Local 600, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 21, 2019

07-CB-221096 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 21, 2019)

JD–20–19
Detroit, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
LOCAL 600, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA
(UAW), AFL -CIO
and Case No. 07-CB- 221096
LLOYD STONER, an Individual Charging Party
Kelly A. Temple, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Glenn M. Taubman and Alyssa Hazelwood, Esqs.,
(National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation),
Springfield, VA, for the Charging Party.
James R. Andary, Esq. (Andary Law Group),
Mt. Clemens, MI.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Detroit,
Michigan on January 7, 2019. The Charging Party, Lloyd Stoner, alleges that Local 600, United
Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO
(Local 600 or Respondent) violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act)1 on March 12, 20182 by: (1) unfairly and arbitrarily failing and refusing
to represent Stoner; and (2) attempting to cause and causing Ford Motor Company (Ford) to
continue to deduct dues from Stoner’s wages and remit those monies to Local 600
notwithstanding the absence of an employee authorization for the deductions and remittances.3
Local 600 denies the allegations and asserts that the approximate two month delay in finalizing
Stoner’s dues check-off revocation and accepting his membership resignation did not establish a
refusal to represent Stoner in a fair and impartial manner. Local 600 asserts that administrative
oversight or mere negligence, and not a lack of good faith, caused the delay.

1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
2 All dates are in 2018 unless otherwise indicated.
3 The complaint allegations in Case 07-CA-221045 against Ford Motor Company were severed from
Case 07-CA-221096 and Case 07-CA-221045 was withdrawn on January 7, 2019.
JD–20–19
2
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Charging Party and Respondent, I make
the following5
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
10
Ford, a corporation, is engaged in the manufacture, nonretail sale, and distribution of
automobiles and other automotive products at its facility in Dearborn, Michigan, from where it
annually sells, and ships goods valued more than $50,000 directly to points outside the State of
Michigan. Accordingly, I find that Ford is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and Local 600 is a labor organization within the 15
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Ford-Local 600 CBA20
Local 600 represents and services approximately 47 bargaining units in Michigan. The
following employees employed by Ford at its truck plant located at 3001 Miller Road in Dearborn,
Michigan are exclusively represented by Local 600 pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act and constitute
one of those units, which is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the 25
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full -time and regular part-time employees employed by [Ford] in the classifications
described in Article 1, of the current collective-bargaining agreement between the [Ford]
and the International Union.30
Ford’s recognition of Local 600 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the unit has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of
which is effective from November 23, 2015 to September 14, 2019. In pertinent part, Article 3
of the CBA provides for the periodic withholding of union membership dues and initiation fees 35
for employees who authorize such withholdings by Ford and provides for the twice-monthly
remittance of those monies to Local 600. During the term of the CBA, Ford has fulfilled its
obligations under Article 3 by withholding union membership dues and initiation fees from unit
employees’ wages and remitted them to Local 600.
A unit employee may resign membership from Local 600 by sending a signed letter to its 40
financial secretary, Mark DePaoli. Upon receipt of such a letter, DePaoli customarily sent a
letter notifying Ford’s human resources manager at the Dearborn facility to cease deducting dues
from the employee’s wages.4

4 Local 600’s bylaws state that “resignation or termination of [union] membership shall not relieve [a
JD–20–19
3
B. Stoner’s Membership in Local 600
Stoner, a materials handler, began his employment with Ford on or about January 26,
1994. At that time, he also joined Local 600 and executed a dues check-off authorization form
directing Ford to deduct membership dues from his wages and remit them to the Union:5
I hereby assign to that Local Union of the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), designated by the
International Union to the Company, in writing, as having jurisdiction over the Unit
where I am employed, from any wages earned or to be earned by me as your employee, 10
or for any Regular Supplemental Unemployment Benefits to be paid to me, such amount
as may be in effect, from time to time, during the effective period of this assignment and
authorization, and due from me to the Union as my monthly membership dues in said
Union, and (if owing by me) any initiation fee. I authorize and direct you or the Trustee
of the Ford – UAW Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan Fund to deduct such 15
amounts from my pay or from any Regular Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
payable to me during each calendar month in accordance with arrangements as may be
agreed to between the Company and the Union, and to remit the same to the above local
union.
20
This assignment and authorization may be revoked by me only at the times and in the
manner hereinafter provided. I may revoke this assignment as of any anniversary date
hereof by written notice, signed by me, of such revocation received by the Company by
registered mail, return receipt requested, not more than twenty (20) days and not less than
ten (10) days before any such anniversary date. I may also revoke this assignment by 25
written notice, signed by me, of such revocation received by the Company by registered
mail, return receipt requested, at any time when there is not in effect between the
Company and the Union an agreement that the Company will check off membership dues
on behalf of the Union.
30
In February, Stoner decided to resign from Local 600. As a prelude to resignation, he left
several voicemail messages for DePaoli requesting a copy of his dues check-off authorization
card. DePaoli returned Stoner’s call around the end of February or beginning of March. On
March 5, DePaoli emailed Stoner a copy of his dues check-off authorization card.
35
C. Stoner Resigns from Local 600 and Revokes Dues Authorization
On March 9, Stoner notified Ford and Local 600 by certified mail, return receipt
requested, that he was resigning from the Union, “effective immediately” and revoking his dues
check-off authorization. In his letter, Stoner stated in pertinent part:

member from the obligations arising from [a] check off obligation.” (Jt. Exh. 1). In addition, Appendix A
of the CBA states that an employee may only revoke dues check-off authorization during a specified
window at the anniversary of the employee’s dues checkoff authorization. (Jt. Exh. 3.) However, it is
undisputed that these time restrictions were not applied during the relevant period, presumably because of
Michigan’s right-to-work law. (Tr. 49, 59-60.)
JD–20–19
4
Since I have resigned my membership in the union, you must immediately cease
enforcing the dues check-off authorization agreement that I signed. That check-off
authorization is hereby revoked. I signed that check-off authorization solely in
conjunction with, and in contemplation of, my becoming a member of the union; and, as
such, it is no longer valid.5
Stoner also requested that the parties promptly inform him in writing if they refused to
accept his union membership resignation and dues check-off revocation and to state the reasons
for such refusal.
DePaoli received Stoner’s letter on March 12 but did not respond in writing to Stoner. In
instances where employees sought to revoke their dues authorizations, he customarily drafted an 10
instructive letter to Ford’s human resources manager to cease deducting union dues from
Stoner’s paycheck and forwarded it to his assistant for printing on letterhead. In this case,
however, DePaoli drafted a letter but did not email it to his assistant for printing. Nor did he
otherwise notify Ford about Stoner’s resignation and revocation.5
15
On March 19, Ford sent a letter to Stoner stating that because his revocation was not
received within the time frame and in the manner specified in the CBA, the automatic dues
check-off would continue until Stoner complied with the requirements of Appendix A of the
CBA. Subsequently, on March 26 and continuing into June, Ford continued to deduct money
from Stoner’s wages and remitted those funds to Local 600 notwithstanding the lack of an 20
employee authorization for the deductions and remittance. Local 600 continued accepting the
dues that Ford continued deducting from Stoner’s paycheck for the remainder of March, all of
April and May and part of June.
On May 29, Stoner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor 25
Relations Board (the Board). On June 1, Local 600 notified Ford in writing that Stoner exercised
his rights under Michigan’s Right to Work law and terminated his membership. It directed Ford
to immediately cease deducting union dues from Stoner’s pay. Despite Local 600’s letter to
Ford, Stoner still did not receive any correspondence from Local 600.6
30
After the filing of the unfair labor practice charge, dues continued to be deducted from
Stoner’s paychecks on June 4 and 8 and accepted by Local 600. At some point after June 8,
Local 600 ceased accepting dues deducted from Stoner’s wages, but continued to retain the
amounts previously deducted and accepted from his wages.7
35
On August 16, in response to the unfair labor practice charges, DePaoli finally provided
Stoner with an explanation for the delay in processing his resignation:

5 DePaoli’s testimony that he forwarded a draft to his secretary for printing on letterhead was not
credible. Although evidence of the computer properties of a drafted letter was received in evidence, there
was no evidence of an email to his secretary like the one he issued on June 1. (Tr. 58, 62, 65, 73-74; R.
Exh. G- I.)
6 R. Exh. O.
7 DePaoli provided a vague and less than credible explanation attributing the delay in responding to
Stoner’s resignation to various union activities and staffing issues. (Tr. 58-67, 72-75; R. Exh. I, L.)
JD–20–19
5
Based on your recent charges filed through the NLRB, it appears that Ford Motor
Company is still deducting union dues from your wages. Unfortunately, we have to wait
for the company to send us a report of all the dues deducted each month, and currently we
only have records through June. If you had contacted me, as you did so many times in the
past when you wanted a copy of your dues check off authorization card, I could've 5
resolved the issue just by getting copies of your check stubs that show the amount of dues
deducted, and I could've reimbursed you within a week. This current process takes much
longer. Here is what our records show and what I am authorized to reimburse at this
time: April - $75.25 May - $75.25 June - $66.75 TOTAL - $217.25 Should Ford
Motor Company deduct any further dues, you can contact me for prompt reimbursement, 10
or you can continue to contact the NLRB and they will let me know.
A check for $217.25, the amount referenced in the letter, was enclosed. However, the
amount deducted from Stoner’s pay after he resigned from Local 600 in March and continuing
through June was $247.35.815
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The complaint alleges that Local 600’s unlawful failure to acknowledge and process
Stoner’s union membership resignation and dues check-off authorization revocation coerced20
Stoner and breached its duty of fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act;
additionally, as a result of Local 600’s failure to act, Stoner’s employer, Ford, discriminated
against him by continuing to classify him as a union member in violation of Section 8(b)(2).
Local 600 denies the allegations and asserts that the delay in honoring Stoner’s resignation from
Local 600 and revocation of his check-off authorization was attributable to excusable neglect 25
and/or Ford’s failure to honor the resignation and revocation.
I. THE SECTION 8(B)(1)(A) CHARGE
A. Stoner’s Resignation and Revocation30
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, including their right
to refrain from engaging in concerted activities. As such, it is well-settled that employees have
an absolute right to resign their membership in a union at any time, and that it is unlawful for a 35
union to restrict this right. E.g., Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 (1985) (“by
allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose
views come to diverge from those of his union.”). Union members also have a statutory right to
revoke authorization for their employer to deduct union dues from their paycheck (dues check-
off authorization) at least once a year. Atlanta Printing Specialties, 215 NLRB 237, 237 (1974) 40
(holding that Section 302(c)(4) guarantees to an employee who signs a check-off authorization
the right to “a chance at least once a year to revoke his authorization.”).

8 This finding is based on Stoner’s credible and undisputed testimony and the amounts deducted from
the pay stubs. (Tr. 32, 39-40; GC Exh. 8-12, 14-15.)
JD–20–19
6
When language in a dues check-off authorization indicates that the dues being deducted
are “membership dues,” the presumption is that a resignation from union membership is also a
revocation of dues checkoff authorization. Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2008,
AFL-CIO (Lockheed Space Operations Company, Inc.), 302 NLRB 322, 328 (1991). That
presumption holds unless there is explicit language within the check-off authorization clearly 5
setting forth an obligation to pay dues even in the absence of membership. Id. at 329 (“explicit
language within the checkoff authorization clearly setting forth an obligation to pay dues even in
the absence of union membership will be required to establish that the employee has bound
himself or herself to pay the dues even after resignation of membership.”). Lockheed’s
presumption that dues check-off does not survive a resignation from membership is premised on 10
the understanding that an irrevocable dues check-off authorization constitutes a waiver of an
important statutory right—the right to refrain from supporting a union—and “clear and
unmistakable language” is needed for the waiver of such rights. Id. at 328 (“we will require clear
and unmistakable language waiving the right to refrain from assisting a union, just as we require
such evidence of waiver with regard to other statutory rights.”).15
Here, the language of Stoner’s dues check-off authorization states that he assigned Local
600 “such amount . . . due for me to the Union as my monthly membership dues in said Union.”
This language is like that of the check-off authorization in Lockheed, where the Board found that
the employee’s resignation from union membership was also a revocation of his dues check-off 20
authorization.
Local 600’s Bylaws, specifically Article 6, Section 17, states that “resignation or
termination of (union) membership shall not relieve (a member) from the obligations arising
from (a) check off obligation.” However, this language is not found within the dues check-off 25
authorization itself and is not the sort of clear waiver of a statutory right by the employee that
Lockheed demands. See id. at 323 (holding that a waiver requires “explicit language within the
checkoff authorization.” (emphasis added). Even if the language in Local 600’s bylaws could be
construed to limit Stoner’s right to revoke his dues check-off authorization, at no point did Local
600 raise this argument, nor did it contest the claim that Stoner revoked his dues checkoff 30
authorization. In addition, Local 600 never disputed the assertion made in Stoner’s resignation
letter that he authorized a dues check-off solely in conjunction with his becoming a union
member. Accordingly, Stoner effectively resigned both his membership in Local 600 and made
a valid dues check-off revocation. The only question remaining is whether Local 600’s failure to
respond to this joint resignation and revocation constitutes an unfair labor practice.35
B. The Delay in Acknowledging and Processing Stoner’s Resignation and Revocation
Failing to timely honor an employee’s request to resign and revoke an authorization to
deduct union dues from his or her paycheck restrains the employee’s right to refrain from 40
concerted activity and is thus a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). E.g., Affiliated Food Stores, 303
NLRB 40, 45 (1991) (finding that a union’s 10-week delay in processing an employee’s
revocation of dues deduction and resignation from the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)). This
is true even when the union’s delay is unintentional—for example, due to a clerical error.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 385 (Walt Disney), 366 NLRB No. 96, slip op. at 45
2, fn. 4 (2018) (holding that a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to timely revoke a
dues check-off because the employee’s revocation letter was misfiled).
JD–20–19
7
Local 600 asserts that its delay in processing Stoner’s dues check-off revocation was due
to administrative error. DePaoli drafted a letter to Ford on March 12 instructing it to stop
deducting dues from Stoner’s paycheck. However, he took no further action. In contrast to
evidence of his practice in emailing his draft to his assistant on June 1, so he or she could print it 5
out on Local 600 letterhead, there was no evidence that he emailed his March 12 draft to the
assistant for printing. Even if DePaoli’s failure to further process Stoner’s resignation and
revocation request was inadvertent, Walt Disney established that a clerical error is no defense to
a Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation. A union may not shield itself from responsibility simply because
it lacked ill intent because intent is not a required element of an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. The fact 10
that the evidence failed to establish, as Local 600 puts it, “a pattern of behavior on the part of
[Local 600] to willfully ignore [Stoner’s] request” does not negate the fact that Local 600’s
inaction or delay amounted to a restraint on Stoner’s Section 7 right to refrain from union
affiliation.
15
Local 600 also seeks to deflect blame to Ford, arguing that because Ford handled payroll,
it has sole responsibility for effecting dues check-off revocations. For the reasons previously
stated, however, Local 600 failed to fulfill its initial part of the process which requires that it
notify Ford of the resignation and dues check-off revocation from Stoner. In Walt Disney, the
union and employer followed a similar process—the union, upon receipt of a written employee 20
request to revoke dues checkoff, would send an email to the employer’s payroll office. 366
NLRB at fn. 4. The union in Walt Disney was not able to hide behind the employer to shield
itself from responsibility. Local 600, which uses a similar process for dues checkoff revocation,
cannot do so either.
25
Also, like the union’s transgression in Walt Disney, Local 600 delayed processing of
Stoner’s until resignation and revocation until after he filed an unfair labor practice charge –
about two and one-half months later. Local 600 then delayed three additional months before
partially reimbursing Stoner for dues deducted from his wages after Local 600 received his
resignation and revocation notification. At that time, instead of apologizing for its gross 30
inaction, Local 600 excoriated Stoner for exercising his Section 7 rights by filing charges and
seeking remedial action under the Act.9
Under the circumstances, Local 600’s delay in acknowledging and processing Stoner’s
membership resignation and dues revocation violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act because 35
Stoner, after having revoked his authorization for dues check-off, received paychecks in which
union dues were deducted. At that point, funds which belonged to Stoner were used to support
Local 600 against his wishes and, thus, he was coerced in his right to refrain from supporting the
union. See, e.g., Lockheed, 302 NLRB at 330 (“by continuing to collect . . . regular dues from
(employee’s) wages after he communicated his intent to resign membership and revoke 40
authorization, the [union] is treating him as if he is still a member of [the union] or has agreed to
pay dues even when not a member.”).

9 Unsurprisingly, Local 600 does not argue that DePaoli’s August 16 letter lawfully repudiated its
unlawful conduct under Passavant Memorial Hospital, 237 NLRB 138, 138 (1978).
JD–20–19
8
In addition, Local 600 breached its duty of fair representation in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) by intentionally ignoring Stoner's resignation and revocation requests for over two
and one-half months, and by responding reproachfully after learning that he had filed this unfair
labor practice charge. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (union breaches this duty
when its conduct toward a member is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”).10 See also5
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998) (“the duty of fair representation requires
a union to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty…”) (internal quotation omitted).
II. THE SECTION 8(B)(2) CHARGE10
Where a union causes an employer to take action that would constitute unlawful
discrimination under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, it commits a Section 8(b)(2) violation. See Int’l
Woodworkers of America, 304 NLRB 100, 101 (1991) (holding that for there to be an 8(b)(2)
violation, there must be some affirmative act by the union that caused the employer to continue 15
to deduct dues from an employee). Specifically, continuing to accept dues from an employer
after an employee revokes a dues check-off authorization can be a Section 8(a)(2) violation.
Newport News, 253 NLRB 721, 726 (1980) (union violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by causing
employer to continue to remit the dues of employees who revoked their dues check-off
authorizations and then receiving and retaining their dues); NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties, 20
523 F.2d 783, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1975) (a union violates Section 8(b)(2) by causing employer to
deduct and remit dues after valid dues revocation by the employee). Cf. NLRB v. Local 50,
American Bakery and Confectionary, 339 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1964) (a union does not violate
8(b)(2) unless the discrimination it seeks would constitute a violation of 8(a)(3) if done by the
employer of its own volition); NLRB v. Local 776, IATSE (Film Editors), 303 F.2d 513, 516 (9th 25
Cir. 1962) (finding that if an employer’s act does not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(3),
then a union would not be guilty of an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(2)).
A Section 8(b)(2) violation also requires a showing of intent, on the part of the union, to
cause the employer to discriminate. Plumbers Local 447, 172 NLRB 128 (1968) (finding it 30
relevant to the 8(b)(2) inquiry that a union’s object in picketing was to protest the use of
nonunion employees). See also Northern California Chapter, Associated General Contractors of
America, 119 NLRB 1026, 1029 (1957) (finding a violation where a union’s strike against an
employer was intended to cause the termination of non-union employees) (emphasis added);
Typographical Union No. 2, 189 NLRB 829, 829-30 (1971) (finding no 8(b)(2) violation where 35
the union, in interfering with an employee’s employment interests, was motivated by the
employee’s misappropriation of union funds, rather than a desire to coerce union membership).
The overwhelming evidence establishes that Local 600’s inaction effectively caused Ford
to discriminatorily deduct dues from Stoner’s pay. DePaoli’s practice in similar circumstances 40
was to draft a letter to Ford notifying it of the employee’s resignation from the union and the
dues revocation and then forward the draft to his assistant for printing on letterhead. In this

10 The Charging Party argued that a duty of fair representation analysis is inappropriate in this case
because the Board majority in Walt Disney commented that such inquiry was “unnecessary” in that case.
366 NLRB at 2 n.4. The facts in that case, however, involving numerous discriminatees and different
responses by the union and employer, are not entirely like those in this controversy.
JD–20–19
9
instance, however, his failure to process Stoner’s resignation and revocation for over two months
was more than mere negligence.
DePaoli’s actions in this instance, however, lead to the reasonable inference that he
drafted the applicable notification to Ford and then decided to sit on it for a while. Under the 5
circumstances, DePaoli knew or should have known that his inaction would cause Ford to
discriminate against Stoner’s Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
causing the company to continue to deduct union dues from Stoner’s wages. Such knowledge on
DePaoli’s part constituted the requisite intent necessary for a Section 8(b)(2) violation.
10
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Local 600, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. 15
2. Ford Motor Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. By failing or refusing to promptly honor Stoner’s request to resign his union 20
membership and revoke his dues check-off authorizations, Local 600 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act.
4. By attempting to cause and causing Stoner’s employer, Ford, to continue to deduct
dues from his wages and remit such dues to Local 600 notwithstanding the absence of employee 25
authorization for the deductions and remittances, Local 600 violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor violations affected commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
30
REMEDY
Having found that Local 600 has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. Local 600 will be ordered to honor the resignation from union membership 35
request and dues check-off authorization revocation request of Lloyd Stoner and reimburse him
for the union dues deducted from his wages and remitted to Local 600 for the time during which
Local 600 failed to timely honor his dues check-off authorization revocation request.
Accordingly, Local 600 should be required to pay interest owed to Stoner based on the delay in
receiving his dues refunds since March 12, 2018, the date of his revocation request,40
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended11

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–20–19
10
ORDER
The Respondent, Local 600, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO (the Union), Dearborn, Michigan, its officers, agents, 5
and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to honor employees’ requests to resign from membership in the 10
Respondent.
(b) Accepting dues deducted and remitted from employees’ pay in the absence of an
authorization for the deductions and remittances.
15
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing member employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
20
(a) Accept or acknowledge the effectiveness of employee Lloyd Stoner’s resignation of
Union membership since on or about March 12, 2018.
(b) Make whole Lloyd Stoner for any monetary loss, with interest, that he may have
suffered because of our acceptance of dues deducted and remitted to the Union in the absence of 25
an authorization for the deductions and remittance since on or about March 12, 2018. (c)
Reimburse Stoner for the dues deducted from his wages and remitted to the Respondent since
March 12, 2018, with interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional30
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
35
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Dearborn, Michigan facility
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees and members are 40
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–20–19
11
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In addition, within 14 days after service by the
Region, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the signed notice
to all its members who have been represented by the Respondent during their employment with 5
Ford Motor Company at its Dearborn, Michigan facilities since March 12, 2018.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver to the Regional Director for
Region 7 signed copies of the notice enough for posting by Ford Motor Company at its
Dearborn, Michigan facilities, if they wish, in all places where notices to employees are 10
customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region
7 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.15
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 21, 2019
20
_________________________________
Michael A. Rosas
Administrative Law Judge25
~.~~ /~ ~-
JD–20–19
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to honor your requests to resign your union membership.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to honor your timely requests to revoke your dues checkoff
authorizations, and WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to respond in any manner to your untimely
requests to revoke your dues checkoff authorizations.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL honor the request of Lloyd Stoner to resign from membership.
WE WILL reimburse Lloyd Stoner the dues deducted from his wages and remitted to us since
March 12, 2018, with interest.
Local 600, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
AFL-CIO
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Room 300, Detroit, MI 48226-2543
(313) 226-3200, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
JD–20–19
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CB-221096 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (616) 930-9165.