Local 964, Carpenters

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 7, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 948 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America , AFL-CIO and Contractors &
Suppliers Association of Rockland County, New
York , Inc. Case 2-CB-4666
April 7, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On September 17, 1969, Trial Examiner Sidney
Sherman issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, exceptions with supporting arguments
were filed by the Respondent,' and limited
exceptions and briefs in support thereof and in
support of the Trial Examiner's Decision were filed
by the General Counsel and the Charging Party.
Pursue nt to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the briefs,
and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations2 of
the Trial Examiner, as modified herein '
The Respondent ' s request for oral argument is hereby denied, as the
record , the exceptions , and briefs adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties
'In adopting the Trial Examiner ' s recommendations , we find it
unnecessary to rely on H K Porter Co, Inc, 172 NLRB No 72, revising
397 U S 99 (March 2, 1970) For, unlike the situation in Porter , where the
employer was directed to include in the contract a provision upon which it
had bargained in bad faith but on which no agreement had been reached,
here the Union acted unlawfully in bypassing the Charging Party as the
representative of its employer members by rejecting the Charging Party's
substantive contract proposal while simultaneously offering to, and
subsequently imposing upon, the Charging Party's members individually
contracts with the same substantive terms Accordingly, our order requires
only that the Union offer to reexecute that agreement , albeit without the
non-mandatory provisions , through the agency of the Charging Party, thus
requiring the Union to recognize and deal with the Charging Party as the
duly designated bargaining representative of its employer members The
Trial Examiner's recommended remedy with respect to the substitution of
the Charging Party's name for that of the Carpenters Association in the
Union's contract with members of the Charging Party is wholly consistent
with our order and, in these circumstances , is but a technicality which does
not alter the substantive contract terms and , hence, does not constitute a
trenching on the rule against the Board ' s writing contract terms for the
parties
'In adopting the "Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner ' s Decision, we
hereby modify it to require that reimbursement be made with interest, at
the rate of 6 percent per annum , as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co , 138 NLRB 716 In addition, we find merit in the contention of the
General Counsel and Charging Party that the Respondent should be
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, Local 964, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, Bardonia, New York, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall take the action set forth in
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as
herein modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(c) in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, and reletter
the present paragraphs 2(c), (d), and (e) as 2(d), (e),
and (f), respectively:
"(c) Subject to the conditions set forth in the
"Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner's Decision,
as modified herein, refund to the members of the
aforenamed Association all contributions made by
them since July 19, 1968, to the industry
advancement fund designated in their individual
contracts referred to above."
2. Footnote 34, second sentence, should be
amended to read as follows:
"In the event this Order is enforced by a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals,
the words in the notice reading "Pursuant to the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read
"Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board." "
3. Add the following new paragraph 3 to the
affirmative section of the Notice To All Members:
ordered to reimburse members of the Charging Party for payments which
they were compelled to make to the industry advancement fund of
Carpenters Association The Board has consistently ordered such
reimbursement where, as here , a union unlawfully imposed upon employers
a contract containing an industry advancement fund and required
employers to make payments into such fund Local 80, Sheet Metal
Workers International Association , AFL-CIO, et al (Turner-Brooks, Inc ),
161 NLRB 229, 233, 237-238, Southern California Pipe Trades District
Council No 16 of the United Association (Hero Plumbing Co ), 167
NLRB No 143, Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' International
Association Local 2, AFL-CIO (Arnold M Hansen), et al, 149 NLRB
1264, 1267, 1269, United Slate , Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp &
Waterproof Workers Association , Local No 36 (Roofing Contractors
Association of Southern California, Inc, etc ), 172 NLRB No 249 We
find no reason for departing from precedent in this case Accordingly, we
shall order Respondent , subject to the conditions set forth in the
"Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner ' s Decision, to reimburse members
of the Charging Party for all contributions made by them since July 19,
1968 to the industry advancement fund of Carpenters Association as
designated in their individual contracts with Respondent
Member Brown agrees that the reimbursement remedy is proper in the
circumstances herein because these employers were compelled to make
such payments involuntarily , although he would find that industry
advancement programs are mandatory subjects of bargaining See his
dissent in Brotherhood of Painters , Decorators and Paperhangers of
America, Glaziers Local Union 1385, AFL-CIO (Associated Building
Contractors of Evansville, Inc ), 143 NLRB 678, 683 Member Brown did
not participate in any of the above-cited cases, including Arnold M
Hansen , supra , although this fact was inadvertently omitted from the
printed volumes of Board decisions
181 NLRB No. 154
LOCAL 964, CARPENTERS
3. Refund to tht members of that Association
all contributions paid by them since July 19, 1968,
into the industry advancement fund designated in
their current contracts with us.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY SHERMAN, Trial Examiner: Copy of the instant
charge was served upon Respondent on September 3,
1968,' the complaint issued on March 28, 1969, and the
hearing was held between June 9 and 12. The issues
litigated related to alleged violations of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
and 8(b)(3) of the Act. Briefs were filed by all parties
Upon the entire record,' including observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, the following findings and
conclusions are adopted:
1. JURISDICTION
The record shows, and it is found, that the Charging
Party is a corporation, organized under the laws of the
State of New York; that one of its objects, as set forth in
its charter, is to bargain on behalf of its members with
labor organizations; that the members of the Charging
Party consist, inter alia , of employers in the construction
industry; that for at least the past 15 years the Charging
Party has negotiated contracts with unions, including
Respondent, which contracts have been uniformly adopted
by its members; that among such members are
Helmer-Cronin Construction, Inc., and John Forni
Construction Company; that during the year preceding the
instant hearing the former firm purchased supplies worth
more than $50,000 from out-of-State sources; and that
such out-of-State purchases by the latter firm annually
exceed that amount . It is accordingly found that the
Charging Party is an employer' and is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act
'All dates hereinafter refer to 1968 , unless otherwise indicated
'For corrections of the transcript and certain rulings on evidence , see the
order of August 4, 1969 For a ruling on objections to the admission of
General Counsel 's Exhibit 15, see the telegraphic order of July 18, 1969
Documents relating to a posthearing stipulation by the parties as to the
commerce of Helmer-Cronin Construction , Inc , are hereby received in
evidence as Trial Examiner's Exhibits 1(a) and I(b)
'In its answer to the complaint, Respondent professed ignorance as to
whether the Charging Party had authority to represent its members in
collective bargaining However, no formal delegation of such authority is
required It suffices that, as the record shows , the Charging Party has for
at least :5 years negotiated with Respondent contracts prescribing terms
and conditions of employment and that such contracts have uniformly been
adopted by all contractors in the area , including the Charging Party's
members N L R B v Dover Tavern Owner's Association , 412 F 2d 725
(C A 3), enfg 169 NLRB No 21
At the hearing , the General Counsel offered in evidence General
Counsel's Exhibit 15, which purported to be a complete list of the
Charging Party ' s members at the time of the events here involved, and
which designated 27 of the firms on that list as employers of carpenters
Final ruling on the admissibility of this exhibit was reserved pending the
inspection by Respondent of the records from which this list was compiled
and pending notice by Respondent to the Trial Examiner of any objections
to the accuracy of the list By letter dated July 15, 1969, which is hereby
incorporated in the record as Trial Examiner 's Exhibit 2, Respondent, inter
atta, questioned the membership status of eight of the firms that were
identified or that list as employers of carpenters In the order of July 18, 1
received General Counsel's Exhibit 15 as probative evidence of the
membership status during the period here in issue of all firms with respect
to which no objection was indicated by Respondent , and I made no
determination as to the membership status of those firms which were
objected to The issue of the status of the latter firms may appropriately be
resolved in compliance proceedings , should it then become relevant
II. THE RESPONDENT
949
Local 964 , United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, herein called Respondent,
is a labor organization under the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The pleadings, in the main, raise the following issues
1. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the Act by coercing employers to cease negotiating with
Respondent through the Charging Party9
2. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act by insisting, inter alia , upon the termination of certain
litigation and that the employer-trustees of certain jointly
administered funds be employers of carpenters, by the
aforecited coercion of members of the Charging Party to
cease bargaining through it, and by refusing to agree to
the same terms and conditions of employment as
Respondent had negotiated with another association?
A. Sequence of Events
The Charging Party has had contractual relations with
Respondent for at least 15 years, executing a series of
contracts covering carpenters employed by its members.
Such contracts provided for employer contributions to
various funds, which were administered jointly by trustees
appointed by Respondent and by the contributing
employers Such contracts also provided for employer
contributions to an "industry advancement fund," which,
according to the testimony at the hearing, was to be used
to further the economic interests of building contractors in
the area The most recent such contract ran from July 1,
1963, to June 30, 1968. In January 1967, Respondent
executed a contract with another association representing
contractors in the same area -- Rockland County
Carpenter Contractors Association, Inc., hereinafter called
the Carpenter Association. That contract, which also
expired on June 30, 1968, provided for employer
contributions to, inter alla , jointly administered pension
and welfare funds
In December 1967, a controversy having arisen between
the employer-trustees and the union-trustees administering
the various joint funds under the Charging Party's
contract, the employer-trustees filed suit against the
union-trustees , which litigation was still pending at the
time of the instant hearing.
Negotiations between the Charging Party and
Respondent for a new contract, at meetings held on April
5, and 25, and on June 28, failed to produce agreement.
On July 1, Respondent struck all contractors in the area
employing carpenters, including those affiliated with the
Carpenter Association, as well as the members of the
Charging Party. On July 5, Respondent concluded an
agreement with the Carpenter Association, and on July 19
Respondent met again with the Charging Party, but
without result There were no further meetings. Within the
next few weeks all the members of the Charging Party
signed individual contracts with Respondent binding them
to the same terms and conditions as were contained in the
contract between Respondent and the Carpenter
Association
950 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. Discussion
1. The 8(b)(1)(B) issue
Section 8(b)(1)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for
a union to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection
of his bargaining representatives
The record shows that Helmer-Cronin Construction
Inc.,' as a member of the Charging Party, was represented
by it in the 1968 contract negotiations with Respondent;
that early in May, Sopko, Respondent's business agent,
approached a representative of that firm, William Helmer,
and told him it would be to his advantage to resign from
the Charging Party and affiliate with the Carpenter
Association, predicting that the former would have "a lot
of labor trouble" and referring to certain "unfounded"
action that was being taken by it against Respondent.
Helmer did not heed Sopko's advice He thereafter
experienced difficulty in recruiting carpenters through
Respondent's hiring hall, which had theretofore been his
main source of supply Repeated requests for men elicited
only the answer by Respondent that there was a dearth of
carpenters and that they would be dispatched as soon as
they became available. However, early in August, within a
week after signing a separate contract with Respondent,
Helmer-Cronin received from Respondent all the
carpenters it needed
The record shows, also, that late in May, the John
Forni Construction Company,' a member of the Charging
Party, while engaged as a subcontractor on the "Homart"
job, had need for about 30 carpenters, that, when its vice
president, Minarchi, first solicited the assistance of
Respondent's shop steward, Badcock, in recruiting
carpenters, the latter told him he was in the wrong
organization and should withdraw from the Charging
Party; that, although Badcock and Sopko told Minarchi
he could not hire carpenters directly, but only through
Respondent, they failed to furnish any, contending that
none was available, and that by June 5, Forni had lost the
few carpenters that it had managed to hire by its own
efforts. About the same time (a) Badcock repeated to
Minarchi that Forni would not have any trouble if it left
the Charging Party and joined the Carpenter Association,
(b) Sopko told Cole, a representative of the general
contractor on the Homart job, that Respondent would
furnish no carpenters to Forni because it was a member of
the Charging Party and not of another organization, and
(c) Sopko gave Cole the names of three contractors whom
he described as members of such other organizations,
urging Cole to select one of them as a replacement for
Forni. It was not until June 10, after the matter had been
brought to the attention of a local court in connection
with some litigation between the Charging Party and
Respondent, that the latter agreed to, and did, furnish
carpenters to Forni.
It is clear from the foregoing, and it is found, that
Respondent used its control over the supply of carpenters
as a means of pressuring both Helmer-Cronin and Forni
to withdraw from joint bargaining through the Charging
Party and to bargain with Respondent either directly or
through the Carpenter Association. Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act
'Hereinafter called Helmer-Cronin
'Hereinafter called "Form "
2. The 8(b)(3) issue
With regard to the negotiations between Respondent
and the Charging Party for a new contract, the
uncontradicted testimony shows the following:
At the first meeting, on April 5, Respondent submitted
a written list of 23 demands, which did not include wage
rates As to the latter, Respondent orally requested a
1-year contract with an increase of $1 08 per hour.
Respondent further demanded that all employer-trustees
of the joint funds, contrary to the existing situation, be
employers of carpenters, and asserted that there would be
no agreement so long as Respondent had a' gun at its
head, which was an apparent reference to the litigation
then pending between the two groups of trustees of the
joint funds On April 12, the Charging Party mailed to
Respondent a statement of position with regard to
Respondent's written demands, wherein there was
indicated acceptance of a number of Respondent's
nonwage proposals At the next meeting, on April 25,
Respondent renewed its demand that the
employer-trustees be employers of carpenters, but there
was some narrowing of the considerable gap between the
parties on the wage issue. During a caucus by the
employer representatives, Respondent's legal counsel,
Mulderig, approached them and indicated that
Respondent was disposed to make further concessions that
might lead to an agreement, provided that the litigation
instituted by the employer-trustees against the
union-trustees was abandoned The employer
representatives rejected this condition Thereupon,
Respondent's representatives, who had earlier in the
session reduced their wage package' proposal to $2.35 an
hour over a 3-year period, returned to the negotiations
with a demand for a $2.77 an hour package over the same
period
At the third meeting, on June 28; Respondent insisted
that there could be no agreement, unless its proposed
limitation on the selection of employer-trustees was
adopted, again implied that it would be futile to bargain
as long as Respondent had a gun at its head, and, with
respect to wages, took the position that during the first
year of the contract wages should be raised by $1.08 an
hour, to conform to the existing rate for New York City
carpenters, and that during the next 2 years the rate
should correspond to that fixed in future negotiations for
New York City carpenters. The Charging Party's offer of
a wage increase of about $1.30 per hour,over a 3-year
period was rejected.
On July 1, a countywide strike by all building trades
employees began On July 5, Respondent executed a
3-year contract with the Carpenter Association,- thereby
settling its strike against the members of that Association.
Such agreement provided, inter alia, for a
5-cent-per-man-hour employer contribution to an industry
advancement fund and for wage increases totalling $1.85
per hour over 3 years, plus improvements in fringe
benefits. The strike against the members of the Charging
Party remained in effect During the next several weeks'
Respondent solicited members of the Charging Party to
sign a memorandum agreement binding them to adopt the
terms and conditions of Respondent's contract with the
Carpenter Association, which was stated in that
memorandum to call for a wage increase of $1.85 per
hour over 3 years plus 22 cents per hour in fringe benefits,
As here used , "wage package " denotes wage increases plus the value of
fringe benefits
LOCAL 964, CARPENTERS 951
or a total of $2.07 per hour
On July 19, the instant parties held their final
bargaining session Respondent renewed its demand for
parity with future New York City rates during the second
and third year of the proposed contract, and for the
aforementioned limitation on the selection of
employer-trustees. The employer representatives, whose
spokesman was Mascola,' countered with an offer of the
same wage package as had just been negotiated by
Respondent with the Carpenter Association and as was
currently being offered directly to Charging Party's
members, and for negotiations with respect to such other
changes as Respondent might desire Sopko, Respondent's
spokesman, rejected this offer, charging Mascola with
taking advantage of Sopko's inexperience as a negotiator
and with "preparing a case before the Board," and he
remained adamant even after Mascola pointed out that
this proposal embodied the very same terms as
Respondent had just negotiated with the Carpenter
Association. Mascola then submitted an even more
generous proposal, which provided for wage increases over
a 3-year period totalling 15 cents more than the previous
offer. This was also rejected. In rejecting either the first or
second of these offers, Sopko objected to the inclusion
therein of a 5-cent per man-hour employer contribution to
the industry advancement fund, and persisted in this
objection even after it was pointed out to him that
Respondent's new contract with the Carpenter Association
contained a like provision When, at the conclusion of this
meeting, he asked Sopko about a date for another
meeting, Mascola received a noncommittal answer. He
thereupon reported to the members of the Charging Party
that Respondent had no apparent intention of reaching an
agreement, and advised them that the most expedient
course for them to pursue was to sign the individual
memorandum agreements adopting the provisions of the
Carpenter Association contract, which were being
circulated among them by Respondent. The members of
the Charging Party did sign such individual agreements
within the next few weeks.
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent
demonstrated its bad faith in the bargaining sessions by
taking the following positions:
(1) Insisting on abandonment by the employer-trustees
of the litigation over the trust funds.
(2) Insisting that employer-trustees of the funds be
employers of carpenters
(3) Demanding that the' Charging Party bind itself in
advance to adopt the same rates as would be negotiated in
the future for New York City carpenters by other parties
(4) Refusing to grant the Charging Party the same
terms as had just been negotiated with the Carpenter
Association.
The Supreme Court has held that a party to collective
bargaining may not lawfully insist, as a condition of
reaching agreement, upon acceptance of a clause that does
not relate to the statutorily defined subject matter of
collective bargaining - namely, "wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment."' In that case, the
Court affirmed the Board's finding that the respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) by insisting to the point of
impasse upon exclusion from the recognition clause of a
contract of the name of the union certified by the Board,
and upon the inclusion of a clause requiring the union to
poll the employees before calling a strike or rejecting the
7 He was the Charging Party's managing director
respondent's last offer. As to the latter clause, the Court
found that it did not relate to wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment, and the Court
condemned the insistence on excluding the name of the
certified union from the recognition clause as an
"evasion" of the obligation imposed by the Act to
recognize the certified representative of the employees.
Thus, it is clear that contract proposals that do not relate
to terms and conditions of employment, or that are at
odds with statutory provisions may not lawfully be
adhered to by a party so as to preclude agreement. Many
examples of the application of this rule may be found in
Board cases. Thus, the Board has held to be unlawful a
party's demand for a bond to guarantee faithful
performance of the contract by the other party,' a union's
demand that the employer agree to contribute to an
industry advancement fund,'" a party's insistence on a
clause limiting the right of the other party to select
members of its bargaining or grievance committee,"
employer insistence on a clause requiring individual
employees to sign grievances,' 2 employer insistence that
the union comply with State law governing credentials of
union representatives," and employer insistence on the
right to approve appointment of a shop steward 11
We turn next to a consideration, in the light of these
authorities, of the various positions taken by Respondent
in the course of the negotiations
The record shows that at the first three meetings some
reference was made to the trust fund litigation as an
obstacle to agreement, the most explicit being Mulderig's
assurance at the second meeting that the prospects of
agreement would be greatly enhanced if the litigation was
abandoned, coupled with the fact that after Mulderig was
rebuffed, Respondent promptly withdrew a wage
concession already made It is thus clear that, at least
during the first three meetings, Respondent regarded the
abandonment of the lawsuit as a condition of agreement.
While the record shows no reference to this issue at the
parties' last meeting, on July 19, it is clear, for reasons
explained below, that Respondent was by that time no
longer genuinely interested in obtaining concessions but
only in breaking off negotiations with the Charging Party,
and that there was no meaningful bargaining by
Respondent on that date nor any possibility of agreement
It is accordingly concluded that at those bargaining
sessions at which there was any disposition by Respondent
to reach agreement, its insistence on the termination of
the trust fund litigation precluded any accord.
It is found, further, that such insistence had no prima
facie relationship to wages, hours or other terms or
conditions of employment, and Respondent made no
attempt to show that there was any such relationship.
While the instant demand presumably stemmed from the
controversy over the administration of the trust fund, it
does not appear how the resolution of such controversy in
accordance with Respondent's proposal would benefit, or
otherwise affect, the employees.
IN L R B v Borg-Warner Corporation, 356 U S 342
IN L R B v American Compress Warehouse, 350 F 2d 365 (C A 5),
and cases there cited , Arnold M Hansen, Inc , 157 NLRB 823
'"Turner Brooks, Inc, 161 NLRB No 7, Mill Floor Covering Inc, 136
NLRB 769, enfd 317 F 2d 269 (C A 6)
"American Vitrified Products, Co, 127 NLRB 701, Federated
Employers of Navada, Inc, 135 NLRB 462, 471
"Bethleham Steel Co. 133 NLRB 1347
"Hans J Hvide, 134 NLRB 795, enfd in part 315 F 2d 376 (C A 5)
"Oates Bros , Inc, 135 NLRB 1295
952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is accordingly found that the Union's insistence on
the, termination of the lawsuit was per se unlawful,
because it dealt only with the relationship between the two
groups of trustees rather than with any aspect of the
employer-employee relationship
With regard to Respondent's demand that the
employer-trustees be selected from firms employing
carpenters, any connection between it and the
employer-employee relationship is so tenuous and
speculative that the General Counsel must be deemed
here, also, to have made out a prima facie case that such
demand was beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining
There is nothing in the record to the contrary 15
Moreover, even if the foregoing demand be deemed to
be somehow related to terms or conditions of
employment, it would still seem to be unlawful under the
Board precedents cited above16 condemning efforts by one
party to dictate the selection by another of its
representative for purposes of administering contractual
grievance machinery, for example. While we are dealing
here with the administration of a different aspect of the
contract, there is necessarily involved here, as in the case
of grievance handling, dealings or negotiations between
the representative of management (the employer-trustees)
and the representatives of the employees (the
union-trustees) Thus, the situation is analogous to that
considered in the foregoing cases.
Since the record shows that Respondent adhered to this
demand throughout the bargaining, it is found that
Respondent made the granting of such demand a
condition of reaching any agreement, and thereby engaged
in a per se violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
With respect to the proposal for parity with future New
York City wages, the General Counsel does not dispute
that this was related to a mandatory subject of bargaining.
His sole contention is that, in making such proposal at the
final bargaining session, after having already settled its
wage dispute with the Carpenter Association, Respondent
was presenting a predictably unacceptable demand, since,
for competitive reasons, it was essential that the wage
scale of the members of the Charging Party not be
materially higher than that already negotiated by the rival
association for its members There could, of course, be no
assurance that such would be the case, if the Charging
Party agreed to be bound by any rates negotiated in the
future by other parties. However, properly analyzed, this
contention appears to be related to the issue of general
bad faith, discussed below, and it will be dealt with in that
context
The General Counsel's final point relates to the
rejection at the July 19 bargaining session of the Charging
Party's offer of the same wage package that had been
negotiated by Respondent on July 5, with the other
association. Since this, too, bears in the issue of bad faith,
it may be in order at this point to review the entire course
"It may be that the instant demand was related to the one just
considered , its object being to obtain employer-trustees who, because of
their dependence on Respondent for carpenters, would be more amenable
to pressure by it to terminate the trust fund litigation , or it may be that
Respondent thought that employers of carpenters would be more
sympathetic to the needs of the beneficiaries of the funds and hence more
liberal in the administration thereof In the latter case, but not the former,
it would seem at least arguable that the demand had some relationship to
employee benefits and was therefore within the scope of mandatory
bargaining However, the failure of Respondent to offer any evidence as to
the reason for its demand invites the inference that any evidence on that
point would not have been favorable to Respondent
'•See fns I I and 14, above
of the negotiations from the standpoint of Respondent's
general approach to the bargaining While it has been
found that the subject matter of two of Respondent's
proposals exceeded the scope of mandatory bargaining, it
is not entirely clear that during the first three sessions
Respondent lacked a genuine desire to reach agreement,
and, indeed, the pressure exerted by Mulderig at the
second bargaining session to induce the Charging Party to
withdraw the trustees' lawsuit would seem to suggest that
at least in that session Respondent was anxious to reach
agreement with the Charging Party, albeit only on
Respondent's terms with regard to the issues of the
lawsuit and the selection of the employer-trustees
However, after it had negotiated a settlement with the
Carpenter Association, Respondent found itself in a
position where, by continuing to strike against the
members of the Charging Party, Respondent could
"whipsaw" them into submission, forcing them to defect
from the Charging Party and sign individual contracts
adopting the Carpenter Association's agreement." This
tactic would have the advantage, from Respondent's
standpoint, of strengthening the Carpenter Association by
diverting into its various funds, including its industry
advancement fund, the employer contributions that would
otherwise have been paid into the Charging Party's funds,
and of undermining the financial position and prestige of
the Charging Party with which Respondent was embroiled
in a controversy over the management of the trust funds
That Respondent had in fact by July 19, decided,
because of its animus toward the Charging Party, to
bargain so as to avoid agreement is evident from the
events of that date When the Charging Party then
announced its capitulation on the wage issues, offering the
same wage package as Respondent had dust obtained from
the Carpenter Association, and as Respondent was even
then offering to members of the Charging Party in
separate contracts, Respondent refused to accept such
capitulation. While Respondent's counsel suggested at the
hearing that the reason for this was that the Charging
Party's proposal was only for an "interim agreement," in
that it resolved only the wage issues, and left all other
matters open for further negotiations , no such explanation
was offered by Respondent's negotiators. So far as the
record shows, the only response by such negotiators to the
foregoing offer was Sopko's complaint that (a) Mascola
was taking advantage of his inexperience as a negotiator,
(b) Mascola was attempting to build up a case for the
purpose of litigation before the Board, and (c) the
proposal included a provision for the continuation of
employer contributions to the industry advancement fund
"The predictable effect of continuing the strike against the members of
the Charging Party, after it had been terminated with respect to their
direct competitors in the other association , was to divert to the latter all
the jobs in the county requiring the services of carpenters , including those
jobs which had already been started by members of the Charging Party but
could not be completed by them because of the strike
At the hearing , the General Counsel appeared to disclaim any contention
that the purpose of the strike was to break up the Charging Party's
multiemployer unit His position seemed to be, rather, that the
disintegration of the unit was the necessary effect of the strike , coupled
with Respondent 's determination not to reach agreement with the Charging
Party Essentially , the General Counsel 's position adds up to a contention
that, while the strike was originally called on July I, for other, legitimate
reasons, Respondent took advantage of the pressure exerted by the strike,
together with all the other circumstances , to exact separate contracts from
the Charging Party's members It is difficult to reconcile this contention
with the foregoing disclaimer However, in view thereof, and as the
complaint is silent in that respect, no finding is made that the July I strike
was in itself unlawful
LOCAL 964, CARPENTERS 953
As to (a), above, this was, in effect, an admission that
Mascola had outmaneuvered Respondent, by putting its
good faith to the test via a proposal that matched, and, in
the case of the second wage offer made later in that
session, even exceeded, the terms of Respondent's wage
settlement with the rival association As to (b), above,
while this might be construed as questioning the good
faith of Mascola's wage offer, the obvious way to resolve
any doubt on that point was to accept the offer As to (c),
this was a patently frivolous objection, in view of the fact
that, as Mascola pointed out to Sopko, Respondent had
just agreed to a like provision in its contract with the
Carpenter Association.
Thus, it suffices to demonstrate Respondent's bad faith
that it arbitrarily rejected a proposal that represented a
major concession on the vital issue of wages, and that it
did not even see fit to continue the negotiations after such
a significant, favorable development This attitude is
clearly less consistent with good-faith bargaining than with
a desire to avoid any meaningful bargaining with the
Charging Party and to by-pass it in reaching a settlement
with its members, which was what Respondent in fact did
That such individual settlements incorporated the same
wage package as was rejected at the July 19 session is
further proof, if any were needed, that such rejection was
not based on any evaluation of the merits of the Charging
Party's proposal 11
It is, therefore, found that by July 19, Respondent not
only no longer had any desire to reach agreement with the
Charging Party but in fact, had ulterior reasons for
avoiding any agreement, and that this approach prevented
a meeting of the minds on that date
At the hearing, Respondent's counsel, by way of
defense, cited the circumstances that one of the Charging
Party's proposals throughout the negotiations had been
the continuation of employer contributions to its industry
advancement fund, that insistence on such proposal was,
under Board precedents, per se unlawful," and that,
shortly before the instant hearing, the Charging Party
had, in fact, entered into a settlement agreement with the
Regional Director, binding it to forego such insistence in
the future 21
However, even if it be assumed that the Charging Party
improperly insisted in the negotiations on continuing the
industry advancement fund, it would still be necessary to
consider whether such insistence "preclude[d] the existence
of a situation in which [Respondent's] own good faith can
be tested "$1 Here, it is clear that the industry
advancement provision was not an obstacle to agreement.
Respondent had accepted such a provision in its prior
agreement with the Charging Party and, more
significantly, in its July 5 settlement with the Carpenter
Association, and Respondent included a provision for
"Indeed , such individual settlements, like that reached with the
Carpenter Association , were even less favorable to Respondent than the
second wage offer made, and rejected , on July 19
Even if it be assumed that Respondent 's rejection of the July 19 wage
offers reflected insistence on its own proposal on that date for (a) parity
with New York City rates and (b ) the selection of carpenters trustees from
firms employing carpenters , it is clear that the insistence on (a) was not in
good faith , in view of Respondent 's having already accepted a different
basis for a wage settlement with the Carpenter Association (and with the
individual members of the Charging Party), and that the insistence on (b),
as found above , was per se unlawful
"See cases cited in In 10, above
"Such agreement was for the purpose of disposing of a charge filed with
the Board alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(5) by the Charging Party in
connection with the instant negotiations
payments to such fund in the memorandum agreements
which it was presenting to the individual members of the
Charging Party for their signature even while Respondent
was castigating the Charging Party for insisting on such a
provision
In any case, there is no reason to doubt that, even if
the Charging Party had not sought the continuation of the
industry advancement fund, Respondent would still have
insisted on the two impermissible items relating to the
employer-trustees of the joint funds, and that
Respondent's ultimate decision to abandon good-faith
bargaining with the Charging Party was in no way
influenced by the industry fund issue but was motivated
solely by the entirely different considerations outlined
above. Under these circumstances, I find no merit in this
defense 22
It is therefore concluded that since at least July 19,
Respondent has failed and refused to bargain in good
faith with the Charging Party, thereby violating Section
8(b)(3) of the Act
The General Counsel seeks a further finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3), as well as 8(b)( l)(B)
of the Act, by causing or attempting to cause the
members of the Charging Party to enter into direct
negotiations with Respondent and abandon multiemployer
bargaining through their duly designated representative.
Respondent counters that such separate bargaining was
lawful because (a) it occurred after an impasse had been
reached in multiemployer bargaining on July 19, and (b)
the Charging Party consented on July 19, to such separate
bargaining Whether that is an adequate defense to such
separate negotiations as occurred after July 19 will be
later considered. It is evident that pressure exerted on
Helmer-Cronin and Form to disaffiliate from the
Charging Party occurred well before that date It is clear,
also, that, as related above, even before that date
Respondent had begun to solicit members of the Charging
Party to sign the memorandum agreement adopting the
terms of Respondent's July 5 settlement with the
Carpenter Association 21
It is found, therefore, that, by thus soliciting the
members of the Charging Party to abandon
multiemployer bargaining, Respondent violated Sections
8(b)(1)(B) and 8(b)(3) of the Act 24
"See Timer Publishing Co, 72 NLRB 676, 683
"Alba-Waldensian , Inc. 167 NLRB No 101, Radiator Specialty
Company, 143 NLRB 350, 353, Anderson Lithographic Company, 124
NLRB 920, Tulsa Sheet Metal Works Inc, 149 NLRB 1487, 1488
"Mascola testified that the wage package offered by him on July 19, was
based on the terms set forth in the copies of such memorandum agreement,
which Respondent was already submitting directly to members of the
Charging Party
"Cascade Employers Association, Inc, 141 NLRB 469, 473-474
On August 8, Respondent addressed a letter to the members of the
Charging Party who had signed the individual contracts , offering to release
them therefrom , if they objected to adopting the contract of the Carpenter
Association , and offering to "bargain individually" with such members
The letter concluded
if we do not hear from you by August 16, 1968, we will assume you are
not one of the former members of [the Charging Party)
On August 14, Mascola replied to this letter , characterizing it as a
"self-serving" effort to "cover up" the true nature of Respondent's
bargaining tactics So far as the record shows , there was no other reply
Far from being a good - faith offer to rescind the individual contracts, this
was a palpable attempt to force the recipients of the letter into the position
of appearing to renounce their affiliation with the Charging Party
Obviously, none of them had anything to gain by affirming his allegiance
to the Charging Party or by accepting the offer to release him from his
contract and to negotiate for a new contract on an individual basis There
954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As to the solicitation of such members to execute
separate contracts after July 19, Respondent contends that
such solicitation was not unlawful because it occurred (l)
after an impasse in bargaining and (2) after there had
been mutual consent to separate bargaining.
However, there was no impasse in fact on July 19, since
it is clear that, even after Respondent's arbitrary rejection
of its proposals, the Charging Party was still willing to
negotiate, and it was only Respondent's failure to respond
to the Charging Party's inquiry about a future meeting
that caused the negotiations to lapse Moreover, if there
was any impasse on that date, it clearly was not the
product of good-faith bargaining but of Respondent's
desire to avoid agreement with the Charging Party. It is
only when the parties have reached an impasse after
exhausting the possibilities 3f good-faith bargaining that
they are free to engage in unilateral action. Any other rule
would set a premium on bargaining in bad faith to a
stalemate.
As to Respondent's contention that the Charging Party
on July 19, consented to the separate negotiations, it is
true that such consent was given, but only after it was
manifest that Respondent was not interested in reaching
agreement with the Charging Party on any terms, and in
the face of the virtually irresistible pressure of the
"whipsaw" strike that was jeopardizing the competitive
position of the Charging Party's members vis a vis the
members of the other association. This would not seem to
be the sort of "mutual consent" to separate negotiations
that was contemplated in the Retail Associates case.35 To
hold otherwise would be tantamount to permitting a
respondent to disrupt a multiemployer unit by simply
refusing to bargain in good faith with respect to such a
unit . Nor, in any case, may the action of, the Charging
Party's members, in withdrawing from joint bargaining
under such extraordinary pressure, be regarded as a
reliable and unequivocal indication of their preference for
conducting their future labor relations on the basis of
individual, rather than joint, bargaining 26
It is therefore found that Respondent further violated
Sections 8(b)(l)(B) and 8(b)(3) of the Act by such
solicitation of separate contracts as occurred after July 19.
THE REMEDYT7
It having been found that Respondent violated Sections
8(b)(1)(B) and 8(b)(3), it will be recommended that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom. With regard to an
affirmative remedy for the violation of Section 8(b)(3), the
General Counsel and Charging Party strongly urge that
the Board not confine itself to issuing the usual order that
Respondent, upon request, bargain in good faith with the
was no reason to believe that he could obtain more favorable terms
through such negotiations and every reason to assume that , if he did
choose to negotiate , Respondent would present more stringent demands,
backed by the threat of strike Thus, contrary to Respondent 's contention,
I find nothing in this letter that would cure the illegality of Respondent's
conduct in soliciting separate negotiations
"Retail Associates , Inc , 120 NLRB 388, 395 The Board there laid
down the ground rules governing withdrawals from multiemployer units
"See, e g , Thomas H Marrow Trucking Co , 155 NLRB 271, for the
proposition that a party 's withdrawal from joint bargaining is not effective,
unless it unequivocally manifests an intent to abandon joint bargaining in
favor of a course of individual bargaining
"In response to my request , the General Counsel and the Charging
Party submitted statements supplementing and clarifying the comments in
their briefs with regard to the appropriate remedy Respondent submitted a
reply memorandum
Charging Party concerning terms and conditions of
employment of the employees of members of the Charging
Party The General Counsel and the Charging Party share
the view that, if merely ordered to bargain in such general
terms, Respondent would return to the bargaining table
with inflated demands, confronting the Charging Party
with the option of (a) saddling its members with higher
labor costs than those borne by their competitors in the
Carpenter Association or (b) subjecting its members to an
indefinite strike, while such competitors continue to
operate. Respondent does not dispute this assumption To
forestall this, the General Counsel and Charging Party
propose that the Board order Respondent (1) to cease
giving effect to the individual contracts between
Respondent and the members of the Charging Party,TB and
(2) to offer to enter into a contract with the Charging
Party containing the same terms and conditions as those
individual contracts,29 except that the General Counsel
would have the Board order the inclusion in such contract
offer of provisions substituting the various trust funds
maintained by the Charging Party for those maintained by
the other association He would in addition require that,
as an incident to the "recission"'° of the individual
contracts, Respondent be required to refund all monies
already paid by members of the Charging Party, pursuant
to such contracts, into the various funds of the Carpenter
Association
Initially, the problem here is whether the Board may
prescribe the terms of the contract to be offered by
Respondent to the Charging Party It has been frequently
held that the Board may not write contracts for the
parties However, the Board may order parties to reduce
to writing and execute agreements that they, themselves,
have reached; and, an order that merely required
Respondent to re-execute, through the agency of the
Charging Party, the same contract with its members that
Respondent has already executed with them individually
would seem to be within the competence of the Board
However, the difficulty, here, is that the General Counsel
"The General Counsel requests , in fact, an order that Respondent
"rescind" the contracts , citing Hoisting & Portable Engineers , 141 NLRB
469, where the Board found that the respondent had coerced members of a
multiemployer association to execute separate contracts However, there
the Board did not order rescission but only that the respondent cease
giving effect to the contracts Presumably , the reason for this was that
rescission is a bilateral act, which may not be ordered unless both parties
to the contract are before the Board as respondents . As only the Union is
here a respondent , there is no legal predicate for "rescission" of the
individual contracts but only for the order to case giving effect thereto,
which is recommended below
"The General Counsel suggest that Respondent need not be required to
offer to the Charging Party a provision for an industry advancement fund
The Charging Party, on the other hand, requests that a provision for an
industry advancement fund be included in such offer However, since it is
well settled that such a provision is not a mandatory subject for
bargaining , the Board would have no jurisdiction to require any
negotiations with respect thereto Nevertheless , as the General Counsel
points out , the parties would not be precluded from reaching agreement on
such a provision, and in all likelihood they would do so, once the current
provision for contributions to the Carpenter Association ' s industry
advancement fund ceased to be operative by reason of the Board's order
herein
The General Counsel would also not require Respondent 's offer to
include the provision in Article 16, Section B, of the Carpenter Association
contract that all employer-trustees of the apprenticeship training fund be
employees of carpenters As this, too, is not a matter for mandatory
bargaining, the General Counsel's position is well taken, and the order
recommended below is not to be construed as requiring that such a
provision be offered by Respondent
11 See fn 28, above
LOCAL 964, CARPENTERS 955
does not seek merely the reexecution of the individual
contracts, albeit via the Charging Party, but apparently
seeks, also, to effect changes in the provisions of such
contracts pertaining to the trust funds, especially the
substitution of the Charging Party's trust funds for those
of the other association as the depositories of the various
employer contributions. The General Counsel contends
that this is merely a matter of form, and not of substance
Whether this be true or not, it is clear, in any event,
that the remedy proposed by the General Counsel would
be consistent with the policy of the Board, in fashioning
its remedies, to restore the parties to the same position as
they would have occupied had there been no unfair labor
practices Here, it is manifest that, had Respondent
bargained in good faith, it would have offered the
Charging Party the same substantive terms as Respondent
granted to the Charging Party's own members.
Accordingly, to order Respondent to make such offer now
would merely recreate the situation that would have
existed had Respondent bargained in good faith On this
point, the General Counsel cites the H K Porter, case,"
where, having found that a respondent had no legitimate
reason for rejecting a union's request for a check-off
clause but did so only to prevent agreement, the Board
ordered the respondent to grant the union such a clause
The apparent rationale of the Board there was that, since
its only reason for opposing check-off was to frustrate
agreement, it was proper to assume that respondent would
have granted check-off had it bargained in good faith, and
the Board was therefore merely placing the parties in the
same position as they would have held but for
respondent's bad faith Here, it has been found that it was
only its determination to avoid agreement that prevented
Respondent from extending to the Charging Party the
same offer as the General Counsel would now have the
Board order Respondent to make Thus, in the instant
case there is at least as much reason as there was in H K
Porter for trenching on the rule against writing contracts
for the parties in order to effectuate the policy of restoring
the situation that would have existed absent any unfair
labor practices.
As for the General Counsel's proposal that Respondent,
in addition, be required to refund the amount of all
contributions made by the Charging Party's members to
the Carpenter Association trust funds, such a remedy may
be justified on the ground that it is necessary in order to
make the Charging Party's trust funds whole for monies
diverted therefrom as a result of Respondent's unlawful
coercion of the Charging Party's members to execute
individual contracts obligating them to contribute to the
trust funds of the Carpenter Association. The fact that
Respondent may have to make such refund out of its own
treasury is no bar to such a remedy Where a union and
employer have unlawfully coerced employees to join the
union through the execution of an illegal union security
clause, which provides for the checkoff of union dues, the
Board has frequently ordered the employer to reimburse
the employees for such dues, even though he has already
paid them over to the union and must, therefore, stand the
loss, himself
However, in view of the rather novel nature of such a
remedy in the present context, and since the interests of
the employees will apparently be better served by a
negotiated settlement of the parties' differences over the
"H K Porter Company, Inc, 172 NLRB No. 72 The Board ' s decision
was based on the action of the Court of Appeals in that case , in remanding
the case to the Board for the purpose of enlarging its prior remedial order
trust funds,12 it will be recommended that, before imposing
such a remedy, the Board give the parties an opportunity
to attempt to resolve such differences through
negotiations
To sum up, the following affirmative order will be
recommended
1. That Respondent offer to the Charging Party
forthwith, as the representative of all its members who
employ carpenters, the same contract as is currently in
effect between Respondent and such members, but without
any of the provisions relating to the trust funds and the
industry advancement fund
2. That, if, after the expiration of 60 days from the
effective date of the Board's order herein, it is determined
by the Board that the parties have not resolved their
differences over the trust funds, Respondent shall (a) offer
to the Charging Party the same provisions with regard to
the trust funds as are currently in effect, except that the
Charging Party's trust funds shall be designated as the
sole depositories of employer contributions, and (b)
reimburse such trust funds in an amount equal to the total
of all contributions paid by members of the Charging
Party into the trust funds of the Carpenter Association
since July 19, 1968."
It will be further recommended that the Board retain
jurisdiction over this proceeding for the purpose of
effecting such modifications of the remedy herein as the
circumstances may warrant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I The Charging Party is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2 Respondent is a labor organization under the Act
3 The following unit has been at all material times,
and still is, appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act:
All employees of members of the Charging Party
employed as carpenters and joiners, reed and rattan
workers, railroad carpenters, ship carpenters, caulkers
and joiners, bench hands, cabinet makers, stair builders,
floor layers, millwrights, boxmakers, furniture workers,
bridge, dock, and wharf, carpenters, shipwrights and
boat-builders, car-builders, saw filers, and all workers
engaged in the running of woodworking machinery and
the laying of all canvas roofs and decks, and all
insulation workers.
4 At all times here material, Respondent has been, and
still is, the statutory representative of the employees in the
aforedescribed unit
"It appeared at the hearing that employees work interchangeably for
members of both associations and therefore accumulate credits under both
sets of funds It is thus possible for an employee , for example, to work 15
years for members of the Charging Party and 15 years for members of the
Carpenter Association , and receive no retirement benefits, although he
would have received such benefits had he worked 30 years for one group or
the other While Respondent indicated at the hearing that employees were
currently being credited by the Carpenter Association for service with
members of the Charging Party even though the Carpenter Association's
funds had received no contributions with respect to such service, this is
evidently a temporary expedient, as it cannot be continued indefinitely on
an actuarially sound basis The ideal solution of the underlying controversy
over the trust funds would seem to be a plan which consolidates both
credits and contributions
"For reasons indicated above (fn 29), no like requirements will be
recommended with respect to the industry advancement fund
956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. The Charging Party has been at all material times,
and still is, duly authorized by its members to represent
them in collective bargaining with Respondent concerning
the terms and conditions of employment of the employees
in said unit.
6. By coercing and restraining such members to bargain
directly with Respondent, or through some other
representative, rather than through the Charging Party,
Respondent has violated Sections 8(b)(I)(B) and 8(b)(3) of
the Act
7. By failing and refusing since July 19, 1968, to
bargain in good faith with the Charging Party concerning
the terms and conditions of employment of the employees
in the above unit, Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(3)
of the Act.
8. By insisting, as a condition of reaching agreement,
that the Charging Party effect the termination of a lawsuit
brought by management trustees of certain funds against
the Union trustees of those funds, and that all such
management trustees be employees of Carpenters,
Respondent has further violated Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and the foregoing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended
that Respondent, Local 964, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall be required
to:
1. Cease and desist from.
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith, upon request,
with Contractors & Suppliers Association of Rockland
County, New York, Inc., concerning the terms and
conditions of employment of the employees in the
following unit:
All employees of members of that Association
employed as carpenters and joiners, reed and rattan
workers, railroad carpenters, ship carpenters, caulkers
and joiners, bench hands, cabinet makers, stair builders,
floor layers, millwrights, boxmakers, furniture workers,
bridge, dock, and wharf, carpenters, shipwrights and
boat-builders, car-builders, saw filers, and all workers
engaged in the running of woodworking machinery and
the laying of all canvas roofs and decks, and all
insulation workers
(b) Insisting, as a condition of reaching agreement
concerning the terms and conditions of employment of
such employees, upon the abandonment of any pending
litigation between the trustees of trust funds, or that the
management trustees of such funds be employers of such
employees.
(c) Restraining or coercing members of the aforenamed
Association or any other employers in the selection of
their representatives for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
(d) Giving effect to, or seeking to enforce, the contracts
executed in July and August 1968, by Respondent directly
with members of the aforenamed Association fixing the
terms and conditions of employees in the unit described
above, or any extensions or renewals thereof
2 Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer forthwith to the aforenamed Association, as
the representative of the employers of the employees in
the aforedescribed bargaining unit, the same terms and
conditions of employment as are currently contained in
the individual contracts referred to in paragraph 1(d)
above, omitting only those provisions relating to the
jointly administered trust funds and the industry
advancement fund, and, if agreement is reached, embody
such agreement in a signed contract.
(b) Subject to the conditions set forth in The Remedy
section of the Trial Examiner's Decision, (1) refund to the
members of the aforenamed Association all contributions
made by them since July 19, 1968, to the various jointly
administered trust funds designated in their individual
contracts referred to above, and (2) offer to such
Association the same provisions with respect to the joint
trust funds as are contained in those individual contracts,
except that the trust funds heretofore established by
agreement between such Association and Respondent shall
be substituted for those designated in those individual
contracts, and, if agreement is reached, embody such
agreement in a signed contract retroactive to July 19,
1968.
(c) Post at Respondent's business office and meeting
places copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "'°
Copies of said notices, on forms to be provided by the
Regional Director for Region 2, shall, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive
days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Forward to the members of said Association who
employ employees in the aforedescribed unit, for posting
on their premises at their option, copies of said notices,
duly signed by Respondent's representative.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.35
"If this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended
Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the
Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words , "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order "
"If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken
to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL' 964, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT refuse, upon request, to bargain in
good faith with Contractors & Suppliers Association of
Rockland County, New York, Inc., concerning the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees
in the following unit:
LOCAL 964, CARPENTERS 957
All employees of members of that Association
employed as carpenters and joiners, reed and rattan
workers, railroad carpenters, ship carpenters, caulkers
and joiners, bench hands, cabinet makers, stair
builders, floor layers, millwrights, boxmakers,
furniture workers, bridge, dock, and wharf,
carpenters, shipwrights and boat-builders,
car-builders, saw filers, and all workers engaged in
the running of woodworking machinery and the
laying of all canvas roofs and decks, and all
insulation workers
WE WILL NOT insist, as a condition of reaching
agreement on terms and condition of employment, upon
the abandonment of any lawsuits between the trustees
of trust funds established for the benefit of the
employees in the above bargaining unit, or that the
management trustees of such funds be employers of
such employees.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce the members of the
above-named Association or any other employers in the
selection of their representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT give effect to, or seek to enforce, the
contracts signed in July and August 1968, by us with
members of the above-named Association
WE WILL offer, at once, to that Association, as the
representative of the employers of employees in the
above bargaining unit, the same terms and conditions
of employment as are now contained in our individual
contracts with its members, except for those provisions
relating to the trust funds and the industry
advancement fund, and, if agreement is reached,
"Supply here the date of the Board 's final order herein
embody such agreement in a signed contract.
If, after 60 days from . '" it is determined by the
Board that we have not settled our differences with the
above-named Association over the trust funds, WE WILL
take the following action
I Offer to that Association the same provisions
with respect to those funds as are contained in the
current individual contracts with members of that
Association, except that the funds established by us
with the Association will be substituted for those
designated in such contracts, and, if agreement is
reached, embody such agreement in a signed
contract, retroactive to July 19, 1968.
2. Refund to the members of that Association all
contributions paid by them since July 19, 1968, into
the trust funds designated in their current contracts
with us.
Dated By
LOCAL 964, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO
(Union)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 36th Floor,
Federal Building, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York
10007, Telephone 212-264-0340.