Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of Machinists

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 651 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

LOCAL LODGE NO 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 651
Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
(O.K. Tool Company, Inc.) and Ralph W. Stinson
and George Staiti. Case 1-CB-2319
The Board has considered the stipulation, including
exhibits, brief, and the entire record in this proceeding,
de novo, and hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
December 16, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon charges duly filed, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 1, issued a complaint and notice of
hearing July 18, 1973, against Local Lodge No. 1994,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO. The complaint alleged that the
Respondent had engaged in, and was engaging in, cer-
tain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Copies of the charge and of the complaint and notice
of hearing were duly served on the parties. On July 30,
1973, the Respondent filed its answer to the complaint
denying the commission of unfair labor practices and
requesting that the complaint be dismissed.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation of
facts and jointly moved to transfer this proceeding di-
rectly to the Board for findings of facts, conclusions of
law, and order. The parties waived a hearing before,
and the making of findings of fact and conclusions of
law by, an Administrative Law Judge, and stipulated
that no oral testimony is necessary or desired by any of
the parties.' The parties also agreed that the charge,
complaint and notice of hearing, the answer, and the
stipulation of facts, including exhibits, constitute the
entire record in this proceeding.
On December 21, 1973, the Board issued its order
granting motion, approving stipulation, transferring
the proceeding to the Board, and setting January 4,
1974, as the date for filing briefs. None of the parties
having filed a brief, the Board issued its Decision on
April 3, 1974. After the Decision issued, Respondent's
counsel advised the Board that he had not been served
with a copy of the order transferring the proceeding to
the Board and was not aware that a date for filing briefs
had been set. On April 16, 1974, the Board, by Execu-
tive Secretary's Order, rescinded its earlier Decision
and set a new date for filing briefs. The Respondent
filed a brief in support of its position on May 10, 1974.
The parties stipulated that the stipulation of facts was made without
prejudice to any objections any party might have to the relevance , material-
ity, or competence of any facts , and reserved any such objections In the
motion to transfer , counsel for the General Counsel contends that whether
or not a grand lodge representative of the IAMAW read and explained art
L, sec III, of the IAMAW constitution at regular membership meetings of
Local Lodge No 1994 is irrelevant No other objection on any basis having
been urged to the Board, we conclude that the parties have no other objec-
tions or , alternatively , that they have now been waived
I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
O.K. Tool Company, Inc., maintains its principal
office and place of business in Milford, New Hamp-
shire, where it manufactures, sells, and distributes cut-
ting tools and related products. In the course and con-
duct of its business, the Company annually receives
from points outside the State of New Hampshire goods
valued in excess of $50,000.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and we
find, that O.K. Tool Company is, and has been, en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and
we find that the Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act. We find that it will effectuate the purposes
of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and we
find, that the Respondent is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and
O.K. Tool Company were parties to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement effective from April 1, 1971, to
April 1, 1973. The Company and the Lodge began
negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement
on February 15, 1973, and continued negotiations until
April 6, 1973, following an agreement to extend the
contract to April 7. On April 7, 1973, the Lodge's
members rejected the Company's proposal and voted to
strike. The parties have stipulated that it was a lawful
strike over employment terms.
On May 9, 1973, George Staiti and Ralph W. Stinson
submitted their resignations to the Lodge by mail. Rep-
resentatives of the Lodge visited Stinson at his home
May 11-the day the resignations were received. They
gave him a copy of the IAM constitution, and called his
attention to article L, section III, concerning resigna-
tion during the course of a strike. The lodge representa-
tives also attempted, but failed, to see Staiti on the same
day. On May 12, Staiti and Stinson returned to work.
The Lodge sent letters to Staiti and Stinson on May
16 with copies of the constitution, referring them to the
provision concerning resignations during a strike and
also stating that they were subject to charges for their
215 NLRB No. 110
652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
violation of the constitution. On May 17 a letter was
sent to all lodge members, including Staiti and Stinson,
advising that charges would be brought against mem-
bers who crossed the picket line, that such members
would be subject to fines, and that, under the IAM
constitution, members could not withdraw during a
strike.
Stinson and Staiti continued working and, in June
and July respectively, were advised that they had been
charged with violations of article L, section III, of the
IAM constitution, conduct unbecoming a member, for
accepting employment while a sanctioned strike was in
progress. Neither appeared at his trial and both were
found guilty. Stinson was fined $200 for each week he
crossed the picket line, Staiti $150. They were notified
of the results by letter and that they were "obligated for
payment." Both have continued to work, and neither
has appealed through intraunion procedures. Staiti and
Stinson were advised before charges were filed that
members who crossed the picket line would be charged.
The Respondent concedes in its brief that the fines are
court-collectible.
The complaint alleges that Stinson and Staiti duly
resigned from the Lodge and that the Lodge violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening a fine or other disci-
plinary action if they did not support the Lodge's posi-
tion and return to work during the strike. The fines
were not alleged as violations of the Act. But, because
that issue lies well within the ambit of the complaint,
and has been briefed extensively by the Lodge's coun-
sel, and as the necessary facts for its resolution have
been stipulated, we conclude that the parties have con-
sented to trial of that issue.
The Respondent now concedes that Stinson and
Staiti had duly resigned from the Lodge before return-
ing to work. It contends, however, that they were law-
fully fined under article L, section III, of the IAM
constitution, "Improper Conduct of a Member." Sec-
tion III provides in pertinent part that a member may
be penalized for:
Accepting employment in any capacity in an
establishment where a strike or lockout exists as
recognized under this Constitution, without per-
mission . Resignation shall not relieve a member of
his obligation to refrain from accepting employ-
ment at the establishment for the duration of the
strike or lockout if the resignation occurs during
the period of the strike or lockout or within 14
days preceding its commencement. Where observ-
ance of a primary picket line is required, resigna-
tion shall not relieve a member of his obligation to
observe the primary picket line for its duration if
the resignation occurs during the period that the
picket line is maintained or within 14 days preced-
ing its establishment.
The issue thus presented is whether or not a labor
organization may lawfully threaten to impose, and im-
pose, a court-collectible fine on a former member, who
has tendered a valid resignation, for conduct following
his resignation which is prohibited by the union's con-
stitution but protected by Section 7 of the Act. For the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that it may not
and that the Lodge has violated the Act.
The Supreme Court in two recent decisions has con-
sidered the application of Section 8(b)(1)(A) to union
fines of former members for crossing picket lines and
working during a strike following lawful resignations.
N.L.R.B. v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213
(1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM [Boeing Co.] v.
N.L.R.B., 412 U.S. 84 (1973). In Granite State the
union members voted to strike shortly before the con-
tract expired. The membership also adopted a rule that
any "member" guilty of "aiding or abetting" the em-
ployer would be subject to a $2,000 fine. Over a period
of some 1 to 12 months, 31 members resigned from the
union and returned to work. They were tried and fined
by the union which then instituted court suits for col-
lection of the fines. The Board found that the union had
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), 187 NLRB 636 (1970); the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied enforce-
ment, 446 F.2d 369 (1971); and the Supreme Court
reversed, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
The court of appeals held that a strike vote implies
a mutual reliance by the participants on an undertaking
by all to abide the duration of the strike. It reconciled
enforcement of that undertaking in the face of the Sec-
tion 7 guarantee of the right to refrain from concerted
activity by finding that the right had been waived by
the agreement to strike. But the Supreme Court con-
cluded that a union's power over its members is no
greater than the union-member contract, and ends
when a member lawfully resigns. The Court observed,
in response to the weight that the court of appeals had
attached to participation in the strike vote, that events
occurring after a strike vote may have an unsettling
effect, leading members to change their minds. It held
that the "vitality of section 7 requires that the member
be free to refrain in November from the actions he
endorsed in May," at least when there are no restric-
tions on resignation. Following his resignation, a union
has "no more control over the former member than it
has over the man in the street." 409 U.S. 213 at 217.
In Boeing, supra, the union sought to distinguish
Granite State and contended that its constitutional
prohibition against strikebreaking, though applicable
to "members," extended by implication to former
members. The Court rejected the distinction and stated
that it was no more disposed to find an implied post-
resignation commitment from the prohibition against
strikebreaking than it had been from participation in
LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 653
the strike vote and ratification of the rule in Granite
State. 412 U.S. 84 at 89.
We note that the Supreme Court's rejection of an
implied commitment from participation in the strike
vote in Granite State had not been based on a narrow
construction of "member" as used in the rule,' but on
the conclusion that events during a strike may lead a
member to change his mind. The Court stated, in the
passage previously cited, that, where there is no restric-
tion on resignation, "the vitality of section 7 requires
that the member be free to refrain in November from
the actions he endorsed in May and that his section 7
rights are not lost by a union's plea for solidarity or by
its pressures for conformity to its regime." 409 U.S. 213
at 217-18.
The Lodge argues that, because its constitution
specifically prohibits former members from returning
to work following resignation during a strike, Granite
State and Boeing are not applicable, and that the right
of a labor organization to maintain solidarity during a
strike and to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition and retention of membership must take
precedence over whatever Section 7 rights its former
members may have to abandon a lawful strike and
return to work. In support, it cites the Supreme Court's
Decision in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 388
U.S. 175 (1967).
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that a union does
not violate the Act by fining members who return to
work during a strike and instituting state court suits for
collection of the fines, concluding that Congress had
not intended to regulate a union's internal affairs in
those circumstances. But those fined enjoyed full union
membership, as the Court pointed out in Granite State,
409 U.S. 213 at 215, in distinguishing Allis-Chalmers,
on that basis. Not only do full members reap the bene-
fits of their continuing union membership, but they also
have a continuing voice in the union's course of action,
a factor the Court relied on in Allis-Chalmers, supra,
191.
No such justifications can support the imposition of
court-collectible fines on former members. They no
longer receive the benefits of union membership and
have no right to participate following resignation in
deciding their former union's course of action. It can-
not be argued in reason that continuing membership to
the extent, but only to the extent, that the "member"
remains subject to union discipline is the equivalent of
the "full union membership" that the Court relied on
in Allis-Chalmers, and relied on again in distinguishing
that decision in Granite State.
2 In fact, the Court was not concerned with any commitment based on
the rule, but the commitment which the court of appeals had found implicit
in participation in the strike vote
Moreover, in Granite State the Court reiterated its
view, expressed first in Scofield v. N. L. R. B., 394 U.S.
423 at 430 (1969), that:
8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a prop-
erly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union
interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded
in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced
against union members who are free to leave the
union and escape the rule. [409 U.S. 213 at
216.]
Not only does the Lodge's proscription of postresigna-
tion strikebreaking impair a former member's Section
7 right to refrain from concerted activity, but it also is
plainly contrary to Scofield's requirement that union
members be free to leave the union to escape member-
ship conditions that they consider onerous.
Balancing an individual's right under Section 7 to
refrain from concerted activity following resignation
from a union against that of a union to maintain
solidarity during a strike, we conclude that the latter
must give way. Conformity may be none too high a
price for the benefits of union membership. But the
choice, at least in the absence of reasonable restrictions
on resignation, is the individual's to make, not the
union's. Should he choose to resign and to forgo the
benefits of union membership, the union may not
nonetheless seek to exact conformity without regard to
the individual's Section 7 rights.
Whether the Lodge might lawfully have placed rea-
sonable restrictions on the circumstances in which a
member could resign , and have enforced those restric-
tions and strikebreaking sanctions against full members
who returned to work during a strike, is a question
which is not raised by the facts of this proceeding. We
hold only that a union may not levy, or threaten to levy,
court-collectible fines against a former member for ex-
ercising his Section 7 rights following lawful resigna-
tion from the union.
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The conduct of the Respondent set forth above, oc-
curring in connection with the operations of the Em-
ployer as set forth in section 1, has a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States , and tends to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in, certain unfair labor practices, we
shall order it to cease and desist therefrom. In order to
effectuate the purposes of the Act, we shall also order
654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent to rescind the unlawful fines, to refund
any money paid to it as a result of the fines, with
interest computed at 6 percent per annum, and to post
the notice attached as an appendix to this Decision and
Order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening to discipline, and by imposing
court-collectible fines on, former members, who had
duly resigned from the Union, for their postresignation
crossing of a sanctioned picket line and working during
the strike at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., Respondent
restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Lodge
1994, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining or coercing employees who have re-
signed from, and are no longer members of, Respond-
ent, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act, by threatening disciplinary action
against, and by imposing court-collectible fines on,
such employees because of their postresignation con-
duct in working at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., during
the strike which began in April 1973.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Rescind the fines levied against Stinson and Staiti
because of their postresignation work for O.K. Tool
Company, Inc., during the strike which began in April
1973 and refund to them any money they may have
paid as a result of such fines, plus interest computed at
the rate of 6 percent per annum.
(b) Post at its business office and meeting hall copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix. ,3 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 1, after being duly signed by an author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 1 signed
copies of said notice for posting by O.K. Tool Com-
pany, Inc., if the Company be willing, in places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of
said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Respon-
dent's authorized representative, shall be returned
forthwith to the Regional Director.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
MEMBERS FANNING and JENKINS, concurring in the result:
In agreement with our colleagues, we conclude that
the Lodge violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
threatening to impose, and imposing, court-collectible
fines on George Staiti and Ralph W. Stinson for return-
ing to work during a strike after they had duly resigned
from the Lodge. Our view of the facts, however, makes
it unnecessary for us to consider the broader legal issue
which our colleagues here determine adversely to the
Lodge: whether or not a union may, on proper notice
and in the absence of any other legal impediment, en-
force an otherwise valid constitutional provision forbid-
ding former members from returning to work during
a strike following lawful resignation from the union.
We do not believe that issue is present and we reserve
our judgment on it until it is presented in a more appro-
priate factual setting. Our concurrence is not intended
to reflect, and should not be read as reflecting, either
favorably or unfavorably on our colleagues' view of the
law in that respect.
Local Lodge No. 1994, IAM, and O.K. Tool Com-
pany were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
effective from April 1, 1971, to April 1, 1973. Negotia-
tions for a new agreement began February 15, 1973,
and continued to April 6 after an agreement to extend
negotiations to April 7. On April 7, the Lodge's mem-
bers rejected O.K.'s proposal and voted to strike. It is
stipulated that it was a lawful economic strike.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 655
On May 9, 1973, George Staiti and Ralph Stinson,
the Charging Parties, submitted their resignations to
the Lodge by mail. Representatives of the Lodge visited
Stinson at his home on May 11-when the resignations
were received-gave him a copy of the IAM constitu-
tion, and "called his attention" to the constitutional
provision regarding resignation during a strike. The
Respondent's representatives also attempted, but
failed, to see Staiti on the same day. On May 12 both
returned to work.
The Lodge sent letters to Staiti and Stinson on May
16 with copies of the constitution, refering them to the
provision, article L, section III, concerning resigna-
tions during a strike. The letter did not advise Staiti and
Stinson that they could not resign and return to work
during the strike as the constitution provides. Rather,
it interpreted the constitution (wrongfully, as the
Lodge now concedes) as prohibiting resignations:
Enclosed you will find the most recent copy of the
I.A.M. Constitution. On page 123, lines 30 thru
41, you will find language clarifying how you re-
sign from this organization.
Since your resignation has not been properly pre-
sented by the rules of our Constitution, we find we
must notify you that your resignation request is
denied.
The letters also advised them that they were subject to
charges for violating the constitution.
On May 17 a letter was sent to all the Lodge's mem-
bers stating in part that:
Questions have been asked as to what can be done
with members that cross our picket lines. Some of
the answers are as follows:
1. Charges can, and will, be brought against any
member of Local Lodge 1994 that crosses our
picket line.
2. If charges are upheld by a trial committee .
any violators will be subject to fines that will be
voted by our membership at a regular meeting.
3. Can members be fined? Yes. What about the
New Hampshire court ruling against the Textile
Union? This law is not applicable. When you re-
ceived your checks this week you also received an
I.A.M. Constitution. On page 125, lines 30 thru 41
will explain that you can not withdraw from this
Union during a strike.
Stinson and Staiti continued working and, in June
and July respectively, were advised that they had been
charged under article L, section III, of the IAM consti-
tution, concerning conduct unbecoming a member, for
accepting employment during a sanctioned strike. Nei-
ther appeared for trial and both were found guilty.
Stinson was fined $200 for each week he crossed the
picket line, Staiti $150. Among the exhibits presented
at the trial were "#I Letter of resignation" and
"#2 Letter of denial & Constitution." They were noti-
fied of the results by letter and that they were "obli-
gated for payment. 14
Both have continued to work and neither has ap-
pealed through intraunion procedures. They were ad-
vised before charges were filed that members who
crossed the picket line could be charged. Except for the
references to the IAM constitution, there is no evidence
that they were told that former members who resigned
before crossing a picket line could also be charged.
Although the parties stipulated that the constitutional
provision in issue here was read and explained to mem-
bers before the strike, there is no evidence of how it was
explained. It was also stipulated that lodge representa-
tives, as noted above, visited Stinson, but not Staiti,
"and called his attention to the provision on page 125
[of the constitution] pertaining to resignation in the
course of a strike." It is only reasonable to infer that the
explanations were consistent with the Lodge's later,
and oft repeated, explanation that the constitution pro-
hibited resignations during a strike.
The complaint alleged in paragraph 8 that "Stinson
and Staiti duly resigned from membership in Respond-
ent." The Lodge answered that it:
denies the allegation of paragraph 8 of the Com-
plaint. The Respondent denies Paragraph 8 of the
Complaint and further answering states that Arti-
cle L, Section III, of the Constitution . . . prohib-
its such resignations.
Paragraph 12 of the complaint, alleging that the Lodge
had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), was denied in its an-
swer on the ground that:
The resignations referred to in Paragraph 8 of
the Complaint could not be honored, therefore
these people were still members and subject to the
obligations set forth in the Constitution.
The Lodge argues that it fined its resigned members
pursuant to the provisions of the IAM constitution
which forbids a member, who resigns during a strike or
within 14 days before it begins, to work at the struck
establishment. To reach this argument, it contends that
whether or not its members were ever advised that they
could be tried and fined for returning to work during
a strike after valid resignations, or whether it is es-
topped from relying on its constitutional prohibition
against postresignation strikebreaking, are not raised
4 The Lodge concedes in its brief that the fines are court-collectible
656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the parties and, in any event, that its members were
on notice.
But the issue is presented to the Board , not only by
the facts, to which the Lodge stipulated, but also by the
Lodge's answer to the complaint. The answer not only
denies that the Charging Parties had resigned from the
Lodge, but also affirmatively defends that the resigna-
tions could not be honored, and for that reason they
were still members and subject to constitutional obliga-
tions.
The Lodge's brief buttresses its claim that its mem-
bers were apprised of the postresignation restriction by
arguing that the reference to the "New Hampshire
court ruling against the Textile Union ," in its May 17
letter to its members, supra, is "obviously to the Su-
preme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Granite State
Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213." In the context of "this
exact citation" (which is exact in the Lodge's brief), the
further statement that the constitutional provision
-will explain that you cannot withdraw from this
union during a strike' plainly means , and cannot rea-
sonably be prejudicially misunderstood, that a mid-
strike resignation does not free the resigner to engage
in post-resignation strikebreaking."
But Staiti and Stinson did not have the benefit of the
Lodge's brief. The point, after all, is not what the Lodge
might have thought it was telling its members, nor how
what it did tell them might be interpreted under the
most favorable analysis to comport with its present
defense, but what information the Lodge actually con-
veyed to its members.
The Lodge asserts that it is clearly unlawful to fine
former members for conduct occurring after they have
submitted valid and effective resignations , in the ab-
sence of any postresignation restrictions . With that in
mind , the IAM had amended its constitution to provide
what it considers to be lawful restrictions in article L,
section III. The Lodge argues that in view of the clear
state of the law, and the fact that its constitution had
been amended to prevent lawfully the very conduct the
Charging Parties engaged in, the Lodge would not have
ignored the amendment and have proceeded in a man-
ner which is clearly unlawful.
The argument, however, is not sufficient to prevent
the conclusion that that is precisely what the Lodge did
do. It would be strange indeed if the Lodge, by now
conceding for the first time that it could not lawfully
restrict the resignations of Stinson and Staiti and con-
tinue to treat them as members for the purposes of
union discipline, could thereby compel the conclusion
that it had neither restricted their resignations nor dis-
ciplined them as members . We doubt that Congress
labored under the belief its enactment of the law was
sufficient unto itself or that the Supreme Court thought
its view of the reach of Section 8(b)(1)(A) would have
the effect of a law of nature.
The Lodge's position comes down to the argument
that its representatives simply did not know what they
were talking about . But to sustain the Lodge 's factual
argument , we must also conclude that, although its
representatives did not understand the meaning of their
own words , its members were able to see through what
was actually said to what was supposedly intended. In
the Lodge 's view , its members , not the Respondent,
must bear the burden of any misunderstanding or am-
biguity.
The interpretation of the IAM constitution which
the Lodge now advances to the Board, although con-
sistent with its plain meaning , is not consistent with the
interpretation advanced to the Lodge's members, with
its refusal to accept the resignations of Staiti and Stin-
son, nor with its answer to the complaint: that it had
not violated the Act because the resignations of Staiti
and Stinson could not be honored and they were still
members. Having undertaken to interpret its constitu-
tion to Staiti and Stinson, the Lodge may not belatedly
justify encroachment on their Section 7 rights on the
basis of a contrary interpretation.
But, assuming that we did not find that the Lodge is
estopped from raising that defense , we could not con-
clude that Staiti and Stinson were on notice that the
Lodge claimed a right to discipline them as resigned
members for postresignation activities. The record
before us demonstrates that they were told that article
L, section III, prohibited resignations . That was the
Lodge's only interpretation. Its members were entitled
to rely upon it, and entitled to conclude that was the
sole import of article L, section III, and the sole consti-
tutional impediment to working during the strike.
There was no burden on Staiti and Stinson to go behind
the representations made by the Lodge's representa-
tives. The burden was upon the Lodge to assert any
claim to a continuing power over former members not-
withstanding resignation before, and not after, exercis-
ing that power.
It is clear that, even if a labor organization may
lawfully impose postresignation restrictions on former
members, it may do so only upon proper notice. Justice
Blackmun, the lone dissenter in Granite State, supra,
observed in his concurring opinion in Boeings that
even a constitutional provision clearly prohibiting post-
resignation strikebreaking is no substitute for proper
notice. Not only were Stinson and Staiti not on notice
of the interpretation of the Lodge's constitution which
it now urges, but they were advanced a completely
different interpretation. Indeed, the Lodge's case for
5 Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM [Boeing Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 412 U.S. 84
(1973).
LOCAL LODGE NO. 1994 , INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 657
notice would have been better had it never mentioned
its constitutional provision to them at all.
Because Staiti and Stinson had duly resigned from
Local Lodge No. 1994 before crossing the picket line
and were not on notice that the lodge asserted any right
to restrict the postresignation conduct of former mem-
bers , and because the Lodge is estopped from asserting
that its constitution prohibits postresignation strike-
breaking , we concur in the finding that the Lodge vi-
olated Section 8(b)(1)(A). We find it unnecessary to
consider whether a union which is not estopped may,
on proper notice , lawfully restrict the postresignation
conduct of former members on the basis of a clear and
otherwise binding constitutional proscription. In our
judgment that issue is not presented by the facts of this
proceeding.
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, work after their
resignation at O.K. Tool Company, Inc., during
the strike which began in April 1973, by threaten-
ing to discipline them or by imposing court-col-
lectible fines.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL rescind the fines levied against George
Staiti and Ralph W . Stinson because they worked
at O.K . Tool Company , Inc., after their resigna-
tion from the Union during the strike which began
in April 1973, and refund any money they may
have paid as a result of such fines , plus interest.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
LOCAL LODGE No. 1994,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS, AFL-CIO
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees who
have resigned from the Union and who, in the