Local 997, UAW

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 14, 1971

194 N.L.R.B. 534 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 997, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) and Saundra Whitton. Case
25-CA-4218
December 14, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On September 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Max
Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respon-
dent filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed in its
entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAx ROSENBERG, Trial Examiner: With all parties
represented, this proceeding was tried before me in Marion,
Indiana, on June 30, 1971, on a complaint filed by the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
and an answer filed thereto by Local 977, International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), herein called the
Respondent.' The issues raised by the pleadings relate to
whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by certain
conduct to be detailed hereinafter. Briefs have been
received from the General Counsel and Respondent, which
have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record made in this proceeding,
including my observation of the witnesses who testified on
the stand, I hereby make the following:
i The complaint, which issued on April 30, 1971, is based on charges
filed on March 23, 1971, and served on March 24, 1971.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent is a labor organization chartered by and
affiliated with the International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW). Subject to the provisions set forth in the
constitution and laws of the International, Respondent is
authorized to exercise the powers and privileges of a local
union involving matters of general interest and welfare for
its members. An integral part of a multistate labor
organization comprising the International and affiliated
local union, Respondent maintains an office and place of
business in Marion, Indiana, where it engages in represent-
ing approximately 3,000 employees for purposes of
collective bargaining under a contract with an employer
who is engaged in business operations both within and
without the State of Indiana. During the annual period
material to this proceeding, and in the course and conduct
of its business operations, Respondent remitted per capita
dues and taxes in excess of $75,000 directly to the
International at its headquarters in Detroit, Michigan.
During said period, the International received at its Detroit,
Michigan, headquarters, per capita taxes in excess of $1
million which had ' been remitted to it across state lines
directly from its various local member unions which are
situated in and among the various States of the United
States. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local Union # 1, Office and Professional Employees
International Union,. AFL-CIO, herein called OPEIU, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the following conduct:
5.(a) On or about October 29, 1970, the Respondent
suspended the employment of Saundra Whitton, an
employee at the Marion facility, and on or about
November 2, 1970 converted the aforesaid suspension
to a three day disciplinary suspension, because said
,employee threatened to file a grievance and to resort to
the contractual grievance procedure, and because said
employee engaged in other Union and protected
concerted activities.
(b) On or about November 16, 1970 the Respondent
discharged JoEtta Miller, an employee at the Marion
facility, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate
said employee except that on or about November 23,
1970 the Respondent rehired, but did not reinstate said
employee.
(c) The Respondent engaged in the discriminatory
conduct alleged above in subparagraph (b) because of
194 NLRB No. 93
LOCAL 997, UAW
Saundra Whitton's union and concerted activities
described above in subparagraph 5(a), and for the
purpose and as a result of implementing the discrimina-
tory transfer of Saundra Whitton described below in
subparagraph 5(d).
(d) On or about November 16, 1970, the Respondent
purported to eliminate the job heretofore performed by
Saundra Whitton and transferred Saundra Whitton to a
different job assignment, specifically to the job
theretofore performed by JoEtta Miller, because
Saundra Whitton engaged in the union and concerted
activities described above in subparagraph 5(a).
* *
(e) Commencing on or about October 29, 1970
Respondent, by the acts and conduct alleged above in
subparagraphs 5(b), (c) and (d), by other acts of
harassment, including, but without limitation the acts
described below, sought to induce the resignation of
Saundra Whitton because of her union and concerted
activity:
(i) On or about November 21, 1970, refused to grant
meritorious grievances of Saundra Whitton and JoEtta
Miller unless Saundra Whitton agreed to resign her
employment.
(ii) On or about November 21, 1970 announced that
JoEtta Miller's discharge was in retaliation for the
Union and concerted activities of Saundra Whitton.
(f) On or about November 21, 1970, Respondent
constructively discharged Saundra Whitton and at all
times since has failed and refused to reinstate or rehire
said employee, because said employee engaged in union
and concerted activities.
For its part, Respondent denies the commission of any
labor practices proscribed by the statute.
It is undisputed and I find that, at all material times,
Respondent represented a unit of employees at the General
Motors Fisher Body plant in Marion, Indiana. To service
its members, Respondent maintained an office in the city
which it staffed with two secretaries, Saundra Whitton and
Jo Etta Miller. Whitton, who was hired by Respondent in
November 1964, served as the secretary to Ralph Brooks,
the Fisher Body plant shop committee chairman. In the
course of her normal duties, Whitton handled grievances
and appeal cases. Miller, who was first employed in
September 1966, acted as secretary to President James
Dutton and Financial Secretary Chester Ward. She served
as a receptionist' in the office and performed bookkeeping
chores. Both Whitton and Miller were represented for
purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent by the
OPEIU and were covered by a labor agreement governing
their terms and conditions of employment. Pursuant to this
contract, Whitton, in 1966, and Whitton and Miller jointly,
in 1968, grieved over Respondent's practice of assigning
officials to perform unit work. Both employees received an
adjustment in pay in settlement of the grievances.
'In September 1970,2 negotiations between representatives
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter fall in 1970.
3 This section provides that "In the event of a decrease in volume of
work to such an extent that a layoff of an employee is made necessary, the
principle of seniority shall be applied providing that the employees who
535
of General Motors and officials of the Respondent and its
International over a new contract broke down and a strike
ensued at the Marion plant. In consequence of the strike,
which terminated in early December, the secretarial
workload doubled. This was occasioned by the fact that the
girls were required to stencil and run off thousands' of
copies of the tentative agreements which the parties had
reached regarding the prospective contract. Around the
middle of October, Shop Committee Chairman Brooks
informed Whitton that Respondent intended to enlist the
support of the members of his committee to assemble and
distribute the tentative contract items to the membership of
his union. Upon learning this, Whitton protested that it was
unfair to the secretaries. This protest was apparently
bottomed upon article IX, section 10, of the contract
between the OPEIU and Respondent which recited that:
Local 977, UAW, agrees that it shall not be the policy of
the Local to allow supervisory officers or representa-
tives of Local 977 to do work which will deprive OPEIU
# 1 AFL-CIO employees of work or earnings.
However, the section also related that "This provision can
also be disregarded in the event of a prolonged strike."
On October 29, Shop Committee Member Jim Basey
approached Whitton and reported that he had been
requested by President Dutton to appear on November 2 at
Respondent's offices with the other committee members
and assist in collating the approved contract clauses. Upset
by this intelligence, Whitton proceeded to Dutton's office
to verify Basey's statement . Whitton asked Dutton if it was
true that the committee members would be utilized to
assemble the contract and the latter responded in the
affirmative. At this juncture, Dutton handed Whitton a
letter, dated October 29, prepared by Miller and signed by
Dutton, which read:
Dear Mrs. Whitton:
Due to a strike situation at the Fisher Body Plant in
Marion it may be necessary to have a reduction in force
of the employees at Local 977, U.A.W.
This is in accordance with Article VI, Section 1, of the
contract between Local 977, U.A.W. and OPEIU # 1
AFL-CIO .3
A similar letter was given to Miller on that day. Dutton
assured both Whitton and Miller that the proffered written
notice of possible layoff was contractually required and was
"normal procedure" and advised them "not to worry about
it " Dutton added that if Whitton "had any gripe to make"
she should take it up"with Committee Chairman Brooks,
her superior. Later that afternoon, Whitton visited the
office of Brooks. She testified that, in the presence of
Dutton, she asked Brooks what he thought about the letter
which she handed to him. Brooks inquired as to who had
given her the document and, when she replied that it was
Dutton, Brooks asked "Well, then what's wrong?" Whitton
protested that it was inequitable-for Respondent to lay off
Whitton and Miller while at the same time it had enlisted
the aid of its shop committee to perform the task of
assembling the proposed contract. Brooks retorted that "it
would thus be retained possess the qualifications and ability to perform the
work available, and wherever practicable , said application shall be on an
office-wide basis. Rehiring shall be on the basis of seniority, providing the
employee can perform the available work."
536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was his office, he could do as he saw fit to do it." As the
discussion became more heated, Brooks reminded Whitton
that she had improperly typed a seniority agreement earlier
that month. Whitton thereupon warned Brooks that, if
Respondent actually utilized the shop committee members
to fasten the contract pages, she would contact Frances
Bick, chairman of the OPEIU bargaining committee, and
file a grievance over the matter. According to Whitton,
Brooks then inquired whether she was threatening to file a
grievance against his contemplated action and she an-
swered in the affirmative. Upon receiving her reply, Brooks
shot back that Whitton was indefinitely suspended from
her job. Initially, when asked whether Brooks had assigned
any reason for her suspension, Whitton testified that he
bottomed this personnel action on the ground that "I
threatened a grievance." Pressed on this issue, Whitton then
stated that Brooks "just said, after I had said that [the threat
to file a grievance], that I was suspended until further
notice, until I realized he ran this office." At this point,
Fred Troxell, a member of Respondent's executive board,
intervened and attempted to calm the disputants. Whitton
was then instructed to leave the office.
On November 1, Whitton filed a grievance with Bick in
which the former charged Brooks "with unjust suspension
on date October 29, 1970, also threatening me with
replacement on my job. Demand therefore I be paid all
monies and benefits lost." The following day, Whitton filed
another grievance charging Brooks with "doing my work
dunng my regular working hours and also on my lunch
hour. Demand therefore I be paid all monies and benefits
due me for this violation." On November 2, without
apparently having seen Whitton's grievances, Brooks
dispatched a letter to Whitton which read as follows:
On Thursday, October 29, 1970 you were suspended at
4:00 p.m. You failed to perform the job assignments as
you had been instructed to by your supervisor. You are
hereby advised that a Balance of Shift plus three (3)
days Disciplinary Layoff is being issued to you for your
improper action. The Disciplinary Layoff will be for the
Balance of Shift, Thursday, October 29, 1970 through
Wednesday, November 4, 1970. You are to return to
work on your regular shift Thursday, November 5,
1970. It should be noted that Friday, October 30 is not
included in the disciplinary layoff because the employee
was excused to attend a funeral service prior to the
suspension.
Because Whitton was ill, she did not return to work until
November 9. When she reported for duty, she sought out
Brooks and asked why he had indicated in his letter of
November 2 that she had been suspended for failing to
perform certain job assignments. Brooks replied that he had
ordered her to prepare a seniority agreement as requested
by an International representative and mail it to that
official, a task which she had not executed. Brooks resumed
her duties and, according to her testimony, working
conditions had so deteriorated as to cause her "a
tremendous strain and pressure." 4 Previously, Whitton and
Miller took their 1-hour lunchbreak whenever they decided
to do so. However, upon her return to work, Brooks
instructed Whitton to take her break at noon although the
duration remained the same . Whitton attributed another
"change" in working conditions to the fact that Brooks told
her to lock a "dutch" door which separated their office
from the rest of the quarters . This entailed securing a slip
lock which was located at the bottom of the door . Whitton
explained that shop committee members and other
individuals frequently sought admission to the office and
this required that she open and close the lock on these
occasions . However , she allowed as how "the shop
committee members , or committeemen would come in for
use of things . And he [Brooks ] would hear about this and
get upset . Or maybe a few members would come in with the
men. They weren 't allowed in the office. And he would hear
about it later and wouldn't like it very well." (Emphasis
supplied)
On November 16, Miller was laid off and she immediate-
ly filed a grievance against the Respondent claiming that
she had received inadequate notification of this employ-
ment severance . On the same day, Whitton was transferred
to Miller's position in President Dutton's office where she
acted as a receptionist and did general office work . Whitton
admitted that the transfer did not alter any of her existing
wages or terms and conditions of employment . A few days
after her assumption of the new position, Whitton stated
that she had a conversation with Brooks in which "he told
me at that time that the reason he had closed his office
down was because he didn't feel we could work together
and that things had to be straightened out before we could
continue working in the office ." However, in the same
conversation, Brooks related that "they would have to lay
Jo Etta off to close down the chairman 's office . because
there wouldn't [be] enough work up front for two. And
since the chairman's work wouldn't be done, well, it would
just be general office work up front until the grievance
meeting arrived."
A meeting to discuss the grievances was held on
November 21. In attendance were the two grievants,
Frances Bick, their OPEIU representative , and Brooks and
Dutton. The parties opened the parley by discussing the
layoff of Miller. Miller took the position that her layoff on
November 16 violated a provision in the existing contract
which provided for a 2-week notice . Respondent claimed
that the provision had been satisfied by its letter to Miller
under date of October 29, and no settlement at this first
stage was immediately reached . The parties then turned to
the case of Whitton, with the Respondent contending that
she had been suspended on October 29 for "personal"
reasons and it refused to reimburse her for the period of her
suspension . During the colloquy, and according to
Whitton's testimony, President Dutton "made the state-
ment that because of me another girl [Miller] was laid off
for no reason at all except because they had to close the
chairman's office and that the wrong girl had been laid off
because after I was suspended they brought her back and
she finished the work in one day, she did the work in one
day that it took me two months to do." Dutton added that
"they couldn't pay either Jo Etta or myself anything for the
grievances, but if we would prefer to take it onto the second
4 Whitton also acknowledged that she experienced stress in her job had a history of "acute anxiety" as medically diagnosed during her
because of the continuation of the strike. Indeed, Whitton unfortunately employment with Respondent.
LOCAL 997, UAW
step. They would not settle." At this juncture, the grievants
requested a recess and met separately. In their solitude,
Whitton of her own volition informed Bick and Miller,that
the former would resign her job on the condition that
Respondent reinstate Miller and pay both of the secretaries
for any loss of wages suffered during the period of the
suspension and layoff. In Whitton's words, she decided to
resign because "It was the whole thing for the last two
months. It was just everything. I just couldn't take it. The
nerves and it was just making me nervous to have to work
under that constant tension. And then laying Jo Etta off
simply because of what was going on between Ralph
Brooks and myself. It's just the constant little things that
was being thrown at me." Whitton then added that "I
would have quit no matter what after that day. With what
was going on during the grievance I would have walked out
no matter what." When the meeting reconvened, Whitton
proffered her settlement proposal to Respondent's officials
which, after further discussion, was accepted. Whitton
handed in a written resignation and Brooks, in turn, gave
her a letter of recommendation which recited that "Saundra
Whitton is a good secretary. She is capable, qualified, and
punctual. I would highly recommend her for any position
you might have open." The parties stipulated and I find
that, on November 27, Respondent hired another secretary
to replace Whitton. In January 1971, Respondent conduct-
ed a membership meeting at which the subject of Whitton's
problems and resignation was reviewed, and she was
invited to appear before the membership and present her
side of the story. In March 1971, she filed unfair labor
practice charges which triggered this litigation.
Fred Troxell, a member of the Respondent's executive
board, joined the heated discussion between Brooks and
Whitton after it had commenced on October 29. He
testified on behalf of the General Counsel that he appeared
in the area of the dispute at a point when Whitton and
Miller had been given their layoff notices. Whitton was in
the process of protesting the layoffs, claiming that this
action was unfair in light of the fact that Respondent
intended to utilize members of its shop committee to
perform the unit work of assembling the proposed contract
between General Motors and Respondent. After unsuccess-
fully attempting to still the troubled waters, Troxell
overheard Whitton angrily inform Brooks that "You
[Brooks ] give me no choice but to call my representative
and write a grievance." Brooks retorted, "You're suspended
as of now." When Whitton demanded an explanation for
the discipline visited upon her, Brooks replied that "she
wasn't carrying out her work assignment." The following
day, the executive board met and the matter of Whitton's
suspension became a topic of deliberation. Troxell argued
against Brooks' personnel action and the latter repeated
that the suspension was prompted by Whitton's unsatisfac-
tory work performance and no mention was made of her
threat to file a grievance against Respondent.
Jo Etta Miller testimonially recounted that she had
prepared the layoff notices on October 29 and that, on
November 16, she was laid off and Whitton was retained.
The predicate for her grievance was that she believed the
October 29 notification became invalidated because the
requisite 2-week notice provision in the unit contract had
537
expired. She recalled that she was present at the grievance
meeting on November 21 in company with OPEIU
Representative Bick, Whitton, Brooks, and Dutton. Miller's
and Whitton's grievances were discussed seriatim. Miller
sought backpay for the 5-day period of her layoff and
Whitton requested compensation for her 3-day suspension.
When Respondent's officials rejected this settlement
proposal, Miller and her cohorts decided to caucus. Before
they did so, Miller overheard President Dutton remark that
"actually the wrong girl was being punished; that I was laid
off, you know, because of she's [Whitton's] got higher
seniority than I have." Dutton added that Miller "went
back when she [Whitton] was suspended and I did the work
in one day that it would take her to do in two weeks."
During the settlement recess, Whitton voluntarily
announced that she would resign her job because "she
couldn't stand it any more" and that she would offer her
resignation if Respondent would afford backpay to the
girls. Although both Bick and Miller implored Whitton not
to quit work, Whitton could not be dissuaded. Thereupon,
the parties reconvened and Whitton made her announce-
ment. After a short recess, Dutton and Brooks decided to
accept Whitton's proposed settlement. Rounding out
Miller's testimony, she acknowledged that, under her labor
agreement, she, as the most junior secretary, would have
been the first employee to be reached in a reduction in
force. Miller also averred that, contrary to the allegations of
the complaint, she was not "discharged" by Respondent on
November 16 but was in layoff status; that she was recalled
from layoff status on November 21 rather than refused
reinstatement; and, that Respondent did not inform her
that she was or had been severed from Respondent's
employment rolls in order to punish Whitton because of the
latter's concerted, protected activities.
Frances Bick, the chairman of the bargaining committee
for OPEIU, recalled the grievance meeting of November
21. Bick maintained, on behalf of her constituents, that the
girls deserved backpay because the suspension of Whitton
and the timing of Miller's layoff notice offended the
existing contractual agreement. Dutton and Brooks ex-
pressed the view that both personnel actions were
privileged under the contract. Attention was then shifted to
Whitton's complaint that her duties had become more
onerous because she was required to lock the door to
Brooks' office. According to Bick's undisputed testimony,
Dutton and Brooks explained that they were in studied
negotiations with General Motors during the strike and that
"they were preparing proposal demands and that they
wanted to pass these out at a membership meeting and that
they were having trouble with all the members just walking
in the office and helping themselves and that they wanted
to have the door locked during this particular period so that
... the work could be done and so that these could be
passed out at the membership meeting, which was to be
held at a future date." It is also undisputed and I find that,
during the session, Respondent's officials pointed out that
the purpose for the layoff notices of October 29 was
bottomed on Respondent's desire "to cut down on expenses
because of the strike. . . . They said the strike was so long
and it was costing the union money and the International
538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was running out of money. They were trying to cut
corners." The meeting thereupon temporarily adjourned.
During the respite, Whitton announced to Bick that "I
don't want to work here any more. I'm going to resign."
Bick essayed to impress upon Whitton the folly of such a
venture, explaining that good positions such as Whitton
occupied were difficult to obtain in the Marion area and
pointing out that Whitton was the sole support of an infant.
Despite this advice, Whitton replied, "No, Frances, I've
been thinking about this for a long time. I want to quit. I'm
going to quit anyway. And I dust don't want to work here."
Whitton mentioned that her boyfriend was employed by a
local insurance carrier and that he was in a position to
secure employment for her. Bick once again sought to
dissuade Whitton from tendering her resignation, pointing
out that "as her rep' . . . I saw no reason for her to resign
just because we hadn't won it [the grievance] at the first
step or because we hadn't won it then. We hadn't even
finished with the first step of the grievance procedure.
Certainly we could have gone on." Whitton eschewed this
counsel and the grievance committee reconvened. Whitton
announced her decision to Dutton and Brooks. After
consultation among Respondent's officials, they agreed to
accept Whitton's resignation, recall Miller from layoff, and
pay each girl the requisite amount of backpay. This
agreement was reduced to writing, and the meeting
terminated.
If I understand the General Counsel correctly, his
position appears to be that, on October 29, Respondent
suspended Whitton because of her threat to file a grievance
against it occasioned by her dissatisfaction over the
potential layoff and the employment of nonunit personnel
to perform her work; that, when she was recalled to her job
on November 9, she was assigned more arduous duties to
chasten her due to her threat; that, on November 16,
Respondent "discharged" Miller and "refused to reinstate"
her in order to punish Whitton for grieving; that, on
November 16, Respondent eliminated the job which
Whitton had held with Brooks and transferred her to the
position previously occupied by the departed Miller; and,
that, on November 21, Respondent "constructively dis-
charged" Whitton in retaliation for the grievances she filed
in early November. On my view of the evidence adduced in
this proceeding, the General Counsel's position presents a
portrait of sheer legal nonsense.
It is undisputed and I have found that, in September,
Respondent embarked upon a strike against General
Motors which persisted until December. The work stoppage
undeniably caused a financial drain upon the coffers not
only of Respondent but its International as well and this, I
find, was the sole reason for the issuance of the notices of
possible layoff to Whitton and Miller on October 29. When
Whitton learned that Respondent intended to utilize the
services of its shop committee to assemble the agreed-upon
aspects of its contract with General Motors, she became
incensed and berated Brooks on this score. Brooks
thereupon took Whitton to task for concededly having
failed to fulfill her duties efficiently earlier that month
5 At the hearing, the General Counsel abandoned any contention that
Whitton had been suspended because she was a persistent grievant.
6 1 would note that the General Counsel does not contend that
when she neglected to collate and type a seniority
agreement which an International representative had
requested from Respondent's officials. After Brooks
informed the excitable Whitton that "it was his office, he
could do as he saw fit to do it," Whitton warned that she
would file a grievance if Brooks implemented his plan to
enlist the labors of his committee in performing the clerical
tasks. Angered, Brooks stated that Whitton was immediate-
ly suspended. At the outset of her testimony, Whitton
averred that Brooks assigned her suspension to the fact that
"I threatened a grievance." She later recounted that Brooks
told her that, "I was suspended until further notice, until I
realized he ran this office." Fred Troxell, who was present
during this encounter, remembered that Whitton asked for
the cause for her suspension and Brooks responded that
"she wasn't carrying out her work assignment," a basis
which Brooks reiterated at an executive board meeting the
following day. In sum, I do not accept the General
Counsel's assertion that Whitton was suspended by Brooks
because she had chosen to grieve. I am fortified in this
conclusion by the circumstance that Whitton had filed
grievances on two previous occasions regarding the same
subject and on each occasion the grievances were
satisfactorily resolved in her favor without recrimination or
punishment.5
However, assuming, arguendo, that I were to find that
Whitton's temporary suspension was triggered by her threat
to grieve and that the threat was statutorily privileged, I am
not convinced that any remedial order would be warranted
in this case. Following her return to work on November 9,
Whitton claimed that she was subjected to more taxing
terms and conditions of employment. The first of these
related to Respondent's insistence that she and Miller take
their lunches on repast at the noon hour. The second bore
on Brooks' requirement that his office door be locked at all
times. Both of these "changes" can be plausibly explained
on the uncontroverted testimony adduced herein. Respon-
dent's strike against General Motors had reached a
crescendo. Agreement on tentative contract proposals
between the economic combatants were flowing into
Whitton's office. Committeemen and rank-and-file mem-
bers were invading Brooks' office in numbers on conceded-
ly unauthorized junkets. Viewing the totality of these
circumstances, I conclude that it was reasonable for
Respondent to ask the secretaries to conform their lunch
hour to that prescribed by Brooks and to request that the
door to his office be closed against unauthorized forays.
Nor am I convinced that Miller's layoff on November 16
and Whitton's transfer to Miller's duties on that date was
fraught with discriminatory overtones. The contract
between Respondent and the OPEIU clearly provided that,
in a reduction in force, the most junior employee should be
laid off.6 Miller admittedly was the more jumor member of
the staff. When Whitton was assigned to Miller's position in
President Dutton's office, her wages and duties remained
the same.
Furthermore, I am not persuaded that Respondent
"refused to grant meritorious grievances of Saundra
Respondent's layoff notice of October 29 was prompted by statutorily
proscribed considerations
LOCAL 997, UAW 539
Whitton and Jo Etta Miller unless Saundra Whitton agreed
to resign her employment" on November 21; that
Respondent announced on that date that Miller's
"discharge" was in retaliation for the concerted activities of
Whitton ; or, that Respondent "constructively discharged"
Whitton on November 21. The recorded facts simply are to
the contrary . Whitton, Miller, and Bick made it testimonial-
ly clear that, during the grievance meeting on November
21, Whitton and Whitton alone volunteered to resign on
that day if she could persuade Respondent to award
backpay to her and Miller and to recall the later . Moreover,
Miller's testimony belies any assertion that she , or anyone
else, was informed by Respondent 's officials that she had
been laid off in order to punish Whitton for grieving.
Furthermore , I perceive nothing Statutorily sinister in
Dutton's statement that "the wrong girl was being
punished ; that I [Miller ] was laid off . . . because of she's
[Whitton's] got higher seniority than I have ," in view of
both Whitton's and Miller's testimony that Dutton added
that Miller's production far exceeded that of Whitton.
In sum, even were I to have found that Whitton was
suspended because she threatened to grieve on October 29,
the record establishes to my satisfaction that she was
reimbursed for the 3-day period of her suspension; that
none of Respondent's actions thereafter were designed to
harass or punish her for making or fulfilling the threat, and
that Whitton voluntarily quit her job and was not
constructively discharged. I therefore find and conclude
that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of
proof of any allegations listed in the complaint , and I shall
recommend that it be dismissed in its entirety.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is hereby recommended that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.