whether to belong to a union and if
so to which one.” In refusing the Respondents’ gambit
to detach the work performed from the employees who
perform it, the judge properly declined to follow the Re-
spondents’ “logic” which must inevitably lead, as the
majority’s decision shows, to the sacrifice of the P&A
employees’ “Section 7 right to choose whether to belong
to a union and if so to which one.” Since such a sacrifice
of Section 7 rights would, as shown above, be wholly
contrary to the Board’s policy of protecting these funda-
mental employee rights which informs the Board’s
analysis of unit placement and accretion issues, the judge
did not err in finding that the Respondents violated the
Act by accreting the employees at issue here into the
bargaining unit.
While my colleagues may desire to check the declining
membership of a bargaining unit by absorbing into the
unit work that they assert has “seeped out” from it, they
cannot do so by conducting a mopping up operation that
effectively wipes out the Section 7 rights of unrepre-
sented employees.10 My colleagues’ failure to mention,
much less to consider, much less to vindicate these Sec-
tion 7 rights marks a clear departure from well-
established Board precedent.11 That my colleagues can

9 As the Board explained in the underlying decision, United Parcel
Service, 303 NLRB 326, 327 (1991) (emphasis in original):
The limitations on accretion . . . applied in Laconia Shoe and
related precedent require neither that the union have acquiesced in
the historical exclusion of a group of employees from an existing
unit, nor that the excluded group have some common job-related
characteristic distinct from unit employees. It is the fact of his-
torical exclusion that is determinative.
10 Stated otherwise, even though the Laconia Shoe “fits,” my col-
leagues decline to “wear it.”
11 My colleagues can only assert that they are “not ‘ignoring’ the
Sec. 7 rights of the P&A employees” by analogizing the Sec. 7 rights of
those employees to those of newly hired employees who in my col-
leagues’ words, “[do] not have a right to choose to perform unit work
but be unrepresented by the union[.]” By making such an argument,
my colleagues only prove what they attempt to disprove: that they are
ignoring the Sec. 7 rights of the P&A employees. For by passing over
the fact that the P&A employees are not newly hired employees, my
colleagues ignore the fact that they have already exercised their Sec.7
rights by choosing not to be represented by the Union. Given that the
P&A employees have already exercised their Sec. 7 rights in this mat-
ter, it is disingenuous for my colleagues now to assert that they are not
“ignoring” the Sec. 7 rights of those employees when, by their decision,
only justify their departure from Board precedent by re-
lying on negative inferences to find legally dispositive an
issue which is, in fact, of no legal significance only un-
derscores the poverty of analysis. That such an analysis
is bereft of any supporting case citation can hardly be
deemed surprising.
For all these reasons, I find that my colleagues’ “rea-
sons” for reversing the judge only confirm the soundness
of the judge’s decision. Accordingly, contrary to my
colleagues, I would adopt the judge’s findings that the
Respondents violated the Act as alleged and would re-
quire the Respondents to abide by the judge’s recom-
mended Orders to remedy the violations found.12
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

they compel the P&A employees to join the bargaining unit or risk the
loss of their jobs.
12 As noted above, the complaint’s allegations encompassed the de-
partment 17-4 employees and other “similarly situated” employees.
The Respondents except to the judge’s inclusion of such “similarly
situated” employees in the remedy section of his decision. For the
following reasons, I find the Respondents’ exceptions without merit.
As explained in Morton Metal Works, 310 NLRB 195, 195 (1993),
enfd. mem. 9 F.3d 108 (6th Cir. 1993):
It is well established that both named and unnamed discriminatees are
entitled to a reinstatement and make-whole remedy in a situation, as
here, where the General Counsel has alleged and proven discrimina-
tion against a defined and easily identified class of employees.
I find that these criteria are met here. As established by the General Coun-
sel, the class of affected employees is easily definable as all unrepresented
employees who were historically excluded from the bargaining unit and (1)
who were reclassified to bargaining unit positions; (2) who had the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement applied to them by the Respondents; and (3) as to
whom Lockheed granted recognition to the Union as their exclusive bar-
gaining representative from about Jan. 5, 1995, to the present. The General
Counsel has also established that the affected employees are easily identifi-
able as the specific identification of known affected individuals are set forth
in GC Exhs. 30 and 33 which list, respectively, the names of 26 employees
in department 17-4 and 3 employees in department 88 (material finance)
who were reclassified from unrepresented salaried positions to bargaining
unit positions and otherwise meet the criteria which defines the affected
class of employees set out above. I agree with the judge that the extent to
which the remedy would apply to such “similarly situated” employees
should be resolved at the compliance proceeding.
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1413
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge if
they refuse to join the Union or sign union dues-checkoff
authorization cards.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten employees that the Union
will seek their discharges if they refuse to sign a union
membership application and dues-checkoff authorization
card.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 277, AFL–CIO
Timothy L. Watson, Esq. and David Garza, Esq., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Gary L. Ingram, Esq., of Fort Worth, Texas, for the Respondent
Company.
James L. Hicks Jr., Esq., of Dallas, Texas, for the Respondent
Union.
Alma Paulette Beveridge, of Fort Worth, Texas, Charging
Party.
DECISION
Introduction
ALBERT A. METZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard at Fort Worth, Texas, on May 28–30, 1996.1 Alma
Paulette Beveridge has charged that Respondent Lockheed
Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (Lockheed) and Respondent
Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local
277, AFL–CIO (the Union) have respectively violated Section
8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Na-

1 All subsequent dates refer to 1995 unless otherwise indicated.
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act).2
The primary issue is whether the Respondents violated the
Act by agreeing to accrete certain previously unrepresented
salaried employees into the bargaining unit represented by the
Union. Additionally, there is an issue of whether the Respon-
dents made various threats to employees that they would be
discharged if they did not join the Union and/or sign dues de-
duction authorization cards.
Both Respondents admit that Lockheed is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
I. RULINGS ON POSTHEARING MOTIONS
Subsequent to the hearing Lockheed and the Government
filed various motions.
A. Lockheed’s Motion to Reopen the Hearing
Lockheed filed a motion seeking to reopen the hearing.
Lockheed asks that portions of a transcript from an ancillary
Section 10(j) Federal District Court proceeding be accepted as
part of this record. The Respondent particularly focuses on
arguments made by Government counsel before the District
Court and testimony of witnesses who had also testified in the
instant hearing. The latter is characterized in Lockheed’s mo-
tion as “merely additional testimony from witnesses who ap-
peared previously . . . [and] would not represent entirely new
evidence.” The Government filed an opposition to this motion
asking that it be denied.
Lockheed’s request does not meet the test of a motion to re-
open the record. Section 102.48(d)(1), Board’s Rules and
Regulations. Lockheed’s motion to reopen the hearing is de-
nied.
B. Government’s Motion to Strike Portions of Union’s Brief
Counsel for the General Counsel moves to strike a reference
in the Union’s brief to the Government’s memorandum submit-
ted in the 10(j) injunction proceeding. (U. Br. at 4 and attached
portion of memorandum.) The motion points out that the mate-
rial cited has not been made a part of the record in the instant
case. On that basis the Government’s motion relative to the
Union’s brief is granted. The noted portions of the Union’s
brief are stricken. United Parcel Service, 303 NLRB 326 fn. 2
(1991).
C. Government’s Motion to Strike Lockheed’s Brief
The Government moves to strike Lockheed’s brief for the
reason a copy was not served on the Charging Party, Alma
Paulette Beveridge. In the alternative the motion asks that por-
tions of Lockheed’s brief which make reference to matters that
are not a part of the record in this case be stricken. (App. A, any
reference thereto, and last sentence of fn. 4.) Service of briefs is
required to be made on all parties. Section 102.42, Board’s
Rules and Regulations. The service sheet of Lockheed’s brief
does not show that its brief was served on the Charging Party.
Lockheed explained this was an oversight and has now served
its brief on the Charging Party. On balance I find that the
Charging Party was not prejudiced by this oversight. Alma
Beveridge relied on Government counsel to represent her inter-
2 The Government withdrew charges relating to Cases 16–CA–
17681 and 16–CB–4927 (concerning the suspension and discharge of
Alma Paulette Beveridge).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1414
ests in the case and there has been no assertion that she was
prejudiced by receiving the brief late.
Counsel for the General Counsel’s motion to strike Lock-
heed’s brief in its entirety is denied. The motion is also denied
as to the references in footnote 4. The motion is granted with
respect to Appendix A, which is material not introduced into
evidence in this hearing.3
II. BACKGROUND
Lockheed operates a military aircraft manufacturing facility
in Fort Worth, Texas. The Union and Lockheed have had a
collective-bargaining relationship at the facility since about
1951. Since approximately 1966 the Union has continuously
represented a unit of employees in the following unit:

Included: All office and clerical employees in the Employer’s
Fort Worth, Texas Division and all employees of the Em-
ployer employed at its Fort Worth, Texas plant in the classifi-
cation of Photographer A and B, and Photographic Labora-
tory Man A and B. Excluded: All other employees, including
confidential employees, professional employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

The Respondents have signed successive collective-
bargaining contracts over the years covering the unit. Lock-
heed’s Fort Worth facility is considered a Federal enclave and
at all material times the Respondents’ collective-bargaining
agreement has contained a union-security clause that requires
financial support from unit employees after a 30-day waiting
period.
III. P&A EMPLOYEES ARE ACCRETED INTO THE UNIT
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement between
the Respondents is effective from December 13, 1993, to May
4, 1997. At the time of the negotiations for this agreement the
Respondents discussed the increasing number of grievances
that were being filed alleging that nonunit employees were
doing unit work. This influx of grievances was fueled, in part,
by a reduction in national defense spending and the consequent
layoff of Lockheed workers.
In approximately the summer of 1994 the Respondents
formed audit committees consisting of members from Lock-
heed and the Union. Their mission was to examine some of the
tasks that were the subject of grievances. The unrepresented
employees who were allegedly doing the unit work were inter-
viewed by the audit committees and a recommendation was
then made as to whether the disputed tasks were unit work.
Some of the contested work was being done by salaried pro-
fessional and administrative (P&A) employees in department
17-4. Their work involves editing and graphics of such things
as brochures, sales proposals, posters, and internal newspapers.
These P&A employees were not represented by the Union. The
audit of department 17-4 examined 76 P&A jobs. The conclu-
sion of the audit process was that 26 of these employees per-
formed unit work and their jobs would be reclassified as unit
positions. Lockheed recognized the Union as the exclusive
representative of these P&A employees and the Respondents
applied the terms of the existing collective-bargaining contract

3 The Government objected to Lockheed’s method of requesting an
extension of time to file a response to the Government’s motions. The
granting of the extension has been reconsidered and, in light of all the
circumstances, is affirmed.
to them. Two new unit titles were created for this reclassified
work—document editor and computer graphics technician.
On March 10, 1995, the effected P&A employees were
called to a joint Union-Company meeting and told they were
being reclassified as represented unit employees. The change
officially took effect the next Monday, March 13. It is undis-
puted that none of the P&A employees had designated the Un-
ion as their collective-bargaining representative prior to the
March 10 meeting. Several reclassified P&A employees testi-
fied they had been performing their jobs before the 1993 nego-
tiations and their jobs remained the same after they were reclas-
sified to unit positions.
The reclassification had the effect of diminishing the P&A
employees’ sick leave, vacation benefits, and the number of
funds they could invest in under their 401(k) plans. Their insur-
ance plans were changed and matching funds in investment
plans were reduced. There was a similar diminution of benefits
in other areas such as flexible scheduling, lack of eligibility for
bonuses, and reduced amounts of raises. The collective-
bargaining contract applied to the reclassified employees also
states that “under normal circumstances bargaining unit em-
ployees will not be offered promotions to Professional and
Administrative (P&A) positions within their departments or
transfer to Management Support classifications.” The reclassi-
fied employees’ wages were “red-circled” so they would not
suffer a reduction in pay on transfer to the unit.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ACCRETION
The Board takes a prudent and limiting position in accretion
representation situations:
The Board has followed a restrictive policy in finding ac-
cretion because it forecloses the employees’ basic right to
select their collective bargaining representative. We stated
in Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 NLRB 107, 110 (1969), that
the Board “will not, . . . under the guise of accretion, com-
pel a group of employees, who may constitute a separate
appropriate unit, to be included in an overall unit without
allowing those employees the opportunity of expressing
their preference in a secret election.” Towne Ford Sales,
270 NLRB 311 (1984).
In Laconia Shoe Co., 215 NLRB 573, 576 (1974), the Board
expounded upon its accretion policy by discussing the follow-
ing principle:
The single most crucial factor in any ‘accretion case’ under
settled Board law is whether the group sought to be accreted
has been in existence at the time of recognition or certifica-
tion, yet not covered in an ensuing contract.
In United Parcel Service, 303 NLRB 326, 327 (1991), the
Board explained further that:
The limitations on accretion . . . require neither that the union
have acquiesced in the historical exclusion of a group of em-
ployees from the existing unit, nor that the excluded group
have some common job-related characteristic distinct from
unit employees. It is the fact of historical exclusion that is de-
terminative. [Emphasis in the original.]
The Respondents argue that they did not transfer employees
into the unit but rather reabsorbed unit work that had “seeped”
away from the unit. It is asserted that the only reason the P&A
employees kept their jobs was because no laid-off unit employ-
ees were available to take the positions. The Respondents’
LOCKHEED MARTIN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1415
characterization of the reclassification as involving only job
tasks and not the individuals who performed the work is a dis-
tinction without substance. The P&A employees performing the
work were clearly transferred into the unit. They had been per-
forming the same tasks since before the 1993 collective-
bargaining contract was negotiated and their positions were not
covered by the 1993 contract. Importantly, these historically
unrepresented P&A employees’ desires as to representation
were never determined. Finally, the Union did not represent a
majority of these employees before their accretion into the unit.
The previously unrepresented P&A employees did not con-
stitute a proper accretion to the office clerical unit. I find that
Respondent Lockheed violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of
the Act by accreting the P&A employees into the bargaining
unit, granting exclusive collective-bargaining recognition to the
Union when it was not the designated majority representative of
the P&A employees, and applying the terms of the collective-
bargaining contract to them. Likewise the Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by accepting recognition of
the P&A employees when it did not represent a majority of
these employees and applying the terms of the Respondents’
collective-bargaining contract to them. Teamsters National
UPS Negotiating Committee v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 1518 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
V. BREADTH OF THE REMEDY
The complaint alleges that since January 3, 1995, the de-
partment 17-4 employees and others “similarly situated” were
harmed by the Respondents’ unlawful accretion actions. The
Government argues that the remedy should be broad enough to
cover such others. The Respondents assert that there is insuffi-
cient evidence to support more than a violation with respect to
department 17-4.
The record shows that grievances were resolved by reclassi-
fication in departments other than 17-4. In January 1996, three
unrepresented P&A employees were reclassified and accreted
to Union represented positions in material finance, department
88. Background evidence demonstrated that a large number of
employees in the engineering department were also reclassified
from unrepresented to represented positions.
The Government has made a sufficient showing that the Re-
spondents’ use of the audit/reclassification process was more
far reaching than department 17-4. Therefore, I find that it is
appropriate to order a remedy that includes others similarly
situated who have been unlawfully effected by this process
within the 10(b) period. The extent to which this remedy ap-
plies to other employees will be left to the compliance process.
Morton Metal Works, 310 NLRB 195 (1993), enfd. 9 F.3d 108
(6th Cir. 1993); Iron Workers Local 433 (Reynolds Electrical),
298 NLRB 35, 36 (1990), enfd. 931 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1991).
VI. ALLEGED THREATS TO EMPLOYEES
The Government alleges that both Lockheed and the Union
unlawfully threatened certain employees that they must join the
Union and sign dues authorization checkoff cards or they would
be terminated. The Respondents deny any such threats were
ever made.
A. March 10 Statements by Union Representative Moss
Union Representative J. B. Moss was among the persons
who addressed the employees at the March 10 meeting an-
nouncing their incorporation into the unit. Employee Stacy Jobe
testified that the employees received a dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion card and a union membership card during the course of the
meeting. Moss was asked a question as to what would happen if
the employees did not sign the cards. Jobe remembered Moss
replying that the employee would be terminated. P&A em-
ployee Paula Beveridge had the same recollection of Moss’
statement about the cards. Employee Lowell Perkins recalled
Moss saying that one of the cards (union membership) had to
be signed that day and the other (dues checkoff) had to be
signed within the next 30 days or the employees would be ter-
minated.
Moss denied telling the assembled employees that they
would be discharged if they did not join the Union or sign a
checkoff authorization. He was supported in this denial by
Lockheed’s director of employee relations, Charles Bartek, who
denied that Moss said the employees would be required to sign
a union card within 30 days or be terminated. Additionally,
Lori Hunter, a human resources specialist for Lockheed, was
called to testify by her Employer. She was asked if while she
was in the meeting she heard Moss say anything about termina-
tion if employees did not sign union cards. She denied hearing
Moss make such a statement. On cross-examination Hunter
admitted that she was only present in the meeting for about 15
minutes and was not present when Moss addressed the employ-
ees.
I find the demeanor of Moss and Bartek when testifying re-
garding threats of termination during the March 10 meeting not
to be persuasive. Likewise their general denials were not com-
pelling. In contrast the three employees’ testimony presented
the impression of persons who were directly and deeply ef-
fected by the threat of discharge they attributed to Moss. The
demeanor of each of these employees was that of a person who
was recalling the event as accurately as memory allows. I credit
the employees’ version of the meeting and find that Moss did
make the threat of discharge if the employees did not sign the
cards. The Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when
this threat was made to the assembled employees. Communica-
tions Workers Local 1101 (New York Telephone Co.), 281
NLRB 413 (1986); and Service Employees Local 680 (Leland
Stanford University), 232 NLRB 32 (1977).
B. March 20 Statements by Supervisor Winchester
P&A employee Monte Richardson was on vacation when his
department 17-4 administrative services representative job was
reclassified. When he returned to work on about March 20 his
supervisor, Mickey Winchester, explained to him that his job
tasks had not changed. According to Richardson, Winchester
also told him that he would need to join the Union or he would
be discharged. Winchester denied that he told Richardson he
had to join the Union or he would be terminated.
Richardson’s testimony was certain and his demeanor was
believable as to what he was told by Winchester about having
to join the Union. Winchester’s general denial and his uncon-
vincing demeanor lead me to find that Richardson’s testimony
was the most accurate account as to what was said. I find that
Lockheed violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by the
statement requiring union membership under the threat of dis-
charge. Honeywell, Inc., 307 NLRB 278, 284 (1992).
C. April 8 Statements by Supervisor Crook
Department 17-4 employee Stacy Jobe testified that after the
March 10 meeting she had told a union steward she was not
going to join the Union. On approximately April 8 Jobe was
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1416
summoned to Supervisor Larry Crook’s office. In addition to
Jobe and Crook, Union Stewards Gene Patton and Sue Mitchell
were also present. According to Jobe, Crook said she did not
understand what she was doing by not signing “the card.” He
said if she did not sign the card Lockheed would have to initiate
the process of discharging her. Jobe explained she did not want
to join the Union. Patton spoke up and said she need not join
the Union but she had to sign a dues deduction card. Jobe said
she wanted to think the matter over. Jobe later signed a union
dues-checkoff card.
Crook denied telling Jobe she would be discharged if she did
not sign a dues-checkoff card. He did concede that he was un-
aware of any employees who paid their financial obligations to
the Union by means other than payroll deductions. He also
testified that the meeting was called because Jobe had not exe-
cuted a dues card although he was uncertain whether she was
late in this regard. Patton testified that he told Jobe she did not
have to join the Union but did have to pay an amount equal to
union dues. She could pay the Union directly or could sign a
checkoff and have the amount deducted from her pay. Patton
denied anyone present said Jobe would be fired if she did not
sign a card or that anything was said as to the consequences if
she did not pay dues. Union Steward Mitchell did not testify.
Jobe was a credible witness whose demeanor and detailed
testimony of the meeting were convincing. Crook was evasive
and his and Patton’s demeanors were not persuasive as to what
was said to Jobe. I credit Jobe’s version of what took place in
this meeting. Crook’s statement to Jobe that she would be dis-
charged if she did not sign a dues authorization card is found to
be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. Office and Professional Employees International Union,
Local 277, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent Lockheed violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of
the Act by threatening employees with discharge if they did not
agree to sign a union dues-checkoff authorization card and/or
join the Respondent Union.
4. Respondent Lockheed violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and
(3) of the Act by entering into an unlawful agreement with the
Respondent Union to accrete unrepresented P&A employees
into the collective-bargaining unit represented by the Respon-
dent Union and enforcing the Respondents’ collective-
bargaining contract against such employees at a time when the
Union did not represent a majority of the accreted employees.
5. Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
by threatening employees that the Union would seek their dis-
charges if they refused to sign a union membership application
and dues checkoff authorization card.
6. Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act by entering into an unlawful agreement with the Re-
spondent Lockheed to accrete unrepresented P&A employees
into the collective-bargaining unit represented by the Respon-
dent Union and enforcing the Respondents’ collective-
bargaining contract against such employees at a time when the
Union did not represent a majority of the accreted employees.
7. The foregoing unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall order them to cease and desist and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent Lockheed unlawfully recog-
nized and entered into an agreement with the Respondent Un-
ion as the representative of previously unrepresented P&A
employees, I shall order Respondent Lockheed to withdraw and
withhold all recognition from the Respondent Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of those employees, and
shall order both Respondents to cease applying to those em-
ployees the terms of the Respondents’ December 13, 1993 col-
lective-bargaining agreement, or any extension, renewal, modi-
fication, or superseding agreement, unless and until the Re-
spondent Union is certified by the Board as such representative.
Nothing in this decision should be construed as requiring Re-
spondent Lockheed to rescind benefits conferred on the group
of previously unrepresented P&A employees as the result of the
unlawful application of contract provisions to them.
I shall order that the Respondent Union and Respondent
Lockheed, jointly and severally, reimburse the previously un-
represented P&A employees, present and former, for any initia-
tion fees, dues, or other moneys involuntarily exacted from
them as a result of the union-security clause in the Respon-
dents’ collective-bargaining agreement. Additionally, I shall
order that Respondents be jointly and severally liable to reim-
burse these employees for any losses they suffered to vacation
time, sick leave, fund investments, employer matching funds,
bonuses, raises, retirement benefits, savings plans, or any other
similar benefits previously enjoyed as unrepresented employ-
ees. All monetary reimbursements shall be with interest to be
computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]