Local No. 454, United Food and Commercial Workers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 28, 1979

245 N.L.R.B. 1295 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

LOCAL NO. 454, UNITEID FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
Local No. 454, United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO' (Central Soya of
Athens) 2 and James Jackson. Case 10-CB-2982
September 28, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MtMBEIRS JENKINS
AN) MURPHY
On July 30, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Rob-
ert W. Leiner issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter. Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,3 and
conclusions 4 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Local Union No. 454,
United Food and Commerical Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Athens, Georgia, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order.
I The name of Respondent, formerly Local No. 454. Amalgamated Meat-
cutters & Butcher Workmen of America, AFL-CIO. is amended to reflect
the change resulting from the merger with Retail Clerks International Union.
2 At the hearing in this proceeding, the Administrative Law Judge granted
the General Counsel's motion to sever this case from Case 10 CA-14142,
which had been settled pnor to the heanng.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefull) examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
4 Member Murphy notes that although the Administrative Law Judge
found that Respondent violated Sec. 8(bXIXA) of the Act as well as Sec.
8(b)(2), he set forth no independent factual findings upon which the
8(bXlXA) violation forth no independent factual findings upon which the
8(bXlXA) violation is based, It is well established that violations of other
subsections of Sec. 8(b) do not give nse to derivative violations of Sec.
8(b)(XA). L.RB. v. Drivers. Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America [Curtis Brothers, Inc 1. 362 U.S. 274. 290 (1976). Accordingl,.
she does not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Respon-
dent violated Sec. 8(b I KA) in this case.
D)FCISION
SIAtIEMLNI t() rill CAS}
RtBE R1 W. LEINER. Administrative l.aw Judge: This
case was heard in Athens. Georgia. on May 22, 1979, pur-
suant to the charges in Cases 10-CA 14142' and 10 CB-
2982. filed on November 8, 1978. and the complaint and
notice of hearing issued on January 16, 1979. The above-
captioned Local No. 454. the sole Respondent, filed its
timely answer on January 23, 1979. The pleadings raise two
related questions: (a) whether on or about October 12.
1978, in violation of Section 8(bh)1 )(A) and (2) of the Act.
Respondent caused or attempted to cause the Employer.
Central Soya of Athens. to discharge its employee James
Jackson: and (b) if so, whether this union action was caused
byv the fact that James Jackson was not a member of Re-
spondent. Respondent in its answer, denied both elements
of these allegations.
At the hearing, the General Counsel and Respondent
were represented by counsel (the Employer made no ap-
pearance) and all parties were given full opportunity to ex-
amine. call, and cross-examine witnesses. At the conclusion
of the hearing. the parties waived oral argument and on
June 18, the General Counsel and Respondent submitted
post-trail briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case, including the briefs.
and from my observation of the w itnesses and their demea-
nor. I make the foillowing:
FINI)IN(;s OF FA('I
I. THE EMPLOYER S BUSINESS
Central Soya of Athens. Inc.. herein called the Employer
or the Company. a Georgia corporation having a factory
and place of business in Athens, Georgia. is engaged in the
operation of a poultry processing plant. During the past
calender year. a representative period of its operations, the
Employer sold and shipped finished products valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the
State of Georgia. The complaint alleges. Respondent ad-
mits, and I find, that the Employer, at all times material.
has been and is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. HE LABOR ORi;ANIZA'ION INO()I.VED
Local No. 454. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of America, AFL-CIO, herein called Respon-
dent, admits, and I find., that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
I At the opening of the hearing, General Counsel stated that the above-
captioned Emploer. Central Soya of Athens, had entered into a Settlement
Agreement with the Regional Director for Region 10, disposing of the com-
plaint as to the Ernmploer-Respondent in this consolidated proceeding With-
out objection. I thereafter granted General (ounsel's motion to sever the
proceeding. The terms of the Settlement Agreement are not in evidence.
245 NLRB No. 167
1295
DECISIONS OF NATIONAI. I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I11. I 11 Al.lE(ill) UNFAIR ABOR I'RA(' II( S
A. Background
For more than a dozen years, Respondent has been rec-
ognized as the exclusive collective-bargaining agent for the
Employer's production and maintenance employees who
perform the slaughtering and processing of poultry. This
unit includes some employees who work predominantly
outside the plant in the "Live Haul" department. The live
haul department includes the functions of getting the chick-
ens from field houses into coops, placing the coops on
trucks, hauling the coops to the plant, forklifting the loaded
coops into the plant and reloading empty coops back on the
trucks. The present collective-bargaining agreement (J.
Exh. ) between Central Soya of Athens and Respondent.
effective November I. 1977, through November 1. 1980,
provides for checkoff of union dues, but does not provide
for any union security device requiring membership in Re-
spondent as a condition of employment. Georgia is a "right
to work" state.
Central Soya's supervisory hierarchy starts with the gen-
eral manager, Bill Schimmel. Under Schimmel are two su-
pervisors, plant manager, Terry Waldon, and manager of
the live haul department, Charles Bruce. Under Bruce in
the "Live Haul" department, is Earl Howard. Under Terry
Waldon in the plant is Ray Edwards, superintendent of the
day shift.
Fannie Jordan, a scale operator in the plant for 6 years,
has been union president for 9 years and shop steward for
15 years. She is thus the sole shop steward for the approxi-
mately 200 unit in-plant and live haul production and
maintenance employees in Central Soya Athens' plant.
The collective-bargaining agreement (J. Exh. 1) provides
(article 1,. section 2). in the "management rights" enumera-
tion, inter alia, that "claims of unjust promotion, demotion.
discipline, or discharge shall be subject to and decided
through the grievance and arbitration procedure of this
Agreement." The collective-bargaining agreement also pro-
vides (article VIII) a five-step grievance procedure ending,
in the fifth step, in binding arbitration. The first step re-
quires that the grievance be filed within 3 working days of
the aggrieved employee's "first knowledge" of the griev-
ance.
The parties stipulated that, at all material times, there
has been posted and enforced a list of 19 "dischargable
offenses,"2 9th of which provides discharge for: "leaving the
plant during his scheduled work shift for any reason what-
soever, without written permission from his supervisor."
Employees violating this rule have been suspended or dis-
charged.
Charging Party, James Jackson commencing working for
Central Soya in September 1974 and, in October 1978, was
employed as a forklift operator in the "Live Haul" depart-
ment.
On October 3, 1977, Jackson, a member of the Union for
some years, resigned his membership in the Union.
:The parties also agree that the employer has the right (pursuant to an
understanding not incorporated in the collective-bargaining agreement) to
wait 5 days after an incident warranting it, before imposing discipline.
About a year later. on October 11. 1978. at about 8:30
a.m., because of difficulties in the work place relating to the
loading or unloading of the chicken coops, Jackson became
upset with the job and without permission, left his work
place and the Respondent's factory premises. He then ap-
parently immediately received employment from another
employer. By I I a.m., however, he was told to call Charles
Bruce, his live haul supervisor, and Jackson did so at about
8 p.m. that evening. Bruce asked him what had happened
on the job that morning and requested that Jackson return
to work. Jackson agreed and returned to his old job at
about 5:30 a.m. the next morning. October 12, 1978. He
worked all day and, as he was about to punch out at about
3 p.m.. his other live haul supervisor, Earl Howard. told
him that they had to go to the "trailer," the office of super-
visor Charles Bruce. In the presence of Earl Howard, Bruce
told Jackson that he was sorry but he would have to let him
go. At that point, Central Soya discharged Jackson who did
not thereafter seek the assistance of or speak to the Union
relating to the discharge.
B. The Testimnon, of Union President iannie Jordan and of
Supervisor RavI Edwards
Jordon testified that she learned that Jackson had left his
job on Wednesday, October 11. 1978. Upon her coming to
work the next morning, October 12. she saw Jackson back
at work and immediately requested permission to speak
with Ray Edwards, an in-plant supervisor, regarding Jack-
son's "status." Hler testimony is that she did so solely be-
cause she wanted to know if the Company had effected
discipline or intended to effect discipline upon him, includ-
ing whether Jackson was returning as a new employee,
stripped of seniority rights. The parties agreed that Central
Soya has 5 days in which to discipine an employee for in-
fraction of work rules after the day of the infraction, thus
making ambiguous Jackson's status on his return.'
She testified further that she went to see Edwards, who,
as an in-plant supervisor, was not in the supervisory chain
over Jackson because another unit employee (union mem-
ber Annie Sue Scott, involved during the week before Jack-
son left his job in an altercation with a coemployee) had
been suspended for 3 days without pay because she had left
her work station without permission. Scott was punished
because she left her work station and went to another em-
ployee's work station rather than going directly to Central
Soya's office to complain of this other employee's harass-
ment of her. Thus, Jordan stated that the undisclosed pur-
pose for which she went to see Edwards, was to see if Re-
spondent was enforcing the disciplinary rule (against
leaving Respondent's factory without permission) against
Jackson; or, if not, she would have the grounds to file a
grievance on Scott's behalf for the 3 days of pay loss she
suffered. Thus Scott who had notified her supervisor of the
altercation was disciplined for the lesser act of merely leav-
ing her work place. Jackson had left his work place and the
employer's premises and was apparently back on the job
without suffering discipline.
3 The ambiguity results from the fact that Jackson's reappearance on the
job leaves undecided, for 5 days, what his status will be.
1296
LOCAL NO. 454, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
Edwards testified that early in the morning of October
12, Jordan visited him in his office. According to Edwards,
whom I credit (Jordan's version is not dissimilar) Jordan
stated that Jackson had quit and she asked him what he
knew of the situation and: "Why is he back to work? Does
the rule apply to everyone?". To this, Edwards said he an-
swered "Yes," and that he would look into the matter. Jor-
dan admitted that this was the first time she had ever gone
to the employer seeking to obtain information regarding the
employer's retention of an employee where the result of her
action would cause the employer to discipline the employee
who might otherwise not have been disciplined.
With Jordan sitting there, Edwards called his superior,
Supervisor Waldon into the office. Jordan asked Waldon
the same question that she asked Edwards: "What was
James [Jackson's] status with the company and why was he
back to work if he had quit?". She testified that she wanted
to know, but did not ask, if disciplinary action had been or
would be imposed upon Jackson. Terry Waldon said that
he would take the matter up with Supervisor Bruce (super-
visor in the live haul department and Jackson's supervisor)
and with Plant Manager Schimmel and would let Jordan
know through Edwards.
Jordan denied that she went to these Company supervi-
sors in order to punish Jackson or to retaliate against him
because he was no longer a member of the Union and
"thought it was good" that he was back at work. She also
testified that she did not speak to any supervisor in the live
haul department; never caused Central Soya to hire or fire
an employee; suggested no discipline to Edwards or Wal-
don regarding Jackson; and inquired of Jackson's status
only in furtherance of, and preparation for, the undisclosed,
possible filing of a grievance on the part of Annie Sue Scott.
Jordan, however, admitted that in her conversations with
Edwards and Waldon on October 12, she did not mention
the filing of a grievance on behalf of Annie Sue Scott or any
other matter relating to the discipline of Scott for leaving
her work station.
Discussions and Conclusions
It is uncontested that Central Soya discharged Jackson
on October 12 after Jordan spoke to Edwards. The alleged
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) allegations present two issues: (a)
Did Jordan seek out and speak to Edwards in order to
"cause or attempt to cause" Central Soya to discipline
Jackson; and (b) if so, was Jordan motivated by Jackson's
nonunion status.
(I) Regarding the first issue, above, whether Jordan
sought the disciplining of Jackson, Jordan asserts that she
went to Edwards in order only to erect a secret foundation
for a grievance on behalf of Annie Sue Scott. But the evi-
dence here of her conversation with Edwards ("Why is he
back to work; does the rule apply to everybody; what is
Jackson's status?") demonstrates. in view of the fact that
Jordan never mentioned a grievance, much less a Scott's
grievance, that even if Jordan had the Scott's grievance as
her purpose, since she did mention a disciplinary rule and
did mention Jackson as escaping from discipline, that a rea-
sonable and foreseeable consequence of her "inquiry"
about Jackson and Respondent's disciplinary rule is that
Central Soya could reasonably believe that Jordan was
speaking to Edwards, not about some unexpressed, poten-
tial (Scott's) grievance, hut about its lack of discipline in
dealing with Jackson's earlier conduct. In short, since, as
she admitted, Jordan could reasonably foresee that, as a
result of her conversation with Edwards, Jackson would be
disciplined, i.e., discharged, that possibility is sufficient base
on which to conclude that she acted, at least in part, for
that purpose. I so conclude.
That she contacted Supervisor Edwards, ultimately a su-
pervisor over Annie Sue Scott rather than Charging Party
Jackson, is a fact which at first blush might militate against
that conclusion. Yet, she never mentioned Scott to her su-
pervisor, Edwards, or a grievance, and only mentioned
Jackson, his return to employment and his "status." In ad-
dition, Jordan knew that Edwards and Waldon would talk
to plant manager Schimmel about Jordon's inquiry, and
Schimmel had jurisdiction over Jackson. Moreover, on this
record, we do not know whether Jackson's supervisors, Earl
Howard and Charles Bruce, were even available for consul-
tation or whether Jordan, an in-plant employee. chose to
deal with her own in-plant supevisors, Edwards and Wal-
don, rather than the "Live Haul" supervisors, Howard and
Bruce. Since overall Plant Manager Schimmel would be
involved, the fact that Jordan complained to in-plant super-
visors over the retention of a live haul department em-
ployee, loses its force.
Jordan, at best, created an ambiguous situation, at all
times remained silent regarding her allegedly true motive,
and if a foreseeable consequence of Jordan's failure to
manifest to Edwards the true motive for her visit (allegedly
Scott's grievance) was that three supervisors of Central
Soya believed from her actual "inquiry" ("does the rule
apply to Jackson") that she sought the disciplining of Jack-
son, then Jordan and Respondent must abide by that fore-
seeable result.'
In short, contrary to Respondent's principle defense, it is
not dispositive that Jordan never explicitly requested Jack-
son's discharge or disciplining, for the question is whether
her conduct amounted to such a request. As the Board has
held (affirming the Administrative Law Judge) in Interna-
tional Packings Corporation. 221 NLRB 479. 484 (1975):
The question . . . is whether the [Union] caused the
discharge within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act.
* .
The answer to that question depends on the con-
struction one places on [the union agent's] conduct. It
is clear she did not expressly demand that [the em-
ployer] discharge [the employee]; however, a discharge
may be caused by less than an express demand. It may
be caused by conduct which from the circumstances of
the case can only be construed as intended to cause a
discharge. Such is the case here.
Such is the instant case here as well.
(2) Regarding the second issue above, Jordan's motive, it
4 Another interpretation of Jordan's conduct is that the Scott's grievance
motive did not exist at the time ,t her visit ito Edsards and that her sole
motive was to insure that Jackson -utld not go unscathed, see infra
1297
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is striking that this is the first occasion on which Jordan
ever intervened with the Employer where an employee, who
had violated the rule, was back in employment, apparently
unscathed. When Jordan admitted in her testimony that her
inquiry might cause the Employer to discharge Jackson, it
is difficult to credit Jordan's further testimony that she
throught it was a good thing that he was back in employ-
ment.
Moreover, the obvious speed with which she acted in
making this October 12 "inquiry" into Jackson's continued
employment by Central Soya is more compatible with Jor-
dan's distress over an apparent lack of discipline meted out
to Jackson, who had resigned from the Union, than it is
with her concern for, and sense of injustice regarding, An-
nie Sue Scott's loss of 3 days' pay, albeit for merely leaving
her work station rather than leaving the factory itself.
Furthermore, as the General Counsel observes, it ap-
peared that any grievance regarding Scott's suffering dispa-
rate discipline may have been time-barred under the con-
tract grievance procedure since that Scott incident occurred
in the week befbre Jackson's October 12 quit while the
grievance, to be vital under the contract, is required to be
"[taken up] . . . within three (3) working days of ... first
knowledge there of . . . . It is presumed that Jordan, the
sole shop steward and union president for 9 years, knew of
the plain terms of the contract grievance procedure and the
resulting possibility of a time bar. With any reasonable pos-
sibility of such a time bar, her approach to the employer
demanding to know why Jackson was permitted to return
makes the Scott's grievance argument pretextual; the
greater the likelihood of time bar, the stronger the inference
of pretext. The Scott "grievance" appears time barred.
Respondent next argues that it was not in its interest to
have Jackson discharged: for its real interest was the possi-
bility of prosecuting a grievance on Scott's behalf and to
enforce collective-bargaining agreement article I, section 4
and its prohibition against discrimination because of union
membership.
(a) In the first place, Jordan's action in consulting the
employer regarding the applicability of the rule punishing
leaving work stations was not the enforcement of a contract
clause but rather, on its face, an attempt to enforce, or have
the employer enforce, a rule of punishment which the Em-
ployer unilaterally issued and which rule is not part of the
collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) If Jordan's action in seeking clarification of Jackson's
status is the alleged motive (because it was merely part of
her secret plan to protect union member Scott from dispa-
rate enforcement of the Company rule, rather than the pun-
ishment of former union member Jackson), then Jordan's
action which led to Jackson's discharge was not only con-
trary to the Union's suggested motive, but also against
I It is difficult to believe that the phrase "first knowledge thereof" would
permit the entertaining of an otherwise untimely Scott grievance because the
disparate treatment of Jackson would be interpreted as the predicate for the
"first knowledge" of Scott's cause of action. Were this an actual interpreta-
tion of the clause, then all otherwise ancient, time-barred discharges (or
other discipline) would become automatically viable under the gnevance
procedure. Such an interpretation would obviously be unacceptable and in-
compatible with the orderly administratlin of the contract. In short, the
Employer's action would effect subsequent similar discipline cases.
Scott's interest. This is clear from Jordan's admission that
her unique inquiry would cause the Employer to discipline
an employee (Jackson) who, having violated the Company
rule, had nevertheless not yet been punished.
In particular, Respondent argues that the Employer had
5 days to mete our punishment to Jackson; that Jackson's
return to work was ambiguous because Respondent did not
know what his status was in the 5-day period because the
inquiry occurred on the first day; and that Respondent had
a right to inquire as to the terms of Company discipline, if
any, under which Jackson was again working. These terms
could run the gamut of discipline, including reemployment
without seniority rights. If Jackson were reemployed with-
out discipline, then Scott's grievance, based on disparate
treatment, according to Jordan, would be secure. Thus, as
Jordan testified, she did not want him disciplined.
The short answer to this argument is that if Jordan had
simply waited the 5 days after Jackson's reemployment, she
would have possessed conclusive proof of the Employer's
disciplinary intentions toward Jackson. If the Employer, on
one hand, substantially disciplined Jackson, then Respon-
dent's potential grievance on behalf of Scott would have
been completely undermined (because of no disparate treat-
ment) but Respondent would have been innocent of any
instigation of discipline against Jackson. In such a case,
neither Scott nor Respondent would have suffered from the
restraint of waiting for 5 days. Scott would then have been
no worse off then she was before this event because both
she and Jackson would have been disciplined for leaving
their work stations and violating the company rule. If, on
the other hand, the Employer failed to substantially disci-
pline Jackson within the 5-day period for imposing disci-
pline, or, more likely, fail to discipline him at all, Respon-
dent could file its grievance or, if it were time-barred, file an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board because of the
patently disparate treatment accorded a union member and
a nonunion member in enforcement of the company rule.
In such a situation, the 5-day period having expired, Re-
spondent's legal position would have been perfected, Jack-
son (a unit employee whom Respondent was obligated to
represent fairly) would not have been disciplined, and the
disparate treatment to Scott, evident. In such a disparate
situation, the grievance, or charge on behalf of Scott would
have been ripe and Jackson would not have been disci-
plined. In such a case, Respondent would have the best of
both possible worlds: Respondent would have performed
its statutory function of representing unit employees, pro-
tecting Scott's interest, and yet it would have also not en-
gaged in the sudden and unique activity of instantaneously
raising the question of application of employer discipline to
a unit employee. Certainly this would have been Jackson's
action if her motive was actually to protect Scott and the
unit's interest. This would have been the direction in which
she would have gone had her motive been equal rule en-
forcement, contract enforcement, and protection of all unit
employees, including union members.
Instead, I conclude that Jordan's conduct is actually ex-
plainable solely because, on October 12, she was chagrined
at the reemployment of Jackson who had violated the com-
pany rule and, oblivious to any legal advantage from pa-
tience and restraint, she sought out the supervisor in order
1298
LOCAL NO. 454, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
to have the Employer discipline Jackson. The circum-
stances require the conclusion that Jordan was motivated
not by any desire for equal implementation of the rule, but
rather Jackson's nonunion status. Mindful only that union
member Scott6 had recently been disciplined for a lesser
violation of the same rule nonmember Jackson had vio-
lated. Jordan, in substance, demanded that the Employer
apply the same rule to, and thereby punish and discipline,
Jackson ("do the company rules apply to James Jackson as
well as to everyone else."). Jordan succeeded in getting him
discharged thereby violating Section 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act.
Such a violation would exist where it is merely inferred or
presumed, from a union causing the discharge of an em-
ployee without lawful justification. that the discharge en-
courages union membership. International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Local 18, AFL-CIO (Ohio Contractors
Assn.), 204 NLRB 681 (1973). Where, as here, Jordan's ad-
mitted unique and unquestionably instantaneous conduct
was directed at an employee who had resigned from the
Union, such reflexive union action, I conclude, was fueled
by, and would not have occurred but for, Jackson's non-
union status. Thus, in this case, no mere inference or pre-
sumption regarding encouragement of union membership is
necessary. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
18, supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. Respondent, Local No. 454, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. Respondent, by causing and attempting to cause the
discharge of James Jackson, an employee, because he was
not a member of Respondent, engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2)
and (I )(A) of the Act.
6 I thus agree that Jordan may have been propelled to action in some part
because of the apparent dispanty of treatment accorded to Scott; but I con-
clude that the testimony regarding the filing of a grievance over Scott appears
to be a post-hoc pretextual contrivance. Rather, Jordan's motive, from all the
circumstances of this case, was to punish Jackson, whatever benefit, if any.
might accrue to Scott. This conclusion, I believe, disposes of Respondent's
further arguments that the Employer's disparate treatment of Scott violated
the collective-bargaining agreement and Respondent had a right to enforce
it. Respondent argues that Jordan purposely failed to tell Edwards she was
comtemplating a grievance on behalf of Scott because she did not want to
"tip him off": if the Employer discovered that Jordan might file a gnevance
over Scott, it would fire Jackson to rid itself of its own disparate treatment
and thereby undercut Scott's grievance without helping Scott. Ultimately.
however, since the Employer was evidently desirous of keeping Jackson in
employment, it is highly speculative to analyze what would have happened If
Jordan had disclosed her alleged true motive. Instead, the preponderant evi-
dence of record shows that what Jordan actually did was to seek to have the
Employer punish Jackson. As I have said, I believe Jordan did not mention
Scott's grievance to Edwards when she went to him regarding Jackson be-
cause she did not, at that time, contemplate it. If her true motive was to help
Scott, Jordan had the means at hand to do so perhaps at no cost to Jackson.
See text, supra. She did not desire to help Scott but to punish Jackson who.
above all, had resigned from the Union.
4. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices burdening commerce within the meaning of the Act.
Tilt Ri Mi )
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)( I A) and
(2) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
remedy the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent immediately notify
Central Soya of Athens, Inc.. and James Jackson, that it
has no objection to his being employed by Central Soya of
Athens, Inc. As I have found that Respondent caused Cen-
tral Soya of Athens, Inc., to discharge James Jackson, I
shall recommend that Respondent make Jackson whole for
any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of Respon-
dent's action against him by payment to him of a sum of
money equal to that which he would have earned as wages
from the date of his discharge by Central Soya of Athens,
Inc., to a period 5 days after notification by Respondent to
Central Soya of Athens, Inc., and James Jackson, that Re-
spondent has no objection to his being reinstated, less net
interim earnings. International Packings Corporation, 221
NLRB 479, 485 (1975). All backpay shall be reimbursed
and computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon to be
computed as prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977).' Respondent's backpay obligation, how-
ever, shall take into account any monies remitted to James
Jackson as backapy by Central Soya of Athens. pursuant to
its Settlement Agreement, supra. I shall further order that
Respondent post an appropriate notice.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
ORDER8
The Respondent, Local No. 454, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North Amenca, AFL-
CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing, or attempting to cause, Central Soya of
Athens, Inc., an employer, to discharge, or otherwise dis-
criminate against employees because they are not members
of Respondent or because they engage in or refrain from
engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining and coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
7See. generally. Isis Plumbing & Healing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions. and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Notify Central Soya of Athens, Inc., and James Jack-
son, in writing, that it has no objection to James Jackson's
employment by Central Soya of Athens, Inc., and request
his reinstatement.
(b) Make whole James Jackson for any loss of earnings
he may have suffered because of Respondent's unlawful ac-
tion, commencing October 12, 1978, in the manner set forth
in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Post at its offices, copies of the attached notice
marked, "Appendix."9 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for Region 10, shall, after being
duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted im-
mediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by Re-
spondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Sign and mail sufficient copies of the attached notice
to the Regional Director for Region 10 for posting by Cen-
tral Soya of Athens, if willing, at all locations where notices
to its employees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken to comply therewith.
9 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NoTrCE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law and ordered us to post
this notice.
WE WILL NO] cause, or attempt to cause Central
Soya of Athens, Inc., to discharge, or discriminate
against employees because they are not members of
Local 454, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or because
they exercise rights protected under Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL notify Central Soya of Athens, Inc., in
writing, that we have no objection to its employment
of James Jackson and will request his reinstatement.
WE WI.L make whole James Jackson for any loss of
wages he may have suffered by reason of our having
caused Central Soya of Athens, Inc., to discharge him.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them under Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL No. 454, AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS
AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA,
AFL-CIO
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