Local Union 337, United Association (Plumbing)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 929 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

LOCAL UNION 337, UNITED ASSOCIATION (PLUMBING) 929
CONCLUSIONS
The certification which the Petitioner seeks to clarify is 20 years
old. As already indicated, many changes in the Employer's opera-
tion have taken place since its issuance. Certain of these changes are
the reason for Petitioner's requests herein. It appears that the em-
ployees whom Petitioner wants included in the unit by Board declara-
tion belong in classifications which if not in existence at the time of
the certification or deemed excluded .from the unit, have never been
represented by the Petitioner as part of the certified unit. The as-
signment of additional duties or personnel to these classifications has
not altered their basic nature and characteristics.10 None is now en-
titled to inclusion in the existing unit as an_ accretion or by amend-
ment of the- certificate. Upon the basis of these considerations, and
the entire record, we believe that Petitioner's motion for clarifica-
tion should be denied.ll
[The Board denied the motion for clarification.]
"We are not of course passing upon the impact of the contract upon the Employer's
right to make work changes such as are involved herein.
n See Alumanum Company of Ameraca, 146 NLRB 929; General Electric Co , 144
NLRB 88.
Local Union No. 337, United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada, AFL-CIO [Townsend and Bottum,
Inc.] and Frank Ubbes. Case No. 7-CB-1083. June 09, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 1, 1963, Trial Examiner George L. Powell issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent, Local 337, had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor prac-
tice alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Local 337 filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent with
this Decision.
147 NLRB No. 95.
756-236-65-vol. 147--60
930 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As found by the Trial Examiner, Local 337 and the Employer had
an agreement obligating the Employer to notify Local 337 of all job
vacancies, and prohibiting the Employer from hiring any workers not
referred by Local 337. The agreement also provided that referral by
Local 337 should'be on a nondiscriminatory basis. To carry out its
obligation to fill such vacancies promptly, Local 337 kept a current in-
ventory of unavailable workers by issuing travel cards to members
who wished to work outside its territorial jurisdiction and in the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of a sister local. Local 337 required as a 'matter
of general practice that the travel card either be turned in or destroyed
when the member wished to return to work in Local 337's territorial
jurisdiction, and again become available for local employment.
Pursuant to the agreement, the Employer in May 1963 notified
Local 337 that it needed a welder at its White Pigeon construction job.
Local 337 then sent a telegram to Ubbes asking him to report to the
Local's office for work. Ubbes did so on May 21, and the Local offered
him a written referral to the job on the condition that he turn in the
travel card the Local had issued him. Ubbes had this travel card on
file with the sister local in Battle Creek-in order to get employment
in that geographical area, and refused to turn in the card or destroy
it. The Local accordingly did not give Ubbes the referral. On July 2,
after Ubbes had filed a Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) charge on these
facts, the Local unconditionally offered him a referral to the White
Pigeon job. Ubbes refused the offer because, having left his travel
card on file with still another sister local, in Lansing, he had obtained
work and at the time was in fact working in the Lansing area.
On these facts the Trial Examiner recognized that Local 337 would
not violate the National Labor Relations Act by setting up reasonable
rules for administering the hiring hall. But he concluded that since
there was'no express rule requiring that the travel card be turned in
before Ubbes could be referred to the Employer, Local 337 was in
violation of the Act.
We are constrained to disagree with this conclusion of the Trial
Examiner, in view of the practice, which he found to exist and of
which Ubbes was aware, that an outstanding travel card had to be
turned in, or at least destroyed, before the holder became available for
employment within the geographical area covered by Local 337. We
cannot say that Local 337 was required to make an exception for Ubbes
upon learning that Ubbes was desirous of keeping his travel card so
as to obtain employment in other geographical areas, but also wanted
local employment. As we have held,' the Act does not prohibit a
i See Plaza Builders , Incorporated, 134 NLRB 751. See also Yonkers Contracting Co.,
Inc., 135 NLRB 865; Houston Chronicle Publishing Corporation, 145 NLRB 1657.
LOCAL UNION 337, UNITED ASSOCIATION (PLUMBING) 931
union from trying to ease the impact of. local unemployment by ex-
cluding workers holding outside jobs, or by attempting to cause em-
ployers to limit work opportunities to strictly local applicants.
In sum, the evidence found by the Trial Examiner does not satisfy
us that Local 337 had an unlawful purpose in conditioning its referral
on Ubbes' surrender of his travel card.' In making this evaluation,
we find that Local 337 had a legitimate interest in refusing to refer
Ubbes to the Employer, untainted by any motive for discriminating
against him for reasons condemned by the Act?' Accordingly, we find
Local 337's refusal to refer Ubbes to the Employer not violative of Sec-
tion 8(b) (2) and (1) (A), and shall dismiss the complaint.'
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
2 See Planet Corporation , 144 NLRB 798.
2 Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning would dismiss the complaint also for the
following additional reason : As the Trial Examiner found , almost all the Employer's em-
ployees at White Pigeon got their jobs directly , without referral by Local 337 ; and Ubbes
could have gone to the White Pigeon jobsite and secured the job without the necessity of
a referral . Under Section 8(b) (2) of the Act the case 'turns on whether or not Local 337
caused or attempted to cause the Employer to discriminate against Ubbes . It may be
conceded that Ubbes would have secured the job if Local 337 had given him the referral.
But it can hardly be said , in the circumstances present here , that Local 337 , by its with-
holding of a referral , caused the Employer not to employ Ubbes , in view of the fact that
Ubbes could have obtained the employment if he had applied to the Employer for It.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case , heard at Kalamazoo , Michigan , on August 26, 1963 , pursuant to a charge
filed June 10, 1963, amended June 18, 1963; and an answer dated July 22, 1963,
presents a single issue: Whether. Respondent operating under an exclusive hiring
agreement with the Employer violated Section 8('b) (1) (A ) and (2 ) of the Act by
refusing to refer one Ubbes for employment because Ubbes had not turned in his
travel card . Briefs were received by Trial Examiner George L. Powell from the
General Counsel and the Respondent on September 27 and 30, . 1963 , respectively.
Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, including the briefs of the
parties, and upon my observation of ' the witnesses as they appeared before me,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER
The Employer, Townsend and Bottum, Inc., is a Michigan corporation having its
principal office and place of business in Ann Arbor, Michigan . It is engaged in
business as a building construction and heavy equipment erection contractor and as
such maintains operations in several other States of the United States . During the
calendar year 1962 , a representative .period , the Employer, in the course and conduct
of its business operations , purchased and caused to be delivered at its Michigan
places of business , construction materials and other goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Michigan. In
the same period . it performed services valued in excess of $1,000 ,000, of which
services valued in excess of $100 ,000 were performed in and for various enterprises
located in States other than Michigan . Employer is thus an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Respondent , Local Union No. 337 , United Association of Journeymen and Ap-
prentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada,
AFL-CIO, and United Association of Journeyman and Apprentices of the Plumbing
932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, herein called
the International Union, are, and have been at all material times, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The provisions of the National Labor Labor Relations Act,' herein called the
Act, alleged to have been violated are as follows:
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or ]protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization . .
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership.
With the labor relations law of the United States thus stated, we come to a
consideration of the facts in this immediate case.
Frank Ubbes, characterized by Carl Bryer, Respondent's business manager, as an
"excellent welder," reported to Bryer's office on May 21.2 He came pursuant to, a
telegraphic request by Bryer who intended to refer him to the White Pigeon job of
Employer, Townsend and Bottum, Inc. However, Bryer refused to issue Ubbes
a referral slip 3, to the White Pigeon job because Ubbes did not bring in his outstand-
ing travel card.
A word about a "travel card" is appropriate. A travel card is issued to a member
of the local union who wishes to work outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the
local and in the jurisdiction of a sister local union. Then before working in the sis-
ter local's jurisdiction, the member deposits the travel card with the business agent
of the sister local where it remains while he is, working in that jurisdiction. When
the member wishes to return to his home local for work he picks up the travel card
and turns it back to his own local's business manager or else destroys it. These
union regulations were set out in Respondent's constitution and Ubbes was familiar
with them. Failure to follow this procedure subjects the member to a fine of $100.
There are several practical results of this travel card routine. For example, a mem-
ber working in a sister local after first depositing his travel card there can be expected
to stay on the job he is referred to, in that local so long as the travel card is on file.
Likewise, the member's own local can expect the member to remain on jobs referred
to in his local's jurisdiction if there is no outstanding travel card issued to him.
Thus the local union involved in either case has a good inventory of available
129 U.S C. Sec. 151 et seq.
2 All dates occur in 1963 unless otherwise stated.
3 A referral is a slip of paper Introducing a named person to a certain named job. The
person hands it to the job steward on the job when starting to work.
LOCAL UNION 337, UNITED ASSOCIATION (PLUMBING) 933
workers.4 This travel card system applied equally to all members. Another ex-
ample is that as a person cannot be issued a travel card by his local until he has been
a member therein for at least a year, the card warrants to sister locals that the holder
thereof has been a member for at least a year and is a qualified journeyman.
There is no question in this case but that if Bryer had issued a referral slip to Ubbes
that Ubbes would have been employed on the White Pigeon job. The Employer had
previously notified Bryer that he wanted a welder and it was pursuant to this request
that Bryer wired Ubbes to come into the office.
Bryer offered Ubbes the job if he would turn in his travel card but refused to give
him a referral when Ubbes refused to give up the travel card. Ubbes had left his
travel card on deposit at a sister local in Battle Creek, Michigan.
Ubbes' Explanation
Ubbes refused .to give up his travel card because, in his opinion, he would not
get another one from Bryer. Respondent's constitution provides that travel cards
cannot be issued to a local member against whom charges are pending in the Union,
and charges were pending against Ubbes at this time. The consequence of this rule
is to keep the member within the jurisdiction of his local until the charges are handled.
Further, should the charges result in loss of membership no travel card would issue
as it is given only to members. Ubbes asked Bryer to promise to give him another
travel card when he needed it if he would give up his present one. Bryer would
promise him nothing.
These same charges had been pending against Ubbes in January when the travel
card in question had been issued by Respondent. At that time Ubbes had asked
Bryer for a travel card but had been refused and had been referred to the financial
secretary, the proper agent under the Respondent's constitution to issue travel cards.
When Ubbes went to the financial secretary the latter called Bryer and told him he
could not issue a travel card under the constitution because charges were filed against
Ubbes. Bryer was told by the financial secretary that:
Ubbes is over here raising hell, and he is threatening. to get my house, my car
and everything by legal action, and what am I going to do ... .
Bryer then told the financial secretary to issue the travel card to Ubbes which was
done.
Pertinent Provisions of Collective-Bargaining Agreements Involved
The Employer- and the International Union have been maintaining a nationwide
collective-bargaining agreement relating to the hire, tenure, terms, and conditions
of employment of certain employees of the Employer, which provides, inter alia that:
The Employer agrees to be bound by the hiring practices in the local area
not inconsistent with the terms of this agreement.
The Employer shall notify the Local Union to refer competent and skilled
journeymen and, apprentices.
Under the provisions of the contract between the Mechanical Contractor's As-
sociation of Southwestern Michigan and Respondent, the Employer and Respondent
have agreed that:
The Employer shall notify the Union of, its need for all workmen and shall not
recruit applicants directly or hire additional persons not referred by the
Union....
Additionally:
Referral to the jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis and shall in no way
be affected by union membership, by-laws, rules and regulations, constitutional
provisions, or any other aspect or obligation of union membership, policies or
requirements.
Further, the Employer reserved the right to accept or reject any applicants referred
by the Respondent.
The Theory of the Case
The theory of the General Counsel, as set out in his complaint, is based upon
the proposition that the above provisions of the agreements require a referral of
Ubbes by the Respondent as a condition of employment at the Employer's White
Pigeon job. Therefore when Respondent refused to refer Ubbes to the Employer's
4 Conclusions drawn from Bryer's credited testimony.
934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
White Pigeon project for employment , Respondent caused and attempted to cause
the Employer to deny Ubbes employment in violation of the sections of the Act set
out'above.
Bryer , who impressed me as a very credible witness, testified that a referral by
him to Ubbes would be the equivalent of Ubbes actually taking the job although
there was always the slender possibility that the Employer might say "I don't want
this man ," and refuse to hire him when he reported to the jobsite.
There is also credited evidence by Bryer that of the approximately 30 members of
Respondent 's Union at work on the White Pigeon job that only 4 got their jobs
through referral . The others went to work without referral slips. They had been
reached directly by the job superintendent . Terrill, the job superintendent , in many
instances decides who he wants, calls them up and gets them to come to work and
then notifies Respondent of his action . But if a member who had been working out
of town on a travel card went to the White Pigeon job on his own and was hired with-
out first turning in his travel card or destroying it, he could be fined $100.
Ubbes' Later Refusal
Bryer credibly testified that on July 2, 1963, he referred Ubbes to the same White
Pigeon job that had been available to him on May 21, but that Ubbes refused to take
'the job . This referral apparently was made by Respondent to stop the running of
any possible backpay should a violation of the ' Act in the particulars alleged be found
and should an award of backpay be made to Ubbes. Accordingly, it would appear
that the refusal to refer Ubbes is confined to the period between May 21 and July 2,
1963.5
Respondent 's Position
Respondent argues in its brief . that "the travel card had absolutely no connection
as a condition to the referral ." It further argues that Ubbes' right to employment
on the White Pigeon job was not prejudiced by the, refusal by Bryer to issue 'him
a referral because the facts indicate that Ubbes could have gone to the jobsite and
obtained the job himself without the necessity of referral.
Analysis and Conclusions
There is no merit to this argument of the Respondent that the travel card had no
connection as a condition to the referral . The Employer on'the White Pigeon job
had asked Bryer for a qualified . welder and Bryer had wired Ubbes to fill this require-
ment. But when Ubbes came to the office Bryer would not refer him until Ubbes
gave up his outstanding travel card . Respondent argues that Bryer refused to refer
Ubbes because Ubbes was conditioning his request for referral on a promise by
Bryer that he, Bryer , would give Ubbes another travel card when needed if he gave
up his present one to take the job at White Pigeon . It is true that Ubbes indicated he
would give up his travel card if Bryer would promise to issue him another one when
he needed it. Nevertheless , - this condition by Ubbes " would not support a finding
that Ubbes was not interested in a referral unless he could obtain the terms which
he demanded . Ubbes' application to Bryer pursuant to the telegram is sufficient to
establish the proposition that he sought a referral . Why was it even necessary to
mention a condition ? The facts indicate that Bryer was more interested in obtaining
Ubbes' travel card than in referring him to White Pigeon . As charges were on file
against Ubbes when he obtained this card , Bryer had violated his union 's rules in
having the card issued in the first place. • And nowhere in the record is there evidence
of any repentance on Bryer's part. Hence it could be assumed that if he wished to do
so he could also ignore the rule requiring a fine up to $ 100 from Ubbes if he worked'
at White Pigeon with a travel card on deposit in Battle Creek ,.and refer Ubbes to the
5 Ubbes testified that Bryer's refusal to refer him without his turning in the travel card
first occurred on April 25 . Thereupon , the General Counsel moved to amend the com-
plaint to allege the refusal to refer to have first occurred on April 25 , rather than .the
date of May 21 as it appears in the complaint . Counsel for Respondent objected and the
Trial Examiner upon learning from the , General Counsel that the correct date had been in
doubt at all times since the case was investigated , sustained the objection and denied the
motion to amend . ' I do not credit Ubbes when his testimony is in conflict with that of
Bryer. In addition to his demeanor while on the stand, Ubbes is not credited because he
admitted to having been convicted of a felony in the Michigan Supreme Court in a case
involving the alleged stealing of from $12,000 to $15 ,000 Worth of construction materials
from various employers for whom he had worked.
LOCAL UNION 337, UNITED ASSOCIATION (PLUMBING) 935
job. Such a referral would be in accord with the collective-bargaining agreement
which said that referrals would not be affected by ". . . union membership,, by-
laws, rules and regulations, constitutional provisions . " Therefore, focus
should be on the question of under what right, if any, did Dryer refuse to carry out
his obligations under the collective -bargaining agreement rather than on any con-
sideration of a conditional request for referral.
Likewise, the Trial Examiner finds no merit in the Respondent's proposition that
Dryer's refusal to grant a referral to Ubbes did not prejudice.Ubbes in obtaining a
job because he could have gone to the White Pigeon jobsite and secured the job
without the necessity of a referral. This is an irrelevant matter in this case.
According to the hiring agreement between the parties, Bryer had the exclusive
right to grant a referral and the Employer in this instance had even requested Re-
spondent to supply it with a qualified welder." Hence it is unnecessary for Ubbes
to apply for a job at the jobsite in order to make out a case.
Finally, Respondent argues that even if referral to the job was conditioned upon
giving up the travel card that there would be no violation of the Act under the cir-
cumstances in this case . The Trial Examiner finds no merit in this argument.
There is a line of cases wherein the Board has held that a union may attempt to
cause or cause the discharge of an employee for reasons other than the payment of
dues and uniform initiation fees in situations where the evidence is that the Union
is merely seeking to enforce the collective-bargaining agreement it has with the
employer. Such a case was Planet Corporation 6 wherein the Union Respondent,
Millwrights Local Union 1102, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO, attempted to cause and caused the discharge of employee
Baxter. But there the union had a legitimate interest in seeking his discharge
untainted by any motive for discriminating against him because of failure to perform
an obligation of union membership. Nor could it be said that the union was guided
by arbitrary irrelevant considerations inconsistent with its duty to represent all in a
bargaining unit fairly. The evidence was that the union's only aim was to police
and enforce the contractual provisions governing subsistent allowances with which it
honestly believed the employer was failing to comply. Likewise in Fugate and Girton
Driveway, Inc.,7 the Board held that the union, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers,
Local Union No. 414, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, did not violate Section 8(b) (2) of the Act by
continuing-with the processing of seniority grievances which had the effect of causing
loss of employment to employees. In that case the Board affirmed Trial Examiner
Owsley Vose on the theory that the union in processing the grievance to a con-
clusion was merely attempting to require the employer to live up to its obligations
under the collective-bargaining contract.
Thus it is argued that the Board in preserving a sense of moderation and proportion
and in striking a balance between orderly Government and individual liberty ef-
fectuates the policies of the Act by permitting reasonable nonarbitrary actions of
labor organizations which, under the evidence, are undertaken solely in order to en-
force collective-bargaining agreements.
Thus it can be argued that in this same area of enforcing collective -bargaining
agreements lies rules and requirements put into operation in order to fulfill obliga-
tions under collective-bargaining agreements. For example can a labor organization
establish uniform rules, untainted by any motive for discriminating against employees
for failure to perform obligations of union membership, for the very purpose of
fulfilling its obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement . Assuming arguendo,
that this is possible under the theory of Planet and Fugate, supra , let us consider the
present case facts.
Bryer, under the collective-bargaining agreement , was obligated to refer on a
nondiscriminatory basis and was obligated to refer both members and nonmembers.
Accordingly it would appear that any rule set up to measure reliability, industry,
skill, integrity, compatibility, etc., if uniform and nonarbitrary, would be such a rule
the uniform following of which would not violate the Act even though employment
opportunity may be jeopardized . 8 But that is not the type rule involved in the instant
case. Here the rule penalizes a member of the Union up to $100 should he secure
employment in his local's jurisdiction without first turning in or destroying his travel
8 144 NLRB 798
7142 NLRB 273
8 See Circuit Judge Hays' opinion in Valetta Motor Trucking Co Inc (Local 294, Team-
sters), 317 F. 2d 746 (C.A. 2), involving petition for enforcement by the Board of 137
NLRB 1023
936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
card. The rule did not bar referrals even assuming for the moment that travel card
rules are of sufficient importance to be included with "reliability, etc." above. Thus,
Bryer's action was not taken under a rule and hence was arbitrary and not pro-
tected. Obviously such rules would require publication and would be strictly' con-
strued to assure their necessary uniform application. It cannot be argued that
Bryer's refusal to refer Ubbes is the same thing or equal to a fine of up to $100.
The solution to this extremely interesting case requires much more than sympathy.
Ubbes obtained a travel card from Respondent not in accordance with the rule.
Bryer ignored this rule. Then in an area where there is no rule prohibiting his
handing Ubbes a referral slip, he refuses to grant the referral attempting to equate
this refusal with a fine which may or may not even be levied. Bryer's actions thus
are arbitrary, are not in accord with the collective-bargaining agreement, are in-
consistent with his duty to represent all employees fairly, and hence are discriminatory
within the meaning of Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act .9
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Employer described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
I will recommend the usual remedy in requiring Respondent to make whole Ubbes
and to cease and desist from engaging in conduct found above under section III.
As the violation found is against basic rights of employees and seemingly would
be practiced against employees of any employer , I will cause Respondent to cease
and desist doing these acts with respect to employees of any employer.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Townsend and Bottum, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. By attempting to cause and causing Townsend and Bottum, Inc., not to hire
Frank Ubbes by refusing to issue him a referral slip as it was obligated to do in ac-
cordance with the collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
4. By the above conduct, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
9 "Our scheme of ordered liberty is based, like the common law, on enlightened and uni-
formly applied legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in a particu-
lar case." Mr. Justice Harlan, Supreme Court of the U.S., in "Thoughts at a Dedication,"
Amer. Bar Assn. Jour., vol. 49, No. 10, p. 944.
General Engineering , Inc., and Harvey Aluminum (Incorpo-'
rated ) and United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO. Cases
Nos. 36-CA-953 and 36-CA-954. June ^?9, 1964
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
On May 19, 1961, the Board issued its Decision and Order in the
above-entitled proceeding t finding, inter Aa, that the Respondents
1131 NLRB 648.
147 NLRB No. 127.