Local 933, UAW

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 20, 1971

193 N.L.R.B. 223 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

LOCAL 933, UAW 223
Local 933 , United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and
Marilyn S. Mosier and Ruby Krom
Local 1, Office and Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union , AFL-CIO, and Marilyn S. Mosier
and Ruby Krom . Cases 25-CA-3594,
25-CA-3594-2, 25-CA-3822, 25-CB-941, and
25-CB-1005
September 20, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the Respondents , Local 933 , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, and Local 1, Office and Professional Employ-
ees International Union , AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives , shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner 's recommended Order.
i The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a
Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear
preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing his findings
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
On March 30 , 1971, Trial Examiner James M.
Fitzpatrick issued his Decision in the above -entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondents had en-
gaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that they cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner ' s Decision.
The Trial Examiner further found that the Respon-
dents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommended
that the complaint be dismissed with respect to those
allegations . Thereafter , the General Counsel filed
limited exceptions and a supporting brief ; Respon-
dent Local 1, Office and Professional Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, filed cross-excep-
tions and a brief in support thereof and in opposition
to the General Counsel 's exceptions ; and Respondent
Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's
brief in support of exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are
hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this proceeding , and hereby
adopts the findings , conclusions , and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Trial Examiner: These consoli-
dated proceedings under Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act), apse from
charges filed by Marilyn S. Mosier and Ruby Krom, both
individuals, against Local 933, United Automobile, Aeros-
pace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), and Local 1, Office and Professional Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 933
and Local 1, respectively, and collectively called Respon-
dents. Based on charges filed by Mosier on December 10,
1969, the Regional Director for Region 25 on January 30,
1970, issued the initial complaint (25-CA-3594) alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by Local 933.
Based on further charges filed by Mosier on April 3, 1970 a
further complaint (25-CB-941) issued April 6 alleging
violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by Local 1.
Pursuant to charges filed by Krom on April 27 (amended
on May 8) a further complaint (25-CA-3594-2) issued on
May 8 alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by
Local 933. Respondents filed answers denying the commis-
sion of unfair labor practices. A hearing was held at
Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 27 and 28 and June 1, 1970.
Before decision in those matters Mosier filed further
charges on June 11 and 29 (amended July 20 and 22)
pursuant to which a further complaint (25-CA-3822 and
25-CB-1005) issued July 30 alleging further violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by Local 933 and of Section
8(b)(1)(A) by Local 1. Respondents also filed answers
denying the unfair labor practices alleged in this complaint.
It was consolidated with the prior cases and a further
hearing was held thereon at Indianapolis, Indiana, on
October 13, 14, 26, and 27, 1970.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the witnesses,
and consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel
and Respondents, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE OPERATIONS OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYER
Local 933, the employer involved herein, is a local labor
organization chartered by and affiliated with the United
193 NLRB No. 34
224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America, an international labor organization, herein
called UAW. Pursuant to the constitution and bylaws of
UAW, Local 933 exercises the powers and privileges of a
local union affiliated with it involving matters of general
interest and welfare for members of Local 933 and as an
affiliate of UAW is an integral part of a multistate labor
organization comprising UAW and its numerous affiliated
locals.
Local 933 maintains its office and place of business in
Indianapolis, Indiana. As a local union it represents for
purposes of collective bargaining approximately 9,000
employees of Allison Division of General Motors Corpora-
tion, an employer engaged in interstate commerce, with
which it has a collective-bargaining agreement. During the
past year it has remitted per capita taxes for its members
directly to UAW in Detroit, Michigan, in an amount in
excess of $100,000. During the same period UAW has
received at Detroit, Michigan from Local 933 and other
affiliated local unions per capita taxes in excess of
$1,000,000 which have been remitted to it across state lines.
Local 933's affairs are handled by its elected officers
including, inter alros, the president, financial secretary and
treasurer (which are full-time positions), first and second
vice presidents, and recording secretary (which are part-
time positions), and by a chairman of the bargaining
committee (who is part-time and not elected).' To assist in
the operation of the office, Local 933 has employed a staff
of five secretaries and twojanitors.2
11. THE RESPONDENT UNION
Local I, the Union involved herein, is a labor organiza-
tion which admits to membership employees of Local 933,
among others . It currently has about 125 members. It is the
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective
bargaining of the employees at the Indianapolis office of
Local 933.3
They were initially represented by Local Industrial
Union No. 1805, chartered in 1952. In or about 1959 Local
1805 merged with Respondent Local I which as the
surviving labor organization has since represented the
employees. Since at least 1958 Local 933 has had successive
collective-bargaining agreements with either Local 1 or its
predecessor Local 1805.
Virtually all Local I representation of Local 933
employees for the past 3 years has been handled by Frances
Bick, financial secretary of Local I As financial secretary
she is paid $40 per month. She had been the president of the
predecessor Local 1805, and for all but 4 years since 1952
has been chairman of the bargaining committee of either
Local 1805 or its successor Local 1. According to her she
has handled all representative functions for employees of
Local 933 including all employee grievances and all
contract negotiations.
I At the time of the hearings herein the incumbent in these positions
were president , James Patterson, first vice president, Arthur Sam Murray,
second vice president, Eugene Crawley, financial secretary and treasurer,
A C. Coleman, recording secretary Catherine Milliken, and chairman of
bargaining committee , Earl Coleman
2 At the time of the initial charges herein these employees were Phyllis
Becker, secretary to the president, Emma Lou Calvert, secretary to
It is not clear whether anyone ever acted as a union
steward at the Local 933 office. Bick claims there never was
a union steward and that she performed these functions,
this despite provisions in Local is constitution and bylaws
allowing for stewards. Some years ago Hazel Redenbacher,
senior employee in the Local 933 office, was designated
"group leader" in which capacity she exercised at least
some of the functions normally associated with union
stewards. Thus she acted as a conduit between the
employees and Bick, calling Bick when she was needed,
channeling grievances to her, transmitting meeting notices
from Bick to the employees, and, in preparation for
contract negotiations, collecting and transmitting to Bick
new proposals desired by the employees as a group.
Redenbacher testified she has been less active in recent
years. Although she was not referred to as steward, at least
one Local 933 employee, Emma Lou Calvert, thought of
her as the incumbent steward.
Since 1952 Bick's full-time employment has been as a
secretary in the Indianapolis office of UAW Local 23, a
sister local of Respondent Local 933. In this job she is
secretary to the chairman of their shop committee,
performing required secretarial work for all grievances at
every step of the Local 23 grievance process.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues Posed by the Pleadings
Presented here are questions whether Local 933 as an
employer committed independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act about November 25, 1969, by the conduct
of its president in, inter aha, forcibly taking from employee
Mosier a petition relating to the internal affairs of Local 1,
causing copies to be made thereof for the use of Local 933,
coercing other employees to remove their names therefrom,
and instructing employees they could not circulate the
petition; on January 15, 1970, threatening Local 933
employees with discharge and other reprisals for engaging
in union activities or for giving testimony under the Act;
and on June 10, 1970, through its second vice president also
threatening employees with discharge and other reprisals
for engaging in union activities or for filing charges or
giving testimony under the Act.
Section 8(a)(3) issues posed are whether Local 933
temporarily suspended Mosier on November 25, 1969,
because she circulated the above-described petition and
engaged in union activity. Section 8(a)(3) and (4) issues
posed are whether Local 933, because Mosier and Krom
engaged in union activity and filed charges and gave
testimony under the Act, discharged or laid them off on
January 15, 1970, recalled but refused to reinstate Krom the
following day but did not recall or reinstate Mosier, on
April 24, 1970, again laid off Krom and thereafter failed to
recall her, on June 10, 1970, again discharged Mosier and
thereafter failed to recall, reemploy, or reinstate her, and
chairman of the bargaining committee , Hazel Redenbacher, Marilyn
Mosier and Ruby Krom , secretaries in the office of the financial secretary
and treasurer, and John Golioday and William Lovins, both Janitors
J The bargaining unit which is admittedly appropriate for the purposes
of Section 9(b) of the Act consists of all clerical employees and janitors
employed at Local 933's Indianapolis office, exclusive of all professional
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act
LOCAL 933, UAW 225
also on June 10 refused to recall, reemploy, or reinstate
Krom until July 27 when it recalled but did not reinstate
her.
This issues with respect to Local I are whether it violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by arbitrarily refusing to process
a grievance of Mosier on December 8, 1969, and of Mosier
and Krom on June 12, 1970, and attempting in its
bargaining with Local 933 on January 29, February 2, 3,
and 4 , and March 2, 1970, to change job classifications,
which would result in lower pay for Mosier and Krom, and
reduce leave of absence and paid absence allowances for
employees with less than 5 years seniority (which would
include both Mosier and Krom), all because Mosier sought
to become a union steward in Local 1 , opposed the policies
of Local I and its incumbent official Bick, filed charges and
gave testimony under the Act, and because Krom assisted
her.
B. Background
As indicated above, Local 933 is a large local. Its history
has been marked by bitter intraorganizational feuding for
control of its elective offices. This case is immersed in that
political feuding.
When Charging Party Mosier was hired on January 19,
1967, there were already three secretaries in the Local 933
office, Phyllis Becker, Emma Lou Calvert, and Hazel
Redenbacher, who had been employed there for many
years. Mosier was hired by John V. Loudermilk, then
president of Local 933 and her brother-in -law. She
understood she was hired as a secretary. She performed
some secretarial work . But she replaced a retiring employee
who had been classified as a record clerk . The then extant
collective -bargaining agreement between Local 933 and
Local I representing the employees provided for two
classifications of clerical employees , record clerk and
secretary , the secretary classification receiving a slightly
higher wage rate. The agreement also provided for
progressive wage increases based on tenure . However,
Mosier was hired at the same wage rate as the other
secretaries who were doing secretarial work and who had
through the years progressed by seniority through the wage
structure to the highest rate . The older employees,
particularly Calvert and Becker, resented the fact that
Mosier was newly employed at the top rate Calvert voiced
this resentment to the then Local 933 president Loudermilk
and to Bick , but no changes were made. Charging Party
Krom was hired as a secretary on August 9, 1967, also by
Loudermilk and at the top rate She performed the same
work as Mosier . They were assigned to the office of the
financial secretary and treasurer, a position held then and
now by A. C. Coleman. The senior clerical in that office
was Hazel Redenbacher. A few days after she was hired
Krom asked Redenbacher if the office help had a union
steward . Redenbacher answered no, that she had been
several years earlier but had given it up. Thereafter Krom
talked to her several times about having a steward but
Redenbacher replied they did not need one, that Bick
would take care of them.
In February 1968 Local I and Local 933 negotiated a new
2-year contract covering the office employees. In the
negotiations Loudermilk as the incumbent president of
Local 933 insisted upon a single classification of secretary
for clericals . The parties agreed and the new collective-
bargaining agreement which went into effect February 27,
1968, contained a classification of secretary but no
classification of record clerk.
On May 18, 1969 , following a bitter campaign and an
election on May 1 and 7 , a new administration took control
of most of the principal offices of Local 933. Loudermilk
was voted out as president and James Patterson was voted
in as the new president along with a slate of several other
new officers. An exception to the new look was A. C.
Coleman who was reelected financial secretary and
treasurer.
As might be expected following the defeat of the man
who had hired them , Mosier and Krom were apprehensive
about the security of theirjobs. This was particularly true of
Mosier because of her relationship to Loudermilk and her
apprehension was heightened by Patterson 's conduct. At a
get acquainted meeting with the other officers and the
employees a few days after taking office , Patterson,
according to his own testimony, looked directly at Mosier
and stated , "I would like to try to get along over here, run
the Union, that I was president now, and not John
Loudermilk , he had Just been defeated and that's the way it
was going to be over here , because I felt like I had to make
that statement with his sister -in-law in the Union hall." He
also admitted that a few days later he questioned her old
pay vouchers , asking her if she had not used up all her sick
leave. He directed Redenbacher to pull out all Mosier's pay
vouchers for a year back . He then took these to his own
office for detailed examinations but took no action against
her based on them.
A few months later , in early autumn 1969, Patterson
again called the employee into his office together with Earl
Coleman (chairman of the Local 933 bargaining commit-
tee) and A . C. Coleman (financial secretary and treasurer of
Local 933) and announced that in the interest of efficiency
the employees , with the exception of Redenbacher, were
being reassigned to differentjobs . Although historically the
employees were not moved around, Becker , who up to then
had been the president's secretary , and Calvert , who had
been secretary to Earl Coleman and who testified that in
her 18 years at Local 933 she had never before been
reassigned, were thenceforth to work with A. C. Coleman.
Krom was to be Patterson's secretary and Mosier Earl
Coleman' s. Krom expressed doubt that she could perform
the required duties of the new assignment . According to
Patterson 's testimony Earl Coleman advised Mosier that he
would expect her to learn the duties in his office "in a
reasonable length of time," that he would have Calvert give
her a list "of what she was supposed to do , and if she wasn't
able to perform the job in that length of time that she would
be sent back to my (Patterson's) office for reassignment on
whatever I wanted to do with her ." From this I find that
Mosier reasonably inferred that she risked being fired if she
failed. A. C. Coleman objected that the transfers would be
disruptive of operations in the financial office . As a result
Patterson reconsidered and left the employees in their old
jobs.
Because of Patterson's attitude Mosier called Bick on
several occasions during the autumn to complain that he
226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was calling meetings in which he would harass her. Bick
took no action . Instead she advised that she could do
nothing about his calling meetings , and that when Mosier
felt she was being threatened with disciplinary action she
should ask Patterson if she was being reprimanded, and if
he replied that she was then Bick had a right to be present
and Mosier should at that time ask for her representation.
Mosier also suggested to Bick that a union steward was
needed at the Local 933 office . Bick disagreed , saying a
steward was not needed , and that she (Bick) could handle
the problems.
C. The Petition for Steward
Shortly after Patterson 's abortive move to reassign the
office help, Mosier, Krom, and the two janitors Golloday
and Lovins talked the situation over during working hours
and concluded they needed a union steward on the spot.
Uncertain as to how to proceed, Mosier called Local I
recording secretary Jane Peggs and received from her
instructions on what to do. On November 24 shortly after 4
p.m. Mosier prepared and circulated a typewritten petition
selecting herself as steward . She, Krom , and the two
janitors then signed it.
Becker , Patterson 's secretary , declined to sign saying it
was illegal . She then told Patterson that Mosier had been
chosen steward. He proceeded to question the two Janitors
who were about to leave for the day, asking them if they
had signed the petition . They admitted they had. Patterson
wanted to know when, and, after learning that they had
signed between 3:30 and 4 p.m., he commented, "That's
when I am paying the bill. Is this legal or illegal, boys?"
The following morning, November 25, Mosier made a
xerox copy of her steward petition , including the signatures
thereon, and asked Calvert, secretary of Local 933's
bargaining chairman Earl Coleman, to sign. Calvert
refused . She and Mosier got into an argument regarding the
propriety of the petition, Calvert contending that Reden-
bacher was steward and the petition was illegal . It was a
noisy argument and Patterson came down the hall to
inquire what was going on. Calvert offered the explanation
that Mosier had just appointed herself steward, that they
were arguing because Calvert said it was illegal . Mosier was
holding the copy of the petition in her hand. Patterson
asked to see it. She declined , claiming it was a union affair
and not his business , but he insisted , saying, "As president
and your boss, I have a right to see it," and grabbed it out
her hand . In the process it tore . He then told Mosier to
return to her office and go to work. Taking the torn
petition, he proceeded toward his office, announcing on the
way to Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins that there was going
to be meeting in his office They followed him. He told A.
C. Coleman to have Mosier and Krom come in also,
showing him the petition and saying, "I want you to look
what this bitch has done now." He then made copies of the
petition on the xerox machine and went on to his office.
The evidence indicates that A C. Coleman delayed about
30 minutes in giving Mosier and Krom word about a
meeting in Patterson 's office . He also told them Bick was
being called in and they should ask her to hold the meeting
in his office . In any case Mosier and Krom did not appear
at Patterson 's meeting in his office . Only the two janitors,
Becker , Calvert and Patterson were present , Redenbacher
being on vacation. Patterson , putting a copy of the petition
on his desk, proceeded to question Becker and Calvert as to
whether or not they had been informed there was to be an
election on November 24 for union steward . They both
replied no. He then criticized the two janitors for signing
the petition during working hours, asking them if they knew
the document they signed was illegal, that he had just
talked with their union representative and no clause in the
contract provided for the election of, or the office of,
steward . Replying they did not know it was illegal, they
immediately scratched lines through their names on the
torn copy of the petition . He then directed them to return to
work.
Patterson also directed Becker to call Bick . According to
Bick , whom I credit in this regard , Becker told her on the
telephone , "that they had a problem out there, Marilyn
Mosier had been selected as steward , and Mr . Patterson
had said for me (Bick) to come out there as soon as
possible." Becker also wanted to know how Mosier had
been able to get herself appointed steward without Becker
knowing that such an office was open or that there was
going to be a selection process . Patterson , according to his
statement , also talked to Bick that morning , apparently
twice within a short period of time , asking her to come out
because he had a problem with one of the secretaries
passing out an illegal document without permission during
working hours making herself union steward . She advised
him she had given no one authority to select a steward.
At some time during the morning Becker at the request of
Bick and with the permission of Patterson made further
xerox copies of the petition on his desk. Neither these nor
those made earlier by Patterson were offered in evidence.
A short time after she was called Bick arrived, meeting
first with Patterson in front of his office . She asked for and
obtained the use of his private office for a union meeting of
employees . Bick then began the meeting with Calvert,
Becker , and the two janitors , Mosier and Krom not being
present . After a short while Bick went to the financial
secretary's office to get them , announcing that the meeting
was in Patterson's office . Mosier then gave her A. C.
Coleman's message to the effect that he wished the meeting
to be held in his office. But Bick rejected the idea, telling
them to either come to Patterson's office or forget it. They
reported this development to A. C. Coleman, their
supervisor , who told them to go to the meeting in
Patterson's office , which they then did.
In advance of their arrival Bick had been handed the
copy of the petition with lines drawn through the names of
Golloday and Lovins. A discussion followed regarding how
Mosier had had herself selected steward , Becker and
Calvert asserting they had no prior notice of the matter.
Bick characterized the petition as illegal , whereupon
Golloday and Lovins declared they had not known what
they were signing and wanted their names removed. Bick
then wrote on the document , "Please remove our names as
we were misinformed." Golloday and Lovins then signed
their names again under this statement . When Mosier and
Krom arrived, Bick told Krom the two janitors had already
removed their names from the petition and asked if she did
not wish to remove her name also since it was illegal. Being
LOCAL 933, UAW
thus led to believe the petition was illegal, Krom drew a line
through her signature and signed along with the janitors'
names under Bick 's writing to remove their names. At the
hearing Bick asserted her basis for declaring the petition
illegal was the belief (in fact erroneous) that a secret ballot
was required. Neither the Local I constitution and bylaws
nor the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect so
provided nor was there any past practice to support Bick's
position. In the 18 years Calvert had been on the job there
had never been an election for steward.
When Bick felt she had gotten things settled down, she
invited Patterson and A. C. Coleman into the meeting. She
reported to them that Golloday, Lovins, and Krom had
withdrawn their signatures from the petition. A discussion
followed in which Bick described Mosier's petition as
illegal , adding that Local I would not recognize Mosier
being chosen as steward, that there was no basis in the
collective-bargaining agreement for a steward, and that
under the agreement Patterson had the right to reassign
secretaries. Patterson lectured Mosier for circulating an
illegal petition in the office.
Mosier, believing that Patterson had returned the torn
copy of the petition to her shortly after he had taken it from
her and that she had placed it in her handbag, raised a
question as to how it got out of her handbag. Patterson
claimed he had never returned it. They argued. He accused
her of calling him a liar and a thief. At the hearing she
denied doing so. Whether or not she did so specifically is
not material because even if she did not, the whole context
of the argument put his honesty in question. He responded
by suspending her without pay for the balance of the day, 3-
1/2 hours. That ended the meeting.
D. The December Grievances
As the meeting in Patterson's office on November 25
broke up Bick commented to the assembled employees that
she wanted them to know that Mosier had called Patterson
a liar. As Mosier left Bick asked her if she wanted to file a
grievance, but Mosier replied that she did not want Bick to
represent her. Nevertheless, when at the end of that
workweek Mosier found that her pay was in fact docked for
3-1/2 hours, she changed her mind about filing a grievance.
On December 1 she prepared and later handed to Bick a
written grievance against Local 933 claiming violation of
the collective-bargaining agreement for being shorted 3-1/2
hours pay and demanding that she be paid therefore. On
December 4 she filed another grievance claiming she had
been verbally abused, harassed, threatened, cursed, and
mistreated because she had on November 24 consulted
with, and been chosen by, her fellow union members as
their representative.
On December 4 Krom also filed a grievance. This arose
out of the following circumstances. Earlier on December 4
Patterson had called a number of employees separately into
his office and asked each to sign a statement prepared by
him favoring his version of the argument he had had with
Mosier at the union meeting on November 25. I infer from
the sequence of events that the filing of Mosier's December
1 grievance caused him to take this action in defense of his
position. The prepared statements read as follows:
I was present at the meeting held in the President's
227
office for the office and maintenance employees of
Local #933, UAW on Tuesday, November 25, 1969.
I heard the accusation made by Marilyn Mosier, office
employee of Local #933, UAW to Mr. James
Patterson, President of Local #933, UAW accusing
him of taking a paper from her purse.
I heard Mr. Patterson deny this action, and I also heard
Marilyn Mosier make the statement that Mr. Patterson
was a liar.
Becker, Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins were each asked to,
and did, sign such a statement. Krom was also called in and
asked to sign. She declined, saying it was not true.
According to her Patterson then said, "If you don't sign
you're in serious trouble. You're just the same as fired."
Patterson denied that he made such a statement. Consider-
ing Patterson's strong feelings and participation in the
events of November 25, I credit Krom. In her grievance she
claimed Patterson had threatened her and tried to force her
to sign an untrue and fraudulent statement. She asked that
he be instructed to stop making threats and harassing her.
She and Mosier together delivered their December 4
grievance to Bick's office in her absence. Both had
Loudermilk's help in preparing them.
The collective-bargaining agreement then in effect
provided in pertinent part that, "All grievances shall be
subject to the following procedure; First: An employee
having a grievance shall present it in writing to his President
or designated representative; who shall attempt to settle it
with the employees immediate selected Supervisor." The
immediate supervisor of Mosier and Krom was A. C.
Coleman. Bick did not follow this contract procedure.
Instead she jumped to the second step under which
grievances not satisfactorily settled at the first step were to
be presented by the union representative to "an official
selected by Local 933." Bick arranged with Patterson to
take up the three gnevances on December 8 with Earl
Coleman acting for Local 933 and with Patterson being
present. In advance thereof she consulted neither Mosier or
Krom about the grievances.
The December 8 grievance hearing was held in Patter-
son's office. Bick, with another Local 1 member to assist
her, presented all three grievances. Neither Mosier nor
Krom was called in until after the grievances were disposed
of. With respect to Mosier's December 1 grievance based
upon her 3-1/2 hour disciplinary suspension, Bick asked
that she be paid for the time docked. In answer Earl
Coleman rejected the grievance, presenting the four
statements of Becker, Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins (which
Krom refused to sign) corroborating Patterson's version
that Mosier had called him a liar, and in connection with
his defense said, "We reserve the right to discipline." In
addition he produced Mosier's pay voucher for the week
which he claimed showed that she in fact had only lost 1/2
hour's time. Bick in effect agreed with him that only 1/2
hour's pay was involved. Further, based not so much on the
statements of the four other employees that Mosier had
called Patterson a liar, but rather on her own view that the
grievance lacked merit since she herself had been there and
observed what had transpired, she withdrew Mosier's
December 1 grievance noting thereon "W.D.W.O.P."
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(withdrawn without prejudice ). There was no further
processing of it.
Krom 's December 4 grievance faired better . On behalf of
Local 933 Earl Coleman wrote on that grievance , "I Earl N.
Coleman as Rep. for Local 933 will agree that there will be
no threats and harassment of the members of Local 1.
Local 933 will continue to maintain discipline and
efficiency of employees at all times in accordance with
existing terms of existing agreement ." Bick deemed this
disposition satisfactory and so noted on the grievance.
Earl Coleman offered to make the same disposition of
Mosier 's December 4 grievance which alleged harassment
in connection with her steward 's petition , although he
denied there had been harassment . Bick testified she
believed the grievance lacked merit and, moreover, was
illegal , and not wishing to be in the position of backing
Mosier in her grievance , she rejected Earl Coleman' s offer
to settle it , instead noting thereon "grievance untimely,"
and withdrew the grievance . There was no further
processing of it.
Mosier and Krom were then each separately called in and
advised of the disposition of their grievances . Thereafter a
meeting of all employees was called and the fate of the
grievances explained to the entire group
E. The January Separations
On December 5 Catherine Milliken , Local 933's record-
ing secretary , filed with the Board's Regional Office Section
8(a)(1) and (3) charges against the Allison Division of
General Motors Corporation and 8(b)(1)(A) and (3)
charges against Local 933 and Patterson . The gravamen of
these charges was that they, acting together , had discrimi-
nated against her as an employee of Allison in connection
with her taking time off for union business . Ultimately the
charges against Allison were withdrawn and those against
Local 933 and Patterson were dismissed for insufficient
evidence . Prior thereto, however , the charges were investi-
gated by the Region.
In response to requests made to her by two Local 933
committeemen , Al Goodman and William Hirshberger, in
connection with Milliken 's dispute with Allison and Local
933 which were the subject of charges then pending with the
Region , Mosier while at work in Local 933's office on
January 13, 1970 typed up a statement to the effect that on
December 31 Patterson had made a statement bearing on
the merits of that dispute . Mosier and Krom then both
signed the statement and gave it to the committeemen.
The following day, January 14, a Board agent investigat-
ing the Milliken charges came to the Local 933 office and
took separate sworn statements from Mosier and Krom
about the December 31 incident . There is no direct
evidence that Patterson knew these statements were being
taken, but, on the other hand , no secret was made of the
fact that they were being taken.
Also on January 14, the record being unclear as to what
time of day or whether the time was coincidental with the
taking of the Board 's statements in the Local 933 office,
Patterson attended a grievance hearing (unrelated to the
present matter ) at the Allison plant in the course of which
an Allison management official showed him a copy of the
January 13 statement signed by Mosier and Krom . Seeing
the statement upset him.
Upon returning to Local 933's office that day Patterson
did nothing further . The following morning, however, he
called the Local 933 employees , including Krom but not
Mosier who was on sick leave , to his office , and in the
presence of the group confronted Krom with a copy of the
January 13 statement, demanding to know if she had signed
it. When she admitted that she had , he told her both she
and Mosier were laid off, and that she could so advise the
absent Mosier , adding additional comments, according to
the testimony of Krom whom I credit , indicating the
separations would be permanent . I find that on that
occasion he fired both Krom and Mosier . Patterson admits
that he reprimanded Krom for involving herself in local
politics and threatened all the employees with discharge if
any like statement should be made by any of them in the
future . He denied he knew at that time that either Mosier or
Krom had also given a statement to a Board agent . There is
no question but that he had knowledge the Milliken charges
were pending with the Board and that the subject matter of
the January 13 statement was relevant to issues posed by
the charges.
In contradiction to Patterson 's testimony regarding the
state of his knowledge on January 15, the General Counsel
recalled Mosier as a rebuttal witness. She testified that on
January 13 Patterson confronted her in her office with a
copy of the January 13 statement, asking her if she had
signed it , and according to her she admitted she had,
adding that it was related to the pending Board charges.
Patterson did not thereafter specifically deny this testimony
of Mosier . Nevertheless , in the circumstances , I do not
credit Mosier 's version regarding the state of Patterson's
knowledge on January 15 because her testimony strikes me
as being an afterthought, there being no explanation as to
why it did not form part of her testimony during the
General Counsel' s case-in-chief.
Although the fact that Patterson was embarassed by
having an Allison management official show him a copy of
the January 13 statement logically explains his anger and
the action he took against Mosier and Krom on January 15,
I cannot believe he did not also know about the statements
given the Board agent on January 14. They were given to
the Board agent in the Local 933 conference room during
office hours . They dealt with a subject of interest to many
Local 933 officials and employees . The suite of offices was
relatively small. The staff of officials and employees of
Local 933 was small. Patterson himself was present in the
office sometime on January 14 as well as on January 15.
When he confronted Krom on January 15 he had two
pieces of paper, one being the January 13 statement, the
other unidentified . In these circumstances I infer, and find,
that when he discharged Krom and Mosier on January 15
he knew they had given statements to the Board agent.
After separating Krom and Mosier on January 15,
Patterson reconsidered in part at least because the
collective-bargaining agreement provided for a 2-week
notice He immediately sent Krom a telegram , the contents
of which were telephoned to her that afternoon, instructing
her to report for duty the following morning. Mosier
returned to work when she recovered from her illness.
LOCAL 933, UAW
Neither she nor Krom sustained any loss in wages as a
result of Patterson 's January 15 action.
After her separation on January 15 Krom on her way
home went to Mosier 's home and advised her about
developments , including that they both had been separated.
They then telephoned Bick for the purpose of instigating a
grievance . Bick , however, discouraged them on the ground
that if they were only laid off a grievance was not in order.
Krom and Mosier considered that Bick had refused to
handle the grievance . Nevertheless , Krom prepared a
grievance in writing with Loudermilk 's assistance and
mailed it to Bick. She claimed her dismissal was a violation
of the collective -bargaining agreement as well as a violation
of the settlement of her prior grievance . She requested
reinstatement and to be made whole . She then proceeded to
her own home where she learned of the telephone message
recalling her to work the following day
After receiving the grievance Bick called Paterson
regarding it, learning from him that Krom was by then back
to work . Both Bick and Patterson considered that this
disposed of the matter and Bick did nothing further with it.
Although recalled to work Krom never affirmatively
withdrew the January 15 grievance Instead she called Bick
to inquire what had been done about it and in effect was
told by Bick that because she was back to work nothing
further was in order . She asked Bick for a copy of what had
been done regarding the grievance , that is, how it was
settled , but she never received anything . In her own view
Krom did not consider the matter satisfactorily settled. She
felt that in the light of the earlier grievance which had been
settled on the basis that Local 933 would not harass her, the
January 15 separation was a breach of that settlement and
she wanted assurance there would not be further threats
and harassment . According to Bick she never withdrew this
grievance of January 15.
F Local I Bargaining Preparations
When Mosier and Krom were first hired they understood
they were employed as secretaries . Not until January of
1970 did they learn of any question regarding their
classification . On or about January 20 in anticipation of the
approaching end of the contract term for the Local 1
collective -bargaining agreement in effect and in accordance
with her past practice in preparing for contract negotia-
tions, Redenbacher solicited contract proposals from the
various employees . She asked Krom and Mosier to get
together what they thought should be proposed. She made
the same request of Calvert and Becker . Krom and Mosier
prepared a set of typed proposals which they handed to
Redenbacher . She then showed these to Calvert and Becker
and returned with a rough draft of different proposals from
them . Her aim was to work out a common set of proposals
agreeable to all employees . In discussing the Calvert- Becker
proposals , Mosier and Krom indicated disagreement with
certain items . These included recreation of the c lassifica-
tion or record clerk which would include Mosier and Krom
and would result in their receiving , beginning with the
second year of a new contract , $5 per week less than
secretaries ; a requirement of 5 years seniority before
eligibility for a Christmas bonus, which would have
229
excluded Mosier and Krom; and a similar provision for a 7
days' absence allowance.
Redenbacher returned to Calvert and Becker with the
objections of Mosier and Krom , and, after discussing
matters with them , obtained their consent to drop the
objectionable proposals . She reported this development to
Mosier and Krom. On the following weekend , however, she
received a message from Mosier that she (Mosier) and
Krom had decided to submit their own proposals.
Redenbacher thereafter told Becker and Calvert to write up
a set of their own proposals . I base the above findings upon
the credited testimony of Redenbacher partially corrobo-
rated by Calvert and Becker.
Calvert and Becker then prepared a set of their own
proposals and mailed them to Bick . Mosier and Krom did
likewise , taking them to Bick 's office and handing them to
her. Bick rejected them by dropping them into her
wastebasket . Later she reconsidered , retrieved them from
the wastebasket , and took them to a meeting of the
employees on January 29 at which contract proposals were
discussed . At this meeting Bick read aloud to the group the
proposals submitted by both factions . In the past in
preparing for contract negotiations she had always received
a set of proposals unanimously supported by all employees,
her practice being to leave to Redenbacher the chore of
ironing out in advance any difference of view . Lack of
unanimity was for her , therefore , a new development. At
the January 29 meeting no one informed her that there had
been at one point agreement at least informally. After
reading out the proposals and conducting discussion with
respect to them , and indicating that in the absence of
unanimity she would have to act upon proposals supported
by a majority, Bick put them up for a vote. A majority
voted in favor of the Becker-Calvert set of proposals. Bick
accepted those, rejecting the others , and in subsequent
bargaining sessions they were the ones which she presented
to management.
G. April Separation of Krom
On January 30, 1970, the initial complaint in this matter
issued against Respondent Local 933, hearing at first being
scheduled for March 18 and later reset for April 8. On
March 2 the Charging Parties and the two janitors filed
with the Board a petition seeking decertification of Local 1
as their representative . On April 6 the second complaint
directed against Local 1 issued . It was consolidated with the
first, being again reset for April 28.
On April 10 Krom was given 2 weeks' notice that she was
laid off effective April 24. Patterson called her into his
office and in the presence of her supervisor A. C. Coleman
and second vice president Crawley gave her 2 weeks' notice
of layoff due to lack of work , a cutting down of expenses
because Local 933 was $12 ,000 in the red (a fact which A.
C. Coleman confirmed), and because there had been a
continuing and substantial layoff of 933 members at
Allison. She had the least seniority of any employee in the
unit . In reply to her question whether she could draw
unemployment compensation , Patterson told her that she
could.
Following her layoff Krom on April 28 filed a grievance
with Bick claiming her layoff was a violation of the
230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
settlement of her December grievance and was unfair,
unjust, and illegal. Sometime after receiving this grievance
Bick talked to Patterson about it. He showed her a copy of
Krom's unemployment insurance application in which she
had indicated that the reason for unemployment was "no
work." As a result of talking with Patterson Bick apparently
was convinced that Krom's grievance lacked merit and that
Patterson had valid economic reasons for laying her off. At
any rate she took the position with Krom that nothing
could be done about her layoff status, and she did nothing
further with this grievance.
H. The June Separation of Mosier
On May I I Patterson began a leave of absence from his
duties as president of Local 933 in order to work at the
UAW International's Regional Office. He remained on
leave until July 21. During his absence the functions of
president were carried on by first vice president Arthur Sam
Murray as acting president. On May 27, 28, and June 1 the
initial hearings were conducted in the present matter at
which both Mosier and Krom testified.
On June 9 Murray as acting president presided over a
regular meeting of the Local 933 Executive Board attended
by, among others, second vice president Eugene Crawley
and executive board member James Persinger who with
Murray were members of the same political faction as
Patterson. The regular order of business was set aside to
allow Local 933 attorney Lynnville Miles to speak about
the status of the decertification petition against Local I and
the NLRB charges of Mosier and Krom. As to Krom's case,
he characterized it as cold, commenting that few such cases
succeeded. During discussion Persinger, according to the
minutes of the meeting, asked what they were going to do
about Marilyn Mosier who had filed NLRB charges.
Murray replied, according to his testimony, "I am not going
to do anything. You can do your own thing."
Following the meeting Murray advised Crawley he would
be away from the Local 933 office the next day and that
Crawley should stand in for him as acting president.
Crawley agreed. Murray also advised the president's
secretary, Phyllis Becker that Crawley would be acting
president the next day
The following morning around 9 a.m. Crawley received a
call at the Local 933 hall from Murray to the effect that a
certain letter to a so-called CAP committee had to go out
that day. This involved sending an identical letter to some
25 or 30 members of the committee, some of whom were
new and with addresses not appearing in the files in the
president's office. Such new addresses could be obtained
from records in the financial secretary's office where
Mosier worked. In the past it had been established practice
for personnel in the various offices in the union hall to
come into the financial secretary's office to obtain such
needed data, to use the mimeograph machine, or to obtain
coffee from the coffee machine. This had resulted in
friction between clericals in the financial secretary's office
and the other clericals, particularly between Mosier and
Becker. Sometime in May after Patterson had gone on
leave, A. C. Coleman, in an effort to minimize such
conflicts, met with Murray and the office employees in the
hall. He obtained Murray's agreement that if any
information was needed from the financial secretary's
office by employees in other offices they should come to
him, A. C. Coleman, and he would see that the information
was furnished to them. He also privately instructed Mosier
that in the event controversy developed in the financial
office she should avoid confrontation by leaving the scene
of the dispute.
It was against this background that the events of June 10
occurred. Shortly after 10 a.m. A. C. Coleman left the union
hall, advising Crawley that he would be gone for a short
while. He was away 45 or 50 minutes. Shortly after his
departure Becker, following Crawley's instructions, entered
the financial office for the ostensible purpose of obtaining
addresses of new CAP committee members from a rotary
file at which Mosier was working. An argument developed
between them. Becker then left to seek the aid of Crawley
who returned with her and directed Mosier to move away
from the file to her own desk so that Becker could use the
file. After a short delay she complied and then left the
scene, going down the hall to the office of recording
secretary Milliken.
After Becker had obtained the addresses, Crawley sought
out Mosier, directing her to return to her own office. She
refused to return so long as Becker was there and even after
Crawley informed her Becker had left, she persisted in her
refusal on the basis that Crawley was not her boss. She was
emotional and intemperate in her refusal while Crawley
was soft-spoken throughout. After several unsuccessful
efforts to persuade her to return to her office and go back to
work, he discharged her. There is some conflicting evidence
as to whether she was at that time laid off or discharged.
She apparently felt either that she was only laid off or that
there was at least a chance that her discharge was revocable
because she did not immediately leave but awaited the
return of A. C. Coleman. However, his efforts to save her
job were unsuccessful. Murray confirmed the discharge by
telephone about midday and again in person in midafter-
noon. In effect A. C. Coleman then acceded to the
discharge by instructing her to go home, which she did.
1. Protests of Mosier and Krom Regarding Their
Employment Status
The day following her June 10 discharge Mosier sent
telegrams to Local 933 and Bick requesting a hearing on her
discharge as provided in the contract between Local 1 and
Local 933. She also filed additional Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(4) charges with the Board. On June 12 she mailed a written
grievance to Bick based on her discharge claiming it
violated the collective-bargaining agreement and was also
an unfair labor practice. In support of the grievance she
recited the following facts, "that on June 10, 1970 at
approximately 11 a.m. one Eugene P. Crawley notified me
that I was off the payroll for the rest of the day and at
approximately 3:30 p.m. one Arthur Murray who is vice
president of Local 933, UAW notified me that I was
discharged." She asked for reinstatement and to be made
whole.
As noted earlier herein the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Local I and Local 933, had been scheduled
to expire on February 27, 1970. Sometime in advance
thereof Bick had initiated the bargaining process looking
LOCAL 933, UAW 231
toward a new agreement by sending Local 933 proposed
terms for a new contract. On February 18 she wrote
Patterson asking that the agreement about to expire be
extended beyond its termination date. By letter of February
20 Patterson agreed to extend the existing contract on a
day-to-day basis. The agreement continued in effect until
Patterson, on April 27, (3 days after Krom's layoff took
effect) wrote Bick cancelling the contract effective the next
day, April 28.
Among other provisions, the checkoff provisions of that
agreement then became inoperative. On May 19 Krom,
then in layoff status, mailed Bick a check in payment of her
May dues. Mosier did likewise sometime in May On June
4, however, Bick returned Krom's uncashed check to her
along with a withdrawal card from Local I in accordance
with an established practice of automatically issuing
withdrawal cards to employees not actually working. On
June 15 she also returned Mosier's check for May dues
along with a withdrawal card.
In response to Mosier's June 10 telegram, Murray wrote
her on June 12 that, "Your contract has been cancelled as
of April 28, 1970. Will be glad to meet with you, and
anyone who legally represents you, at your convenience."
Thus, as to Mosier, he apparently was not rejecting the
grievance process because he was willing to meet. To Bick,
who had called him that same day to set up a meeting on
Mosier's grievance, he took a different position. To her he
wrote that the contract was cancelled, adding, "There can
be no meeting with you concerning the disciplinary action
taken against Marilyn Mosier, until there is a contract
negotiated." Bick, also on the same day, wrote Mosier that
there was no contract in effect, stating, "We will attempt to
negotiate your return to work when negotiations are
resumed. If you have any facts to assist in negotiations
please forward to me in writing as soon as possible." This
letter crossed Mosier's grievance in the mail. Thereafter
Mosier considered that her written grievance had supplied
the facts which Bick needed; Bick claimed otherwise,
because the grievance was not specifically in response to
her June 12 letter. I find that Mosier supplied the essential
facts in her written grievance and that Bick could not
reasonably expect a further response in answer to her letter.
A few days later , about June 15, Local 933 began a
program of receiving advanced dues from its members on a
weekly basis resulting in additional work in the financial
secretary's office. Krom heard of the additional work and
that Becker had been called in for extra work on a
Saturday. On the theory that she should have been recalled
from layoff to perform any additional work, Krom decided
to join with Mosier in protesting what they considered
unfair treatment.
On June 16 Krom, Mosier, and a number of her relatives,
including several children, began picketing in front of Local
933's hall in protest of their alleged unfair treatment. The
picketing, after the first day carried on only by Mosier and
Krom, continued for about a week.
Local 933 management responded to these protests about
June 18 by putting out and distributing at the Allison plant
a handbill signed by Murray, Crawley, and Earl Coleman
giving their side of the story, defending the action they had
taken with regard to both Krom and Mosier, and including
language critical of Mosier's brother-in-law Loudermilk
who preceded Patterson as president of Local 933. A couple
of days later Mosier and Krom with some help from
Loudermilk put out their own handbill in answer to that of
Local 933 management and distributed it at the gate of the
Allison plant. It attacked Patterson, Murray, and Crawley,
referring to them as the "unholy tno,"justified Loudermilk
and detailed the claimed unfair treatment of Mosier and
Krom.
Shortly thereafter on June 20 Krom, with Mosier on an
extension, telephoned Bick to inquire what could be done
on her behalf. According to Krom and Mosier, whom I
credit over Bick, she in effect indicated nothing could be
done, that Mosier and Krom were not members of Local 1,
had no rights, and were troublemakers. Nevertheless, on
June 25 Krom filed another written grievance with Bick
claiming that Local 933 was using temporary employees for
work for which she (Krom) should have been recalled. She
asked to be reinstated and made whole. Bick replied by
letter of June 29 in the same vein as she had replied to
Mosier, that there was no contract in effect but that she
would attempt to negotiate Krom's return from layoff when
contract negotiations resumed.
J. The July Recall of Krom
Sometime in July, I judge from the circumstances in the
earlier part of the month while Krom was still in layoff
status, A. C. Coleman requested the financial secretary-
treasurer of the UAW International to assign additional
help to his office at Local 933 to assist with the extra work
that was piling up. He received no response from this, but
Becker and Calvert were from time to time assigned to
assist in his office.
On July 21 Patterson's leave as president ended and he
returned to active direction of Local 933. Shortly thereafter
Krom, having heard indirectly that Local 933's executive
board had voted to recall her, called Patterson to ask if she
could return to work. He told her he did not know when she
would be recalled; that he did not know why she wanted to
come back to work there anyway, referring to some of the
derogatory references used in the handbill she and Mosier
had distributed, as well as the fact that they had picketed;
and when she said that she had to have a job, he stated that
she might as well hunt one elsewhere because he was not
expecting to recall her. Nevertheless, on July 26 Krom
received a telegram instructing her to come to the Local 933
hall on July 27 to talk with Patterson. She reported as
directed. He told her he was not recalling her because he
wanted to but because he had to; that if she wanted to
return to work she would have to do so on his terms; that
she did not deserve to be recalled, referring to the handbill
put out by herself and Mosier. A. C. Coleman urged him to
forget the past and their differences because the work was
piling up and he needed help. But Patterson responded that
he was forgetting nothing, that he did not want to recall
Krom but that the higher ups were making him. He further
told Krom that there was plenty of work for her at that
time; that he was going to bring in four temporary
employees until the work got caught up and then she would
be out again; that after the work was caught up he might
have 1 day a week or 1 day a month for her, and if she
232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wished to return on those terms she could . She was to go
home and think about it . She then left . Shortly after she
arrived home Patterson telephoned , instructing her to
report to work the following morning.
When Krom reported for work the next day four new
temporary employees were on the job in the financial
secretary 's office . They worked the balance of that week, as
did Krom . Thereafter she continued to work and at the time
of the last hearing herein on October 27 she was still
employed . Since returning she has worked from 6 to 9 hours
overtime each week.
K. The New Collective-Bargaining Agreement
In early August Local 1, represented by Bick , and Local
933, represented by Patterson and Earl Coleman , resumed
negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement, the
decertification petition having by then been withdrawn.
Following the instructions of Local l 's attorney, Bick
incorporated the June grievances of Mosier and Krom into
the negotiations . She contended Mosier was discharged
improperly ; that management should let bygones be
bygones; she asked that she be reinstated and made whole.
This proposal was categorically rejected on the grounds
that Mosier had been insubordinate , having refused a direct
order to return to work . Management was adamant in its
position, stating it would permit Local I to go on strike over
the issue before giving in on it . Bick in effect then gave up
on that grievance.
As to Krom , Bick proposed that she be recalled with
backpay . To this management responded that she had
already been recalled and that management reserved the
right to determine when there was enough work for
employees . In effect this was a rejection of the claim for
backpay, but in view of the fact that Krom was working,
Bick did not press that aspect . With respect to the nature of
the recall she did press for clarification whether the recall
was permanent and obtained from management the
statement that the recall was as permanent as any could be,
that in the event of a layoff Krom as the most junior
employee would be the first to go , but that they were not
anticipating a layoff . Bick accepted this as an adequate
disposition of that grievance.
Terms of a new collective -bargaining agreement were
also negotiated , agreement being reached on August 5,
subject to ratification by the employees in the bargaining
unit . Bick through Redenbacher then called the employees
in the unit , including Mosier and Krom, to a meeting on
August 8 for the purpose of considering ratification of the
new contract . The weight of the evidence establishes that
Bick reported to the members on the terms of the new
tentative agreement and also on disposition of the
grievances of Mosier and Krom and answered questions
from the floor . The contract terms were put to a vote and
accepted by the employees . It is clear that Bick considered
the disposition of the grievances tied to the acceptance of
the contract proposals . In her words it was "a package
deal" and she felt that the negotiations followed by
acceptance of the agreement put an end to the grievances.
Although they voted to accept the contract terms , Mosier
and Krom did not consider that their grievances were
thereby terminated . On August 10 the new 3-year
collective-bargaining agreement was signed.
L. The August Rocket
Local 933 regularly publishes for the information of its
members a small newspaper entitled The Rocket. Among
other things it contains a column written by the Local's
president . In the August 1970 issue , put out in the third or
fourth week of August , Patterson used this column to refer
to the "constant charges" of Krom and Mosier as
constituting a "serious problem." He also referred to the
fact that both had picketed the union hall. And while
objecting to the filing of the charges , he alluded to the fact
that Krom had been brought back to "part-time work as
required" but that the charges "still persist ." He asserted
that Local I would not come to Mosier 's defense.
M. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Analysis of events of November 24 and 25
Background events prior to November 24, 1969, establish
beyond doubt Patterson 's pervasive personal animus
toward Mosier . Upon learning from Becker late in the
afternoon of November 24 that Mosier had been chosen
steward by circulating a petition among the office help,
Patterson proceeded to interrogate Golloday and Lovins as
to whether they had signed the petition , and, when they
admitted they had, he further interrogated them about
when they had signed , questioning their right to do so
during working hours . Considered in context , including the
events which followed and the location of the interrogation
in their place of employment , I find that such interrogation
was coercive and a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Although the complaint did not allege these particular
events as an unfair labor practice , the evidence respecting
them was fully litigated at the hearing. There is no evidence
of an established rule in the office against solicitation. So
far as the record shows Patterson just pronounced it on this
occasion . Considering that circulation of a petition
regarding union affairs is an activity ordinarily protected
by Section 7 of the Act and that other union activity, for
example the Local 1 meeting in Patterson 's office the
following day , was allowed on the employer's premises
during working time , I conclude there was no lawful
employer regulation limiting employee rights to circulate or
sign a union petition.
On November 25 Patterson further violated Section
8(a)(l) when he knowingly took the petition dealing with a
union matter from Mosier against her will while she and
Calvert were discussing it. In so finding I do not mean to
imply that he was without authority to direct them to cease
their arguing , or to defer their discussion , or to return to
work.
In the meeting in his office which Patterson then called,
he indulged in further coercive interrogation of Becker and
Calvert regarding the same matter when he delved into the
state of their knowledge as to whether there was to be an
election for a steward. It is immaterial that he may have had
reasons to think that they opposed the whole matter. The
Act guarantees them freedom as employees from such
LOCAL 933, UAW
interference by their employer. Although not specifically
alleged as an unfair labor practice , the facts were fully
litigated , and I find , that such interrogation also violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Further, when he then proceeded to criticize Golloday
and Lovins for signing the petition during working hours,
interrogated them as to whether they knew they had signed
an illegal document , and advised them in the absence of
their union representatives that no clause in the collective-
bargaining agreement provided for a steward or the election
of one , he further interfered with their Section 7 rights and
those of the other employees present . His conduct induced
them to strike their names from the petition . I find that this
conduct and the inducement of them to strike their names
from the petition also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I have found that after seizing Mosier 's petition and while
on the way to his office Patterson stopped off to make
copies of the petition . To make such copies for his own use
of a document dealing with union affairs which , at that
point at least , was no concern of the employer was a further
implementation of the course of interfering conduct upon
which he had already launched, and considering what
immediately preceded it and what later followed it, I
conclude that the making of such copies was, as alleged in
the complaint , a further violation of Section 8(a)(1). With
regard to the copies which Becker later made at the request
of Bick and with the permission of Patterson , I reach a
contrary conclusion . These were made at the request of,
and for the benefit of, the employees ' union representative,
albeit with the permission of the employer . Such conduct
did not violate Section 8 (a)(1).
Later in the morning of November 25 when Patterson
was called into the union meeting by Bick , he further
indulged himself in lecturing Mosier about the petition
which he claimed was illegal . At the time he was doing this
the employees present were engaging in protected activity
in the president 's office . He took that occasion to verbally
chastise an employee for earlier engaging in protected
activity which was the direct forerunner of the union
meeting . I conclude that even though he was invited in to
the meeting , this verbal foray on his part was an
impermissible interference with the employees Section 7
rights and therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I further conclude that Patterson violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act when at the conclusion of the union
meeting in his office he gave Mosier a disciplinary
suspension without pay for the balance of that day.
Although in appropriate circumstances disciplinary action
against an employee for arguing with or maligning a
management official would not be an unfair labor practice,
the suspension here was surrounded by other 8(a)(1)
conduct. It occurred in the course of a union meeting.
Although the employee may not have been without fault in
engaging in the argument culminating in her suspension,
the entire confrontation with Patterson was the latest link in
a chain of events stemming from her earlier protected
activity and Patterson 's interference therewith . The union
meeting was , in a sense , a continuation of that earlier
protected activity , as was the argument in which Patterson
claimed Mosier called him a liar and a thief . Moreover,
although the argument occurred during a meeting on the
233
employer's premises, and even though it was during normal
work hours, the employees at the meeting were not
working. As an invitee at that meeting Patterson could not
lawfully impose upon the protected activity there in
progress the same managerial authority over employees
properly available to him while they engaged in their
normal duties. Patterson claimed he suspended Mosier
because of what she said in this argument. If so, she was
suspended because she engaged in a protected activity and
the suspension was unlawful. In any case since the
argument was sequentially inseparable from her continuing
protective activity which began the day before, the
conclusion is inescapable that she was suspended because
of a dispute with her employer over that protected activity.
In such circumstances the suspension was discriminatory
and a violation of Section 8(a)(3). Inasmuch as Mosier's
suspension occurred in the presence of the other employees
and in the course of a union meeting I conclude it
independently violated Section 8(a)(1).
I also conclude that Patterson in asking Krom on
December 4 to sign a statement favorable to him and
threatening her that if she did not sign she would be "in
serious trouble" and "the same as fired," he further violated
Section 8(a)(1). This was not alleged as an unfair labor
practice. Nevertheless, the whole sequence of events was
litigated.
2. Analysis of December grievances
Bick deemed the disposition of Krom's December 4
grievance to be satisfactory , her view being that about all
an employee could expect to obtain on a grievance based
upon alleged harassment was a promise by the employer
not to harass . Since that was all that Krom asked , I agree
that Bick adequately processed this grievance and was
justified in considering the result satisfactory.
She did not , however, have similar justification for her
disposition of Mosier's December 4 grievance which she
noted as untimely . The collective -bargaining agreement
placed no time limits on the filing of grievances . Moreover,
the evidence shows that untimeliness was not the true
reason Bick withdrew the grievance . That reason was a
sham . She testified that the principal reason she rejected
Earl Coleman's offer to settle Mosier's harassment
grievance on the same basis as he had settled Krom's was
her own unwillingness to back Mosier in an action which
she believed was illegal . Such belief , if she held it, had no
basis in the collective -bargaining agreement nor in Local
l's constitution and bylaws.
Local I argues that in any case a settlement of the Krom
grievance applied to all unit members and, therefore, was
equally applicable to Mosier , thus constituting a favorable
disposition of her December 4 grievance . While it is true
that the language of the Krom disposition , as written, was
broad enough to include Mosier , it is noteworthy that it was
written only on Krom 's grievance and not on Mosier's.
Although Earl Coleman offered to make the same
disposition on Mosier's grievance, that was rejected by
Bick . Together these facts mean that the Krom disposition
was not applicable to Mosier 's; that Mosier's was disposed
of in a different manner. That disposition , maneuvered by
Bick , was a rejection of Mosier's December 4 grievance.
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The satisfactory handling of Krom 's grievance contrasts
with the disparate result reached in both Mosier grievances.
Considering that Bick was experienced in union affairs
including the handling of grievances both in herjob and as
a Local I official , her familiarity with the grievance
procedures called for by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, her sidestepping of first step consideration with the
employees ' immediate supervisor , A. C. Coleman, in favor
of second step consideration by a less friendly host, Earl
Coleman , and the ample evidence that she was strongly
opposed to Mosier 's effort to become a steward , I find that
Bick 's handling of Mosier 's grievances of December 1 and
December 4 was perfunctory , arbitrary , discriminatory,
and in bad faith . She thus failed to fulfill her statutory duty
to the employee . Vaca v . Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 , 190, 191.
She in effect influenced the employer to continue its
existing discrimination . This as well as her failure to
proceed further with the grievances violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB
181, 186; Local 485 , International Union of Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 170 NLRB No. 121, 183
NLRB No. 131.
3. Analysis of the January separations
The General Counsel alleges that Local 933 violated
Section 8 (a)(t), (3), and (4) of the Act on January 15 when
Patterson separated Krom and Mosier.
I conclude that such conduct did violate Section 8 (a)(I).
As an employee of Allison , Milliken was entitled to seek
redress of her asserted grievances under the collective-
bargaining agreement with Allison or in an appropriate
Board proceeding . Employees also have the right to obtain
and give evidence in an unfair labor practice case. Thus
Milliken was entitled to obtain evidence to support her
position , and Mosier and Krom as employees of Local 933
were entitled to give evidence . Interference with such rights
violates Section 8(a)(1). Durahte Co., Inc., 128 NLRB 648.
The discharge of two potential witnesses for Milliken and
also the accompanying threat to all Local 933 employees to
deal with future incidents in the same manner clearly
tended to interfere with , restrain , and coerce all of them
with respect to their Section 7 rights . I conclude this
conduct violated Section 8 (a)(1). See Kingwood Mining Co.,
171 NLRB No. 24.
That employees owe a duty of loyalty to their employer, a
breach of which may be a legitimate reason for discharge,
does not , given the facts of this case , militate against the
above conclusion . The statements of Mosier and Krom did
not deal with the general activities of Local 933 as a labor
organization . Rather they dealt with an isolated incident
concerning a particular official . It cannot be said, therefore,
that the statements were generally deleterious to Local
933's stature as a labor organization in the eyes of the
general public , or of the employers with which it dealt, or of
its own members . Moreover, the information contained in
the statements was not confidential information acquired
by Krom or Mosier in the course of the performance of
their jobs . Rather it was a social conversation at the coffee
machine , which , although they overheard it while at their
work stations during their job, had nothing directly to do
with their work duties . It cannot be said that this revelation
of the overheard conversation violated a duty owed to their
employer . The facts here differ in this regard from those in
N.L. R.B. v. Clearwater Finishing Co., 203 F . 2d 938 (C.A. 4).
The General Counsel also alleges that Section 8 (a)(3) of
the Act was violated on January 15. It is clear that
Patterson 's discharge of Mosier and Krom was discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) if it was done for
a proscribed purpose "to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization ." In making the statements
on January 13 and 14 Mosier and Krom clearly were not
engaged in activity of their own union , Local 1 , inasmuch
as the statements related to activity in Local 933 of which
they were not members . Patterson 's conduct, therefore, did
not discourage them regarding their own union activity. But
the discrimination against Mosier and Krom did tend to
discourage Milliken , an employee of Allison , in regard to
her participation in Local 933 as a labor organization.
Application of Section 8(a)(3) is not limited to situations
where the union activity involved is that of the discrimina-
tees. Bausch & Lomb Incorporated 150 NLRB 1357, 1370;
Bausch & Lomb Incorporated, 159 NLRB 234, 235 ; cf. The
Cooper Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB 502. And the
statutory language makes it clear that the fact that the
employer of the discriminatees is also the labor organiza-
tion involved is not material because the statutory
protection runs against encouragement or discouragement
of membership in any labor organization . Accordingly, I
conclude that Patterson's discharge of Mosier and Krom
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
With regard to the Section 8(a)(4) allegations , inasmuch
as Patterson knew that Mosier and Krom had given
statements to the Board agent on January 14, I find that
their discharge was motivated in part by the fact that they
had given those statements as well as the non-Board
statement on January 13. The discharges for this reason
were violations of Section 8(a)(4). Precision Fittings, 141
NLRB 1034; Virginia- Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., 155
NLRB 447. And even if Patterson acted only on the basis of
the January 13 statement , I conclude , since he acted with
knowledge that the statement dealt with the same subject
matter as the pending charge and could reasonably expect
that statement to be considered in the investigation of the
charge , the discharges for this more limited motive likewise
violated Section 8(a)(4) because , "Congress has made it
clear that it wishes all persons with information about such
practices to be completely free from coercion against
reporting them to the Board ." Nash v. Florida Industrial
Commission, 389 U .S. 235, 238. See also Virginia-Carolina
Freight Lines, Inc., supra.
There remains the question , raised in General Counsel's
brief although not specifically alleged in a complaint, of the
handling of Krom 's grievance of January 15. Bick testified
that Krom had withdrawn it, Krom that she had not. I
credit Krom . Although Bick may not have been eager to
receive the grievance , once it was submitted to her in
writing she promptly contacted Patterson for the purpose of
arranging a grievance hearing, thus starting the grievance
process. She did no more than talk with Patterson because
he advised her that Krom was already back to work. Since
she lost no pay Bick was of the view that the matter was
satisfactorily settled and she did no more about it. I
LOCAL 933, UAW 235
conclude this was a reasonable exercise of her discretion as
an employee representative . To be made whole was all that
Krom had asked for in her written grievance There is no
evidence that Bick acted in bad faith in concluding that
Krom had been made whole. I reach this conclusion even
though Krom testified that she believed she had a viable
grievance in spite of the fact that she had been returned to
work with no loss of pay because her earlier December
grievance had been settled on the basis that employees
would not be harassed . She considered this further
harassment and wanted assurance there would be no
further threats or harassment . Although this was a tenable
theory, and Krom had stated as one of the grounds of her
grievance that the December grievance settlement had been
violated , the relief she sought in the January 15 grievance
only included being made whole. In view of this, Bick's
conclusion that she had been made whole was not
unreasonable . On the entire evidence I conclude that Bick's
motives in handling it the way she did were not invidious
and she did not thereby commit an unfair labor practice.
See Local 485, International Union of Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, supra.
4. Analysis of Local I bargaining
The General Counsel alleges that in bargaining Local I
attempted to cause the employer, Local 933, to accept
contract proposals unfavorable to Mosier and Krom in that
such proposals changed their job classifications from
secretary to record clerk at a lower rate of pay and provided
lesser leave of absence and paid absence allowance for
them. The evidence shows that the Local 1 proposals called
for the same rate of pay for the two classifications of
secretary and record clerk until the second year of the
proposed contract at which point rates for secretaries would
increase above the rates for record clerks. With that small
caveat , the factual allegations as to the terms proposed are
substantiated by the evidence.
The General Counsel further alleges that the reason
Local I urged such terms upon Local 933 was "because
Mosier sought to be designated as a steward of the Union,
opposed the practices and policies of Respondent Union
and its officer Bick, filed charges under the Act and
because Ruby Krom and other employees assisted in such
activities ." The issue, then , is the lawfulness of Local l's
motive in its bargaining.
Looking first to the activities of Bick, I conclude that her
personal motives in dealing with the contract proposals
were not unlawful. Although some inference of bad-faith
representation by Bick can be drawn from her handling of
the December grievances and the fact that she initially
rejected the contract proposals of Mosier and Krom, such
inference is outbalanced by other evidence. It is clear that
she reconsidered her initial rejection of the Mosier and
Krom proposals and in fact did read them out, together
with other proposals, at the meeting of employees January
29. The past practice was for the employees, through good
offices of Redenbacher, to work up a set of proposals
agreeable to all of them and to present Bick with a package
having unanimous support Unanimity is what Bick hoped
for and attempted to achieve at the January 29 meeting.
Failing that she acted upon the next best thing, namely, a
set of proposals having majority support. A preponderance
of the evidence supports the conclusion that she acted in
good faith in doing so and in presenting those proposals to
management. Accordingly, I conclude that insofar as Bick
personally was concerned no unlawful motivation was
present.
But Bick was not the Union. She was not even a member
of the unit , only its representative , and the question remains
whether Local I in the form of a majority of the unit
employees in insisting on contract proposals unfavorable to
Mosier and Krom were motivated by unlawful considera-
tions. There was longstanding animosity between Mosier
and Krom on one hand and Calvert and Becker on the
other. The latter had from the beginning resented the fact
that Mosier and Krom were hired in at the top rate for
secretaries while older secretaries in the office had had to
work years to achieve the top rate. They also resented the
fact that they were classified as secretaries rather than
record clerks. They opposed Mosier's effort to become
union steward. Their testimony and demeanor at the
hearing demonstrated their animosity. But they were only
two of the seven employees in the unit. Three others, Lovins
and Golloday, who were generally friendly toward Mosier
and Krom , and Redenbacher , who was more or less
neutral, cannot be said to have harbored unworthy motives
in supporting the unfavorable proposals. Of course, neither
Calvert nor Becker, nor for that matter Redenbacher,
advised Bick that they had earlier been agreeable to
eliminating the proposals unfavorable to Mosier and Krom.
But then neither did Mosier nor Krom tell Bick that at one
point there had been agreement. Considering all of the
factors, the weight of the evidence does not establish that a
majority of the unit employees voted for the proposals for
the unlawful motives asserted by the General Counsel.
Absent invidious motivation, the proposals disparate as
to Mosier and Krom were not in themselves beyond that
wide range of reasonableness (which) must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents. . .." Ford Motor Company v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 338. Accordingly, those allegations of the
complaint should be dismissed.
5. Analysis of April separation of Krom
The General Counsel alleges that Krom's April 24 layoff
was discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(4), relying principally on the background of prior events
regarding Krom and her association with Mosier and on
the coincidence of timing between the layoff and the
scheduled Board hearing April 28. He asserts that the
reasons given at the time of the layoff notice were a pretext.
There is conflicting evidence as to whether there was a
lack of work in the office. Some evidence indicates that the
layoff status of the large number of Local 933 employed at
Allison, which had continued for many months, resulted in
an increase of work at Local 933's office. Patterson and
Crawley both testified to the contrary that there was
insufficient work to keep all of the staff busy. However,
Crawley's testimony reveals that in any case he really did
not know what the employees did and was hardly in the
position to make a valid judgment as to whether or not their
services were needed . While the same observation cannot
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be made regarding Patterson, he had harbored a precon-
ception from prior to the time of his election that Local
933's office was overstaffed by about two employees, and
attributed the failure of his predecessor Loudermilk to lay
off these excess employees to nepotism. He himself,
however, for many months after he took office continued to
live with that same situation of "overstaffing" without
laying off anyone. The evidence as a whole does indicate
that Patterson and his fellow officers were sensitive to
possible criticism from rank-and-file members of 933
regarding the size of the office staff, particularly in view of
the worsening employment picture at Allison. It is also
clear that at the time of Krom's layoff Local 933 finances
were running substantially in the red.
Considering all of these circumstances, I conclude that
the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Krom's layoff was motivated by
considerations barred by Section 8(a)(3) or (4). On balance
I conclude that her layoff was motivated by the financial
condition of Local 933 and by Patterson's political
sensitivity regarding continued full employment at the
union office while many Local 933 members were
experiencing unemployment, especially when he himself
had long taken the position that the Local's office was
overstaffed. Whether he was right or wrong in this latter
regard seems immaterial. The fact that Krom was chosen
for layoff was due strictly to the fact that she was the junior
employee. Accordingly, these allegations of the complaint
should be dismissed.
6. Analysis of Mosier separation on June 10
The defense of Local 933 to the June 10 separation of
Mosier is that she was discharged for cause, namely
insubordination. She was clearly insubordinate if Crawley
was her supervisor. Her position and that of the General
Counsel is that he was not, that A. C. Coleman was her
supervisor, and moreover that she did not even know
Crawley was acting president on June 10. From all of the
circumstances I infer that he patently was acting president
on June 10 and that Mosier must have known this.
Nevertheless, the general circumstances are suspicious.
Considering the background of past discrimination against
her and the strong animosity against her because she was
the sister-in-law of the prior president associated with a
rival faction in Local 933 to which her immediate
supervisor A. C. Coleman also belonged, the inescapable
question is whether she was set up for the discharge.
Adding to the aura of suspicion is the further circumstances
that at the executive board meeting the day before,
Persinger, a member of the incumbent faction raised the
subject of Mosier in a manner suggesting that, having filed
charges, her continued presence was a problem. Murray in
effect then gave approval to whatever Persinger might do
about it. The next day Murray, who had been party to an
understanding that data from the financial office should be
gotten through A. C. Coleman, was conveniently absent
from the office. His stand-in, Crawley, then instructed
Becker to obtain such data knowing A. C. Coleman was
absent from the office and that friction with Mosier could
ensue. One might infer from this that he was looking for
trouble. Be that as it may, Mosier was not fired because of
the controversy in the office but because of a direction,
reasonably made by Crawley, to return to work after
Becker had left the financial office.
Did Crawley have authority to so direct her and then fire
her for failing to comply? The evidence is clear that Murray
as acting president had the full authority of the office of
president. I conclude from all the evidence that the second
vice president, Crawley, standing in for the acting
president, Murray, likewise was entitled to whatever
authority the office of president carried. The duties of local
union officers in regard to the supervision of local union
clerical help are set forth in Article 40, Section 1 of the
UAW International constitution then in effect, as follows:
"The maintenance of the local union office is under the
president's jurisdiction, and he employs such office help as
required, subject to the approval of the local umon's
executive board. When any of the office employees are
performing duties at the direction and on behalf of any of
the executive officers in connection with their official
duties, such employees are under the supervision of such
executive officer or officers until such time as the duties are
completed." It is also clear from the evidence that A. C.
Coleman as financial secretary was an executive officer
within the meaning of this provision of the International
constitution, and that Mosier when performing her duties
in the financial office on June 10 was doing so at the
direction and on behalf of A. C. Coleman.
At the hearing Patterson took the position that the
financial secretary in administering the duties of his office
was subordinate to the president. The constitution does not
bear him out in this. Nor does other evidence in the case
which indicates that the ambit of authority as between the
president and the financial secretary had long been a
matter of controversy at Local 933. Accordingly, if
Crawley's directions to Mosier which precipitated her
discharge had related to the manner in which she
performed her duties in the financial office, he might well
have been on thin ice. His directions were not of that
nature. He only directed her in a reasonable manner to
return to work at a time when she was away from her office
not working and while her immediate supervisor was away
from the union hall. I conclude that such a direction was
well within the ambit of general authority of the president
over the office as a whole. The action of A. C. Coleman
later in the day in acceding to the discharge by telling
Mosier to go home appears consistent with this conclusion.
And while complete loss of her job seems a severe
consequence for an infraction which might have been
handled by imposition of a lesser discipline , or by delay
until the return of her supervisor, this record does not reveal
that it was disparate treatment of Mosier. Cf. Fibers
International Corporation, 181 NLRB No. 93.
Considering the clear ground for discharge balanced
against the suspicious circumstances suggesting a pretextu-
al discharge, I conclude that the former outweighs the
latter. Accordingly, I conclude that Mosier's discharge was
not a violation of the Act, and the allegation of unfair labor
practice based thereon should be dismissed.
7. Analysis of the recall of Krom
The General Counsel contends that although Krom was
LOCAL 933, UAW
eventually recalled, her recall was delayed and in any case
was conditional, that is temporary, and that the reasons for
the delay and the conditional nature of the recall were
because she had assisted Mosier, had given testimony, and
had filed charges. There is insufficient evidence to connect
the delay in recall or the nature of the recall to the fact that
Krom had filed charges (the latest on May 8) and had
testified at the first hearing. Accordingly, the allegations of
a violation of Section 8(a)(4) keyed to the nature of her
recall should be dismissed.
The evidence establishes that commencing about June 15
there was additional work in the financial office for which
Krom could have been recalled. The next day she and
Mosier began picketing the union hall. In connection with
her return to work July 28 Patterson made it clear that her
recall was temporary and also made it clear that among the
reasons he disfavored her were her participation with
Mosier in picketing the union hall and the distribution of
their handbill. In his own words he was forgetting nothing.
He made no reference to pending charges. His remarks
were directed to her picketing and handbilling.
I find that her conditional recall was not reinstatement to
her former position. So far as anyone knew that situation
continued until early August, about August 5, when, in
negotiations with Patterson and Earl Coleman, Bick
obtained a clarifying statement indicating the reinstatement
was permanent, subject only to layoff as the most junior
employee in the event of a reduction in force not then
anticipated. I find that from that point on Krom enjoyed
full reinstatement . Patterson's statements in the August
issue of The Rocket regarding Krom and Mosier, being of a
political nature and directed to Local 933 members rather
than specifically to Krom, do not amount to a renunciation
of the assurance given Bick during negotiations. This
conclusion is fortified by the fact that at the time of the
final hearing herein in October Krom was still working
regularly.
Based on the foregoing I conclude that Local 933 failed
to fully reinstate Krom when she was recalled July 28,
continuing in this failure until the assurance amounting to
full reinstatement were given August 5, and that during that
period it violated Section 8(a)(1) by interfering with,
restraining , and coercing her regarding her concerted
activities. Inasmuch as activity in a labor organization was
not involved the discrimination did not constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(3).
8. Analysis of the handling of the April and June
grievances
Local I urges that no cause of action for an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) can be founded on
grievances of Mosier and Krom which were initiated and
arose out of incidents occurring during the period when no
collective-bargaining agreement was in effect. The defense
theory is that since the employees right to grieve arose out
of the collective-bargaining agreement, they ended with the
old contract and did not exist again until a new contract
was executed. I conclude that this position is erroneous as a
matter of law. It is true that the employees right to grieve
had foundations in a long series of collective-bargaining
agreements as well as under established practice during the
237
time those agreements existed. But it is also true that the
viability of those rights to grieve were not defined by the
duration of the contracts. Once the grievance process was
established, whether by contract or otherwise, it became a
term and condition of employment and as such survived the
expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement which
finally terminated April 28. N.L.R.B. v. Frontier Homes
Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 980-981 (C.A. 8); Kingsport Publishing
Corporation, 165 NLRB 694, enf. denied on other grounds,
399 F.2d 660 (C.A. 6); Local No. 611, International
Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 123 NLRB 1507; cf.
The Hilton-Davis Chemical Co., 185 NLRB No. 58. Local 1,
then, as the employees' representative, necessarily bore
responsibility during the hiatus between contracts for the
protection and execution of those rights to grieve which
survived the expired contract. The remaining question is
whether Local 1 with regard to that responsibility ran afoul
on Section 8(b)(1)(A).
With respect to Krom's April grievance the evidence
indicates that Bick did not exhaust available contract
procedures. On the other hand she did process the
grievance to the point where she felt there would be no
profit in proceeding further. While this handling of the
matter did not satisfy Krom, there is no evidence that
Bick's motives were invidious or that she acted, or failed to
act, with bad faith. Accordingly, she had discretion to
dispose of the grievance on that basis. Vaca v. Sipes, supra,
191, 192.
I reach a similar conclusion regarding Bick's handling of
the June grievances of Mosier and Krom which she took up
in August in the course of bargaining for a new contract.
Although this was not as established a way of handling
grievances as was the method provided for in past
contracts, it was a method. And in fact Bick did pursue
both grievances in the course of the bargaining. Essentially
what the charging parties (and the General Counsel) object
to is that her efforts did not achieve results which they deem
adequate. In the case of Mosier the results were zero. In the
case of Krom they were more satisfactory. But whatever the
results, nowhere in the evidence regarding what transpired
at the bargaining session is there a shred of evidence that
Bick acted in bad faith or with invidious motives. On the
contrary the evidence indicates that she vigorously pursued
the interests of both grievants, and the fact that she was
unsuccessful in satisfying them was in no way due to a lack
of diligence or good faith on her part. While the Act
protects employees from discrimination by their bargaining
representative, it does not guarantee the quality of the
representation they receive. Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142
NLRB 396, 418. A representative acting in good faith
enjoys broad discretion in carrying out her function. Ford
Motor Company v. Huffman, supra.
It is clear from the total evidence that she finally gave up
on the grievances. Apparently she agreed with management
that one of the conditions for acceptance of the new
contract would be no further processing of the grievances.
This leaves open the possibility that she may have traded
the interests of a grievant for some contract benefit which
could not be enjoyed by that individual. At the unit meeting
on August 8 she represented the proposed contract,
together with the results of the grievances, as a "package
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
deal," the implication being that acceptance of the results
of the grievance discussions was a condition to obtaining
the new contract terms for the employees. It is not clear
from the evidence of the negotiations dust why acceptance
of the contract aspect of the bargaining had to depend upon
acceptance of the grievance results. But in any case there is
insufficient evidence to establish that Bick ' s motives either
in April or August were improper. The events of the
previous November and December supporting an inference
of bad faith were too remote in point of time to warrant
such a finding as to her later representations By then the
circumstances were not comparable to those in Local 485,
International Union of Radio & Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, supra. Accordingly, the allegations of violations
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) based upon the handling of these
grievances should be dismissed.
9 Summary of conclusions
In sum I conclude that on November 24 and 25 Local 933
in the person of Patterson violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by numerous coercive interrogations of employees
regarding the steward's petition, by forcibly taking the
petition from employee Mosier, by instructing employees
not to circulate the petition, by making copies of the
petition for the employer's use, by inducing employees to
remove their names from the petition, and by interfering
with employees at a union meeting. He also violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act on November 25 by
suspending Mosier because of her union activity; Section
8(a)(1) on December 4 by threatening employee Krom that
she would be in serious trouble and the same as fired if she
failed to sign a statement regarding the suspension of
Mosier ; Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) on January 15 by
discharging Krom and Mosier for giving statements
relating to a matter on which a Board charge was pending;
and finally, during the period July 28 to August 5, Section
8(a)(1) by only recalling Krom on a conditional basis and
not reinstating her to her former permanent status because
she had engaged in concerted activity. With regard to Local
1, I conclude that in the person of Bick it violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) on December 8 by failing to process with
good faith Mosier's grievances, thereby causing Local 933
to continue in effect its discrimination against her.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Local 933 and Local I set forth in
Section III , above, occurring in connectia : with the
operations of Local 933 described in section 1, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 933 is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and activities affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act.
2. Local 933 and Local I are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All office clerical employees and janitors employed at
Local 933's Tibbs Avenue Indianapolis, Indiana, facility,
exclusive of all professional employees , guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective-bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Local I is the exclusive representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
5. By conduct set forth in section III, above , which has
been found to constitute unfair labor practices, Local 933
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and
discriminated against employees to discourage membership
in a labor organization and because they gave testimony
under the Act, and thereby engaged and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1),
(3), and (4) of the Act, and Local I restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act and caused Local 933 as an employer
to discriminate against employees in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, and thereby engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices referred to in paragraph 5
above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that each Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of the Act, I recommend that
each cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
With regard to the suspension of Mosier on November 25,
1969, which I have found to be unlawful, I recommend that
Local 933 make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered
by reason of that discrimination in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum as set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and make its
records available to Board agents in connection with
compliance therewith . I make no similar recommendation
with respect to the discrimination against Mosier and Krom
on January 15, 1970, nor with regard to the discriminatory
aspects of the recall of Krom on July 28, 1970, because no
loss of earnings were involved . I further recommend that
Local 933 and Local I post appropriate notices. Since
neither Krom nor Mosier are in the Armed Forces, nor
likely to be, I have omitted from the recommended Order
and notices language complying with the Selective Service
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
LOCAL 933, UAW
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 4
ORDER
A. Respondent Local 933, United Automobile Aeros-
pace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees regarding their
union activities or desires or regarding other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
(b) Taking from employees against their will petitions or
other documents concerning their union activities or other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
(c) Making copies for its own use of petitions or
documents concerning union activity or other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection of its employees.
(d) Inducing its employees to remove their names from
union petitions or petitions circulated for employees'
mutual aid or protection.
(e) Instructing employees not to circulate petitions
concerning union affairs or other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection of employees.
(f) Interfering with employees at union meetings.
(g) Threatening employees with serious trouble or
discharge or other adverse consequences for refusing to
sign statements regarding events at a union meeting.
(h) Discriminating against employees in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment because of their concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
(i) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
0) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees because they gave testimony under the Act.
(k) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities.
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes
5 In the event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
239
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Marilyn Mosier whole for any loss of earnings
she may have suffered as a result of discrimination against
her on November 25, 1969 , in the manner set forth in the
section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Post at its office in Indianapolis , Indiana copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix A."5 Copies of the
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 25 , after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative , shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places , including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.6
B. Respondent Local 1, Office and Professional Em-
ployees International Union , AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,
and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act by failing or refusing
to handle their grievances because of their opposition to
incumbent union representatives , or their efforts to become
union representatives or their participation in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
(b) Causing or attempting to cause Local 933, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America (UAW) to discriminate against Marilyn
Mosier in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees of Local 933, United Automobile , Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of they
Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its office and meeting hall copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix B.117 Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 25 , shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative , be posted by Respondent thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
6 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in wasting , within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps said Respondent has taken to
comply herewith "
I In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to lost as a result of her suspension on November 25, 1969,
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, in 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.8
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaints herein be
dismissed insofar as they allege violations of the Act not
specifically found.
8 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 2r, -days
from the date of this Order, what steps said Respondent has taken to
comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a
trial, that we violated Federal Law by interrogating our
office employees about their union activities, by taking a
union petition from an employee against her will, by
making copies of it for our own use, by inducing our
employees to remove their names from the petition, by
instructing them not to circulate such petitions, by
interfering with our employees at their union meeting, by
threatening an employee with serious trouble or discharge
for refusing to sign a statement regarding events at her
union meeting, and by discriminating against employees
because of their union activity and other concerted activity,
and because they gave testimony under the National Labor
Relations Act:
WE WILL NOT question our employees regarding their
union activities.
WE WILL NOT take union petitions or documents
from our employees against their will.
WE WILL NOT make copies for our own use of union
petitions.
WE WILL NOT induce our employees to remove their
names from union petitions.
WE WILL NOT instruct our employees not to circulate
union petitions.
WE WILL NOT interfere with our employees at union
meetings.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with serious
trouble or with discharge for refusing to sign statements
regarding events at union meetings.
WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against
employees for engaging in union activities or other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or for
giving testimony under the Act.
WE WILL pay Marilyn Mosier for the earnings she
plus 6 percent interest.
Dated By
LOCAL 933, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE
AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA (UAW)
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 614
ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a
trial, that we violated Federal Law by failing to handle
certain grievances in good faith and in so doing caused an
employer to discriminate against an employee:
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse in good faith to process
employee grievances.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Local 933,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (UAW) to discriminate
against Marilyn Mosier contrary to the National Labor
Relations Act.
LOCAL 1, OFFICE AND
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 614
ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis,
Indiana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.