Local Union No. 29, Chemical Workers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 1101 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

LOCAL UNION NO. 29, CHEMICAL WORKERS 1101
Local Union No. 29, affiliated with the International
Chemical Workers Union and Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc. Case 15-CB-1647
March 30, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On January 22, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Melvin J. Welles issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and
Charging Party filed exceptions with supporting
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and adopts the rulings, findings, and conclu-
sions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the
extent consistent herewith.
The facts are essentially undisputed. The Employer
has bargained with Respondent for many years. Over
the past 10 years the parties have established a
practice of meeting on a monthly basis to discuss
existing and potential problems and to attempt to
resolve existing grievances which had reached the
second step. The parties' most recent agreement was
executed on June 14, 1974, to expire on April 30,
1977. During April or May 1975, Maureen Morris,
president of Local 29, requested that the monthly
meetings be recorded on a tape recorder. Morris
contended that because she did not have a secretary
who could attend and take notes it was necessary for
her to use a recorder in order to have a complete and
accurate record of their discussions. On June 4, 1975,
Morris advised the Employer's representatives that
she would not meet with company representatives
unless she was permitted to record the discussions.
At the June 11, 1975, meeting, Morris announced her
intent to record the meeting, and, after objection by
the Employer's representatives, refused to accept the
Employer's proposal to resolve the dispute through
an expedited arbitration proceeding. At subsequent
meetings , Morris refused to discuss specific grievanc-
es unless and until she was allowed to tape record the
discussions. In addition, the parties stipulated that on
two occasions in either July or August 1975 Morris
introduced the tape recorder into discussions with
frontline foremen about first-stage grievances. On
both occasions, the foremen involved refused to
discuss the grievances due to Morris' insistence that
the discussions be recorded. As of the date of the
hearing herein, 25 grievances were pending due to
Morris' position that she would not process grievances
unless she was allowed to record the discussions.'
The Administrative Law Judge, noting that under
Board decision a violation had to be predicated on
bad faith and that there was no basis for finding bad
faith on Morris' part, concluded that Respondent
was not in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. For
the reasons stated hereinafter, we disagree.
As noted above, the parties have had a collective-
bargaining relationship for many years, and for the
past 10 years have processed grievances in the second
step through the medium of regularly held monthly
meetings between employer and union representa-
tives. During these meetings over the years there has
never been any verbatim transcript of discussions by
tape recorder or other means nor any request by
either party for such a record. The established
practice has been for the Employer and the Union to
take whatever notes they deemed necessary. This
method of operation established by mutual consent
and practiced over periods of many years became
part of the conditions of employment which are not
subject to change during the contract term other than
by mutual agreement . By its insistence on recording
the grievance sessions and refusal to participate in
grievance processing unless it was permitted to
record the discussions, Respondent attempted to
change the implied terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement and has in effect terminated the process-
ing of employee grievances for which the collective-
bargaining agreement provides. This is a clear
violation of Section 8(d) of the Act and thus
constitutes a violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By refusing to meet, process, and discuss
grievances unless the Employer agreed that it be
allowed to tape record all grievance meetings, Local
Union No. 29, affiliated with the International
Chemical Workers Union, has undermined and
frustrated the grievance procedures as provided by
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement in
effect between the Employer and the Union in
violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
I The Employer has apparently waived its right to apply the contractual
time limitations relating to the filing and appealing of grievances.
228 NLRB No. 127
1102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
Having found that Local Union No. 29 has
engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall
order Local Union No. 29 to cease and desist
therefrom and from any like or related unfair labor
practices, and take certain affirmative action that we
deem necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent,
Local Union No. 29, affiliated with the International
Chemical Workers Union, Weeks Island, Louisiana,
its officers , agents , and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc., by refusing, unless the Employer
agrees to allow Respondent to tape record all
grievance meetings , to meet, process, and discuss
grievances filed pursuant to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the
parties.
(b) In any like or related manner refusing to
bargain with the Employer over the processing and
adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the unit herein found appropriate,
meet, process, and discuss with the above-named
Employer grievances filed pursuant to the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between
the parties. The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed at the Employer's Weeks Island, Louisi-
ana, installations, excluding professional employ-
ees, laboratory technicians, office employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Post at its office, meeting halls, and bulletin
boards copies of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix."2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being
duly signed by Local Union No. 29's authorized
representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 15
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" for
posting by Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., at its
installations in Weeks Island , Louisiana , in places
where notices to employees are customarily posted, if
Morton-Norwich Products , Inc., is willing to do so.
Copies of said notices to be provided by the Regional
Director, after being signed by an authorized
representative of Local Union No. 29, shall be
forthwith returned to the -Regional Director.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
MEMBER FANNING, concurring:
I agree that Respondent's refusal to discuss
grievances arising under its collective-bargaining
agreement with the Employer unless permitted to
tape record the meetings violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act. As former Member Brown and I explained
in our concurring opinion in St. Louis Typographical
Union No. 8, supra, the mechanics of collective
bargaining are subordinate to collective bargaining
itself. Even the suggestion that a verbatim record be
kept raises suspicions about its purpose, and its use
may inhibit that free exchange of ideas and positions
which the Act seeks to encourage. In my view,
Respondent cannot defend its refusal to discuss
mandatory bargaining matters on the ground that the
Employer would not permit it to tape record those
discussions.
Accordingly, I join my colleagues in finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Morton-
Norwich Products, Inc., by refusing, unless the
Employer agrees to allow us to tape record all
grievance meetings, to meet, process, and discuss
grievances filed pursuant to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement between our-
selves and the Employer.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
refuse to bargain with the Employer over the
processing and adjustment of grievances.
WE WILL, upon request, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the appropraite
unit, meet, process, and discuss with the Employ-
LOCAL UNION NO. 29, CHEMICAL WORKERS 1103
er grievances filed pursuant to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement in effect between
ourselves and the Employer. The appropriate unit
is:
All production and maintenance employ-
ees employed at the Employer's Weeks
Island, Louisiana, installations excluding
professional employees, laboratory techni-
cians, office employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
LocAL UNION No. 29,
AFFILIATED WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL
CHEMICAL WORKERS
UNION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELVIN J. WELLES , Administrative Law Judge : This case
was heard at Lafayette , Louisiana , on November 18, 1975,
based on charges filed June 13, 1975, and a complaint
issued October 2, 1975, alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. All parties have filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case ,' including my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., is a Delaware corpora-
tion, with a place of business at Weeks Island, Louisiana,
where it is engaged in the mining and processing of rock
salt. During the 12 months prior to the issuance of the
complaint herein, it purchased goods and materials valued
in excess of $50,000, which were shipped directly to it from
points outside the State of Louisiana. I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Local Union No. 29,
affiliated with the International Chemical Workers Union,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
expressed in an earlier letter to the Union. This letter,
dated June 6, stated:
Dear Ms. Morris:
This has reference to our short meeting Wednesday
morning, June 4, 1975, in which you indicated that you
had been directed to have no meeting with Company
representatives unless you are permitted to tape record
such meetings.
Our Collective Bargaining Agreement does not
provide for the recording of any of the meetings on
Plant premises which are called for in various sections
in the Contract. Under these circumstances, we do not
believe that such recording need be permitted by either
side, unless both sides agree to such a procedure. As
you know, we have consistently opposed tape recording
such meetings.
Both the monthly meetings and the various griev-
ance meetings provided for by the Contract are
designed to help the parties reach satisfactory agree-
ments with reference to disputes or problems of mutual
concern. We believe that these objectives can best be
reached in a situation where the participants feel free to
advance tentative positions and in general, conduct an
unrestricted conversation. It has been our experience
that the use of tape recorders in such a situation, tends
to inhibit such conversation, and this is our primary
reason for objecting to your use.
In the past, both sides have been free to take
whatever notes they wish to in such meetings and we
believe that this same arrangement should apply in
future meetings. As you know, we have several
grievances pending which are at the stage in the
grievance procedure where it is up to the Union to
accept out last answer or request a meeting, and
although we have generally waived the waiting period
during the last several weeks. We believe that it would
be unwise to leave these matters pending indefinitely.
If you believe that the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment permits the tape recording contractually provided
for meetings, without the consent of the parties, we
suggest that the correct approach would be file a
grievance regarding our refusal to permit their use. In
such an event, we would be willing to waive the
preliminary steps of the grievance procedure and
arrange to refer the matter to arbitration in expeditious
manner. Furthermore, we would be willing to discuss a
compromise interim solution once the question has
been submitted to arbitration.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
On June 11, 1975, at a regular monthly meeting between
the Company and the Union of the type at which, among
other matters of mutual concern, grievances are discussed,
Maureen Morris, president of Local 29, brought in a tape
recorder. The Company reiterated its opposition to tape
recorders at such meetings, which opposition had been
I The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the transcript is
hereby granted.
2 Or, to put it another way, because the Company would not meet for
Since the June 11 meeting, and up to the time of the
hearing, two other monthly meetings have been held, but
no grievances were disucssed because of the Union's
position that it would not discuss grievances without the
tape recorder.z
It was stipulated at the hearing that Ms. Morris' reasons
for insisting on using a tape recorder at grievance
discussions were the same as the reasons contained in a
letter of June 11, 1975, from Union Counsel Simon to the
grievance discussion purposes as long as the Union, by its president,
Maureen Moms, had the tape recorder.
1104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company, sent in response to the Company's June 6 letter.
The June 11 letter stated:
This is in response to your letter of June 6, 1975,
which relates to your refusal to permit Miss Morris to
use a recording device to record meetings with
management and the Union.
As Miss Morris has informed you, the use of the
recording device is her only method of making a record
of what transpires at these important meetings. She
does not have a secretary who can make notes by the
use of shorthand writing or otherwise . She is therefore
unable to make notes while simultaneously conducting
the meeting. The recording of what transpires is of
invaluable assistance to her in conducting the affairs of
the Union. She has informed you also that you have
made factual representations at given meetings which
you have later denied . Thus, inadequate or incomplete
recordings of such meetings only breed unnecessary
controversy.
The use of the recording device does not in any way
whatever interfere with any meetings between labor
and management . No delay is occasioned , no special
arrangement is required , no alteration of schedule or
discussion is insisted upon . Thus, no inconvenience is
inflicted on either side as a result of Miss Morris' use of
the recording device. It is difficult to understand what
possible objection management could have to her using
such a device.
In your letter you state that "it has been our
experience that the use of tape recorders in such a
situation (monthly meetings and various grievance
meetings) tends to inhibit such conversation , and this is
our primary reason for objection to your use." This
statement needs to be explained. Assuming each side
tends to speak truthfully it is more than difficult to
understand how the use of a tape recorder which
records a conversation can tend to inhibit any conver-
sation . If, on the other hand , one side or the other is
being neither candid or truthful, then it can be
understood why a recording of such a meeting would
inhibit conversation.
The use of recording devices to record conversations
of national parties , corporate meetings and other
important functions is widespread and common. There
exists no special circumstances endemic in meetings
between labor and management in our case to justify
any exception to such common use . There is nothing in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement even suggestive of
the prohibitive use of any recording device at meetings
between labor and management . Until therefore you
can demonstrate a contractual proscription against the
use of such a device , Miss Morris intends to make use
of a recording machine so as to accurately record the
3 St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8, International Stereotypers' and
Electrotypers Union, AFL-CIO (Union Employers' Section of the Graphic Arts
Association of St. Louis, Inc), 149 NLRB 750 (1964), the Board dismissed
8(bX3) allegations based on a union 's refusal to meet with a company for
bargaining negotiations if the company had a court reporter present. The
Board , reiterating its position that insistence on the presence of a
stenographer is "determined in the light of the entire bargaining context
rather than on a per se basis," dismissed the complaint . Members Fanning
meetings between Morton and Local 29. Your refusal
to engage in such a meeting would constitute a refusal
to bargain collectively and to recognize Local 29 as the
proper collective bargaining unit for the employee-
members. If you persist in your position then available
remedies will be pursued immediately.
This is also the last time that request will be made of
you to produce the sales data of Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc., that was relied upon by Morton for the
discharge of several employee -members and for Mor-
ton's tentative suggestion of reducing the customary
work week schedule . As I appreciate the law, such a
refusal constitutes unfair labor practice. More than
twice before Miss Morris has requested the production
of such data or your permitting her to inspect Morton's
books to determine the existence or not of a lack of
sales volume, assigned by Morton as the reason for the
discharges involved.
It further stipulated that on two occasions thereafter, Ms.
Morris attempted to have tape recorders present at
grievance discussions with front-line foremen, and that the
foremen, pursuant to instructions , refused to engage in
these discussions with the tape recorder present. It was also
stipulated that the Company had no objection to any
member of the Union committee taking notes at the
grievance discussions . Company Plant Manager Vernon
Langlinais testified that he had an assistant manager with
him at the monthly meetings for the purpose of taking
notes.
The foregoing facts led to the Company's filing 8(b)(3)
charges against the Union, and to the issuance of the
instant complaint. The General Counsel contends that the
Union "refused to bargain" by refusing to discuss griev-
ances without having a tape recorder present.
B. Board Precedent - Positions of the Parties
Although the Board has consistently found that insis-
tence by one party on the use of a tape recorder or other
means of transcribing verbatim during collective-bargain-
ing negotiations is "evidence" of bad faith, in no case has
the Board found a violation based solely on such
insistence .3 Both the Company and the General Counsel
argue that the time has come for the Board to go one step
further, and to adopt a per se rule making the insistence
upon mechanical or stenographic recording of bargaining
or grievance sessions unlawful without any inquiry into the
bona fides of the party so insisting . Both the Company and
the General Counsel also contend that grievance meetings
are sufficiently different from bargaining meetings so as to
require a per se rule to be adopted with respect to grievance
meetings even if the Board does not see fit to adopt such a
rule with respect to bargaining negotiations . Finally, both
the General Counsel and the Company urge that the
and Brown , concurring in the result , would have so ruled because in their
view any insistence on a stenographic trancript of collective-bargaining
negotiations is "itself ... a rejection of the bargaining duty ." See also
Architectural Fiberglass-Division of Architectural Pottery, 165 NLRB
238(1967), where on use of a tape recorder , with Member Fanning again
concumng with the result for the reasons stated by him and Member Brown
in St. Louis Typographical Union , supra.
LOCAL UNION NO. 29, CHEMICAL WORKERS 1105
Union's bad faith is demonstrated by the facts, so that a
violation should be found on the basis of existing
precedent, and without the necessity of adopting a per se
rule. The Union, of course, claims that no violations should
be found, that its insistence was not only lawful, but was in
"good faith" because of various circumstances to be
discussed later.
C. Discussion
The exchange of letters between the Company and the
Union with respect to the Union's insistence upon using
the tape recorder present, in capsule form, both the
arguments pro and con on the question, and (by stipula-
tion) the Union's reasons for wanting to use the recorder.
The Company stated that the use of tape recordings tends
to inhibit unrestricted conversation; the Union that if each
side intends to speak truthfully, there is no inhibition at all.
The genesis of the view that tape recording a bargaining
session (no case has been found involving grievance
sessions) inhibits free discussion is the Board's decision in
Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB 850, 854
(1951), enfd. 205 F.2d 131 (C.A. 1, 1953), cert. denied 346
U.S. 887, where the Board stated:
The presence of a stenographer ... is not conducive to
the friendly atmosphere so necessary for the successful
termination of the negotiations, and it is a practice
condemned by experienced persons in the industrial
relations field . . . . The insistence by Respondent in
this case upon the presence of a stenotypist at the
bargaining meetings is, in our opinion, further evidence
of its bad faith.
Interestingly, the court of appeals, in sustaining the Board's
ultimate conclusion of lack of good faith, noted that it did
not necessarily agree with all the Board's subsidiary
findings, specifically stating : "For instance, we are not
inclined to agree with the Board that the Company's
insistence , over the Union's strenuous objection, of having
a stenotypist present at all the bargaining meetings to take
down a verbatim transcript of the proceedings was
evidence of the Company's bad faith."
As I am bound by Board law, I perforce must conclude,
with the Board, that tape recording or otherwise transcrib-
ing a bargaining session does have an inhibitory effect
upon the parties. By the same token, I am bound by the
Board 's conclusion that insistence upon such transcribing
of a bargaining session is not per se unlawful, but is only so
when "viewed in the context of [a company's] entire course
of conduct," when its purpose [is] to avoid, delay, and
frustrate meaningful bargaining ." Architectural Fiberglass,
supra at 239. Pretermitting the question whether a griev-
ance discussion is different , vis-a-vis insistence upon
transcribing it, from a bargaining session, the only way a
violation could be found here would be to find that the
Union's purpose was to "avoid, delay, and frustrate" the
bargaining process. I am constrained to find, on the facts of
this case, that the General Counsel has not met his burden
of showing that Respondent' s insistence on having a tape
recorder at the grievance discussions was in "bad faith."
In the first place, it was stipulated that Ms. Morris'
reasons for wanting to use the tape recorder were those
contained in the Union's June 11 letter to the Company.
The second paragraph of that letter, set forth in full above,
states those reasons succinctly. Manifestly, there is no basis
for inferring "bad faith" from anything stated in the letter.
The General Counsel and the Company nevertheless
contend that the Union's insistence was in bad faith,
grounding their contention on factors apart from Ms.
Morris' reasons. They point to the fact that during the
more than 10 years in which grievance meetings of this type
have been held, the Union has never sought to use a tape
recorder, that the Company offered an "eminently reason-
able" solution of arbitrating the tape recorder question
itself, that there was no showing of the Union's inability to
function properly without a tape recorder, and that the
Company was in complete good faith in refusing to
acquiesce to the Union's demand. Finally, they assert that
the Union was to blame for the breakdown in the grievance
procedure on and after June 11, because it was the Union's
insistence upon tape recording the sessions that prevented
further meetings, and because it was the Union that for the
first time was injecting the tape recorder question into the
picture.4
None of the above arguments goes directly to the union
purpose in demanding the tape recorder. Indeed, the
General Counsel seems to concede that the Union's
purpose was legitimate, stating "Although the Union may
not have taken the position on the tape-recorder issue to
avoid or frustrate the obligation to bargain, this result has
followed, and the result was clearly foreseeable. The Union
should be held responsible for the foreseeable consequen-
ces of its conduct." This is but another way of saying that
insistence upon having a tape recorder is a per se violation
of the Act, that the insistence itself supplies its own proof
of legal bad faith. Yet that is precisely what the Board has
quite deliberately refused to do. To say that the 10 years of
having grievance discussions without a tape recorder
suggests bad faith by the Union in now raising the question
is, in my opinion, fallacious. Assuming, as I must, the right
of either party to insist on a tape recorder as long as it does
so in good faith, without any purpose to delay or frustrate
the bargaining process, it cannot follow that a history of
not having meetings recorded automatically makes the first
request in bad faith. Nor does the Company's good faith,
including its "reasonable" proposal to resolve the tape
recorder question, in any way impugn the Union's own
good faith in continuing to insist on having the tape
recorders present. It may be regrettable that the impasse
reached on this procedural matter has resulted in the
failure of both parties to meet on grievances, but that is an
unfortunate consequence of any good faith impasse on any
matter that is not unlawful to propose and insist upon.
The Company's suggestion that the party insisting on
recording bear the burden of proving it acted in good faith
has an appealing ring, even though it runs counter to the
prevailing view that the General Counsel has the burden of
4 The Company argues that the Board should, as an alternative to
adopting a per se rule, adopt a policy that the party insisting upon recording,
over objection, have the burden of proving that it acted in good faith.
1106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
proving violations of the Act in all instances. Even
accepting that view here, however, would not alter the
result, for the Union's (Ms. Morris') stipulated reason for
insisting on tape recording the meetings would have in any
event satisfied that burden . In sum, under existing Board
law, proof of bad faith is a prerequisite to finding a
violation in a case such as this, and, the General Counsel
having failed to satisfy that burden , a dismissal is required,
unless, as the General Counsel and the Company urge, a
grievance meeting is sufficiently different from bargaining
negotiations as to warrant the adoption of a per se rule.
In advocating such a proposition , the General Counsel
and the Company argue that there is at least "some
practical justification for stenographic or mechanical
recording of collective bargaining negotiations" (citing
Trial Examiner Reel's views in St. Louis Typographical,
supra at 758), whereas the same justifications do not exist in
respect to grievance processing . They also assert that
"personalities" become much more involved in grievance
resolutions than they do in bargaining negotiations , so that
a transcription becomes much more inhibitory in grievance
meetings than in bargaining.
Granting that there is some merit in the latter assertion,
it seems to me that bargaining negotiations are to a certain
extent akin to horse trading or used-car selling, and
S The Company's suggestion seems to involve a presumption of bad faith
on the part of the proponent of having a meeting transcribed. I have some
difficulty in presuming that a union, the moving party in a grievance
therefore much more subject to one party or another not
wanting any sort of permanent record made of what
transpires, than are grievance meetings, which normally
involve the resolution of a single issue at a time , most often
concerning an individual employee . Indeed, to the extent
that the presence of a tape recorder or a stenographer
might inhibit "free" discussion, and provoke, as Trial
Examiner Reel stated with respect to bargaining negotia-
tions, "a careful weighing of words and a consideration of
how they may strike others," there might well be a salutory
effect on the expeditious and amicable resolution of the
grievance . So, aside from being bound by Board law, and
aside even from my view that there is no meaningful
distinction between grievance processing and collective-
bargaining negotiations in this respect, in view of my own
skepticism as to the validity of the Board's assumptions
about the desirability or lack thereof of a transcription
being made of collective-bargaining sessions , I am certain-
ly not inclined to go one step further than the Board has.5
For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Respon-
dent Union has not violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by
insisting upon using a tape recorder at grievance meetings
with the Company.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]
situation , would be likely to inject such a procedural issue for the purpose of
delaying and frustrating the process.